Episode 17 – Training & Tech – The NTOA – Thor Eells & Don Kester

Jon Becker: My name is Jon Becker. For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

My guests today are Thor Eells and Don Kester from the National Tactical Officers association, or NTOA, which is the largest tactical organization in the United States.

Thor is a retired commander from the Colorado Springs, Colorado Police Department, where he served for 30 years, the majority of which was in tactical response, including serving as a SWAT operator, a SWAT team leader, and a team commander. Thor is currently the executive director for NTOA. After serving many years as a board member and as a trainer.

Don has retired from the Pima County Sheriff's Department in Arizona, where he served as a SWAT team leader, a SWAT team operator, a team sergeant, the training director, and a SWAT team commander, eventually retiring as a division commander and captain. Don is currently the training and education director for the NTOA after many years of service as a trainer and a board member.

Guys, thanks for joining me today!

Thor Eells: Thank you for the invitation! We appreciate it!

Don Kester: Thank you, Jon!

Jon Becker: Why don't we start with your personal backgrounds, because I think it's good to give context to kind of the current face of the NTOA. So, Thor, give me your career background.

Thor Eells: Well, I spent 30 years with the Colorado Springs Police Department in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Came on when I was in my mid twenties. I had been a paramedic for six years prior to becoming a police officer and was attracted to the profession by the diversity of things that you could do within policing.

And I was drawn to that while in the academy, our department had different subspecialties. Come to the academy, give a little briefing on what narcotics does, homicide does, etcetera. And tactical was one of those presentations and saw that, and I thought, well, I know exactly what I want to do when I have the opportunity to do it.

But our agency was one in which you had to. Upon graduation of the academy, you went to patrol. You served a minimum of four years in patrol before you were even eligible to test to go into what was called TEU tactical enforcement unit, which is what was the name assigned to our SWAT team, full time team. Very few openings ever came about because it was such a desired assignment. And yet that was my goal.

So I progressed through my career, eventually was able to test, got into the team, spent my time in the team as an operator. We ended up with a chief that came in and decided that believed that mandatory rotation was necessary and specialty units so that you could take that knowledge and share it throughout the department. Ended up being somewhat short lived, but unfortunately, at that time, I was one of the senior people on the team.

So I was going to be one of the first out, decided I would promote instead of promoted, but was able to come back later as a team leader and team commander. Eventually, as I progressed and promoted, became the commander of our specialized enforcement division. And so I spent the bulk of my career in tactical operations in some capacity or another. Over those 30 years.

Jon Becker: We also spent a bunch of time training. Right?

Thor Eells: A lot of time training. I was very fortunate that early in my career met some people, the Ron McCarthy's and a few others, as I was attending training and for whatever reason they felt I might have some promise as an instructor and so was able to be brought into the fold and began training in a variety of disciplines. Less lethal, basic, SWAT, intermediate, advanced SWAT, HRT, all those types of courses while I was still an actual operator, had some practical, real world experience that I could apply.

And then as I moved beyond that, more into the leadership roles, the supervisory roles, started teaching those disciplines as well. So probably spent a good 20 plus, maybe 25 plus years as a trainer within the tactical community.

Jon Becker: What about you, Don?

Don Kester: My career really mirrors Thor's in many ways. I spent about 24 years with the Pima County Sheriff's department, which is down in Tucson, Arizona, about 1600 employees. I'm one of those folks that had a blessed, charmed career with really no complaints.

I was spoiled, I'll admit it now. I started off in patrol as well, was then in traffic for a couple years and as a traffic investigator, and during that time I was selected to the SWAT team. Our SWAT team had a full time element and a part time element, and so I started that in the early nineties and continued on.

I started off in the sniper role, did that for a few years, was selected as a team leader, eventually got promoted, was a team sergeant and was a sergeant in patrol, but then was soon thereafter signed as our training director for the entire department, did that role for quite a few years while still remaining on SWAT, and then eventually became our full time SWAT sergeant and eventually our full time SWAT commander as a lieutenant for several years, and then I retired as a division commander at the rank of captain from the sheriff's department.

I like Thor, started off with the less lethal, the chemical agents, the flash, sound, diversionary devices. That's really what got me going in the tactical instruction community. And then over the years, that just grew and grew and grew into almost anything related to the tactical world. But I loved it. I enjoyed it.

We were busy team lots and lots of missions, had a great time, and it truly changed who I became as a person and as a law enforcement officer. And SWAT was my world in many ways, and that's what taught me, along with other things. But the primary leadership lessons that I then tried to at least implement throughout my career and to this day, because it really, our team was very progressive, and it was a leadership factory in many ways. It was just one lesson after another.

So not only internally within our agency and the team, I should say, but at the same time as when I was dealing and meeting and spending time with the SIDs, the Rons, the Mike Hillmans, the John Colemans, and that group. And it really, in many ways, made me who I am today. But it was a blessed career, very busy career, fortunate to be involved in a lot of different types of missions and a lot of experiences that I try to just apply those to the teaching world now and share those experiences, particularly those of what didn't go so well, and let people learn from my mistakes.

Jon Becker: When you're currently the training director for NTOA, right?

Don Kester: I am the training director for the NTOA. I took that position when I retired from the sheriff's department. Before that, I actually am the longest running instructor for the NTOA to this day. And so I don't know if that's a good thing or a bad thing, but I spent several years as the Les Lethal section chair for the NTOA, and then I was on the board of directors for the NTOA for about seven years as well. And then when I became the director of training and education is when I stepped down from the board.

Jon Becker: What about you, Thor? When did you first become involved with NTOA?

Thor Eells: 1995 is when I became an instructor with the NTOA. Initially, much like Don, was instructing a variety of disciplines, which also, I think, had a tremendous impact on me. You know, I had the beneficiary of, was the beneficiary of learning as I was instructing, you know, being around people that was able to share experiences and different philosophies with me while I was, I was teaching, but I had a hunger and a thirst that drove me to continue to be really actively participating within the NTOA and any opportunity that I could volunteer for a role, whether it was instruction or otherwise.

Being on committees, I took, and eventually later on, I, like Don, became a board member. I was also on the board for about seven years and served, I think, about the last two years as the chairman of the board, trying to provide some guidance based upon my experiences and the influences of, you know, many of the planck holders that we spoke about.

And eventually, when it came time to retire, it was very fortuitous for me that the position came open. I was actually looking to maybe continue my career within law enforcement as a chief of a smaller agency or doing something in a leadership role there. When the executive director position came open, and I was able to slide into that, you know, I was very, very fortunate for that opportunity.

Jon Becker: What do you see the current mission of the NTOA is?

Thor Eells: Well, I don't think it's changed. I'm very proud in that we have tried to hold true to the fundamental principle that John put forth 40 years ago now in that we are going to focus on training, education, and professionalism to enhance SWAT and to save lives, and that is our guiding principle. We very much keep that in mind when we're making decisions that we think are likely or potentially going to have an impression on the law enforcement world preston.

Jon Becker: What do you see the role of the NToA? There are a lot of voices in the tactical community now between state associations and private training organizations. Obviously, the NTOA is the largest, not only the national organization, but the largest organization. What do you see the role of the NTOA being, like, the responsibility of it to the community?

Thor Eells: Well, I think we, if I were to pick a word, I would say is a resource. So we try to do our very best, make a very concerted effort to gather information. We're listening. We try and balance some humility with our own degrees of competence and understanding, but in recognizing that we are certainly not the know all, be all, end all, but through that recognition, we are very actively and continuously seeking information. We are looking to try and identify what are people's needs. How can we in any way, shape or form, address and or meet those needs, and then how do we share that?

So we try to be mindful that, yeah, there are regional issues, regional problems, state by state, as different legislators or decision makers make various changes to the course of business and daily activity type of thing. But there are lessons to be learned in that, that we can then try and share, communicate elsewhere. We can assimilate that information, disseminate it, and hopefully through all of that, again, remaining true to John's vision, which is help people not have to reinvent the wheel.

And so I think that's still very much our primary role, is to assist people in that, in meeting their individual needs, departmental needs, those types of things.

Jon Becker: Do you see the NTOA as competitive with state organizations?

Thor Eells: Well, I would hope not. I mean, I can tell you that it's certainly not my desire for that to be the case. And in my communication with my colleagues, my peers that are on the board, certainly with Don as our training director, we are very mindful that we don't want to be competitive. And I know that under our tenure, we have made an effort to try and ensure that we have a relationship with the states, that this is a two way flow of communication.

What can we do to help you? We're certainly not afraid to ask for help or input from others. You know, what are we missing? Are we not looking at things the right way? We try to do that, but I think in doing that, we have, with some of our relationships that are more advanced and developed just because of personal relationships or knowledge, done a very good job of finding out where our niche is, so to speak. What can we really do to help state associations, and what can we do to not hinder their abilities to grow and be successful individually?

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's always struck me, I've heard people say they're competitive associations and there is not an overabundance of good training. That's always my argument. It's not like we have 500 good training options every day you can go to. There is a dearth of good training. And I don't understand why somebody wouldn't belong to both the NTOA and their local association, their state association, because the perspectives are different.

The quality of, you know, the variety of training is different. Like, what are your thoughts? I mean, I'm assuming while you belong to NTOA, you probably also belong to RMTA or mountain states when you're in Colorado.

Thor Eells: Right. And you're absolutely correct. And that is really, quite honestly, our philosophy is we recognize that we have a unique and fortunate opportunity to see things from a national level. I mean, we operate from California to Florida, and, you know, all the spaces in between, and there are different perspectives, and it affords us an opportunity to see things through different lenses.

But at the end of the day, we are not looking to compete. What we're looking to do is enhance, to really be a benefit to those that are out there, to be that added resource. As an example of that. I know that Don, as our training director, one of the benefits that I, when I was younger, always thought was unique and helpful from the NTOA.

And Don continues this today. But when we send several instructors to a class, we try and intentionally, we deliberately send two different instructors from different areas. They're not from the same department, the same area. Somebody might have local perspective and experience and understanding, but then we'll bring or partner them with someone that comes from a different region, a different area that may have a different perspective, so that we are able to really expose those that are in attendance to different ways of thinking, different ways of problem solving, and gaining appreciation, that there are frequently more than one ways to address problems.

So it's a very deliberate effort to expand knowledge, experience, exposure, those types of things. And that's what we really wanted try and continue to accomplish with our state partners.

Don Kester: And, Jon, we really do try to support those state associations. In fact, in our classes, we encourage attendees at our courses to be members of state associations, multiple state associations, as well as the NTOA, to attend those state association conferences if at all possible. And we also support those associations when they do have their, their annual conferences.

