Sid Heal Part 1: The History of LASD - SEB

JON: My name is Jon Becker. For the past 4 decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units.

As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations. The goal of this Podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people. Welcome to The Debrief.

My guest today is Sid Heal. Sid is a legend in the special tactics' community, and a key figure in the history and the evolution of special tactics in the United States. Sid is a retired…five of the United States Marine Corps serving numerous combat deployments including the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and Operation United Shield in Somalia just to name a few.

Sid is a retired commander of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and has led the Special Enforcement Bureau, the Emergency Operations Bureau, and a wide variety of other assignments. Sid is the author of several books, and literally hundreds of articles. Sid has taught at the U.S. Army War College, is a former board member of the NTOA, is the former president of the California Association of Tactical Officers. Sid, thanks for joining me on The Debrief.

SID: Thanks for having me.

JON: So, why don't we start with where your career started. Let's start at the beginning and kind of, work our way forward to the present.

SID: Law enforcement career?

JON: Let's start with the Marine Corp.

SID: Marine Corps? I was 18. And in those days, the draft was going. I was one A. I was going to go at any time. Nobody would give you a good job. Nobody wanted to train you and have you leave. So, we were basically societal castoffs. And so, I joined the Marine Corps to keep from getting drafted. So…

JON: And then- How long after you joined the Marine Corps before you deployed to Vietnam?

SID: I went into the Marine Corps in February, and I was in Vietnam by August. So, and that includes a 20-day leave, 10 days of mess duty…

JON: Wow. And then how long were you- How many times did you go to Vietnam? And how long were you there?

SID: Two technically, I was only there on one deployment. But I got hit by friendly fire on April 5th, 1970. And so, I spent the rest of April and most of May in Guam Naval Hospital. And then they staged me back in Okinawa for about a week before I went back.

JON: And then you get back- You're done with the Marine, but not the Marine Corp service, you come back from Vietnam. When do you go into the sheriff's department?

SID: Oh, not 'til 1975.

JON: That's right, because there's interim there. Wasn't there?

SID: Yeah. Oh yeah. You could not have envisioned a scenario that would keep me in the Marine Corps one more day. But what happened was that, on the way to Vietnam I met the girl that I wanted to marry. And I knew that I wanted to go to college. And so, the G.I. Bill made that possible. So, when I came back, the 2 things that I knew that I wanted to do with my life was marry the girl that is still my wife, 37 years now, and go to college. And so, I got out of the Marine Corps. But when she had our oldest daughter, she couldn't work, and we couldn't make it on the G.I. Bill. And so, I joined the Marine Corps to stay in school.

They promised me that if I would come back in, in the reserves that they would guarantee me my bachelor's. Now interesting enough, I was a little bit more than skeptical, but they were absolutely truthful. I can't even tell you the number of things they did to help me stay in school. I'll just give you one that I thought was phenomenal. This particular unit that I joined was Angelical, and yet, you were required to be jumped qualified within 12 months of your billet assignment. And so, they sent me to jump school and when I would come back, I had to go to school. And they would- We'd have a jump, or they'd literally would send us all over the world.

I would just load up my pack-up with books, and land I was a corporal. And the first sergeant to said to me, "Hey Heal, come here." And I'd go over there, and he'd say, "It's time for you to study." And they'd send me off to one side, and I'd sit underneath a tree and study. They were absolutely serious. I mean, that's just one of the things that they did. The reason why I say jumping was significant for me was the fact that, my pack was so heavy that to keep stick integrity they usually make me stick leader because I fell the fastest. So…

JON: I love that! So then, ok so after that you go to college. You didn't start at Early County Sheriff's, right? You started-

SID: I started with the district attorney's office. It was kind of interesting. In those days I was a white male, I was not a high value recruit. And so, I tested for everyplace. I was accepted for Michigan State Police, which was my home of record which is where I had joined. But I had gotten married, bought a house, had a baby. And I got asked to join the L.A. Sheriff's Department and the L.A. District Attorney's Office. But the L.A. District Attorney's Office offered first, and I was in a position where I needed the "bird and the hand." And so, I did 2 years as an investigator. To be honest with you, I loved it.

Investigation was, I don't even know how to describe it. The only thing I could compare it to was either S.W.A.T. or patrol. But you literally would beat the suspect at their own games. So, I learned informants, and I learned interrogation, and putting the pieces together. In fact, I started the Sheriff's Academy because I had to go to another academy when they hired me with a post-certificate in investigation, a basic certificate. So, I have 2 post-basic certificates, one on investigation and one in general practice.

JON: So then, 2 years later you leave, and you go to L.A. County Sherriff's Department.

SID: John Van de Kamp became the D.A. and said that he did not need a police force, the Bureau of Investigations, they're all police officers. So, I was the low man of the totem pole, and I was going to be cast aside. And so, they ask me if I would do a Y-rate. I didn't even know what a Y-rate was. Basically, it's a demotion in lieu of layoff. But I had a baby. I couldn't go out and hope I can get it, a job that I want. So, I took the Y-rate. It went right to the bottom of the totem pole, except for seniority. And they sent me through the sheriff's academy again. So, I went through the real Hondo police academy the first time. So, I went back to the sheriff's department. And interestingly enough, 2 years later they called me to go back to the D.A.'s office. Well needless to say-

JON: That ship has sailed.

SID: That's right. It was gone.

JON: You had your chance at that one, thanks for calling. So, where was your first assignment? Walk me through your sheriff's career up until the point-

SID: Oh, I started with the jail. And it was interesting because there were a lot of opportunities in the jail. But I'm not an indoor person. I didn't realize how bad it affected me until I was actually inside day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year. I would do anything to be outside. Sometimes I'd literally have to check out just to go outside. I can see why people would be claustrophobic. I mean, it was that kind of a feeling. I've never been claustrophobic, but it was an anxiety, so I knew that I was not going to do well there. And to be honest with you, had I not gotten out, I would've left- It was that bad by the time, I had 3 years in, and I'd already decided that I was willing to start over rather than stay inside anymore.

So, I got selected to go to Firestone Station which was actually number one on the list. For 2 reasons, one, I really, really liked the people there. I'd done a ride-along there in the academy in the action. It was probably as close to TV as anything I was likely to see. And the second reason was it was the number one fastest way out of the jail, because there was a lot of people who didn't like that. So, I spent, let's see, last part of '79, '80, '81 and '82 at Firestone. Then I went to Industry. My name was on by that time, intent to promote to sergeant. Then they made me a sergeant, sent me to Crescenta Valley. And then I only had 22 months in grade when they asked me to take a test for the Special Enforcement Bureau.

