Timestamps

3:25 John’s Career History

6:50 Background Of The Warrant

13:45 John’s First Involvement In The Case

17:45 The Night of The Warrant, Ad Hoc Team & Training for Narcotics Units IN LMPD

24:45 Arrival at the Scene, Initial Scouting & Apartment Layout

33:00 Search Warrant Service Begins

42:00 Initial Aftermath of the Shooting

52:00 John’s Injuries and Medical Treatment

58:30 Press aftermath and inaccuracy of reporting

65:30 Initial Response OF City

72:00 Lessons Learned – Training

80:00 Lessons Learned – Knock & Notice, Culture & Complacency

89:00 Lessons Learned – Narco Teams v. SWAT Teams and Body Warn Cameras

93:00 Lessons Learned – Agency Response to These Types of Events

97:30 John’s Cautionary Advice To Young Cops Working Narco

1:01:00 The Need for Debriefs to Avoid Complacency

1:00 – His personal history and career path

2:25 – Structure and functioning of the RCMP

5:45 – Advantages and disadvantages of the Canadian policing model

7:30 – Origins of RCMP SERT and ERT teams

13:00 – The role of modern tactical teams

14:30 – 2010 Olympic and ERTs transition to full time teams

17:15 – Current ERT team configuration

21:00 – Decision making and the trap of risk mitigation

27:00 – Understanding the difference between cheap and expensive and effective and efficient in preparation

33:15 – Weighing when to spend money v. improving skills – understanding requirements

38:00 – Tactical decision making & analysis paralysis

42:00 – Militarization of law enforcement

45:45 – How overly aggressive law and policy can lead to tactical indecisiveness

50:15 – How the standards we hold police to are unreasonable

55:00 – How the origin stories for SWAT are complicating modern tactical response

57:00 – Delegation of authority and decision making

1:01:00 – Who should make tactical decisions?

1:03:00 – How we should be training our future tactical leaders

1:09:45 – Rapid fire questions

2:20 – His history and career path
3:20 – Configuration of York County Sheriff’s Office Agency and the SWAT team
5:10 – Initial call for service and search for suspect
9:00 – Ambush of dog team and Shooting of K9 Sgt. Randy Clinton
15:40 – Initial SWAT response and search
24:15 – Response to 1475 Paraham Road
30:45 – Ambush of team by suspects and shooting of three team members
35:20 – Shooting stops and suspect surrenders
39:10 – Initial medical response for injured operators
45:40 – Buddy’s Injuries
47:30 – Arrest of suspect
56:30 – Initial effects on the families
58:50 – Arrival at the hospital & treatment
1:03:00 – Buddy’s recovery
1:05:45 – Personal lessons learned
1:08:00 – Team lessons learned
1:18:50 – Aftermath and healing from the trauma of the event

1:00 – His Career Path
2:50 – The Evolution of sUAS for law enforcement
4:30 – Categories and types of sUAS and their missions
7:25 – Tactical Use of sUAS & Deescalation
11:15 – Crowd and Riot Control
13:00 – Drones and Robots and the new non-dynamic entry approach
16:34 – Regulatory challenges to sUAS
22:00 – Privacy rights, the Constitution and sUAS
26:15 – The 4th Amendment Consequences of sUAS
27:03 – Weaponizing drones
29:30 – The terrorism threat posed by sUAS
32:30 – Concerns that we are building a dystopian future with sUAS

1:31 – Dana’s Career Path
5:25 – LASD SEB – Emergency Services Detail
10:35 – The History of TEMS/TCCC
13:20 – The Military Research That Gave Rise to TCCC
18:12 – The Origins of Tourniquet Use
22:01 – Law Enforcement’s Beginnings with TCCC
24:20 – How to Build and Maintain a TCCC Capability
29:00 – IFAK Configuration
32:06 – Controlling Massive Hemorrhaging
37:34 – Team Based Medical Supplies & Mass Casualty Bags
41:00 – Making TCCC Training Realistic
44:35 – The Beginnings of Tactical Ropes Work
47:50 – Using Cadres to Maintain Domains of Knowledge
49:05 – Why Teams Need a Tactical Ropes Program
52:00 – Dana’s Gear Recommendations for Teams