The NTOA oftentimes will send an instructor or two and provide free training at the conference on behalf of the state association. And we work that out with the state association each time. And many of the states take advantage of that on a yearly basis. So usually we will send instructors to 13 to 14 state conferences in a year, where we provide the instructors, we pay the instructors, the associations help us out with the expenses of travel, but we cover the instructors and many of those expenses as well.

So that's a resource that is available to them. You'll see Thor and I and others at many of the state associations sitting in classes, trying to learn, trying to keep cultivating those relationships as well. So we, certainly, I can tell you, don't view it as a competition. There are things the state associations can do better than we can, and there are things that we probably have some advantages on at that national level. So we understand that we try to coordinate with them and want to continue that.

Jon Becker:

I think that, you know, it's always struck me that there's a very local aspect to law enforcement, right? It is possibly the most local thing you can do yet, like any political thing, and it's a government service. There's a local perspective, there's a state perspective, and there's a national perspective.

And I think that you guys are in a unique position because in dealing with all the state associations and in states that don't have an association into a is the state association. You have a unique perspective on policing nationally, and I'd like to kind of discuss some contemporary topics with you guys to get your perspective nationally. Why don't we start with police reform?

And this kind of, you know, it seems like the move to police reform and defunding police may have, have hit its nadir and were starting to swing back the other way. But what is your perspective, Thor, on kind of this national movement towards police reform?

Thor Eells: Well, I think it is still evolving. I don't think that it has lost as much momentum as some people might believe. And my reasoning for that is each time we have a police incident that achieves national media attention, it tends to restock those fires and calls for police reform. And so I think that is still a movement that is evolving as we speak.

But I do think that what has happened in a positive sense is that it's not quite as emotional. And they're beginning to recognize that there are more moving parts to this than perhaps were originally forecasted or understood. And by that crime is on the rise. Violent crime in particular is on the rise in communities around the country that jumped into reform without really fully appreciating the unintended consequences of that quote unquote reform.

And I think what we've begin to perhaps appreciate a little bit more is that this reform that has been proposed in many respects is more punitive and in almost all cases tends to be post-incident driven. So really nothing has been done, done or proposed or at least accepted upon proposal to be proactive and to do something to prevent some of these incidents from taking place.

And so when we look at some of the incidents that have taken place that have received a lot of scrutiny and judgment and second guessing, we're beginning to recognize that there are potentially training issues, there are leadership issues, and those are some of the things that we need to be more mindful of and focused on if we want to really try and have a positive impact on policing as it's delivered to the communities throughout this country.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I think so much of the police reform movement is reactionary, angry. One bad incident turns into, well, we need to eliminate all of this. And I think one of the important roles that the NTOA plays is opposing that. Don, talk to me about how the NTOA serves as an information source to kind of oppose that narrative.

Don Kester: Well, police reform really is a very complex topic, and it's very broad. And I think to really dive into the topic of police reform, you have to first start by defining what part of police reform are we going to discuss? And so if it's like Thor mentioned, you know, the punitive aspect, we know that that is setting law enforcement back years, if not decades.

If folks want to talk about police reform in the sense of how do we make law enforcement better, which might not be all about restrictions and curtailing activities. It might be, but it oftentimes is more about how can we make law enforcement better, then we would strongly support that. And so one of the ways we address that publicly and with the state associations and the media and other entities, first and foremost, is be honest. And we've taken the mantra that we're not going to try to defend the indefensible.

And I think that has been a challenge with law enforcement historically, where we do as a, as a profession, there have been times, let's face it, where the profession, the industry has tried to defend things that there really was no defense for. So that's one of the messages we really emphasize and push out is let's have some honest, useful, productive conversations and let's look at what we're doing now and where we can improve.

So the NTOA is really trying to drive that, along with other groups, to focus on what is true police reform, meaning what's going to make us better. And, you know, some of those other negative aspects of it, they'll sort themselves out over time. One of the things we're doing is developing new programs. We're focusing on the concept of emotional intelligence. We're focusing on the concept of brain science and leadership and professionalism.

And when we talk to groups, media, whomever it might be, those are the things we really hit on. And we tell them sometimes, yeah, law enforcement made some mistakes in these areas, these incidents, whatever it might be. But what you're proposing isn't going to solve anything. It's not going to change anything. If we really want to change law enforcement, then there's certain things we need to do, and law enforcement does need to get better. We do a lot of things well, we do a lot of things not so well, but we can do everything better and improve.

And so we're really trying to take it from the strategic standpoint and say, how is it that we're training law enforcement? What can be changed? Because in many ways, training of law enforcement is decades behind the times. We're trying to look at policy issues and see how can we truly improve policy training and education to enhance law enforcement, to avoid these types of problems.

So we're excited about where we're going and what we see as the future. But of course, we can't do it alone. We have to have the buy in and the support of everybody in the state, associations and things like that. And the feedback has been great, but we're excited to get some of these new initiatives launched and really make them a much bigger part of the conversation and a much bigger part of the process of the evolution of law enforcement, because we feel, while we all have great intentions and things, we do a great job in the profession, there are things we can do to get better.

Jon Becker: Well, I think you raise an interesting point, which is so often when an incident happens, the response of law enforcement is one of two. It's either trying to defend something that is very difficult to defend with a straight face, or the corollary to that is not defending something that is completely defensible. And because there isn't an organized messaging platform, law enforcement, media response is based on a local agency, and that agency may have a fantastic PIO, but the majority of them don't.

And so you have a professional media organization that is attacking an agency in a lot of cases, and an amateur PIO who is trying to respond to reporters who do this for a living. It's a difficult balance, because anytime law enforcement defends something that is really not defensible, they lose credibility. Anytime they don't defend something that is, then the narrative is allowed to run rampant.

And the example that I know we discussed it at breakfast is the Breonna Taylor case, where everything that's running around all the media initially is wrong. You have the vice president, now vice president, United States, saying that they hit the wrong house, which is 100% not true. You had people saying that she was shot in her bed. You had all these things, and yet you didn't have a coordinated response to go. Here are the facts. Thor, what role can the NTOA play in kind of countering that messaging and helping agencies to deal with this?

Thor Eells: I think the best thing that we can do is assist with awareness in how they are responding. Should they be unfortunate enough to find themselves in the midst of that type of scenario? And so you said it very, very well, in that if we do something that's bad and we try and defend it, we lose credibility, no doubt.

I mean, the American public is not stupid. They can look at something and recognize that was wrong. The corollary to it that you mentioned is you have an incident that unfolds that is defensible and yet is not defended vigorously. The same consequence is applied, which is you lose credibility. That's true because they believe that your silence is, in fact, an acknowledgement of wrongdoing. And so that's just the end state. So it's a lose lose if we continue to approach these incidents the same way.

So you look at Breonna Taylor, and you're absolutely correct. I mean, it's really a showcase of a multitude of poor decisions in how that information could have been refuted and been more vigorously corrected. And I've said this for a while, that one of the things that is hurting the profession right now is that the silence from American law enforcement leadership is deafening.

Jon Becker: Yes, it is.

Thor Eells: And so it begs the question, well, why is that? I mean, who was in the best position to really vigorously defend what took place in Louisville, Kentucky, with Breonna Taylor? Well, quite honestly and quite bluntly, it was the chief of police.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Thor Eells: But through a variety of, for a variety of reasons, police chiefs in America have been effectively silenced because of their at will status and their vulnerability to be removed at will if they don't get in lockstep with what a political narrative and or track is going to be taken on something. So you mentioned, you know, our vice president incorrectly sharing information about where the warrant was served, and there's no correction of that.

And in fact, what you have is the mayor then makes a comment that really does nothing but add fuel to the fire and doesn't correct it. And the sheriff or the chieftain has been told you're not to say a word. This is the pathway that we're going to take.

And so I think the best that we can do is when we have these conversations, is to share that information, to create that awareness. And we're not passing judgment, believe me, on political ideologies or things of that nature. We're simply saying that you have to evaluate the circumstances that you find yourself in and begin to do sort of a pro and con analysis. You know, what's the cost benefit factor here?

And the analogy that I tend to draw or apply is many people remember years ago when it became very, very common to file frivolous lawsuits against major private corporations because they would always settle. It was less expensive to simply settle. Well, eventually somebody raised their hand and said, do you realize that the number of settlements that we are making out of a need to be expedient is actually our net cost? Is this? And it was far worse.

Well, I think the same thing is applying to law enforcement is that as we continue to just roll over and not defend those things that should be defended as being lawful and correct, albeit difficult, is having a cost. It is tearing the fabric of trust between the American public and their law enforcement providers, which is serving no one.

Well, it's certainly arguably, at least among the quote unquote experts, a contributory factor to our increase in crime in this country. So we need to have greater awareness that these incidents need to be addressed one way or the other. Either acknowledge the mistake or acknowledge that we didn't do wrong.

Jon Becker: Well, you know, you raise a really interesting point, because a lot of the problem is the politicization of American law enforcement. Law enforcement is not a political function.

Thor Eells: It wasn't intended to be. Correct.

Jon Becker: It wasn't intended to be. And sheriffs are elected, and that is, it gives the people the ability to pick their law enforcement leader. But law enforcement in and of itself is an executive function that should be agnostic to politics.

Thor Eells: Correct. In fact, it's part of the reasons that when you look at some of the challenges that we have today is our forefathers wanted American law enforcement to be fractured. We didn't want a single law enforcement entity that could potentially then become corrupted and tyrannical, tyrannical and violate the rights of the American people.

So as a result of that, we have over 18,000 different police departments. We have over 3000 different sheriff's departments, and we have potentially an untold number of federal law enforcement. We have tribal law enforcement. We have thousands and thousands of agencies in the country that have thousands of different policies, procedures, training, standards, etcetera.

And it adds to the complexity of this whole reform. Where do you start? Who are we reforming? Because it's not a one size fits all. There's not a single answer that's going to address the diversity, which certainly has its pros, but it also creates certain complexities that we're facing.

Jon Becker: Now I think it's interesting because the forefathers didn't trust government. If I learned anything in con law and in reading the federalist papers, they were not trying to create an efficient government. They were trying to prevent efficiency in government and ensure that nobody got an opportunity to accumulate power because it corrupts people.

And ultimately their fear was a tyrannical, centralized federal government because that's what they fled. And so they intentionally separated powers. They intentionally created a federalist system. They intentionally paralyzed government. You know, people that have not read the constitution carefully think that it gives you rights. It does not give you rights. The constitution prevents the government from taking rights.

And so much of what is happening in American law enforcement right now is this idea, like, we'll push them all together. We'll make centralized things and we'll give more power to the federal government. And that was exactly what the founding fathers were afraid of happening.