I loved patrol and I was good at it. And they had asked me to go to SEB as a deputy. But I was having too much fun in patrol, and I really didn't want to start over again. But they asked me to go as a sergeant this time and so I did. And I spent, '84 to '89 there. And then they promoted me to lieutenant. And I spent 12 years as a lieutenant. And then I was actually quite shocked to be a captain. But I was ecstatic when they put me back in the Special Enforcement Bureau. It's like putting Br'er Rabbit back in the Br'er patch. I mean I was a happy camper.

And I would've been content to stay there but I got activated. I had been inactivated for every war that a Marine Corps had at that time. And this one, the latest one was Operation Iraqi Freedom. And they activated me in January. And I was gone for pretty much the rest of that year. And so, they put somebody else in charge while I was gone. When I came back, they promoted me. In 5 or 6 years, I stayed as a commander. So, that's pretty much it.

JON: So, I'd love to kind of walkthrough because your career parallels the evolution of special tactics in the United States. And you know, if you were to sit down and write the history of S.W.A.T., you can't write the history of

modern S.W.A.T. without mentioning Sid Heal. Like it's just one of those names that's going to be there. You certainly can't talk about flashbangs or tactical science or a variety of other topics. I will tell you that you know, I've done a lot of these interviews. The one name that has been mentioned in every single one of them was yours. And that is from an officer level to chief of police level. As people talked about their careers, they talked about the evolution of their careers, "and, I went to Sid's this class," "I went to Sid's that class." So, what I'd love to do is wind back to when you first get to the Bureau in '84. Right. The '84 Olympics are happening, and kind of talk me through that initial evolution, because the Bureau starts earlier. When did- Do you remember when S.W.A.T. started?

SID: Yeah. S.W.A.T. actually started in 1966, the concept.

JON: Yeah. Ok so Sid, I would love to start in 1984 when, you know, you get to the Bureau, the '84 Olympics have happened. You know, SEB and LAPD both spun up S.W.A.T. teams, but it's starting to evolve. And you ran there as a sergeant. So, walk me through what happens when you get there.

SID: It's actually even bigger that because there were a lot of societal changes that made S.W.A.T., the concept of S.W.A.T. vital. Not the least of which is fully automatic weapons, and booby traps, and rock houses. What had happened was that our system of government does not allow the military to intervene and what is believed to be a domestic policing matter. So as a result of that, we had arise to the level of our military counterparts. Not the least of which, in those days was Delta Force and the Seals. So, they provided a huge amount of training. And we had all of our weapons upgraded. And largely the 1984 Olympics went on without much problem. So as a result of that, we had all this training and equipment. And now we're faced with rock houses. So as a result, and I don't know who said it first, but somebody said, "hey, if this will work for hostage-rescue, this will work for arresting Narco suspects." And sure enough, it does. And interesting enough, within about 2 or 3 years, we were teaching a lot of the things we had learned back to the military.

So, including my team had been activated and sent back to the east coast to train with Special Operations Training Group, which had just been stood up by the Reagan Administration because of TWA 847. So, it was a time- The best way it was explained to me was, a colonel in Special Operations Training Group, full bird colonel, to tell you how high this was up in the Marine Corps' chain of command. He said that they considered LAPD and LASD experts an interval warfare. And I was shocked. I said, "Sir, we're

not at war." He says, "You're attacking a fortified location." I said, "Yes, sir." "And they're shooting at you." "Yes, sir." "And you're shooting at them." "Yes, sir." "Sounds just like war." And so, as a result of that, that started a relationship that went for years and years and years, where we could literally pick up the phone and talk to people on many cases in different parts of the world and ask a question and get a straight answer.

The special operations community both in the military and law enforcement did not play well together. It was like everybody had their best kept secrets. It did nobody any good, really. And so, the National Tactical Officers Association was formed in 1983, to start alleviating that. But you could have professional conversations that you could not get at a conference, that you could not get at a public forum. But you could talk to people in Nebraska that were taking down underground concrete bunker complexes. And I'm using these as actual examples.

They flew us back to the east coast and flew the Dutch entry team in for the Dutch Moluccan train assault. I went to Israel and debriefed in Entebbe and Molot. I went to Belfast, and Haifa, and Jerusalem, and Prince's Gate in London, the mall bombings in Sydney, Australia, the Yonsei University riot in Seoul, Korea. And so many places I can't even think about because it was not going to be put to paper. And they needed to vet the person they were going to talk to, and they would not exchange the information in any kind of a durable format. We were free to take notes, but some cases we were told like we couldn't take pictures, or we couldn't take some notes or just to lead us off. But we got straight answers. It really kickstarted a lot of our thinking. So…

JON: Well, and just a quick context on it, right? 1972 is the Munich Massacre. And you know, '84 Olympics come, everybody's afraid that's going to happen in L.A. That's in context with Prince's Gate, Bern, Switzerland, you know Mombasa, Kenya, Mogadishu… There's a series of hijackings, and building-takings, and hostage-seizure, becomes a mechanism through which terrorists are negotiating to get media attention and push their message.

SID: Interesting thing that you should say that too because it resulted in a change of tactics with the terrorists. The terrorists at that time really relied on hostages. It gave them a huge amount of public exposure. It allowed them to negotiate because they had to be taken seriously otherwise, we lost the hostages. The tactics, techniques and procedures, and some of the technology allowed us to recover the hostages. In many cases, killing the

suspects, the terrorists, and being very successful with the hostages. When I say we now, I'm talking about the counterterrorist community.

JON: Yeah, the global counterterrorist community.

SID: Which has evolved, both military and law enforcement. It was so successful, that they had to switch to bombings. Because…

JON: Well, because you had Entebbe, they all got killed. You have Prince's Gate, all the hostage-rescuers and suspects got killed. Mogadishu, Bern, Switzerland… You know the one, was it…United, the airplane

SID: Yeah, that was…United was in Mogadishu.

JON: So, like, you have these series of- Like, it works pretty well, works really well in, you know, Munich. But that's kind of the eight pack of taking hostages and making a scene. From then on, the tactic starts to adapt.

