Episode 24 – Key Events in the Evolution of Swat and CNT

Jon Becker: My guest today is a true legend who is one of only three people to have served at all of the ranks in LAPD D-Platoon, Chief Mike Albanese. Mike has spent 52 years in law enforcement with 37 of those spent at LAPD, 26 of which were spent in SWAT and crisis negotiation.

Mike is one of only a handful of people to have ever served in the 10 David, or SWAT commander role at LAPD. Since retiring from LAPD, he has served as a captain, deputy chief and is currently the chief of police for the Burbank, California Police Department.

This is the first episode of a two part series where we walk through not only his amazing career at LAPD, but the evolution of history, of special tactics, creation of crisis negotiation as a discipline, and many of the historic events Mike participated in.

My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

Mike, thanks so much for doing this!

Mike Albanese: My pleasure! Thank you for having me!

Jon Becker: So let's start with how your journey in law enforcement began.

Mike Albanese: So the journey began with LAPD in 1971. August 9th, 1971, when I started the academy, so got through the academy, went to a patrol division, West LA, was rotated to communications for six months and then went to 77th. And that's where I'm going to meet Mike Hillman. I'm going to meet Hillman Preciato, John Christensen. So I'm working a patrol and those guys ultimately are going to promote to sergeant and then I go to vice narcotics and I work for Jeff Rogers who was 10 David for about 13 years.

Jon Becker: David being at that, at that point, and still today, is the commander of LAPD Commander.

Mike Albanese: And for folks in the business, you all know what 10 David is – In LAPD world, there's only 110 David and there's a 110 David. But the 10 David at the time, that's associated with a name. So I worked for Jeff at 77 Vice and went to narcotics. Then ultimately I'm going to go to Metro. By then Jeff was back at Metro, made lieutenant and then McCarthy's there. And ultimately Christensen, Priscilla and that group, that era of SWAT supervisors are going to be in D teams.

So I think it went to the D team in February or March of 1979. So when you look at the history of SWAT, it still was relatively new to law enforcement as far as the model, and it was still evolving. Certainly the C and T process, which is going to be a crisis negotiation team, was only less than a handful of years old.

So kind of overwhelming to go from patrol, vice, narcotics, to a very specialized unit, because when you walk in the door, you know you're in a very special place as far as the folks that you're working with, as far as their understanding of a mission, the way they worked with each other, their physicality. So it was. I don't want to say cool, but it was just very cool just to be around them. And many were Vietnam vets. Some had other specialized skill sets. But what impressed me the most is how measured everyone was.

So a takeaway for leadership is measured, and it translates into tempo when we manage squat incidents, a crisis incident. So Mike Hillman was one of my supervisors, still kind of navigating what my role is going to be, where the interests were in SWAT. And he really encouraged me to get involved in the C and T process.

So just understand that I wanted to be a SWAT cop and not a negotiator. And he was trying to communicate to all of us that he was recruiting. It was the blending of verbal and physical tactics, and you get the best of both worlds. And he was so right on that. Because at a call up, if you're nothing on the entry team or on the perimeter, the two three corner is that you're on the phone, either as a primary or secondary or supporting that process, and you're really, really involved in the path to a solution during a crisis. That training has been the best training that I have ever experienced.

Now, it was 40 hours back then, and 40 hours turned into another 40 hours and 160 hours. And all this sort of training, you know, throughout. Throughout my career. But those are skill sets that I use every single day. Managing incidents, managing people, managing life, and best thing ever happened to me.

Jon Becker: Well, let's talk about that for a second, because CNT, I think, is very interesting. So at the point that you come into the unit, you start working CNT, it is a revolutionary concept right now. It is something that we accept as just. There are guru SWAT teams, have negotiators. We negotiate. But at the point that Hillman goes back to NYPD and meets with Harvey Schlossberg and comes back with this notion and kind of the idea that LAPD would do it differently than NYPD, to embed negotiators with the team. That is pretty revolutionary stuff.

So you, as you're coming into that, you're this. You're not even the second generation. You're part of the first generation of CNT as a concept, what was that like?

Mike Albanese: So you're absolutely right. So the notion you got to go back in time, in history. So sixties, seventies, civil unrest, you had terrorism acts of, globally, you had prison riots, you had hijacking, you had some really provocative and violent events. And then you're going to introduce this conceptual model, this notion that you're going to actually communicate with a criminal to encourage them to surrender.

So that was not embraced by law enforcement. It was not embraced by law enforcement, but it was embraced by your specialized units because they understood what the mission was. The mission was to introduce all, every resource, all the intellect that you had to get a favorable outcome. So it was embraced. It was guardedly embraced.

But as they had more successes or we had more successes, that it became an integral part of managing a crisis. The brilliance with Hillman was embedding the negotiation process into the tactical component. So as you've heard, the west coast east coast model and Schlossberg and Bowles did not like that reference, understandably, but it was brilliant.

And actually, I think it was Pat McKinley, because New York FBI was HNT hostage negotiation team. And I believe it was McKinley who said, these are not hostage situations. 98% of the time it's a crisis. So that's how it evolved to the CNT process.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's a barricade versus a hostage situation or some suicidal.

Mike Albanese: Suicidal that's doing something provocative and violence.