So I think that one of the things that we need to do is we need to eliminate this politicization of law enforcement. We need to have our politicians stop saying, well, the FBI is corrupt or the LAPD is corrupt. People take inappropriate actions and need to be, those actions need to be remedied. But a rogue FBI agent is not reflective of the entire FBI. You know, a George Floyd does not mean we burn the whole police department to the ground, nor does it mean we vilify everybody.

But, you know, you raise an additional point, which is there aren't national standards, and it's problematic. And part of it is the complexity of it. You know, the smallest rural police department in Mississippi is never going to hold the standards that the NYPD or LAPD can because of funding, because of personnel.

But in the tactical community, there aren't national standards. Some states have standards, some don't. And the NTOA played a big role in the creation of a national standard. So talk to me about that. Like, where did the national standards idea come from originally?

Thor Eells: Well, it evolved out of what was originally proposed through the NTOA as our quote, unquote, best practices. And eventually the conversation took place. And this was when Don was on the board and I was on the board and speaking to some bright folks, Sid Heal being one of them, and recognizing that best practices, quite honestly, really wasn't enough. It's like the person that you want to go to the gym type of thing, you know, you say, well, we want everyone to be more cardiovascularly Fitzhe. And you put a challenge out there.

Well, the only people that go to run and get cardiovascular fit were the ones that were running to begin with. And so the best.

Jon Becker: Yeah, the fit ones, right?

Thor Eells: So the best practices, while certainly noble in its foundation, really wasn't enough to incentivize folks to work towards. And Sid being the savant that he was so well educated in looking at trade associations and how they achieved professionalization, and he's the one that shared this with me. And I went out and then started reading and educating myself, and I thought, well, you know, this is really brilliant. You look at, you know, how did medicine get where it is today? How did the bar association get where it is today?

And, you know, Sid would ask. His first thing was, well, who dictates the curriculum of medical schools? It's not the United States government, CMA. It's the American Medical association. They decided what was going to be the curriculum to become an MD or a do in this country. It's the medical associations that have determined what the standards will be. You will take X number of hours of education and et cetera, et cetera, do residencies, the whole nine yards. They do that. And then you pass your boards, which are set by the association. Same thing with the bar, with attorneys and med or, excuse me, law schools.

And you begin to look at that and think, well, you know, that really does make sense. I mean, you can either write your own story or someone will write it for you, and it may not be the one you like. And that resonated with us.

And so, as the board, we said, and Sid was really the one that encouraged us to adopt the leadership role. We were in a unique position as the national association with the opportunity to work cooperatively with the California association of Tactical Officers, CATO, Florida SWAT association, and some of the others, and reach out and bring the thinkers, the practitioners from their respective regions and create a committee so that it is a national perspective.

We consider folks from small, medium, large agencies, small, medium, large teams, full time teams, collateral duty teams, municipal, county, state, federal teams. Bring all of those together, and then let's have the conversation on what should minimum standards be. What can we all agree on are the minimums that SWAT teams need to be able to do? And I can tell you that one of the folks that had a profound impact on me was chief Mike Hillman.

So Chief Hillman was approached by FEMA post Hurricane Katrina when they wanted to type SWAT teams so that it could be like the fire resources, you know, if you need certain number of engines, they pump so many gallons of water, etcetera.

But we would do the same thing with teams. We'd have everything from type one, which would be the most robust, hostage rescue capable teams with, you know, certain number of operators and armored vehicles, et cetera, all the way down to a type four team, which would be, you know, four guys in dark t shirts that were one size too small, but they all had hunting rifles and baseball caps and Oakley sunglasses.

We got together and we thought, well, that's not possible one, because you're missing the cornerstone for that, which is, how do you define SWAT capability? You might have a warrant service team, but that's not necessarily a SWAT team or a dignitary protection team or a fugitive apprehension team or things like that. They're not SWAT teams.

So you had to define, you know, what will SWAT teams do? What are their minimum mission capabilities. And that's where we started. And then from that, and with the input of these committees and these representatives from all across the country, we were able to develop what we believed would be helpful to our profession of what a SWAT team can do at what levels, with different typings, different capabilities.

And I think, I would like to think, anyway, that this has been extremely helpful in serving as a roadmap or as a template for teams to improve either their ability to gain access to training hours, to purchase certain equipment, to sign interagency agreements with others where they're lacking, but certain capabilities.

But a sister agency might have that, and that's really what we've worked towards with the national standard. And it's meant to be just a bare bones minimum. I mean, it's certainly not a dictate. We don't have the authority to mandate people meet these. But at the end of the day, what drives any kind of change, just like in the legal or the medical field, is your risk of liability. That if you're not doing these minimums that the profession is requiring of practitioners, then you expose yourself to liability, not just financial, but certainly public goodwill and other things. And we've tried to step into that was what was a void and provide that.

Jon Becker: That's a huge void. And, you know, one of our mutual friends, Todd Mackler, years ago, told me an analogy I use all the time. He said, I have a driver's license. My 17 year old daughter has a driver's license, and Mario Andretti has a driver's license. We're all drivers. We don't all drive the same.

And I think one of the challenges with the modern tactical environment is you do have a, not only a wide range of agency size and agency capability, ranging from, for lack of a better term, a tier one law enforcement resource, whether that's NYPD, ESU, or LA sheriffs or whoever, all the way down to a part time small regional team. You're trying to regulate behavior from 60 man full time team that does 200 ops a year to 6 man part time team that does 6 ops a year.

And then to make it worse, the mission sets. It's almost a matrix where you have team size and mission set. And the mission sets vary from simple narcotic search warrant to complex, coordinated terrorist attack or hostage rescue. Don, from a training standpoint, how do we address that? Do you think the NTOA has established a national standard? What do you think the best approach is from a training standpoint, to try and equalize some of that?

Don Kester: Jon, that's a complex question, and I don't know that it's got a direct answer. I think that is certainly one of the challenges in training law enforcement because you've got the challenge of the small team, the big team, the medium sized team, the regional team, collateral duty full time, and they all have their own complexities that come with it.

So I don't know that there's one specific answer. I do know that the standardization has to play a key role in that. Standardization of policies as much as possible. Standardizations of training, standardizations of equipment, things that, frankly, are lacking in the SWAT community.

One way to address that, particularly for some of the smaller or midsize teams, is the concept of regionalization. We're forming that multi jurisdictional SWAT team. And I personally think there's a, there's a lot of misinformation out there about regional teams. And I think they get a bad rap. Some, you know, there's teams out there that are some of the biggest SWAT teams in America that are not maybe as high speed as, as they should be, just like there's the smallest teams in America that are not as high speed as they should be. The same goes for regional teams.

But I do truly believe that some of the most capable and competent teams in America are, in fact, regional teams. And I don't think most in the, in the tactical community see that and are aware of that because they only see what they see in their very local small bubble.

You know, if you're here in a small area of California and you've got teams that you, you know, you know, are maybe higher quality and those that aren't as high quality, but that's all you know, because that's what you deal with. That's what you work with on a daily basis. But that doesn't mean that's the same case in the state next door or on the other side of the country.

And so regionalization has actually proven to be quite effective for, for a variety of reasons. One is that it does eliminate lot of SWAT teams. And by eliminate, I mean we can take eight teams and make them into one. Now where we've eliminated seven SWAT teams in the country that had seven different policies, seven different training standards, seven different selection standards, seven different budgets, and on and on and on.

Now we have one team that, again, you sort through your personnel and you work through those logistics, but now you may have a very large tier one team that is one of the most well equipped in the country, and there are regional teams out there that are some of the most well equipped in the country, and they have the personnel. They've got 50 or 60 bodies, and they're doing 200 missions a year, but people don't really hear about those.

And so I think that regionalization leads to more standardization, and it leads to an ability to more properly train because of more people, better budgets, more exposure, maybe around the country or in your region at a minimum. So there's some different ways to go about it. But I think regionalization does play a key role.

Now, that being said, it's not for everybody. And the biggest challenge is not generally the operators and the SWAT teams. The biggest challenge to effective regionalization is administrators and politics. As you brought up earlier, you know, there shouldn't be a lot of politics in law enforcement, but one of our challenges is many of the police agencies out there. They want a SWAT team, or they want to say they have a SWAT team, and they call themselves a SWAT team, but they may not necessarily truly be or have a SWAT team.

And so you have to get the Chiefs and the sheriffs to work together and agree to form a regional concept and a regional team and realize that I'm not giving up my SWAT team. I now have one team that is much larger, much more competent, much better equipped, and much better funded. And any of those chiefs can call that team, and that team belongs to all of them. But you have to get the politics and the egos out of the way.

And generally, looking across the country, in my experiences, those organizations that have been able to put together a high quality, high functioning regional team, that regionalization has expanded to air units, motor units, k nine units, and on and on and on.

And frankly, that just makes sense for policing in America. Having over 20,000 agencies, all duplicating efforts, all trained to do the same thing just on different scales, if we continue with that, we will never eliminate many of the problems with law enforcement. Just that sheer number of agencies creates many of these problems. Regionalization, particularly in the tactical community, does help address these issues.

Jon Becker: I think you're right. It's the double edged sword of fractionating government. You avoid centralized, tyrannical government, but you create an inefficiency. And especially when you get into municipal departments. Small cities may not even have one SWAT call out a year, and so it's not uncommon, in my experience, in dealing with teams all over the country to find a team that trains quarterly and has three operations a year, but is prepared to engage whatever mission they get.

And I think when you look at an agency like that, that has one or two SWAT callouts a year. They would be much better committing a single body to a full time team. I used analogy years ago of like medicine, but if you go into a small town, there's not a brain surgeon. There might not even be an orthopedic surgeon. There's a general practitioner doctor, and he's good at basic life support, but you don't want him to perform brain surgery on you.

To some degree, tactical operations are the brain surgery of law enforcement, and it's challenging to maintain the very high level of specialization that you need to be able to effectively do a hostage rescue or an explosive breach or any of the high risk operations. When you are a small agency and you don't have that kind of op tempo, it's like expecting going into a small town in the middle of the country and expecting to get absolute top tier medical care. It's not going to happen well and.

Don Kester: Logically, Jon, it just doesn't make sense for many of the agencies that have SWAT teams. There's no logic to having that SWAT team. It doesn't make sense financially. It's misleading to the public. We're setting our personnel up for failure as leaders within the organization, and you can't properly equip the team. You can't properly train the team.

You're not going to have enough missions to, number one, justify their existence, but number two, maintain that competency level versus if we combined resources and work together in many, many locations in this country, we would be doing a much better service to our personnel, our agencies, and the citizens of the country.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And I think that is a role that needs a national voice. Right. There needs to be a national voice that is speaking to that, not only in the form of SWAT standards, but in the form of providing a unified voice, which I think is a role the NTOA does and can play in these situations is, you know, if you're a small agency that doesn't have the expertise or you're an agency that gets into trouble or has a bad incident, it strikes me that the NTOA is the place that those agencies can turn to get direct access to true subject matter expertise. Is that true, Thor?