SID: Yeah, and evolve. The after-action of Munich was an eye-opener. They have a saying that, success has many authors, failures anonymous. But there was no way that we could attribute some of the mistakes that were made in Munich to accident or in confidence. There were some real command and control issues, some intelligence issues, and a lot of tactical issues that everybody that was going to find themselves in such a situation started taking seriously. And because this informal collaboration had already started to evolve by the 1984 Olympics.

And you're right, we were terrified. It wasn't just a feeling that they were going to attack, we were terrified. It was like, we knew they were going to attack. We learned everything- I'll just give you one that was shocking to me. I was quite comfortable, having been so many years in the Marine Corps by that time including my tour in Vietnam in the rural environment. But there was as much to learn about the urban environment as there was the rural environment. And I was a duck out of water.

And so, I really started paying attention to the people that had been doing this on a routine basis. Not the least of which is the combat was extremely close-range. The targets were fleeting and allusive. And as a result of that, we learned to shoot without getting a front-side picture. By adapting it literally with a piece of aluminum angle iron in those days with a flashlight, that we would use fiber washers to adjust the flashlight so to the height of burst. And we sighted our weapons in at 25 feet. A lot of people were shocked at that. But the advantage was, is that if you can see the light and it was on your target, you could pull the trigger that quick. I can't tell you

how many times that saved peoples lives. And we went the state-of-the-art sub-machine guns. And the recoil was-

JON: Which at that point were MP-5s.

SID: Started with MP-5s. Yeah. So-

JON: 9-millimeter MP-5s. That's when the MP-5s were just an MP-5. So then, you and LAPD are running parallel in your development. I recently interviewed Mike Hillman. And, and-

SID: There's another guy I gotta tell you. If they're not mentioning Mike Hillman, they're missing.

JON: They're missing. They're just not quite as much as originally-

SID: That guy is a- He was one of my mentors. Let's put that in perspective.

JON: Yeah, Mike, you know- Mike kind of walked me through from the D Platoon side, the evolution of tactics and how they started to reach out to the European units. They started to reach out to military units. You guys were doing the same things kind of together, right?

SID: Together and apart, it's kind of interesting. Because we, we're small. We compared notes with each other on a routine basis. There was a lot of rivalry, but it was a friendly rivalry. And nobody wanted to see anybody on the other side get hurt. And nobody wanted to feel the guilt that we would have inherited if somebody failed and got hurt because of something that we had withheld. So, it was opened but it was very informal. And it was usually done on the phone, or we train together in person. And LAPD ended up with teaching the west coast Marines and the east coast Seals. And the LASD ended up teaching east coast Marines and the west coast Seals. We didn't really plan it that way, it's just the way it turned out. But yeah. And I couldn't even begin to tell you other countries that end up getting involved. But if you ever go down to SCB and see the trophies, and we display them with honor. It's the number of worlds famous teams from France and Germany, and the United Kingdom, and Australia, and both the military and law enforcement.

JON: Well, it's GIGN, it's GSG 9, it's T2 SAS, it's you know. At that time, it's literally a Who's Who in the tactical world exchanging tactics. Because you know, one of the ways that Mike put it was, that I think was really articulated is he said, we were concerned about them taking hostages on a bus like they did in Munich. And he says, "we have to figure out how to

assault a bus." And I think the thing that's easy to forget is everything has a beginning. Special tactics in the United States, that beginning is the late '60s early '70s, you know SCBs, SCDs starts a little sooner. LAPD D-Platoon is the first official S.W.A.T. team beginning fulltime in '71. But the real zenith here, or the real acceleration takes place for the '84 Olympics.

SID: Yeah. The original S.W.A.T. teams were in response to the Texas Tower shooting. And so, as a result to that, the concept was counter sniper. And the sniper had the primary function on the SWAT team, and everybody was in support for years. When we started doing entries, the snipers became in a supporting role. And the entry teams took over the primary function. So, I got to tell you, what I just described was a lot more methodical and neat than it really was. It was messy. For years we refused to write down standing operating procedures because we didn't have any adherence to paper. And as a result of that, we would change a technique- If we had a briefing in the morning, we were free to change that technique for an operation in the afternoon. It was that fast. So, it was a state of constant review and continual adaptation. So-

JON: Where everybody worldwide is trying to figure out how to do hostage-rescue, how to make it affective, how to apply it to multiple environments… And I think one of the things, this is just before I start my career- But there is this very collaborative sense. And I think that was right around the time that John Coleman founds the NTOA and creates an official platform.

SID: Yeah. As a matter of fact, it was never national. It was always international. Right from the very beginning, it was obvious that we had to come to grips with this. We were in operations in those days where we were so certain of being shot that we would put a personal vest inside our entry vest. Because we knew that the entry vests were not going to stop some of the things that were being shot at us. That gives you a perspective of pragmatism that no class or power point could ever achieve. So, just to give you an example, nobody really intended to specialize. But some were just the nature of the game. Seals would teach us how to tell if a boat was overloaded by looking at the waterline and in some cases, they'd repaint the waterline. And the Seals would teach us how to tell when it's repainted, so it looks like it's actually higher than it is. And then we would teach them Urban Warfare. Because we could actually close down the city at night. And we would. And a lot of operations that people have no knowledge of, were because we were moving at night. Crossing a freeway at night is like crossing a big river, except you can get killed. And so-

JON: Except you fall into the river, and it's full of allegators.

SID: Yeah exactly. Yeah, I couldn't even begin to tell you the Marine Corp with a vertical operations, vertical assaults and helicopters, and skid drops. One of the things we discovered was the fact that we could take down a skyscraper because there's no windows on the roof. And so, we could actually, most places we couldn't land but we could skid drop. We also found out that when you skid drop. When you jump off the skids of a helicopter, you need to have some protocols whether standing up waiting procedures or not. Because if half of the people jumped off the helicopter on one side and the pilot corrects for the heavy side, you can tip the helicopter over. And pilots don't like that.

JON: Neither do the guys getting on the helicopter.

SID: Exactly. So, I can't even tell you how many skid drops we did. And then I learned to repel, I mean I repelled in the Marine Corps, but nothing like what we were doing. The Australian repel, because we could go in through the top of a window without exposing us or the rope. And then eventually, we didn't like unhooking from the repels, so we went to fast ropes. And I got that from the Marine Corps. I don't know who invented it first, but I learned it first from the Marine Corps. And then LAPD and LASD, and I don't even know how to tell you how many different things. I would say in the 5 years of my first tour, there wasn't a day that I didn't come to work where I didn't learn something new. And I think that most of the people felt the same way.