Jon Becker: Yeah, yeah, no, it's interesting. So I spent time with ESU, talked about this. I've done quite a bit of research on it. And it's, you know, I didn't realize at the time, early in my career, interacting with D-Platoon as all this was evolving. You didn't understand at the time how revolutionary it was and how it was really starting to something that now is just assumed. Like, it's the idea that a SWAT team would now show up and not negotiate is crazy.

Mike Albanese: So you're absolutely right. It changed managing a crisis situation. And I'll use Hillman's nomenclature as far as the blending of verbal and physical tactics, and that's what we do. So the introduction of words to influence the outcome of a crisis. And this is where words matter. So you have to be thoughtful as far as the words that you're using because you don't know what is going to trigger some type of harmful response.

So it's strategic and that's why that training was so important. And as important was debriefing afterwards. And we would tape record and then we would listen and assess what worked and what didn't work, where it would amp up a suspect or it would kind of calm them down. So each case is going to be unique with his own set of circumstances. But at least you had some, some guidelines as far as introducing words to influence to manipulate the outcome.

Jon Becker: It's funny because in talking with Mike Hillman, one of the things that struck me halfway through my conversation with Mike was, and same thing that strikes me now, at the time that you guys are doing this, there is no tactic or strategy that is taught. You are literally figuring this out. And every operation is informing the next operation. It is a constantly iterative process because it's new now you think, okay, you just go to C and T school. There wasn't a C and T school. You guys were inventing the C and T school as you went along in debriefing.

And it strikes me that one of the things we've lost now as lessons are passed down, is we've lost some of the essence of figuring it out in the way that you guys had to. And I'm wondering, how do we bring back some of that spirit of invention?

Mike Albanese: Well, let me just follow up to your observations. And you're absolutely right. They were developing the playbook as we.

Jon Becker: Were moving during the board.

Mike Albanese: Right. So the first 40 hours C and T class you had, certainly Hillman, I believe Bud Graves, you had doctor Marty Reiser, who was the first police psychologist in US law enforcement. And they collaborated together, Hillman and a couple other folks. And it could have been bud graves. And I think Becky, Dr. Becky Adelin was also involved in developing a curriculum that was new to everybody. Where do you start? You can't even give the history of C and T because there's really no history. You can talk about New York and the FBI, but there's not much. Not much there.

So that first 40 hours class was the beginning of classes for the future. That as far as the sophistication, if you look back to the seventies, to what we're presenting now, just vastly different.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Mike Albanese: But they started so what it speaks to and Bowles and Schlossberg get high marks, Harvey, for introducing this conceptual model. They're introducing words into a crisis. And again, it was not embraced by law enforcement, but he was spot on. And so we depend on folks to introduce or at least start the discussion as far as what we can bring into law enforcement so we can be more effective and efficient. I'll give you an example. Today it's a different example.

So you have the C and T process, you have SWAT, you have all that stuff. But today, like right now, and I just had the discussion yesterday with sergeants and my FTOs is technology is optimizing on technology. So folks of my generation are not that astute as it relates to technology, but these younger folks really are quick studies as far as technology and know how to optimize on technology. If we optimize on technology, introduce it into a crisis or service calls, and we have a good outcome, we done good.

So we need to law enforcement today stay with technology instead of chasing technology. So the analogy I use is that when I came on the job and Hillen and I, that generation said the same thing, they gave me six bullets and a wooden stick. There was nothing else. So I got a revolver with six bullets and a baton. You look at today's police officer as far as all the technology they have wrapped around their body, then they're going to get into a police car that was never designed to be a computer hub with routers, different radio systems where they have to put extra batteries in just for them to. For the vehicles to support all the other equipment that they have.

So what's my point? My point is that we depend on folks to kind of read a need and step up and present it.

Jon Becker: Well, it's interesting, though, because I think having been around this for 40 years, what. What was unique about the OGs, you know, the originating guys, all of you. You were presented with a novel problem. And as a result, we're constantly having to come up with novel solutions. And it's interesting because even today, talking to you this many years later, talking to Mike Hillman, talking to Ron McCarthy, you know, talking to Sid Heal before we lost him, you guys were. Are still constantly looking at how to reinvent it. It's this constant drive towards how can I make it better?

And I don't know whether that is the right guys lined up for the job or the job created a mindset. But it is fascinating to me that I can have an easier conversation with you or with Mike Hillman about, hey, implementing drones that I can with somebody from my own generation who is theoretically 20 years younger and shouldn't have. Shouldn't be as resistant to technology. Yet we are.

Mike Albanese: Yeah. So another astute observation on your part is that I think the problem solving aspect, working squat, is that you're always, always looking to see how you're going to manage or solve it. So you're always looking for solutions.

So I challenge myself in the organization. Is that what, what can we do to provide equipment training to our staff so they are the most effective and efficient police officers that are going to deliver the most professional police service to our community? And you just don't get to this point and stop you. It's a constant question quest to find the best.

So it's safer for our officers, it's safer for the community and it's what we do or should be doing.

Jon Becker: So which kind of continuing on the arc of your career. So you get there in 79, 1984. So Munich massacre happens in 72. The concept of hostage rescue becomes a thing. The genesis of virtually all the hostage rescue teams worldwide is in the next two to three years. D-Platoon already at that point is a full time unit. It happens just a year before Munich, but the 84 summer games are coming to LA. And what's your role at D-Platoon as the Olympics come to town?