Thor Eells: Absolutely. It's one of the things that we have really made a concerted effort to share that information, that we are there for that exact reason. So when we do speak about regionalization and encourage multi multi-jurisdictional approach and sharing of resources to accomplish mission capability, that's one of the things that we try and support.

So our efforts are in that we feel a responsibility that if we're going to set forth standards, we have a fiduciary duty to also support the agency's abilities to reach those standards. We can't just leave this void between we want you to operate at this level and you're at this level. You figure out how to build the bridge.

Our approach to it is that if we're going to set forth that, we're going to provide you with the bridge. Whether you choose to cross it ultimately is up to you, but it absolutely is something that needs to be done. I mean, the byproduct of agencies not doing that or engaging in some of the misguided decisions that Don spoke to, where you allow ego or politics or otherwise to interfere with making a, a really objective, rational decision on need and or capability is that unfortunately, the american public does not discern the difference between a high level, high functioning tactical team in this country from areas that don't have that. They simply see the title squad officer did X, Y or Z.

And in many cases, that is driving bad case law. It's driving a loss of confidence in our ability, in our capabilities, and, you know, a multitude of negative consequences result thereof. And so it's really important for us at the NTOA to create this awareness. With regard to the communities, tactical communities, I'm referring to now about asking these practitioners to pause and really have an objective internal analysis. And you think about after action reports.

So we strongly encourage and for many, many years have told teams, you know, when you finish a mission, you sit down and you have an after action, and it should be very objective. It should be brutally honest. You're looking for your strengths, your weaknesses and means to either bolster or correct.

The same thing has to happen with regard to just your overall function within an agency for the citizens of your community. And that's what our standards are really designed to do, is to ask people to say relative to these standards, where do we honestly and objectively fit? And if we're at a four and we want to be a three or we're at a three and we want to be a one, how do you accomplish that?

Well, we'll help you with that. We'll share policies, we'll share procedures. We have a multi-jurisdictional section chair. So we have folks that have that experience, that have that direct, intimate knowledge of, you know, what are the obstacles that you're likely to encounter? How do you overcome that? And we'll share all of that. I mean, none of this is considered, you know, state secrets or anything that we're going to keep guarded. We want everybody to be successful.

Jon Becker: But I think we have. We've politically driven law enforcement away from self reflection. We have driven law enforcement away from after action. It's interesting, you know, I remember in law school, they talked about subsequent remedial measures and how if a business does something after the fact to fix a mistake that they made, that you can't introduce, that you can't come back and go, well, Ford's brakes didn't work because Ford redesigned their brakes.

Because the policy disincentive of telling Ford that if you change it, we're going to punish you for it is terrible. Yet in law enforcement, just in the time that I've done this coming up on four decades, the amount of introspection I have seen in teams has gone through the floor.

Like, I can remember early in my career, going to debriefs and seeing heated discussions and candid self, you know, self flogging of, we really screwed this up. We can't do this. There was a policy of kind of holding each other accountable. And what we now see is kind of a move towards the opposite. You know, when you attend a debrief, the debrief is a hero story, and anything that went wrong is not discussed.

One of the things that – The first question I ask when we do our lecture series is, what went wrong on your operation? And if the answer is nothing, there's no point in us having a debrief. Cause we're not gonna learn anything. Dawn, over the time, have you noticed that trend? Do you see that happening?

Don Kester: I do. It is becoming more and more frequent, and I'm not really sure why. I mean, I have my personal opinions on that, but we're not being as honest with ourselves as a profession as I think we need to be. And we can be, and I think I said it earlier, we have to improve. Law enforcement has to change. And if we think politics doesn't affect us, then we're living in a world that doesn't exist, because it does. And I'm not saying it's right. It just is what it is. We have to work around that. We have to improve the way we do things.

And I think the most frustrating part that I see looking at incidents and working on cases and working with SWAT teams around the country and then working with legislators and you name it, is that the reality is most of the problems in law enforcement can be pretty easily fixed. They really can be. If you start breaking it down to what the bigger issues are. They're fixable. It's just, do we have the right people in the right places with the guts to move forward and fix it? You know, Thor hit out an important point earlier. You know, most chiefs are at will, so their hands are somewhat tied.

Now, certainly not all chiefs, and certainly some chiefs don't care about that and they do the right thing, but many are hand strung by that. And again, I think that's the frustrating part, is we can fix our problems if we focused on emotional intelligence, and we truly bought into emotional intelligence and we paid the money and we took it serious, like many other industries, many law enforcement problems would go away.

Jon Becker: But in order to do that, we have to be willing to be introspective. And more importantly, as a society, we have to be willing to allow you to make a mistake and recover from it. You know, one of the things that I tell people is any of the forefathers of modern tactics would be fired in their second or third year, maybe, except for Mike Helmand, would be fired in their second or third year in a police department.

Now, because they were aggressive, they were hard charging, and they made mistakes. And that's why they're Graybeards now, was because they made mistakes. We as a society are moving towards this mindset that if you're willing to lie and deny till the very end, we'll keep you. But if you make a mistake, we're going to crucify you for it. Well, the net effect is we're getting people who are either really good liars or people who will not take responsibility for their actions.

And so what's happening is we're breeding a generation of managers, naughty generation of leaders. And I think that's kind of what you're saying is you're not breeding people that go, hey, wait a minute, I screwed this up. I need to fix it.

Don Kester: There is a leadership vacuum in law enforcement. There's some absolutely phenomenal leaders, but there is definitely a need for enhanced leadership in law enforcement. And that's because of a lot of reasons. There's a lot of factors that feed into that, but it is having an impact on the profession, and it really ties the hands of the profession, and it makes it difficult to move forward and do the things we're all talking about. We all would like to see, without leadership, nothing's going to happen without leadership.

Jon Becker: But if you don't get on the scale every morning, you're getting fat, period. Right? Like, if you are not introspecting and looking at yourself, you are not getting stronger as an organization. And I think that the problem for law enforcement is that gradual erosion of leadership, that gradual erosion of knowledge, that gradual erosion of introspection leads to society. I mean, again, you know, law enforcement polices at the consent of the people.

The net effect is if law enforcement is gradually getting worse and is not introspecting and is not owning their mistakes, what happens is what is happening in California, which is we make stupid a** laws to try to fix a problem. We're like, oh, I don't like that. Let's just throw out the whole thing. And the next thing you know, we have AB-481 and we're trying to get rid of canines. And you know, and I think a lot of that is the legislators don't know what they're talking about. But, also a lot of his law enforcement isn't helping them to get smart. What are your thoughts, Thor?

Thor Eells: Well, I couldn't agree more. I think the societal norms have been evolving and not necessarily in a positive direction. You know, I think, as I alluded to earlier, the silence from law enforcement regarding our profession has been this endorsement of our lack of professionalism, albeit unintended. It's the consequence of that we have to find a way to find our voice and be heard. I do agree that much of the legislative efforts are potentially as a result of being uninformed.

Well, some of that we own responsibility for. Who is going to inform them and help them make informed decisions with regard to laws or otherwise. Having said that, I also would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge there have been a lot of good faith efforts where folks have tried to share information, and it's just being willfully ignored.

This politicization of policing has, I think, reached a level of toxicity. Unquestionably. It is doing far, far more harm than it is good. That has to be righted. There needs to be, we need to find a way that we can create. Some separation for chiefs, for leaders, sheriffs, to be somewhat insulated from misguided efforts so that we can do the right things for the right reasons. I think there's an impediment to that right now, but the downward spiral that we find ourselves in right now is, is consequential.

Again, as I say, when you just look at crime, you look at recruitment, you look at retention, all of those are a direct result of some of these societal influences. Politics, bad laws being passed, the punitive approach to this, the criticism that's in many cases unfounded, but no effort to correct, is having a compounding effect on where we are with policing. And it's going to take a herculean effort to reverse what really right now is almost a tsunami of change, not necessarily for the better with the profession, but it, as Don mentioned, is kind of a complex answer.

I mean, it's not just chief standing up and saying something or sheriffs. It's a multiple pronged approach. I think the media bears tremendous responsibility for much of the false information that is shared, and they're not called on that, and they need to be because as the, you know, the fourth tier of our government system, you know, you talked about the separation of powers between judiciary, executive, legislative, et cetera.

You know, they used to always argue or say that the press is the fourth to hold everybody accountable. Well, originally that was, in fact the case, but it was under the premise that people would be honorable and truthful.

Well, that isn't the case. You have a problem. And I would submit that in many cases, the media is not fulfilling their responsibility of being objective in the sharing of information for people to make informed decisions. So until we can correct that, I think we're going to be swimming upstream as well.

But having said that, you know, in the end, the best that we can do and what we're trying to do is stay active, share objective information, continue to encourage people, despite the pressures of not having that introspective encouragement, to engage in it anyway and have the courage to act on it, because there is a lot of incentive right now where the less is more in law enforcement, the less I do, the less likely I am to find myself in a situation that I have to explain and or defend that is not serving anyone well, not the profession, not the public.

And so we'll have to continue to really try and get people's compasses realigned and encourage them to do the right things for the right reasons. And that isn't always easy. But we're not in this for the easy way out. We're in it to do the right thing, and that is continue to fight the good fight.

Jon Becker: One of the things that I think is necessary for that, though, is courage. Right? It takes a courageous approach, and change comes from swimming upstream. Right? And, you know, recently not, you know, not that long ago, the NTOA issued a policy statement about no-knock warrants that was received in some sectors with a shrug and, oh, yeah, I. And in others with a violent, you know, you got to be kidding me. Reaction. Talk to me about one, what, what the policy statement said and why you chose to engage that fight right now.

Thor Eells: Well, the current circumstances was the trigger for why we chose to get back out there, but this time to elevate the directness of the message. So it was sort of an iteration where we had best practices and now we had standards. The same type of elevation in. We have been discouraging dynamic entry, which was the inexplicit association with no knock. They were attached at the hip through a course of evolution over a number of years from when this really became kind of a primary tactic in the eighties, the war on drugs, to current day scenarios.

And we looked at that, and historically, you know, going back literally to the 1980s, Mike Hillman, in that era of people were telling people, hey, no knocks aren't for every single mission. Dynamic entry is not for every single mission. So it wasn't nothing new in terms of our position, but we went back and we looked and said, okay, for years we've been teaching decision making based upon our priorities of life. Hostages, innocent citizens, law enforcement, suspects, and really shouldn't be on the chart.