An ego was your biggest obstacle. It would be like bleeding in the water with these guys. If you had anything that you were sensitive about, a scar, a tattoo, your ears stuck out too far, I'm trying to think. It was like sharks; they would go for you. But it was always with the understanding that we would be better, that we were no different than anybody else, but we were being exposed to knowledge that nobody else had ever taken the effort to gather. It probably always been there. But now, we were actually discussing it at a professional level. If I could take credit for anything, it was the fact that I was one of the few guys to start au codifying it. I actually just started taking notes probably because I just wasn't the sharpest knife in the drawer. And I did not want to forget this stuff.

So, I began taking notes in, probably the spring of '85, is when I can first remember where I can really- And that tickled my curiosity to study, if this is this, what else- And I wanted to know why. It wasn't enough to tell me what to do. I wanted to know why it was important and how it's contributing. So, from there, it just went on. I just started writing lesson plans for years. And then, I got asked to write one article. And so, I wrote

the article. I couldn't believe the interests that I got. It was the first time I had testified out of state. And I was being called to Florida, and Minnesota, and Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. And places that I didn't even know about the case, but I could explain it. And I need to emphasize that I was just one of the guys. I probably got more credit that I deserved because I had the name recognition from the articles and eventually the books. So-

JON: So, mid '80s you're in SEB. You start- You guys are students of the game. You're studying. You start writing lesson plans. At some point, you get tasked to do flashbang research. Walk me through that.

SID: It was in 1980, early 1988, and we were getting sued for flashbangs. And one of the questions that were coming up was, "who trained you, what were their qualifications?" And a variety of other things. So, my lieutenant at the time Russ Collins called me in, and wanted me to do a lesson plan on flashbangs. So, I went back, I gathered all the materials. And about a month later, I came back and said, "Russ, we're going to need to do original research." And Russ goes, "Why?" I said, "Because the only information available is coming from the people that are selling them. And they're only providing the information that makes their particular product look good." And they're really not addressing what we believe to be the key issues.

When it should be used and when it shouldn't be used. But they would tell us everything they want to know about how it worked. So as a result, he said, "how long is this going to take?" I said, "at least 6 months." And to his credit he said, "ok." So that became my collateral assignment and I interviewed doctors, and acoustical experts, and went to the crime lab. And got the original study from the Human Effects Laboratory in Aberdeen, Maryland, and interviewed the military who had been studying grenade simulators, and a variety of other things. And so, we wrote a fairly comprehensive lesson plan and published it December 1st, 1988. And we, according to our protocols, made it available to anybody with the need-to-know, which is our police departments.

By January, it was the national model. And we could no longer keep up with the request, which were coming in scores at a time. And I believe the lesson plan at the time was 30 or 40 pages. It was pretty comprehensive. And it was at a user level. It didn't explain a lot of things, but it was expensive for the L.A. County, if you can believe that to duplicate this lesson plan and send it to everybody that was asking. And yet, we did not want to charge for it. So, we asked the National Tactical Officers Association to make it available at cost. And they did. And to this day, as far as I know, it's still available. So-

JON: Yeah, that was the original NTOA Flashbang Diversionary Device user's manual. Which quickly became the national standard and still form the roots of almost every flashbang class worldwide.

SID: I think as an author, and I became an author later. I really didn't consider myself an author because I did the lesson plan. But the greatest feelings of success and self-satisfaction come from having somebody that I respect, as an intellectual thinker and teacher. Cite me. Either I don't even know how to tell you what that feels like. It feels like, wow, it really was worth going the extra mile and being able to attribute that. And I attribute all of the things that I learned to the original authors. But if I could take any credit, it's the fact that I just compiled it.

JON: Well, see I think that's- So we met in '89? '88 or '89, I think you were just-

SID: I think it was '88.

JON: So '88. I mean, I don't think it's possible retroactively for people to put in context how unusual that Diversionary Device user manual was. It's unusual now. At the time, it was unheard of. Nobody took the time in law enforcement to go and understand blast physics and understand the physiology. And understand that people were using flashbangs. But they were using flashbangs because they'd been exposed to grenade simulators and the kind of made them feel stupid. And they thought, this is going to work. So really like, you were the first one to actually look at it scientifically and say, "this is why it works." Right? I mean, I learned all of that from you because I knew you. Everybody else learned all of that from you. They all learned bleaching of adopts, and they all learned temporary threshold shifts in the area, pressure wave, sensory overload. Like those were terms you developed in that research. But nobody knew.

SID: I think you'll recall that I mentioned that it sounds a lot more methodical than it was in reality, it was quite messy. I'll just give you one, I had laughed when you were saying that, because I remember how messy. We had flashbangs were basically adapted from grenades simulators. And the majority of that, was basically just powder and paper. So, you couldn't throw them through a window, you couldn't throw them through a screen, you couldn't get them through bushes. So, what we would do is, we would get a cog weight, which weighed half a pound to a pound. And we'd put some duct tape around it, and we'd throw it through a window. Well, that solved one problem, but we noticed some disparities. Somebody would say, "Holy mackerel, that was hot. No quality control."

JON: Too many rolls of tape.

SID: Exactly. It was the amount of tape we were using. In some case, we would put just enough to adhere to the weight, and it would explode normally. But in other cases, they would put a hundred-mile-an-hour tape that we get from the pilots or duct tape that we could buy out of one of the hardware stores. And some people would put one band, and some people would put 5 or 6. And without knowing it, we were creating these miniature pipe bombs. Well, when I got my class in blast way physics, literally from Dr. Paul Cooper at Sandia Labs, I learned that we had no clue what we were doing. And it's only by the grace of God that we weren't getting hurt worse than we were or hurting somebody else. Once we explained that, it also really lift the manufactures and developers. And so, they started building things that we could use as is, which is tremendous advantage from a civil land liability standpoint. And to be honest with you, there's more and more money in doing that than there was in selling dope. Because they were making money hand over fist.

The flashbang in those days cost about a dollar fifty to a dollar eighty to make, and we were buying them from anywhere from fifteen to thirty dollars each. So, it was a huge markup. But the use of the flashbang was a gamechanger in our tactics, because it created what I learned, a thing called an exploitation window. A period of time where the human brain is unable to process outside information because it's being overwhelmed by stimuli. And now we know it as the Amygdala Hijack. We're actually indexing a portion of the brain, which is going to be perceived as life-threatening, even though the flashbang if used properly is pretty harmless. But the fact that is perceived overwhelms the brain's ability to do anything that we would consider thinking. So, we- In fact I'll just give you one right now off the top of my head.