Mike Albanese: So I was a police officer, actually I was a team leader in 84. So we, it started years prior to 84.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Mike Albanese: So the acquisition of equipment or at least the wish list. So that's where we went to the mp system, NP5. So that was, that was the weapon of that time. So there was transition going to mp5 and the 33s, so there was the acquisition of equipment and then there was the journey of training. And that's all we did. And a credit to Jeff Rogers, who was the ten David, the SWAT commander at the time, and McCarthy imprecation is that they were able to carve out and convince the command staff.

But we had an advocate and that's Darrell Francis Gateshead. And where they told him is that, lookit, we need a year to train. We have to exercise every possible scenario in the event of go back to Munich and law enforcement. The military did not expect that they weren't prepared. There was a lot of things where they fell short. We're not going to let it happen in Los Angeles. So you have our team, you have HRT is going to be introduced into law enforcement. So do we cross train with them? And we do. So there was a dozen of us that went back to the FBI academy and trained with their HRT team, so that in the event something happened and we had to collaborate all our resources.

We knew what we were doing together. We collaborated with SCB, you had the intel community that was important because what were the trends and themes? I mean, we're focused on what we believed that we would see. And the intel community may have had a different read and we needed to be prepared for that. There was integration with the bomb squad, cross training with the bomb squad, all of that. So it was a year, a solid year of training.

Jon Becker: And not only training with HRT, but training with Delta, training with the European units, GSG nine and SAS. And it's fascinating and it ultimately sets the tone for kind of special tactics worldwide. And I just recently interviewed Phil Hansen.

Mike Albanese: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And Phil talked about how all of the initial hostage rescue training shaped a mindset about movement that they then carried forward to drug houses and began to realize, like, you know, why. Why are we going through the house so fast? Because the root was all. I mean, the root of all SWAT was in hostage rescue. And it wasn't until the mission began to develop that the tactics began to develop. But you're present kind of for all that, right? I mean, it's – What's your recollection post 84 summer games with what's happening at D-Platoon?

Mike Albanese: Well, there. There is a lot. So post post olympics. So that was, that was a big deal. And I cannot overstate it because as far as being at the. Of height of readiness, we were at the height of readiness. All of us, without bravado, knew that we were ready in the event of.

So the good news is nothing happened. So then you have all these high end skill sets with all the extraordinary equipment. Then we had these rock houses that we were doing high risk warrants. And you know that probably for another time as far as the services of those warrants because it was crazy times there.

And then really we had to get really, really conversant with managing barricade incidents with or without hostages. So if you look at the hard numbers. So if we average 100 call ups a year, you got to ask yourself or ask this question, how many involved hostages? It's going to generally be less than five.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Mike Albanese: Okay. And then of that five, how many are stranger events? Zero? One?

Jon Becker: By stranger events you mean they take a stranger hostage.

Mike Albanese: Right. When they don't know each other, victim, suspect, don't know each other as opposed to.

Jon Becker: You know, father holds his kid captive.

Mike Albanese: Exactly. So the straight barricades are a challenge because you have a individual or individuals that are positioned in house, bathroom, under a house, in an attic, in a library, in a bathroom, wherever is it? How can we navigate that? How do we manage that? And with as less risk as possible to staff squad officers in the community?

And we got really good at that and we got better and better, you know, searching for suspects. You mentioned Sandy wall. I think we collaborated together on some addict search training because that was always a challenge. They had had some incidents where suspects were sequestered, an attic we had. And the limited technology. How do you clear an attic safely? Because at some point in time, someone's got to get in the attic. Someone's got to get in the attic. And that's one or two folks to clear the attic to make sure that the attic's clear.

So I believe that we got really good at that. And today, so I've been gone, you know, what, 14, 15 years, is that the skill sets of today's SWAT cop, I think their physicality, their fitness level is just over the top. I think their understanding of the mission is where it should be. They know how to incorporate technology and I think they work much smarter. They got there today based on the journey and the journey of a lot of folks that took some risk, exposed themselves. So that where we are today, they're in a really good place.

Jon Becker: I think one of the things though, so if you look at that time, shortly after the 84 summer games, the NTOA is created and, you know, it is, I think, difficult to overstate the role that specifically John and Janice Coleman, but also Mike Hillman and Phil Hansen talk to me about kind of the founding of the NTOA and the role you see that John played in this whole thing.

Mike Albanese: So it was significant. So when, in fact, I think I was in the first or second edition, I wasn't in there. I wrote an article, and it was kind of the big deal. It was a big deal for all of us because it was specific to what we did. Yeah, it was SWAT stuff. And, John. John recognized, took the lead on how essential this entity was for law enforcement. But it was even more important that the skill sets that we had in southern California, we believe that were at a high level were throughout US law enforcement. And that was the challenge.

So when the NTA was in – NTOA was introduced, it was an opportunity for Paducah, Kentucky, for Graham Rapids, Michigan to come to be with, in the, in the same room, the same training settings as other SWAT officers, Anchorage, Alaska. Those guys were great because they had different environmental issues that they had to deal with. So we could talk about tear gas and some of the stuff that we were doing. But they're talking about how do you rotate folks when it's 20 degrees below zero, and there's no guarantee that your gas is going to penetrate.