But in some cases, people have applied evidence to sort of de emphasize or at least better clarify evidence is at the bottom. Evidence is the least of your considerations. You should not for any reason whatsoever, be in unnecessarily endangering these human life because you want to get evidence.

And so obviously, a number of high profile incidents surrounding the quote unquote no knock prompted us to go back and take a hard look at where do we stand on this and why, and what have we been teaching so that we're not speaking out of both sides of our mouth, so to speak. And in looking at what we realized is what has transpired over a period of time. Is this misunderstanding in why we serve warrants and what the mission objective is relative to what your safety priorities are? And they were being misapplied if you really looked at the mission objective.

So that's the purpose of the warrant and why you're there relative to the safety that is there. We could not with good conscience support no knock warrants. I mean, there were already the legal exceptions that allowed you to forego a knock and announce, if necessary, based on exigency that was occurring.

And the other tactics that have become available to teams over time that are tested made more sense. The primary premise under no knock is that you're hoping through the utilization of that no knock exception, that you're able to achieve surprise.

And then second component sometimes is speed. Although I would be disingenuous to not acknowledge that there are teams that have been using no knock simply to forego the knock and announce requirement. But they're not necessarily making entry. But the real foundation for the no knock is, well, we're hoping that it allows us some surprise, some opportunity for some movement, for some sort of tactical utilization that we achieve surprise.

We're either better positioned or these types of things. Well, hope is not a tactic. And to hang our hat on that is doing a disservice to the men and women doing a very dangerous job. And some would maybe counter, well, without that, it's dangerous.

Well, I'm not going to say that they're all wrong, but it begs the question again, when you look at the analysis and how teams throughout this country, very experienced, very tenured, very busy teams, have been able to accomplish the exact same kind of missions and never use a no knock versus those that are doing them as a matter of routine.

I mean, there's an agency that was using a no knock warrant to retrieve a pit bull puppy that had been taken in a theft slash robbery. You know, that's why we felt we have a responsibility for the good of the profession as a whole. To say that no knock warrants really have sort of outlived their usefulness, in a sense for the safety of all involved.

Jon Becker: So it's, you know, these things, these concepts tend to get conflated together, right? A no knock exception is a legal concept on a warrant that says you do not have to provide knock in notice before making entry, right? Because the constitution requires knock and notice and obviously requires a search warrant to enter somebody's home requires knock and notice as part of that search warrant, unless there is a specific exception granted by the judge, who is the only one that can say that.

But then beyond that legal concept, there's also a tactical question or a tactics question of are you going to knock and wait? And if you knock and wait, then what are you doing next? You see all over the country multiple strategies being employed there.

Some are give knock a notice and don't enter, just contain and call out. You see limited penetration where they are doing knock and notice and breaking down the door, but then withdrawing and waiting and trying to engage the homeowner in a conversation, again with Nye to moving out or true dynamic entry, whether you knock and notice or you don't knock and notice, whether it's no knock or, or knock and notice, dynamic tactics of entering the building rapidly, clearing the house quickly.

And I think that one of the things that you see the media currently conflating is those two concepts. Breonna Taylor had a no knock warrant, but they used dynamic tactics after providing knock and notice. And so is the NTOA's position directed towards the use of no knock warrants or is it directed towards dynamic tactics for search warrants?

Thor Eells: That's a great question. And really what we're wanting to discourage is that entry component, because with the utilization of the no knock frequently then coupled with the dynamic tactics, is this is the part that's counter to what we instructed is you are taking a situation where we are the conduit for compressing time and opportunity for decision making. That's counter to our instruction. It's counter to what we teach is why would we want to compress time both for suspects to make decision making on what their activities are going to be as well as us?

So now we have to assess more under a compressed timeframe that we can created. And now the consequences are in the current climate that we work, if we make a mistake, it isn't. And you alluded to this earlier when you're talking, we now live in a climate where we are criminalizing mistakes. When I was a young officer, some of the mistakes that I made, if I were to make today, I could very well be indicted and criminally charged for.

Jon Becker: Oh, for sure.

Thor Eells: So that has changed and we have a responsibility say, well, why create that circumstance? Why put yourself in those positions? I mean, if you, you know, we're going to speak very bluntly here. You look at the incident that generated a lot of national attention around no Knox other than Breonna was the incident that took place in Minneapolis.

Now, by the letter of the law, what the Minneapolis Police Department SWAT team did there was absolutely legal. They followed all the statutory requirements that the state required with regard to the acquisition of the warrant, the manner in which the warrant was served, those things. And yet you look at then what was the fallout of that? And I'm not passing any judgment on that. I'm just simply saying, you know, you look at what took place on a national level and what it resulted in in many states prohibiting any kind of no knock warrant, their legislators reacted immediately.

So it's another example of a national issue that, you know, originally, ten years ago that would have been a local issue, but everything receives national attention now, and there's often national responses to that. And so we felt that we had this responsibility to differentiate.

A no knock exception is exactly that. It is a legal exception versus a tactic of dynamic movement. And where somewhere along the line, those two became one in the same. If you said no knock people's minds. That meant, you know, people are making entry, their hair's on fire, we're going from front to back in the least amount of time, that type of thing.

But the one thing that I think is also not frequently stressed is there is a knock and an ounce requirement, but there's actually a third leg to that stool, which is wait a reasonable period of time. So not only do you need a knock and announce, the stipulations are that you await a reasonable period of time. Reasonable period of time, obviously being somewhat subjective, based on the time of day that it's being served, the, you know, sides of the structure that it's being served at, all those other types of things.

But timeliness of your waiting is weighted. And many agencies have expressed to us, well, we don't make entry, but we use the no knock so that there's no risk of having to face suppression hearings on did we wait a reasonable period of time to do X, Y and Z? We don't have to answer to did we knock and announce? Well, yeah, we did.

But, you know, you look at Breonna Taylor, one of the contested topics there was, did they knock and announce? Did they announce themselves in a way that could be understood, that type of thing? Well, some agents are saying, well, by having the no knock exception, we don't even have to deal with that. We understand that, and we're not disavowing that. That could be helpful.

What we're really taking a hard stand on is that the entry movement there is fraught with high risk and relative to the safety priorities that we have been for decades teaching, that far outweighs this mission objective of what the warrant's there for.

Jon Becker: It's funny, because if you listen to most SWAT teams talk about the mission of a SWAT team, it is to slow the event down, give the guy time to make a good decision, negotiate, try and slow everything down. But then that same team will turn around and argue that, you know, you have to use dynamic tactics on warrants, so you have speed, surprise and violence of action.

And I interviewed Phil Hanson, who's one of your board members and one of our joint mentors for, you know, many years. And Phil, I asked him about the origin of those tactics because Phil was around when that all started. And he said, you know, the thing is, it all started with hostage rescue. All of our training was rooted in hostage rescue, which is, you know, speed and surprise and violence of action really matters in hostage rescue. You have to get there quickly. And he said, so that was what we built the team's tactics around, and then we just applied that to dynamic, you know, to search warrants.

And he said, at some point, we realized that we were compressing time in a way that wasn't to our advantage. If the goal is to use time to your advantage, it was not working. I think Sid Heal put it best years ago. He and I had a discussion about it, and he said, you know, the problem with. With dynamic search warrants is you're taking a guy who has made so many bad life decisions that when he had time to think about it, that the sheriff is knocking down his door with a SWAT team, and now you're going to give him 30 seconds to make a decision that may not yield the right decision. And, you know, it's, I think this tension is an interesting question that I'm not sure what the right resolution is. Don, what do you think?

Don Kester: Well, I think this points out one of the maybe failings historically of law enforcement is to truly understand the definition of the terminology that we use when people talk about speed, surprise, and violence of action, which we don't condone the use of that term. I haven't for years, and hopefully people aren't using that anymore.

But if we look at the definition of violence of action, it basically is an unrestricted use of force. It's a military term. I don't know of any law enforcement agency or officer in the United States that is allowed to operate under those circumstances. None of us, even in a hostage rescue, violence of action, by definition, doesn't apply to civilian law enforcement in the United States.

So we really have to do a better job of understanding the definitions of the terminology we use, and we're starting to do that. I want to go back to your previous question, because it was a great question about, are we trying to address the tactics associated historically with no knock warrants, or is it the use of the no knock warrant? And Thor hit it all on the head. But I will say it does go beyond that. And what I mean by that is we at the NTOA do strongly feel that anything that is accomplished with the use of a no knock warrant can be accomplished safely and effectively with the use of a knock and announce warrant.

And so, while, like Thor mentioned, we do acknowledge that there are teams that use a knock, a no knock, but they're not making that immediate entry. We understand that. We get that. We understand their philosophy. However, a counter to that is that we can still accomplish everything using the knock and announce. So is it worth it for us to put ourselves in the situation to have to deal with the whole no knock issue whatsoever.

And I say that we know we can do it with a knock and announce piece of paper because thousands of teams throughout the United States have been doing it since their inception. There are teams that were created in the 1970s, extremely active teams, that have never served a no knock warrant. And they do. They apply, they apply the safety priorities and the tactics and they do great.

And there are teams that serve hundreds of warrants a year, some of the biggest teams in America, and they have not done no knock warrants for 30 years. The vast majority of SWAT teams in America do not conduct no knock warrants based on anecdotal evidence conversations.

Jon Becker: Now, when you're saying that, you mean using the no knock exception or using dynamic tactics.

Don Kester: Using the no knock exception even.

Jon Becker: Got it.

Don Kester: And so now people, of course, are going to say, well, where's the numbers? Those numbers don't exist. What we do find, though, first of all, I want to just emphasize that the feedback when that position paper was put out by the n, two, a, the feedback was overwhelmingly positive from law enforcement. In fact, the general response was, two general responses.

One was, why are you guys putting this out? Doesn't everybody know this? And number two was, it's about time you guys pushed this issue and finally took a stand on it. So the overall reaction, even from state associations, was extremely positive. Am I going to say every agency, every SWAT operator and every association completely was on board? No, that, that absolutely is not the case. But it's very regional.

And in fact, some of those I can give you, I won't mention areas and names, but a couple regions where they historically do serve no knock warrants. And they had a little bit of an issue when this position paper came out, have completely changed their tune. Now for a variety of reasons.

One, they've been educated and trained because that's one of the challenges we have seen is teams that really, or personnel that really fight this issue, and they don't want to sit and have a discussion about the no knock, you know, that conversation. They've never done it any other way. They don't know how you accomplish what you accomplish with a knock and announce warrant. Yet hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of warrants have been conducted by SWAT teams using knock and announce warrants, and very safely, very soundly.