I had three separate incidents where we took the guns out of the hand of the people, or we threw them down when they knew we had them, that would have died had it not been for the flashbang. Well needless to say, this created a situation where we tended to overuse them. If it works a little, it work a lot. So, we threw more than one flashbang, and we didn't understand a lot of things. But once we started doing the research, we made a lot more knowledgeable decisions, and intelligent decisions, wise decisions. So, we found actually, and I did a statistical analysis on that, is that we were using them less and we were using less of them, meaning per the situation. It's one of the few non-lethal options that will support a dynamic entry. The affects are aversely instantaneous. I say

instantaneous. Scientifically, there is no such thing. That's one of the things we found out.

JON: Yeah. It's milliseconds.

SID: That's right. Milliseconds. To give you an idea, there's about a 2 second window of vulnerability. But that's because it takes that long for the fuse to go off. It a delay. But then we get anywhere from 2 to 8 seconds of what we call the exploitations window. Where the individual is incapable of mounting an effective defense. I mean, they'll have startle reflexes and other things without getting into too much depth. But typically, that was enough to save their lives and save our lives. So-

JON: Yeah, 2 to 8 seconds is quite a long time. It's-

SID: It's a long time. We could put the full entry. When we were doing experiments with the Marine Corps, one of the things we would do, is we would give the subject ear protection, which most of the suspects didn't have, and a camera. And have him take pictures of the entry team. When that flashbang went off, if they could take the pictures, all they got was pictures of muzzles. In one case, we had Captain Jim French with a camera, and we threw it in. And he could not make his finger work enough to click the trip. I took the camera out of his hand, took his picture and put it back in his hand. That's how long 6 to 8 seconds is.

JON: I have a very clear memory shortly after we met, probably '89 or '90. We did a flashbang demo together testing some stuff. And we gave the guy a squirt gun. And put the squirt gun in his lap, threw the flashbang in, and then simulated an entry coming in. And the last guy grabbed the squirt gun while the guy sat there trying to figure out what to do.

SID: In real life, the first one that happened to me is the first one I can remember on top of my head, is we had a guy with an M2 Carbine. He had gun ports cut in his house, he swore that he never be taken alive. And when that flashbang went off, he reached out and could hit the M2 that was leaning against his bed. But could not put in enough together to grasp it. I literally picked it out.

JON: So, as the sheriff's department starts, you know, actively using flashbangs you're writing. This is kind of the beginning of Sid Heal you know, Warrior Poet, for lack of a better term. You know your- The flashbang manual comes out. It begins to get people thinking about a deeper level of understanding. It's not just, oh the manufacture says it's this, let's go do

our own research. When is the next significant event in your career that you think marks a milestone? Is it Somalia?

SID: Probably. That was huge. That put me at an international level for the first time. By Somalia for me was in 1995. And well, it started in 1994. But- As I mentioned, I was working with the Special Operations Training Group. And I get a phone call, "What do you know about non-lethal options?" And I laughed, "What do you care about non-lethal options?" And he said, "I'd been ordered to do research on this." And these guys were all just like we were, doing research. And they said, "We don't know where to start. But we figured cops would know." I said, "Well, I'll just tell you what I think. Is that you're looking for a magic bullet that doesn't exist. That is not a technology problem, it's a training problem. That we need to have a holistic view."

And one of the incidents they cited, was some refugees in Guantanamo Bay, decided they would riot and take over a PX. Well, a Marines' company was charged with guarding it. And they fixed bayonets. And apparently, they weren't taken seriously, and they stabbed 3 people. And so, I mentioned this incident. I said, "If you're willing to stab them, skip the intermediate options. Because I don't have anything that I can think of that would be as good as that." And he said, "Well, we don't want to do that. We need to be able to accomplish our missions without having to kill the adversary." And I said, "I know a guy that, I'll get him to talk to you." But I was a CWO5 by then. And I was not willing to drive to California, I mean, drive to Camp Pendleton. CWO5, for those who've never been in the military, I explain it as a huge amount of esteem accompanied with absolutely no authority. But my lips were moving and typically a colonel or general's voice would be coming out.

So, as a result of that, I enjoyed vicarious authority. And so, when I said I wasn't coming, they took me seriously. And so, they said, "Well, when can we meet?" "Let me know, I'm working all week." And they said, Thursday." I said, "Come on up." Well, on that particular day, it was raining. And pouring down rain, one of a few days in Southern California. So, we went into a room that kind of went as a skiff. Because everything they were saying was classified. And so, they gave me a bunch of scenarios and I explained where I thought some of the problems were. And I gave them some suggestions, that's all it was, on how I thought we could've done it better. But the big thing is, they had no technological advantage. Their idea of a non-lethal weapon was, "shooting somebody in the foot, so I called you." To bring in whatever you wanted to demonstrate, shotguns, and

beanbags, I'm trying to think. Pepper balls didn't exist in those days, yeah whatever we had. And I do remember-

JON: Stinger grenades.

SID: Stinger grenades, yep. Flashbangs, obviously. It was raining so hard, we had to blow the water out of the rear sight apertures to see. And they were surprised that we didn't go to a range. We went out into a parking lot and fired into a concrete wall. Whatever it was, it left him quite impressed. And so, I got kind of volunteered as a consultant. This-

JON: Voluntold?

SID: Voluntold. Yeah, that- It really wasn't as bad as that because there wasn't anything they could ask for that I wouldn't have given. And- They would have been more than gracious with their information and time. But yeah, it was understood that they wasn't given to me as if I had an option. So, I went down there several times, and they came up, and we exchanged information. And I got a phone call in the spring of 1995. Right out of a clear blue sky, that said, "Sir, what is your- This is sergeant so-and-so, what is your social security number?" So, I gave it to him, and I said, "Just out of curiosity, why don't you get it out of my old QR, Officers Qualification Record." And he goes, "Sir, I'm not from your unit." And I go, "Oh." And so, we hung up and I turned to my partner, Danny Bean. And I said, "Danny, I don't have good feelings about this."

JON: Get ready, buddy. You just became a partner of one.

SID: I got activated on a Thursday. Got my shot record updated on a Friday. Was sicker that a dog on Saturday from all the shots. And Sunday, I was in Mombasa, Kenya. And it was like something out of a movie. It was a side of the Marine Corps that I'd only seen on the Special Operation's side. But I literally had to pick out of the Marine Corps of the best guys. They're all gunnery sergeants, Gunny Eggers, and Gunny Dunn, and-

JON: Tom Magilton, Gunny Magilton.