So it was an opportunity for all of us to get together and talk about what we did and not getting basic, but it was really like a fellowship, is that we were pretty confident that we knew what we were doing, but we were talking to some other folks, and I, we're going, okay, this is something we hadn't thought about. So we're all in that setting where we can really optimize on each other's experience, where we failed, where we fell short so that we could be much better moving forward.

Jon Becker: Well, I think today we would call that crowdsourcing. Right? That's kind of the term of the day, is, oh, they crowdsourced that to some degree. As you guys were trying to solve these problems, you were crowdsourcing it. That was the point of the NTOA, is it gave you access. If it gets really cold in LA, what do we do?

Well, we know guys in Anchorage, Alaska. Let's call them and ask them. We're dealing with stuff on the water. Well, we know guys in Florida. Let's ask them. And it just kind of, I think it did do things. It created a collaborative environment that allowed you to crowdsource the knowledge.

But then I also think, you know, it's like it took forever for the four minute mile to be broken, and the next time it was broken was like days later, because nobody believed it's possible to break four minute mile. And I think that what all of you were doing at this point is discovering what was possible and discovering, you know, what tactics worked and what didn't.

And it strikes me that, you know, I can remember getting my first full edition of the tactical edge, because when you advertise the tactical edge, you got the page your ad was on because it was an intelligence report, and John didn't share it with anybody that wasn't in the community. And I think I was the first civilian member of the NTOA, and I remember receiving the first official copy from John and being blown away by the level of discussion that took place in the magazine.

Mike Albanese: So is that June of 84, the original one? Is that where we had the June of 84?

Jon Becker: 84. Yeah.

Mike Albanese: So that was. I have that edition. Cause that was with the spy rig was on the COVID. I think so, yeah. And so I think it was either McCarthy or Jeff Rogers asked to do the article on Bomar. Cause that's post Bowmore. Bomar was 1983. That was a hostage taking incident.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Mike Albanese: So I wrote the article, my wife edited it. And it was really kind of challenging because you're writing, kind of writing an article for that community. I mean, how much – how do you do it? But once that started, and it speaks to NTOA and the opportunities as far as case studies that were showcased in the magazine and as far as equipment and everything else that was so groundbreaking at that time, and then the NTOA training that they provide and all the training tracks.

So when I was in D team the last couple of years, NTOA was actually in Los Angeles, and there was over 900 tactical officers throughout the world that participated in that training. So not only it was us, there was probably about six agencies to include Burbank that facilitated venues so that we, when I say we, the NTOA could provide marquee training for those folks and they keep coming back. So the training we know is good.

And again, it was groundbreaking at the time and just, just a great opportunity for folks in that community, the tactical community, the CNT community, to be together, talk about what we do.

Jon Becker: And 40 years later, that's still the role it's playing. So I think in that sense, the legacy of all you guys that invested early into NTOA and contributed to it is panned out better than we could have expected. Talking about kind of, you know, so as your career is advancing, you get to Metro at 79, you're an operator in 84. When do you become a sergeant?

Mike Albanese: So I became a sergeant in 88, but I came back to D team in 1990. So I'm going to work as a sergeant from like 90 to 98. So another eight, nine years as a sergeant, then have a two year hiatus, come back as the lieutenant or ten David. And that's how I'm getting into my career.

Jon Becker: So when did you come back as ten David?

Mike Albanese: 2000.

Jon Becker: So, okay, so it's interesting because you, you seem to be there when kind of all of the, you know, the marquee events, like if you go back and you're like, what's the, what's the history of special tactics? You can kind of look at Mike Albanese's career and, well, there, there were, there were others. Oh, yeah, for sure. But like, you just, you were there at the time that it was.

Mike Albanese: And really, it was just shitloading because I could have been on vacation, I could have been on a day off. And then you're right in the middle of whatever's going on.

Jon Becker: Well, so I think, I guess the next thing, post 84 games, I think the next major pivotal point was North Hollywood.

Mike Albanese: Well, yeah, from a tactical perspective, as far as the most notable cases, it's going to be OJ Simpson. Okay, so you look at 94, 97, 98. So 94, OJ Simpson 97, North Hollywood 98 is going to be Columbine. So the nineties really changed law enforcement. So with North Hollywood, North Hollywood, it was a game changer as far as how law enforcement, not D team law enforcement, is outfit Southern California. There was no rifles, there was no slug rounds. There was, there was, didn't have the equipment that other agencies already had.

So we were behind the curve. And I can tell you right now, McCarthy used to talk about that all the time, is that patrol officers should have rifles. And I'm thinking, really, Ron? And he was so right. I mean, he really got that. And then when you go to Columbine. Columbine, is that changed how law enforcement, not SWAT law enforcement, responded to unfolding events is that this notion that you will stop and wait for SWAT no longer mattered, is that you're going to get the guns and go, we're going to train you.

And actually our department, D team with training division, we trained the whole department on the active shooter training response, if you will. And that was a big deal. And so that within four years you had a lot of changes. The only reason I mentioned OJ Simpson, because what it speaks to is the use of negotiations in the midst of a crisis, the use of the tactical component to actually make a picket fence for us so that we could complete the negotiation process.