And so we've seen a huge education boom on that issue. And that's been good to see. We're proud of that. We're happy with that. We are more than willing to have those discussions with anybody. We understand, you know, we're not a governing body, but we felt it was time to take that stance, to, again, try to improve things. Don't set ourselves up for failure. Don't set our people up for failure.

And let's take the whole no knock thing out of the equation, because we can do everything we're doing with a no knock. We can do with a knock and announce. And now we've dealt with this issue and it goes away.

Jon Becker: So what about the argument? And I've heard, you know, people that were opposed to the paper and came back and argued it, their argument is, you know, Breonna Taylor's a perfect example of what happens when you knock a notice and then enter with dynamic tactics. Right? They knock notice. They had time to get out of bed, arm themselves, and then shoot Jonathan Mattingly when he made entry. So, you know, would you not have been better off in that case with a no knock execution and a dynamic execution? What are your thoughts on that argument?

Don Kester: Well, I'll speak and say that I don't support that argument. Could it have happened? Yeah, and I don't discount it either, but I would much rather them get up, arm themselves, and come to wherever they want to come to. And if they are going to fire around, I would rather not be in the house when that's happening. In certainly most situations, it also comes down to what resources are being used. It comes down to training, comes down to education, experience, comes down to who is doing the mission.

And I'm not worried about, personally, I'm not so worried about what people are doing inside a house when I go serve that warrant. If I'm going to do the knock and announce, I'm going to breach the door. When I decide to breach the door, I'm going to wait as long as I decide to wait. And it might be 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 30 minutes, it might be 45 seconds. Every situation is different, but we definitely want to take all of that into consideration.

But we would rather engage all of those folks from outside the house. Anything can happen on any mission at any time. We understand that there's no perfect solution to this, and we're not saying there's a perfect solution. Are people going to get in shootings with knock and announce? Absolutely.

But we're in a much more defensible position, generally, physically, from a safety perspective, and legally, and from a societal perspective. In that public perception. It's a very big, complex picture. We're trying to put teams in the most defensible position they can possibly be in. That includes safety, physical safety, legal and public perception.

Taking out, knowing that we can accomplish the same mission very safely without the use of a no knock warrant, while at the same time we're taking out the legal issues and we're taking out the public perception issues, is a win, win-win for everybody.

Thor Eells: And one other thing that I might add to that is that our approach to the no knock component of this and what we're trying to do is really have teams and operators actively engage in risk management. So when the mission is presented, immediately begin looking at what is our mission objective. How does that correlate to the safety priorities with regard to the manner in which we choose to accomplish the mission objective?

So if we're given the warrant, and our primary mission objective is to secure the residents for the purpose of detectives being able to find evidence, paper evidence, money, receipts, records, things of that nature, you understand that that mission objective with regard to the safety priorities is at the very bottom. We're not going to unnecessarily endanger the lives of those above it.

And so how do you achieve that? You begin to consider your warrant service options, take down away knock and announce with a breach and no entry, limited penetration, contain and call out the all these options that are available, and you engage in the risk mitigation. You know, if we do this, what are the potential positives, what are the negatives? And you eventually arrive at your course of action, where through that process, you have mitigated risk.

To the degree that we can control, we fully understand we don't control suspect behavior, things of that nature, and we appreciate that. But there are things that are within our control that we can mitigate risk based upon the safety priorities, the priorities of life relative to mission objective. And that's where, as I mentioned earlier, we frequently find that mission objective is superseding the safety of the operators, the public, etcetera. And that's when we find ourselves on the receiving end of the criticism that is currently being discussed.

Jon Becker: Well, and I think it's also where you find yourself in the position of trading an officer's life for a bag of dope.

Thor Eells: Absolutely. And when you ask relative, you know, law enforcement practitioners, how much is one of your detectives lives worth? Or an officer, deputy or otherwise, they'll say, well, there's nothing out there in the world that is worth their life. And then you showcase these examples of, well, why are we doing this then? I mean, and there's this always this pregnant pause where you sort of catch them off guard as to. Well, yeah, I guess that is sort of difficult to explain.

So, you know, I just want to underscore that, you know, our position on this is relative to, we want to encourage people to be actively participating in risk mitigation to the fullest extent possible for their own safety, for the safety of their teammates, for the public, because that is what we absolutely need.

Jon Becker: I think that's a really good place for us to stop. Guys, thank you so much for joining me today!

Thor Eells: Thank you! We greatly appreciate the opportunity!

Don Kester: Thank you, Jon!

Episode 10 – Dana Vilander: Tactical Medicine and Ropes Work in Modern Tactical Teams

Jon Becker: My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

My guest today is Dana Vilander. Dana spent 32 years with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, working 26 of those years in the elite Special Enforcement Bureau, or SEB, first as a K9 for four years, then as a SWAT operator for four years, and finally as a tactical medic with emergency services division for 18 years.

Because of his unique experiences and very broad skillset, Dana has trained with and provided training to some of the most elite military and law enforcement units in the world, working in tactical combat casualty care, as well as rural operations, vertical access and rope, and high angle rescue work.

Dana, thanks so much for joining me today on The Debrief!

Dana Vilander: Thanks for having me, Jon!

Jon Becker: First, let's kind of walk through your career path because it's kind of a unique one. You've worked kind of both sides of the tactical world. So why don't we go back to the beginning?

Dana Vilander: Oh, to the very beginning, yeah. Okay, well, that's a good one. In college, I actually met a PJ who just got. Now, this is in the late seventies, and we discussed it and it really fascinated me what PJ's were doing at that time. I don't know if he was in Vietnam or not, but he inspired me to delve into it. And when I went to the recruiter's office, it wasn't the pathway that they have today where they have a pipeline to prepare you for the testing and stuff like that. So that part of it didn't appeal to me, but it was always in the back of my mind.

So in 1982, I enlisted in the Air Force reserve as a security policeman. And what's interesting is in that unit was an LA sheriff's deputy. There were a number of deputies and police officers that were in the unit. And that deputy at the time just happened to be Jack Ewell.

Jon Becker: Oh, man!

Dana Vilander: So that's where we met. Was in the air force reserve back about 1982/83.

Jon Becker: It's like saying, yeah, I met this guy named Babe Ruth, and he's like, hey, you want to hit baseballs?

Dana Vilander: Yeah. So he encouraged me to apply to the sheriff's department set me up on a ride along in Firestone park with Vic Rodriguez and his partner. I believe it was John Hogue, who died a few months after that in a shooting. But I was really happy. I wanted to do that. So chose the sheriff's department. I applied to LAPD, Long Beach PD, Sheriff's department, all at the same time. The sheriffs picked me up first, and I'm glad they did. I had a blessed career while working patrol. Had some interaction with the special enforcement Bureau, but not a lot.

But I knew that was where I wanted to go because when I initially came on the department, they had a unit called the emergency Services detail, which was essentially a civilian equivalent of the PJ's. So I was in the reserves until 1990. May of 1990, I tested for SEB itself, SED for the SWAT side, and I was encouraged to try out for canine as well. So I tried out for K9 during that time. Saddam Hussein invaded Karoit in August of 1990. And if I had still been in the reserves, I probably wouldn't have got to the special enforcement Bureau.

So it was kind of fortuitous that I got out in May because the unit did go to Kuwait. And K9 picked me up in January 91 and went through SWAT school, got the K9, had countless operations like you do as a K9 handler. And some years, it was about four years, I went over to the SED. So the SWAT side. John Ajay, who passed in 1998, he and I did a body swap. He wanted to come over K9. I wanted to go to SWAT. That was one of my goals, was to go to SWAT and worked my way up through the teams. I was actively involved in the sniper program, entry team member.

And in 1998, I tested again for the emergency services detail, or ESD, and was chosen to go there. So in 1998, went through paramedic school, which is the first thing you have to do. And from there, mountain rescue training and then dive training and spent the next 18 years there. Hoist operator, crew chief on air rescue five, and search and rescue, medic, recovery diver, SWAT medic.

Jon Becker: So talk – maybe for those that don't know, La sheriff's ESD. Kind of give us a thumbnail sketch of the unit of.

Dana Vilander: So when I got there, it was an 18 man unit. You had three sergeants, 15 deputies, deputy paramedics. So everybody had to go to paramedic school. And you had all this training and experience. And at the time, we would have five guys on a shift, basically. So you had two in air five working as helicopter rescue medics.

And then the other guys were on the ground driving Angeles crest, Azusa Canyon to Hunga Canyon. You know, you were up in the mountains and if a SWAT activation happened, then you just drive out of the mountains to wherever the SWAT activation was. And so you worked intimately with the volunteer search and rescue teams for LA county and you pretty much were busy all the time. They had a unique schedule. It was a 72 hours on schedule, three days on, six days off.

And I can remember the longest shift I had was 70 hours of being awake for 70 hours, just going from call to call to call, which is great.

Jon Becker: So I think one of the things that's unique about ESD is it's got this multi mission profile. Right? Like, how do those missions silo out? Give me like the kind of, you know, they've got a rescue, obviously, search and rescue mission. What else does ESD do?

Dana Vilander: Well, the tactical medics on every SWAT operation and SWAT operations basically were the king. So if you were – Well, if you're actively involved in a search and rescue mission, say on the ground, they would just have to call guys in to cover the SWAT mission. But if you were just out patrolling, like I said, on Ansar's crest or something like that, and a SWAT mission came in, you'd have to respond to the SWAT call.

And that was pretty much the primary function because when I first got there, if you think about warrant services and some of the barricades where the entry team wants to pull the front door, the front hardened door off the house, it was ESD that would do that. We had the only truck that had a huge boat cleat on the front of the truck and somebody would go up with the big fish hook like this, with the cables attached and hook them to the front door.

And then we would tie it off real fast and then drive back and pull the door off the house. And that was one of our missions for barricades. But more particularly on the warrants, the early morning warrants, that was a real common thing we were used for. And then we're there, obviously, as medics.

Jon Becker: But then there's also a dive component to ESD. Right?

Dana Vilander: Right. So the history of ESD. Let me do that real quick. So the special enforcement bureau or the special enforcement details started in 1958. It was basically like a saturation patrol team of guys. You had to be over 6ft to be in the unit at the time. So real policemen. So it was a gun squad? Yeah, pretty much.

So in 1966, Sheriff pitcher started, created the emergency services detail. And the job was to have active duty deputies up in the mountains on search and rescue missions. And the unit with Frank Waldron was the sergeant and the, basically the founder of the unit. They picked up the recovery diving.

So anybody that goes missing, any object evidence, anything like that, planes in the ocean, if they need to be recovered, it was ESD's job to dive on those things. So typically it was in lakes, pitch black water, no visibility whatsoever for evidence and dead bodies.

Jon Becker: Feeling your way around.