SID: Gunny Magilton, Gunny Rodarte… And a 2nd Lieutenant in the Air Force who had 6 months and worked for Phillips Labs. The guy was smarter than all of us put together. Our GPA, our general classification jumped by double when he was president. I mean, he was that smart. In any event, he was in charge of lasers, and I literally had a blank check. And to this day, I have no idea what I can spend. But I reported to a 3-star general around the chain-of-command. And there's a lot of people, even at a CWO5, between a CWO5 and a 3-star general, including the new commander and

the commander of the landing force, and everybody else. Well, including the ship's captain, to give an example. And so, I not only had the best in the Marine Corps, I had a guy that could write check in about 10 different currencies.

At one time I asked him, "Bob, how much money can I spend on this?" He said, "That's classified." I said, "Yeah, but just give me some idea." He said, "Well, you already spent three quarters of a million dollars." I said, "Oh, can I spend a million dollars?" He looks at me and he gets excited, "You think this is going to cost a million dollars?" And I thought for a second, I said, "You know Bob, I realize that one of my unfulfilled career goals in the Marine Corps is spend a million dollars of the Marine Corps' money. And he laughs. And he goes, "You can spend a million dollars." So I go, "Well, can I spend two million?" He said, "Don't go there."

JON: There's the line.

SID: "I'm not going to tell you what you can do." So, I had stick foam, and oculus foam, lasers that are still classified, and would do things that even Star Trek has yet to figure out, which is- Well, I'll give you an example of how smart this guy was. One of the lasers we had was LX-5, Laser Experimental Model Number 5. And it was at the, what we call, I later found out the Brassboards stage. Basically, they had built this amalgamation, for a lack of a better term, this component out of office shelf things. So, they had gidgets, and gizmos, and whatchamacallits, and thingamajobs, that had to fit a certain way. And so, it was necessary for all of my guys to learn how to do this. And so, we were up, we were staying in a hotel at the time in Mombasa, Kenya in plain clothes. And I was having everybody do the drills. Take it apart, put it together, take it apart, put it together. Hour, after hour, after hour.

Finally, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, when we were literally brain-dead, I looked at the lieutenant. And that was another thing that used to irritate my gunnies, is that I called him by his first name. In the Marine Corps decorum, that was a little out of their social construct. And so I go, "Rob, I got good news and bad news." And he looks at me, he goes, "Well what's the good news?" "The good news is you're going to be the first United States Air Force officer to win a Marine Corps combat action ribbon since the Vietnam War." And his eyes got about this big. And he says, "Well, what's the bad news?" "Bad news is, you're going ashore. There's no Marine that's going to be able to fix that if it doesn't work. And we cannot have it not work."

So, we went ashore. We got into a big firefight which nobody remembers that wasn't there. Because it was so much emphasis on the non-lethal part. But he did, he earned his combat action ribbon. And it was awarded to him as his highest decoration. And he's proud of it to this day, even though he's retired. So, it was a wake-up call. And when I got back, we came into March Air Force Base. They flew us back, flew my team back. The rest of the team was on float, and they were in the Mediterranean in that area. But I had a team, and they flew us back. Well, being a CWO5, March Air Force Base is about 25 miles from my house. So, I called my wife and said, "Meet me here." So, she came there. I waved goodbye and never checked out. So, I just went home. I mean, I'm never going to be promoted again and- So, I went home and sleep, because there was a 12-hour difference with jetlag.

And I get called up by a colonel in Washington, DC. He said, "Gunner, how long is it going to take for you to get back to Washington, DC?" And I go, "Sir, I'm going back to work." He says, "So, when are you going back to work?" I said, "Monday." And it's like, Thursday night now. And he says, "Well, that's true. But technically your orders don't expire until midnight Sunday. So how long will it take you to get back to Washington, DC?" I said, "Wow Sir, military transport?" He goes, "You come back anyway that you can get here." So, I flew commercial back, and what they wanted was a debriefing. And that was probably the tip of the tip, that you just describe in Somalia. I couldn't even begin to tell you how many different places, and how many people I talked to at such high prestige in both academia, the military, and politics. To the consulate level and including other countries. So yeah, everything else I did to that point really paid in comparison. If I had to pick just one, that would have been in 1995. And by 1997, was the first time I was speaking to an international audience. And they were paying me.

JON: Oh yeah. No that was- It exploded, like it- Kind of same thing happened to the business. Right? Like that was the beginning of the Marine Corps anomaly for program which then, with the Army anomaly for program and- All of those program's kind of evolved out of that one trip to Somalia. You know, and it was kind of the genesis of us becoming a non-lethally oriented business especially, because it was that Somalia mission. You know, we didn't have time to put together lesson plans. We didn't have time to train anybody. And so-

SID: It was messy.

JON: Oh yeah. I did a 5-day instructor course for your unit in one day with retroactive read-a-heads. You know, here's all the stuff. You guys have Sid, God speed, good luck.

SID: A lot of the documentation we did after the fact. One of the things that was interesting too, is I mentioned the fact that CWO5s which are pretty rare, I think at that time, I was the 13th one in the Marine Corps, including the reserves. I mean there was only 13, period. And not everybody wore the bars because they became limited duty officers. But we had a huge amount of esteem and not a lot of authority. But I reported directly to General Zinni. I got credit for a lot of things he actually deserves the credit for. I asked him one time. I said, "Sir, do you ever feel dumber when I get near you?" And he's not one that really chit chats. But I was a five, and I was as high as I was ever going to be. And I felt embolden. And he looks at me and he goes, "No, why?" I said, "Well sir, if there really is a scientific process called osmosis, I get smarter. I was just wondering if information and knowledge was a finite."

JON: Yeah. Because I'm getting smarter, are you're getting dumber? Are we-

SID: The great thing was, besides his intellect and his foresight, was he was pragmatic. He understood the concepts, but he also understood that the applications were what we're going to make the concepts work. The rules of engagements for instance were unwielding, and I was ordered to bypass the chain of command. Not run anything through the chain of command, report to him directly. And so, I lived on the Ogden, but the flagship was the Belleau Wood. And so, I would pick up the phone in the Combat Operations Center up with all the Navy guys were and say, I need a ride to the Belleau Wood at such and such a time tomorrow morning. And sure enough, there'd be a helicopter there. And then I'd go see General Zinni, first time I've ever been in a flag-officer's wardroom.