And the other odd thing that I still shake my head out is that, is that it was reversed. Typically negotiate from the outside. In here we were negotiating from the inside out. He's out in front in a car. We're on the inside as the C and T team. He's going to surrender inside to us. Very foreign, but it worked. But what it speaks to is how agile we can be. So kick that aside. North Hollywood. North Hollywood. I don't think I that anybody expected to see that type of criminal activity in a community.

So that community is right down the street in North Hollywood and at a bank of America. The violence, and it wasn't short lived, 48 minutes or however long it was, and it was violent. And the outcome speaks to courage, training, discipline, and just understanding what the mission is. Concluding that incident, which if you watch.

Jon Becker: The North Hollywood, like for anybody that's familiar with watching the North Hollywood video, those three, Donny, Rick and Steve, are the three that roll in in the flat top car and engage the suspect across the pickup truck and ultimately stop him.

Mike Albanese: So I always ask folks in training settings, how many rounds did that black and white take the metro black and white at the time, how many times did it get hit?

Jon Becker: I don't know.

Mike Albanese: Zero. Zero. Zero. So what it speaks to, and this is actually a great interview would be with the three of them because just on that one incident, its piece to Donnie Anderson just driving directly into the vortex of the threat goes just like they taught you to do, is you just limit the field of fire from the suspect drove right into it. And also Gomez is popping off round.

So for the suspect, Imazirano, was the suspect's name Emil Matsurano. You can see his body where it shakes like, okay, something just happened. Something just changed. We got some other folks here. And then the tactics of Massa getting on the ground. He can't see the suspects lies down and at least can grab, some of the, his heel, Achilles Tendon.

And then just how that was all coordinated. And I don't know if you know that, Donny, Donnie's magazine malfunctioned. And in the middle of this gun battle is Donnie's going, hey, I need a magazine. Rick's throwing a magazine and not know that. And everything is very, very measured and even afterwards, so.

But that was yet another sea change for law enforcement as far as how we managed those events. A proud day for LAPD, for sure, because the proud moment, certainly our folks. But it was how the patrol officers contained those suspects. I mean, they really did a great job of containing them. Folks ran Dryden. Folks are throwing magazines to each other just to keep them until more. More resources can get there.

Jon Becker: I think you talked about Columbine. Also, I think that there are certain events over time, Munich being one of them, North Holly being one of them, Colin being one of them, where it is so graphic and plays out in such a way that it brings that type of event to the public consciousness and demands a solution for that kind of problem.

We talked about Munich and how that was the evolution of SWAT teams. But patrol rifles come out of North Hollywood, patrol tactics come out of North Hollywood. North Hollywood combined with Columbine, then is the beginning of active shooter. And it kind of is this evolutionary process where we're looking at what SWAT is doing and trying to then use part of that skill set and spread it into other parts of the agency.

Mike Albanese: Absolutely. So there's some baseline training that can be shared with all there is. You're a police officer. You have skill sets. Let's spend the time and the money to elevate those skill sets. So if you're first on scene at a crisis, you know what to do. So Columbine was a huge sea change for law enforcement.

And then you look at all these other shooting events, active shooting events, and the other one is Uvalde changed how law enforcement responds. And there's an expectation, and you have to be mindful of that. The community expects that when we show up, we law enforcement show up, that we know what we're doing, that we're well staffed, well equipped, and that we will make it safe for them. And there are times where we are very good at it and times where we fall short.

To your point, as far as North Hollywood, the community was furious that we did not have the equipment that we needed to stop that behavior. Furious. It was 48 hours of celebration of their police department. Certainly we had, what, 460 plus officers that were there, absolutely celebrated, and. But they were also angry that we did not have the equipment to make it safe for the community.

Jon Becker: Oh, yeah. The outrage of officers having to go into B&B guns, that was closed.

Mike Albanese: That was closed. That was closed. So the irony this is way off topic is that the officer that went there, I think he ultimately got a rifle, but it was closed at the time because they opened at 10:00 and this was before 10:00 Jerry Fritz, who was a classmate of mine, Vietnam vet. So the watch commander recognized, okay, you got the skillset. At least you know how to use a rifle. Go to B&B, get a rifle, then he's able to get there. They're closed. They open. And I think if you listen to the radio, that you'll hear that he's on scene and deployable. But by then, I think we were on scene.

Jon Becker: It's interesting, though, because that became the narrative that then caused part of that community outrage. Right? That the police were having to go and borrow guns. Yes, I remember the outrage that people felt. So it's interesting how not a wholly accurate narrative actually kind of helped to shape the reaction to it, though.

Mike Albanese: It did. And I did not expect that fury, because we're just focused on what we were doing, what was needed. We didn't, at least, I didn't recognize or see it coming that there would be public opinion on all of this as far as where we're not supported, because that's typically not the case. We got tremendous support. When you get the mayor's office phone in metro and D team and say, I need a wish list within 24 hours, and I'm not going to say no, you know, there's going to be a good outcome.

Jon Becker: Yeah. That's a fantastic call for a salon team to get. Yeah, yeah, I love that!

Mike Albanese: Yeah.