Dana Vilander: Feeling your way around. Exactly. But we would also be out at Catalina, around Catalina island, and then also around San Clemente island. So San Clemente island is actually a piece of LA county and the waters around it. You know, you have a lot of active scuba divers, fishermen, things like that. So if a scuba diver went missing or died off of San Clemente Island, ESD would do the scuba dive death investigation of that, which they still do today. They do all the dive accidents or dive death investigations out of the special ESD.

Jon Becker: So, I mean, that's a pretty, especially for a law enforcement unit, that's a pretty broad skill set. You've got a dive component, you've got, you know, ropes and high angle rescue combined with tactical, you know, combat casualty care.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: All in, all in one unit.

Dana Vilander: Right. So it does take a lot, but luckily, I mean, retraining, constant training, but luckily, like with, let's just say, air rescue five, you're using all of those skills on an almost daily basis. When you, when you load the helicopter, you have your dive gear, you have your medic gear, you have your rope rescue gear, and you have your SWAT gear that all goes in the helicopter and goes with you wherever you go.

The only thing you don't have is tanks because tanks are rather heavy, you know, and so they. But those are staged around the county. So if a dive came up with the operation, you'd change into your wetsuit while flying to the, to pick up your tanks or flying to the dive scene and just make it happen like that.

Jon Becker: So a big component of ESD is kind of the tactical medic thing early in your career. Talk to me about what that was like. What was the, you know, at some point, TCCC becomes a thing, right? Prior to that, what was the strategy?

Dana Vilander: That's a good question, because there's a real good history of SEB in a book. I don't know if you've seen it by John Coleman, but the history of that is there. And basically, in the ESD were more like first aiders than anything. Else. They started going to paramedic school in the early seventies when La county initiated the first paramedic institute. So they were getting the paramedic training, but still they were doing basic, more like basic first aid. They could do IV's and things like that.

So when they integrated with sed in, I want to say it was 1970 to 71, they were still kind of in a first aid mode. Roll into the eighties. There's a lot of doctors around the country who were interested in the tactical world, and rich Carmona was one.

Jon Becker: Rich Carmona, eventually surgeon General Rich Carmona.

Dana Vilander: Yes, that rich Carmona out of Pima County, Arizona. He has an interesting career. So the development of, and they called it TEMS, or tactical emergency medical skills at the time was still more like first aid. You could do your paramedic skills, but the tactical component really hadn't gotten hold yet. So fast forward to 1996. I'm sorry. So, 1989, NTOA and Rich Carmona and SEB, they hosted the first actual NTOA Tems course in the country.

And then next year, it was held in Pima county in 1990. So those are kind of the beginnings right there. Through the early nineties into about the time I came into the unit, they started a tactical EMT program, but it was still kind of a medic, first aid kind of a course.

Jon Becker: Yeah, not a lot of it. It's MT.

Dana Vilander: We're not moving. We're not there. To the TCCC yet. Yeah, TCCC, as a concept started in 1996 with…

Jon Becker: Black Hawk down.

Dana Vilander: Well, 1993 was Black Hawk down, Battle of the Red Sea, and 18 dead and 73 wounded. And Frank Butler, John Hagman. And then there was another doctor out of the military with the last name of Butler. They wrote this paper, and what they did was they did a retrospective studies back to World War 2, Korea. What are the patterns of injury? What are the patterns of preventable death?

And when they looked at what happened in Mogadishu, they're saying that there was a correlation there so that you could die from getting shot in an extremity within two to three minutes if nothing is done for it. And my first EMT class back in 1978 at college, tourniquets were forbidden. You never put it. If you put a tourniquet on that limb, you're gonna lose that limb.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Dana Vilander: So you just…

Jon Becker: Yeah, I remember that.

Dana Vilander: You just didn't put a tourniquet on. And what these doctors advocated was tourniquets, pressure dressings, wound packing, things that were not in the normal world like you see today. We'll stop the bleed. So it was revolutionary in 1996. There was only one military unit that actually adopted it back then, and that was when Stanley McChrystal was the colonel. The regiment commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment instituted it. They have a great program to this day, but it was still slow to pick up in the rest of the military. In the civilian world, there was still no knowledge of this other than the fact, unless you saw the paper itself, the tactical.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I mean, nobody carried tourniquets. No ambulances, didn't have tourniquets. It was not a thing. Right? And when you say preventable death, if my understanding is correct, what you mean is if we had had basic life saving capability, that person survives, for instance, they bleed out from an injury that you could stop the bleeding with.

Dana Vilander: Right. So if you want to look back at some of the old first aid training manuals from EMT classes, from colleges, whatever it is, when they're talking about. What's the common acronym for first aid?

Jon Becker: ABCs.

Dana Vilander: ABCs, right. Airway, breathing, circulation. Well, in those manuals, if you actually go back and look at it, it will say in there, and by the way, if the person is bleeding severely, stop the bleeding first before you address anything else. But that was completely glossed over when.

Jon Becker: It was like, oh, put a little pressure on it.

Dana Vilander: Oh, yeah, elevation.

Jon Becker: Yeah, yeah. Elevate it and put pressure on it. He's missing a foot. Lots of pressure.

Dana Vilander: So that was what they did was they brought this to light, that this was good. Let's go up a few years. 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. Even the military special units didn't really follow TCCC at that point. Early on getting into Iraq, 2003, 2004, it still wasn't being taught pretty much to most of the medical community within the military. Special operations started to get that training and they started to get things like live tissue training to do it.

But what was the problem with all of the training that the military is getting and these doctors identified, that was the training. If you took advanced trauma life support, say, as a course, as a doctor, as a medic, whatever you went to advance, it's based on being in a hospital. And you have every resource in the world when you're a hospital.

But when you're on a target house, on a SWAT operation, or on a military operation, you could be hundreds of miles away from something. Or even in La county, if you're in the high desert, you could be 60 miles from a trauma center. And what do you have as your medical supplies? Usually it's going to be in a backpack or even smaller if you're a team without, say, a dedicated medicine, you may have an individual first aid kit.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but even, I mean, IFACs even was not a thing.

Dana Vilander: Not a thing. Right.

Jon Becker: Like people might have a boo boo kit. Yeah, but they weren't carrying.

Dana Vilander: Yeah. Bandaids, some gauze, Cobans, maybe ace wraps, something like that.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but they weren't carrying IFACS.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: Or tourniquets or compression bandages or any of the stuff that now we regard as kind of de rigueur.

Dana Vilander: Right. When I got to ESD in 1998, I was given a Harper pack is a back pack, and you filled it up basically with the gauze, the wraps, the things like that. Not even chest seals at the time. You'd have Vaseline gauze to create a three sided occlusive dressing if you had a chest injury or abdominal evisceration or something like that. So that came later.

1998, when I got there, aeromedic school, like I said, dive school, mountain rescue school, got on the helicopter, started flying, and then it was about that time we started to see a transition in the guys from the unit, the older guys that were retiring, and then more guys were coming in with Iraq and Afghanistan. You started to see how the tourniquet started to take hold because they had to, because all the blast injuries that were happening in Iraq, I mean, it was pretty much a lot of catastrophic injuries. And the early tourniquets that they had was the Cat tourniquet by North American rescue about 2004, Tachymeter Solutions Ross Johnson developed. He was a special forces medic, developed the soft tea.

Jon Becker: Soft tea, yeah.

Dana Vilander: And that was, those were basically the two basic tourniquets. Two, go to tourniquets on the market at the time, and there were others out there. You had the NATO tourniquet. You had different people doing different things. But those are the two basic tourniquets. I was fortunate enough in 2000 to be flying air five when two PJ's from a special tactics squadron on the east coast came out to fly on air five with us. And I maintained contact with one of them, Mike. And through the years, he guided me towards military courses.

And one of them that he guided to me is John Hagman, one of the writers of the teacher proceed paper. His company, Deployment Medicine International. They were doing live tissue training for the military, and I was lucky enough to get into one of those courses. And that's when I saw the tourniquets that were out there.

And when you're working on something that's bloody. You have dirt and everything else going on. It makes a big difference when you're trying to turn, as opposed to you and I sitting here and applying a tourniquet to your arm or to your leg. With live tissue training, there's real blood, there's real dirt, there's a lot of things going on. And so you can see how these tools work in that environment.

Jon Becker: So when is okay. So tourniquets start to come in. TCCC begins to really take hold of the military.

Dana Vilander: In the military, yes.

Jon Becker: And at what point is the March acronym developed? Is that as part of the initial launch of TCCC?

Dana Vilander: March was. Yes, MAR. Originally it was MAR, and then CH came later, but it was, yeah. Massive hemorrhage, airways and then respirations or breathing. So it wasn't ABC reversed because the C in March is still circulation, but you're dealing with shock, and you're dealing with any additional injuries that you may come across. But massive hemorrhage was the big one. Like you said, if your foot's missing and you've got blood squirting out, you need to stop it. And direct pressure and even putting a constricting band isn't going to work. You need a tourniquet that you have to stop the bleeding.

Jon Becker: When did we figure out that? Because I remember as a kid, my brother was hit on his motorcycle when he was really young, had a compound fracture of his femur, would have bled out, severed femoral artery, and a med student from USC came by and improvised a tourniquet and shut the bleeding off.

And I remember the discussion about, they're gonna cut his leg off and it's gonna cost him his leg. And, you know, when did we figure out that that was just not true?

Dana Vilander: It was the data coming out of the war, Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also, the Israelis had experience with tourniquets, and they found that you could safely have a tourniquet on for two to 4 hours, was the timeframe. The Israelis actually had an experience with a guy having a tourniquet on for 11 hours with no nerve damage, no loss in sensation, anything like that.

So it was that experience at the military being the driver of this program in the beginning, that that's where they said, yeah, these are safe. And it was about 2005, 2006, ESD. We continue to funnel guys into these live tissue courses.

So those concepts came with us, and we started teaching, actually, a TCCC program in about 2006. I want to say right before the NTOA conference in LA, we were already going down that path, and we started to do some. Just some kind of familiarization classes out at patrol stations about the march algorithm and doing things. And you would hear patrol guys would come up and say, why aren't they teaching this to us in the academy? So that was back then, which they do now, probably nationwide, they're doing that.

Jon Becker: I think so. I think most places now we've kind of developed that people are carrying IFACs. If there is a silver lining to the Afghan and Iraq wars, it is the massive expansion of TCCC knowledge and understanding of hemorrhage control. And the devices that work, the devices that don't work, you know, they were obviously born of tragedy. But there are a lot of police officers that are alive today because TCCC was pushed down.