And I remember on this one occasion, I started explaining the conflict and he recognized it so fast, he held up his hand, which I took it as a sign language for shut up. And-

JON: Because it was a sign language for shut up.

SID: Yep. And he turns to the Chief-of-Staff, which is the only reason I know his name, John Moffet. He says, "John, he's right. We got to fix this." And he fixed it. That was just the kind of guy he was. I feel guilty accepting praise that was really vicarious.

JON: I don't know. I mean, General Zinni certainly set the tone. But the evolution of the non-lethal program accelerated rapidly because of your involvement. Whether it would've happened without you is a matter of debate. But the fact that, when we met those guys at SEB, and that conversation started with, "tell me what non-lethal was." And ended with, "train Marines off the coast of Kenya," 3 or 4 weeks later. It was not, it was not a long time. And during that time, it had the right rules of engagement, and had to get all the stuff vetted, and put it together. Has you not been there, you were catalytic to that process. You being there, gave them that connection between the military world and the civilian world, and tying them together.

SID: That was how General Zinni explained it to me, because I was actually feeling it even then, and I did not want to take undue credit. But he explained that I was bilingual. I could talk "atta boy, Charlie David" to law enforcement or "alpha, bravo, Charlie, delta" to the military. One of the things that it led to was, in 1997, I got called into the under-sheriff's office. And he started the conversation with, "If you can do this for the Marine Corps, you can do this for us." And he had a bunch of notes on a legal pad and proceeded to rearrange my career path to what I had envisioned.

And as he's going on, he's describing a project which eventually became known as the Technology Exploration Project. And none of what he described was anything that was really appealing to me at the time. But I'm a lieutenant and he is multiple pay grades above me. So, I'm taking notes and I'm pretty quiet and he says, "I know you don't like this. And I don't particularly care." And he goes right ahead with the next 2 years, which I thought was going to be my career, and that was to manage his Technology Exploration Project. And the focus was, I'm finding technologies that had applications in law enforcement. And the idea was to leverage my contacts in the Marine Corps and my association with them, because I had a clearance, I was working on classified projects, I had literally been all over the world. I was gaining, and I had already gained by that time, a national reputation. And in some cases, international, in a sense that, I was being interviewed by TV stations from Australia, and Italy. I'm trying to think of some of the ones.

JON: We wrote an article. You and I wrote an article for Jane's Exchange International-

SID: Yeah, that's right. As a matter of fact, that was an interesting one because it went to Jane's International Exchange Review. And that was really a groundbreaker, because I got invited to speak at the first

International Non-Lethal Weapons Conference. And ended up speaking at 4 of the first 7 as a keynote speaker. Well, it's like Odenthal calls the self-licking ice cream cone, "the better it tastes the more you lick it. The more you lick it, the bigger it gets." And that's exactly what happened. And I couldn't begin to tell you how many different places but, Haifa, Jerusalem, Israel, Belfast, Dublin, Mostar, Sarajevo, Seoul, Brazil, Argentina. I'll just skip the cities and go to the countries. Because in some of the countries, I go to multiple cities on- Because it was expensive to move me over. In any event, that led to teaching. And I started teaching at the US Military War Colleges.

Well, I did for 20 years, and taught at every single one. My handler was a retired lieutenant colonel from the Marine Corps told me I had a hat trick. I was one of the few guest professors, I don't know what their associate professor, adjunct, I don't know what their title is. But that had been invited and spoken it every single one. All 4 of the services, Industrial Ecology Army Forces, the National War College, Command and Staff, General Command and Staff, which eventually became the basis for a book on the concepts. There was no textbook. And so, I kept thinking somebody would write one and we have had some good books on non-lethal, but they've always been focus on the technology. And right from the beginning, the technology was the way of developing and utilizing the concept. In some case the concept existed without the technology.

JON: The technology was a manifestation of the doctrine. Right? Like in the end, non-lethal is a mindset. It's teaching forces that a re-stat rather than a switch. And the technology was just a vehicle through which you were administering that application.

SID: It's funny you should pick that out. That was one of the original Meta force that I used to explain the non-lethal force concept to people that believed that the Marine Corps force spectrum ran from the M16 to the F16. And that's a quote.

JON: Yeah. Now I remember there was an article that you and I wrote a rebuttal to, written by an Army colonel. And it was like, I think it was, "What Price Sticky Foam?" I think was the article, arguing that the US military is the most lethal killing machine and never needs non-lethal. And then Afghanistan happens, and Iraq happens, and they go, "Wait a minute."

SID: The Balkans were the big ones. When the Balkans went off, we got sent back in as peacekeepers. And one of the things that I used in Somalia, I explained, was the fact that, it's going to be difficult to make a case for a

humanitarian effort if the only tools we have available to us, are to kill the people we were sent to protect. That has been quoted a number of times since, but it also express the frustration that we experience. There were a lot of people out there that became adversaries that I never truly thought that they had thought it through. Not the least of which the International of the Red Cross, who believed that we were using them to enhance our ability to use lethal force. That's true to a point. But the lethal force was going to be used anyway. And the idea was is to protect the innocent while still being able to use the lethal force. And there was a number of other ones. But-

JON: There was a mindset in the kind of late '80s early '90s, I mean I went to it and remember did an interview on Daryl Gates' radio show with the ACLU. And then the whole argument was you know, this was going to be used as proportionately, it's going to be used racially, it's going to be used this way. So, you know what you're saying is, you would prefer to use a baton? Because that's the choice you're giving up. Right? It's like you know, remember you and I both repeatedly used Maslow. You know, the only 2 you have is a hammer, you tend to view your problem as nails. You know, the corollary to Maslow is the only 2 you have is a hammer, all your problems are nails.

SID: Which is really interesting too, and I don't know why. But the baton is one of the oldest non-lethal options available to us. It's been around since at least the 1820s. And for whatever reason, it doesn't have the controversy attached to it. The emotion baggage as some of the safer devices. Even though we'll admit that it's primitive and they're, and they cause injuries, like the beanbag, and the sting-ball, and the taser, and the pepper ball and- I just have to wonder what they think is going to happen. One of the things we're experiencing right now today, is the fact that judges and activists are advocating for injunctions against the use of non-lethal weapons, or some types of non-lethal weapons. Without realizing that removing this particular device from the 4 spectrums, relegates us to using something that's far harsher and primitive. Because the problem doesn't go away because they don't like the way it was handled. And yet, some of the biggest critics have come from the law enforcement community, but we can't get any traction.