Jon Becker: So, okay, so then talk to me. So you, between you get there in 90 as a sergeant, you're going to come back as ten David, in 2000, what had changed? By the time you came back, what had changed? How long were you gone?

Mike Albanese: Just two years. So really not much had changed. You're still scrambling for the noose equipment, more training time. So those bureaucratic issues were still going to be ever present. We did like 1234. The amount of calls were voluminous for us. One year we had 135 call ups and 136 warrant services.

Our CEO at the time was captain Rick Jacobs, who was one of the best guys I ever worked for, because he just, he just understood the mission. He understood that he had to move, make, put barriers in place so that we can do our job. So in other words, deal with the bureaucracy. And he came out to almost every call up. So it was just busy, busy times.

Jon Becker: So you get back in 2000, where is that relative to the loss of Louie?

Mike Albanese: Right, at 2000.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So he was March of 2000.

Mike Albanese: 2000.

Jon Becker: Were you ten David when that happened?

Mike Albanese: No, I was not 10 David. I came in, I think, in May of 2000. Just understand, Louie and I worked together in 77th. We were partners, we worked patrol together, we worked gangs together, and we worked vice together. And then one of our other partners, Steve Steer, who has actually worked more with Louie. So that was a gut check. And it was just a freak training accident, which speaks to training and having safety measures and safety officers don't blow that stuff off.

Jon Becker: Why don't we give context to it? Cause I'm sure some of the people are not familiar with it.

Mike Albanese: Sure, I'll let you.

Jon Becker: So March of 2018. March 18, I'm sorry, 2000. March 18, 2000. The D team is training at Camp Pendleton.

Mike Albanese: Camp Pendleton in the shooting house. They have several shooting houses there.

Jon Becker: And Louie is up on a catwalk, if I remember correctly?

Mike Albanese: So there was really no catwalk, it was more of a wall. And there was just kind of a small footing base. So there was no rails. So you can call it a catwalk, but it was like a path on walls to oversee entries and light fire.

Jon Becker: And loses his balance. Right? Tries to reach, to sit down.

Mike Albanese: So I was not there. He, I think, was either squatted or sitting on the wall. And they were doing kind of a group huddled debrief after a run. And when he went to stand up, he just literally fell off the wall. The way he landed was fatal. And so this is coming on over 23 years ago, and it was heartbreaking. Louis was a Vietnam vetted.

I believe he was a civil star winner, went to Vietnam twice. And in those days, it was not 3, 6 month tours, it was 12, 15 month tours. And he, in my opinion, was an American hero. And just the ending to his life was just heartbreaking. And that's the problem with life.

Jon Becker: Yeah. There is something extremely cruel and kind of ironic about somebody with that resume being killed in an accidental Bennett training.

Mike Albanese: Cruel is the right word, is just cruel. And it was incredulous to us, to me. And I was watch commander at 77th at the time. I didn't want to believe it. And for many of his partners, they were inconsolable. It just hurt so much. And for folks in the law enforcement community and family members that have a loss like that. The pain just never goes away. So that's just a freaking fact. And I've been in the business 52 years now, and it still hurts.

Jon Becker: How did that event, do you think, inform the way you, two months later you're coming in as Tim David? How did that inform the way you looked at that leadership, do you think? .

Mike Albanese: So I don't break down leadership. But it translates into leadership. Okay, what needs to be done? So when we're in a training environment, that we're in a safe training, so we can accomplish training. So what needs to be done in that environment, that setting, so that we can train, train at the highest level, ultimately, you're going to have 911, and 911 is going to be the sea change for all of us.

And for law enforcement, it was grant money that we got grant or funds for training and equipment. And that's when we were able to build our own standalone shooting house. And we designed it, we engineered it so that there were safety features in mind. Because be mindful of this. We're doing live fire. We're shooting ammunition. You have people moving in that environment. You have flashbangs, you have explosive entries. And how you can make it as safe as you can so you can get that training done.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I think it is. I had an experience with LAPD's bomb squad very early in my career. Sid Hale and I were building command initiated flashbangs, and Joe Powell was there with LAPD bomb. And Sid and I are putting these blasting caps together, and I look over my shoulder and Joe Powell and the entire bomb squad are hiding behind their suburbans. I said, Sid, stop. He said, what? I said, the bomb squad's hiding behind their suburbans. We're doing something wrong.

So I walked over to Joe and I said, hey, Joe, why are you hiding behind your car? And he goes, you guys are way too comfortable with explosives. And he said something that stuck with me, literally stuck with me to this day in my career. He said, if you are ever comfortable with something that can kill you or injure you, put it down. And it's so easy to become complacent with danger and with dangerous things that I think as leaders it's a challenge to constantly keep that in front of mind.

Mike Albanese: So I'll share flashbang story with you. And not a good one. So this is, I think, December 13th, 1984. High risk warrant. So post Olympics, that's why I was a little slow to talk about post Olympics. We were doing a lot of high risk warrants, dynamic entries, a lot of explosive breaches and the use of flashbangs. And the night before this incident, we hit a rock house. Did not have a violent encounter other than breaching windows, doors. To stop the suspects was challenging.

And my partner at the time, Steve Taylor, had thrown a flashbang and actually bounced across a suspect's back and his jacket got on fire and he's trying to put it out. And we ended up putting it out the very next night is that I deploy a bang that ends up in a fatality.

Jon Becker: Dolores Langford.

Mike Albanese: And that was another sea change for law enforcement. So that was the circumstances where it was on 48th Street, 748, 48th street, something like that. Breached it. And I was a team leader. We had the ground floor entry and I was going to deploy the flashbang. Then our team would go in as team leader. Then I would follow them. So there was suspect on the bed, suspect on the floor, very clear. We had announced, cleared. And I deliberately threw the bang over the bed to the wall and perfect placement.

So as we trail in, as they go by the bed, because the other two suspects are frozen down, I see a body and I, and it's like, where did she come from? And so I'm screaming at her, down, down, hands and all that stuff. And there's nothing, nothing. And so I pull her up, I throw her on the bed and her whole backside. And I'm looking at her African American woman and it's all white. Her old epidermal had blown off and died. So that kind of derailed the flow. But we were able to secure the house and everything.

And so there was, I'm not sure what the point of all of this is, but there was a couple learning opportunities. So one van Adder was the detective that investigated that use of deadly force. I was certain I was going to get terminated, was certain was going to a bad outcome. Darrell Francis Gates was the chief of police. There was a civil suit that had just a modest outcome.

Jon Becker: But Langford versus Gates, the seminal case on flashbangs in the United States.

Mike Albanese: Yeah. So there. But the bottom line was that when it was all over, after litigation and everything, there was a bit of a learning curve for me personally is that that was the first time I felt like I was on an island because it wasn't funny, but it was funny is my Jeff Rogers at that time goes, okay, who threw the bang?

Everybody goes, he did. He did. I'm going, guys, I would have told them. So it was like I was on an island. And I've been able to use that moment when other folks have had challenges during high profile incidents where, and I'll ask him and say, does it feel like you're on an island right now and that you're by yourself and there's not much support, let alone help coming? And it'll always be, that's exactly how I feel.

So I tell them, I empathize with you. I've been on that island. It's unpleasant, but you'll be okay. You're not going to believe it now, but you will. There is a process, it's a cumbersome process, but you'll be fine as long as you're grounded in that circumstance. The investigation, the DA's response, I think on page four, I was exonerated and it was going to be Gates's fault, but it was a learning curve for all of us. But it changed flashbangs. It changed the deployment of flashbangs. It changed that model of flashbang, that that military hand grenade simulator were gone the next day.

Jon Becker: M-116 A1.

Mike Albanese: Yep.

Jon Becker: Yep. You guys, you guys. It's interesting because Mike Hillman actually told me the story of the original M-116, a one that he brought back on an airplane from Delta and building flashbangs and taking them to Arleigh McCree, right. Really excited that he had done this amazing thing by taking a friction fuse out of a flashbang full of flash powder and gluing in a 201 a one fuse and then getting a lecture from Marley McCree about what a stupid plan that was and how he was never going to do it again.

Mike Albanese: Right.

Jon Becker: But yeah, I mean, that was when you look at the history of bangs, M-116 a one is the beginning of it. Langford versus Gates. That flashbang is where we start to go. Maybe bursting canisters designs is not the right idea because if it gets under somebody it's exactly what happens. And it wasn't just Langford.

There were several cases, Langford being the most high profile, but there were several cases where bangsa M-116 a one s the first american counterterrorism flashbang that was also bursting canister landed on somebody. And did you know in this case it landed between Langford and the wall if I remember correctly.

Mike Albanese: Right. You're right. Where I threw the flashbang was at the wall so it would drop. Did not know that she was there and her back and the wall with the bang between her. So all her body fluid acted as attenuated her and just shredded her.

Jon Becker: Yeah. But that is where the non bursting canister like the def tech number 25 flashbangs, those cases are the genesis of it.

Mike Albanese: Right. It changed the whole industry 100%. One incident because then you had McCree and his crew doing half loads. Yeah, half loads that weren't necessarily scientific. So, but it changed that equipment. And again, one incident and you had the FBI agent that was killed with the Bangdore. So I think those are the only two fatalities in initially.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because there were a number of things that were all occurring there. And that's right about the time that I started. I started ARK in 87 and that.

Mike Albanese: Was in December 13th, 1984. I want to know close to that.

Jon Becker: The first article I wrote for NTOA was a legal aspects of flashbang article and it was anchored in Langford versus gates. And the thing with Langford that I think Langford could have been the end of flashbangs because the proposal that they were making was to put flashbangs, the V100. And I think I figured there's one other tactic that they wanted to put under magistrate review. And ultimately Arleigh McCree is the expert that testifies in the case that the court cites to and cites to how LAPD had really thought about how flashbangs were made.

And ultimately they take the V100, but they leave flashbangs from not being under magistrate review. And that, that inflection point could have been the end of bangs because if it had gone that way, you probably would have then seen legislation to prohibit their use.

Mike Albanese: You're absolutely right. We were at least I was convinced that bangs were going to be out of our equipment opportunity, if you will. So the use of the V100 and I think the other was the explosive entries. But the V100 is that we had to have a judge sign off on that. And there was a lot of controversy because we had, we did so many high risk warrants, dynamic warrants, because of just the number of rock houses, the way that they were fortified, that it made it impossible to serve warrants.