JON: Yeah, it's interesting. I remember when I did the instructor training for Somalia. It was a roomful of gunnery sergeants and, you know arms folded- "I'm the most lethal-killing machine in the world. Tell me why I need this." And I remember saying one of the gunnies, "Right now, you have rules of engagement. Those rules of engagement require lethal provocation

for use of lethal force." Everything up until now, everything up until that occurs means you're taking rocks and bottles. And all you can do is wait until the problem escalates. It's like dropping a match on a piece of carpet and wait until the house is on fire to try and step on the match.

SID: Exactly right. And that was one of the things that the International Committee the Red Cross objected to, was the fact that we could target non-combatants to get them away from harms way, which made the likelihood of killing the adversary, which were putting them in danger to begin with easier. I would, I'll admit to rationale.

JON: Yeah, but the inverse is also true. You're driving away the non-combatants so they're a lot less likely to be killed.

SID: What they ignore is the fact that in many cases, the technicals in Somalia were putting them in harms way on purpose, because they made us reluctant to use lethal force. And so, it gave them an advantage, particularly when our technology was better than theirs. So, they could negate that technology. So, it's one of the things I got asked this in London one time. It's legally right and morally wrong. I understand where you're coming from, but the law needs to be caught up to the technology. We don't have to kill people that are not trying to do us harm.

JON: Yeah, but it's interesting because this is what you see happening today. I mean, you're looking in California in '84 and '81, there is so little understanding of the technology and the doctrine that there is a belief that non-lethal weapons are increasing the number of incidents of injury and fatality. And it isn't until you take them away and put law enforcement in a position like the military was, where like "here's your tools, hammer and screwdriver, you know, hope you don't have to cut anything because you don't have a saw." I think that we're kind of in a point where the doctrine now is lagging behind the technology.

SID: Again, which is interesting, that if you really look at it from the balcony, we're using technologies that we were allotted for 20 years ago. Even 10 or 15 years ago. What's happened is, is that we'll be the first to admit that we're using the cutting edge, the state of the art. There hasn't been a lot of improvements. And the improvements that have been made have usually been increasing effectiveness of an existing device or technology rather than a new technology. So, there are new technologies out there. But sadly, nobody wants to bell the cat.

JON: Yeah, and it's- I think you know, as we've talked about- You know there's always this arms race between technology and doctrine. Right?

Since the first guy picked up a stick and used it as a baton, there has been an evolution of technology and an evolution of doctrine. And you know, you think about the lecture that Robert Bunker gave years ago talking at One Math, talking about the evolution of armor and the evolution of weapon. And there this…constantly taking place. We're in one of those periods where we have transitioned, and doctrine has become less important. And I think that, one of the things you said earlier in this conversation that has stuck with me, is that the "why" was what you were trying to figure out. We've reached another point where the "how" is past the "why."

SID: Yes, and let me just add to that. That is a police problem. The training in police is unbelievably expensive, far more than most citizens understand. We pay the guy to go to school. We pay the person that's teaching him. And we pay the guy that's doing his job or her job while they're gone. It's horrendously expensive. If you gave me a device that worked a hundred percent at a time for free, I as an administrator, would still have to factor in what it's going to cost to bring it up to training. And if it has a steep learning curve, it may not be cost-effective. So, when people are talking about defunding the police, if they would just change the name to Reformed Police, a lot of us would be on their side. The sad part about it is, we've been complaining about this for years, but nobody has been paying attention. Don't listen to the politicians when they're telling you; they're spending millions of dollars on the development of non-lethal options. For the simple reason is, go look at how much of a percentage that really is compared to all the other things that they've been purchasing.

JON: Well, I spent my entire adult life in non-lethal weapons. And the last significant technology was 15 years ago.

SID: Taser?

JON: Yep. It was-

SID: You're right. And interestingly enough the taser, the new taser is really an adaptation and a new improvement on one that had existed a few years before that.

JON: But as you said, it's not a brand-new technology, it's an evolution of an existing technology.

SID: That was one of the things I learned by the travel. The travel really opened up my eyes, because they would send me to places like Belfast, and Dublin, and Haifa, and Jerusalem, and Mostar, where I thought they would be lightyears ahead of us, in both the thinking and the application. In

reality, they were struggling with the same problems and the antiquated technology. You're right, one of the things when you mentioned the taser, was the fact that a lot of the controversy surrounding it in the United States is cultural. It's not unpopular in the United Kingdom. But what's unpopular in the United Kingdom, is impact munition, which are not all that unpopular in the United States. So, it had no basis to do with science, and at safety, and effectiveness. It was people's uneducated opinions, ignorant opinions in many cases. And in some cases, I would argue and debate activists from the other side, including in public, and give them scenarios using their strategy as opposed to ours. And we would admit, for instance, that impact munitions are going to cause injury. So, do batons. The difference is, is that I may be willing to shoot a man with a knife at 35 or 40 feet with an impact munition.

JON: And then hit him with a baton.

SID: I can't reach him with a baton unless I'm willing to accept the risk to my own life.

JON: And he's dead long before that.

SID: And that's exactly what's happening. And they have not thought some of these issues through.

JON: What's interesting because you know, again it goes back to the "why." Right? It goes back to kind of, this understanding of doctrine. And I think that, that's kind of a good Segway for us to talk about how you began to merge or fuse what you had learned in the Marine Corps from a doctrinal standpoint, and what you had learned in law enforcement, and push those together.

SID: Probably the best way to explain this, is the fact when I was an officer in the Marine Corps, I had 10 years as an enlisted. For 1978 to 1986, eight years, I would conservatively estimate that the Marine Corps spent a hundred thousand dollars on my education, before I ever led troops in harm's way. When I became a captain for the sheriff's department, which is an executive level, I got a handshake and a new badge. It was expected that I had already acquired this knowledge, without a career patch, without any command colleges, without any schools. The Marine Corps would give me materials, but I was expected to read. When I would go to school, I took tests that I was expected to pass. And if I didn't pass, I could expect not to be promoted again and within a given time, I could expect to be reduced to harmlessness, that's what we'd call it, to put to pasture. That mindset drove

me into study in for myself as a law enforcement officer, particularly when I became into some decision-making authority.

JON: So that's the genesis of your book Sound Doctrine, which I think we'll pick up on our next episode.