So that was a unique time in LAPD law enforcement history. I don't know if other parts of the country were experiencing the same things that we were as far as fortification, but it was a sea change.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because there was this period of time where the solution to the police catching you with drugs was to turn your house into a castle and then destroy the drugs while the police were trying to get in. And the V100, for those that haven't seen the V100, it's kind of an early APC that had what my favorite rap song of all time, the batter ram describes as a ram, to literally at that point, you guys were having to deconstruct houses to get into them, taking walls out and tearing fortifications and gates and all kinds of stuff off. And there was that. There was a brief period of time where that was what everybody did.

But then you guys figured out how to overcome the fortifications. And so the plan changed. Right? Like all of special tactics is this, this tension between the evolution of a strategy and evolution of a counter strategy. And I think that that period of time was that, that pivotal point with fortification and rock houses and armor that I think is fascinating time.

Mike Albanese: It was interesting times. So. And then it just kind of went away.

Jon Becker: Yeah, well, stop working.

Mike Albanese: Yeah.

Jon Becker: If you think about like, there's a period of time in the eighties there, late seventies, early eighties, where if you were terrorist, you would take an airplane, seize a bunch of hostages, negotiate the surrender of your friends, demand a bunch of money, go to a foreign country and be let go.

And then all of a sudden you had Prince's gates, you had Teby, you had all these cases where you took hostages, and then a counterterrorism team came in and killed you. And all of a sudden that was no longer strategy you could employ. And I don't think that. I think that we still see that developing. I think we're actually kind of real time watching that with active shooter.

So, I mean, as the rock house era is coming to an end, we then go into the nineties, which we talked about, and then in 2000, you come back as ten David. I think another kind of seminal events of that time is the loss of Randy Simmons. Talk to me about that.

Mike Albanese: So, yeah, as we chatted about earlier, that was a very violent incident. It was a family annihilation incident. And during the effort to rescue family members, Randy was fatally shot. So personally, professionally, it was just devastating. We ultimately finished the mission after we secured the location.

What I vividly remember is all of us in a street just weeping. Just weeping. Stood down the team for five days because no one was in a place to work. And once we got through the funeral time with the family, it was time to go back to work. But it was – Everybody was traumatized. The debrief went for 8 hours, and it was very personal for everyone. And it was needed to be in the room together to talk about what, what we did. And that's one of those incidents that, you just never forget. I think about him, almost daily. It's the second worst day of my life. My mom died at a young age, and then randy's. Randy's death just was horrible.

Jon Becker: Yeah. How did it change the way…..

Mike Albanese: Let me just make a comment that I haven't shared that much is that we had just finished a call up a couple days, days before, and during the debrief, Randy said something really profound. And I'm sitting there and I'm going, randy, to myself, why are you saying that? And he goes, look at kind of my words is that this is a real fragile process. There's no guarantees.

And then you would go around the room and say it could happen to you, you or you on any given day, so you make sure you know what you're doing. And again, I'm going, Randy, you're scaring us. But that's how passionate he was and how he clearly understood the mission and that there's no guarantees.

When a tactical team shows up that has extraordinary training and equipment, there's no guarantee that you're going to have a good outcome. You look at all these high profile events and many don't have a good outcome. And I had offline had talked to you about Nashville, and the young officer that was the hall boss in that incident knew what he was doing, knew that he had to coordinate and communicate with his peers to get to the threat.

And he was, from my observations, much younger than some of the other officers, but he knew what his role was and look at the outcome. So there is no guarantees. There is absolutely no guarantees. So I derailed your question. Go ahead.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but then as, as ten David, like the. I can, I can only imagine how that, I mean, everybody obviously loved Randy. Randy was a ridiculously popular character. And, you know, again, like Louis, the cruelty of it is just, you know, insurmountable. But as, at that point, as Tim David, that has got to impact the way you feel about your job and the way you're looking at what the men that report to you are doing.

Mike Albanese: Well, I think it put it in perspective for all of us. We all knew, we've all had talked about it. I mean, this goes back to the seventies, is that we're going to be at risk. At some point in time, someone's going to get hurt. And up until that point, no one had been seriously hurt. There had been injuries. We had folks shot. We've had other, other injuries that changed their life circumstances, but nothing like this.

And since then, I think there's been at least a handful of incidents where we've had officers shot, SWAT officers shot. It's probably been more than a handful, now that I think about it. And it's going to happen. You're exposed. You're exposed. You're in a high risk situation. There's violence. It's fraught with violence, and you have behavior that is violent. And we are tasked with stopping the violence.

Jon Becker: And it's unpredictable. Right? They always say the suspect gets a vote, and sometimes his vote is not a rational one.

Mike Albanese: Absolutely. And that's. That's the other challenge. So it's the old what to fret about is that you don't know with certainty about your suspect or suspects that are involved in the incident. You don't know their emotional state, if there's mental health underpinnings, if there's a chemical influence, if there's alcohol, if there's drug or it's a combination of all of them. Like a very volatile domestic violence situation where, again, fraught with emotion under the influence. There's been a history of mental health and just a reckless behavior that really compromises officers. It really does, and we have seen it many times.

Jon Becker: I think that's a really good place for us to stop. Mike, thanks for doing this!

I'm looking forward to sitting down with you again in episode 2.