Dana Vilander: Absolutely, absolutely. Police officers, citizens, and then even suspects. So the fact that it's out in the police community, it's great for everybody. There's that video of an Oklahoma officer that was shot just recently, making contact with a guy this close. When the suspect pulls out a gun and starts shooting at him, he gets hit in the leg. He follows the TCCC principles. He runs the COVID. There's a vehicle there. While he's still engaging the guy as the suspect.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I remember this one.

Dana Vilander: Did you see that one? Yeah, yeah, yeah, it's a great one. And then he comes back out to see where the suspect is. The guy's running away. So he pulls his tourniquet out and applies it to his leg, continuing to communicate on the radio. Did a fantastic job.

Jon Becker: Yeah, he really did.

Dana Vilander: And that's what you see. You look at LAPD saving their own, also putting him on citizens downtown when they were having some of the riots and things like that. A police officer. Yeah, it's for him. But in that moment, you see a lot of police officers will apply it to the citizens or the suspects.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I mean, you see suspects that are surviving, that have been, you know, engaging police and getting shot, and the team is rescuing the guy with their own medical gear. You know, it strikes me that it's kind of good all the way around.

From your experience, how do we maintain this? Like, it's – We've had this big spike, and the 35 years I've done this, you'll see things come into favor, and then you see them go out of favor, and, you know, it's like we build a capability, and then it gradually attrition takes it down and we go, oh, my God, we have to do this. We start over again. If you're an agency, how do you maintain this capability of TCCC, you think?

Dana Vilander: That's a good question. It takes somebody at the agency, whether it's an appointed person or somebody takes it on themselves, which you see that a lot of agencies, a guy just takes on a project and he owns that project, but they need to have some sort of manager said that the training continues and more importantly, the budget for the equipment. Well, budget for the equipment and the training, because training is money as well.

Jon Becker: Yeah, sure.

Dana Vilander: But definitely on the equipment side. I think as far as state of the art when it comes to the devices and all the techniques and things like that, I think we're probably there for a while, but it's just maintaining that budget so that supplies are replenished. You evaluate your training program and. And then what are you giving the guys in their IFACS, in their first aid kits?

Jon Becker: So let's dissect that a little deeper. So first, starting with the training, what, in your opinion, how many different levels are there of training here? Like, obviously we want first aid training, TCCC training for patrol officers, SWAT teams, probably a little higher level. SWAT medics. How do you dissect that in an agency? Take a middle sized agency, 500 officers. How many different levels of expertise would you try to implement?

Dana Vilander: Oh, I would keep it at maybe just two levels. So, like, for the SWAT team, because SWAT teams train more regularly than I think patrol officers do. So a one to two day program every year for patrol is fine? Well, I wouldn't say fine because I would obviously want it better.

But I think – And on the SWAT side, every quarter, they should have a day at least. You look at the initial training, usually you're talking about, you go through the TCCC program, then you're showing them the tourniquets. Everybody goes to the tourniquets. I think the next phase is that putting them into the training operational mode where they're coming upon casualties and having to deal with them. And SWAT teams are pretty good at doing that, too.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting. One of the things that we're seeing emerging with a lot of the teams we're working with is kind of a, for lack of a better term, like a three tiered approach where you've got IFACS for individuals, you have a team medic who is carrying a backpack and has other levels of equipment and then kind of a third tier of equipment, which is really mass casualty care. Right. It's throw bags. It's, you know.

Dana Vilander: Right, right.

Jon Becker: What are your thoughts on that?

Dana Vilander: I agree with it. We had bigger backpacks in our armored vehicles. For calls. We would have rope access equipment in our bearcats, and then we would also have the bigger ones for the mass casualty. And it makes sense to have the mass casualty stuff because you are going to be. You look at San Bernardino and as the team makes entry and you have 30 casualties on the floor, you know, what do you do?

And, you know, the companies in ours done a very good job of it. Tac Meds has done a good, I'm sure, safeguard medical. They all have these mass casualty bags where you can just drop a kit as you go, roll a person in the recovery position so they don't die an airway death, but then people coming in will see an IFAC next to them or something like that, or a throw kit that's down on the ground next to the casualty. Absolutely.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I think one of the things that came out of San Bernardino is there are a lot of people that are alive today that would have died had there not been a tactical medic or medics who had the ability to quickly look at somebody and just put them in a recovery position. They're unconscious, they're having a hard time breathing. Just rolled them into a recovery.

Dana Vilander: And that's the thing that should go out, even to patrol, because who's going to be first on scene? A lot of times.

Jon Becker: Almost always.

Dana Vilander: Luckily, at San Bernardino, the teams were training just down the road. So they were on scene like that. On a normal MCI, normal active shooter with multiple people down, it's going to be patrol. Just like the active duty procedures have changed from Columbine, where we're going to wait outside and wait for the SWAT team, to now, if you're a lone officer, you're supposed to go in there and address this guy and eliminate the threat if you can. So that's a quantum leap from where we were 25 years ago with Columbine.

Jon Becker: So, Dana, why don't we start with individual gear? Talk to me about an IFAC. What? What should be in an IFAC.

Dana Vilander: So an IFAC is actually designed for you. It's not for you to take off and use what you have in your kit on somebody else. So it's. It's designed and the commercial kits that are out there. So you'll have, typically, you'll have a tourniquet, you'll have one or two chest seals, preferably two chest seals, which we can talk about.

And then you have a gauze, whether hemostatic gauze or just regular gauze. And then you're going to have some sort of a compression wrap. You could have scissors, you could have gloves. You could have a casualty card in it to make notes if you wanted to. But that's typically what you see in a knife. AC.

Jon Becker: So why don't we walk through the components, starting with a tourniquet? Two major tourniquets are still kind of cat and soft tea. Right?

Dana Vilander: Right. Yeah. There's some really good ones from other ones. Like I said, safeguard medical. Some other companies have all come out with good tourniquets that are all committee on TCCC approved.

Jon Becker: Okay, so is that kind of the industry standard? Like, look for something that's committee on TCCC approved?

Dana Vilander: Yes.

Jon Becker: That's the good housekeeping seal, as it were. Okay, and then what about gauze?

Dana Vilander: Well, back up to tourniquets just for a second. So for a SWAT guy, he should have a tourniquet where somewhere on his plate, carrier, vest, whatever it is, where he can get to it with either hand. Because if he shot in his left arm or shot in his right arm, you have to be able to reach it with either hand. And then in the IFAC, you should probably have a second tourniquet. Cause you could get shot more than once, and you might have to treat yourself that way.

Jon Becker: Yeah, we just actually just embedded into one of our play carriers now. A tourniquet into the bottom of the vest, where it's just at your stomach. It's there all the time, and that's the – I use this for you. What do you think about the idea of locating IFACS and tourniquets and those kinds of things on, especially with SWAT cops putting it someplace that everybody knows where it is on a guy.

Dana Vilander: There's philosophical differences on that. It's something that I think it's a good idea. If everybody has their IFAC in one place, everybody knows where to go to for that. If I come on John, and John has his IFAC on his right shoulder, and I go to look for it down where everybody else has it, you're just delaying care.

Our job is to keep every drop of blood in them. So you're just having that seconds delay if you have to find the guy's IFAC or whether it's in his cargo pocket or whatever it is. I like the idea of having him located the same.

Jon Becker: And does it make sense for a team to use the same IFAC and the same gear? Because, you know, you'll see teams where everybody has the same gear, and you'll see other teams where everybody has individual gear. What are your thoughts on that?

Dana Vilander: They have individual gear because they're having to buy it themselves, and that's an issue. Right? So if you're gonna do something like that, everybody on the team should know what's in each, each person's IFAC, and then you have to pull it out and show them how to use. If you have a different iFAC or a different tourniquet than everybody else, you better show everybody how to do it. Cause you might be unconscious and they have to apply your tourniquet on you.

Jon Becker: And you said a second ago, like, we need to keep every drop of blood in their body. Talk to me about the significance of that.

Dana Vilander: Right. So if you go back to MAR from the original TCCC paper, tourniquets stop the bleeding. The second part of massive hemorrhage that they identified, and they were kind of throwing it out to industry that – If you think about the one ranger that died in the movie, Ranger Smith, the PJ or the SF medic, he's trying to clamp his artery because it was way up high in a pelvic region. Right? Couldn't do it. Couldn't clamp it. And he ends up bleeding out as a result of that.

So what they put out there in the TC paper was, we need a hemostatic agent embedded in the gauze so that it can be packed into a wound. So, blood stopping agent, commercially made by a number of companies now, but it's embedded in the gauze, and you're going to pack the wound just like you would with normal gauze.

Jon Becker: So that's like sea locks. And, you know, there are variety of things.

Dana Vilander: HemCon. Combat gauze.

Jon Becker: Yeah, variety of things. But you're not only packing gauze, you're packing in a clotting agent, basically.

Dana Vilander: Essentially, yes. Depending on what the chemistry is on how it's going to affect the clouds, how it's going to create clouds.

Jon Becker: What is it? Give me more there on that.

Dana Vilander: Yeah, so the one that is from. I'm sorry, Z-Medica, the combat GOS. So originally there was Hemcon or something like HemCon, which is a derivative from seafood. Sea life casings.

Jon Becker: Yeah, like shell.

Dana Vilander: Shellfish, which doesn't have any. It creates a clot at the site. So with combat gauze, what it is, it works on the clotting factor within your body. So it's – I forget the name off the top of my head right now for the agent that they're using, Kaolin. They're kind of a kaolin based agent that they use, and it works on the actual clotting factors. To build a clot at the site.

Jon Becker: To force the body into building the clot.

Dana Vilander: As opposed to creating, say, a plug.

Jon Becker: Got it. And so I've heard conflicting arguments on using hemostatic gauze, that doctors don't like it. It complicates cleanup and all that. And then I've heard the exact opposite, that, no, it doesn't matter. It stops bleeding immediately. That's the right answer.

Dana Vilander: Well, that's a really good thing to bring out, because when you're teaching. Stop the bleed to civilians now, and that's where we're at in society today. This all came from TCCC. But when you're talking to civilians, you say, put anything in that wound that you can possibly put into it. T shirt, a sock, underwear, anything. Dirt, grass. Stuff it in that wound if you have to, if that's all you have available to try to stop the bleeding.

So to say that there's an argument from doctors that a hemostatic agent embedded in gauze is a problem. Yeah.

Jon Becker: So when you're doing that right, when you're shoving gauze, you're shoving a sock, you're shoving whatever. What are you really trying to do?

Dana Vilander: You're trying to get in here so that you're pinching the artery down, packing it as tight as you possibly can to keep it that way, and then you're going to wrap it with a compression wrap to keep it right there.

Jon Becker: Is the goal at that point to cause the blood to clot, or is the goal to both pinch the artery down?

Dana Vilander: Both.

Jon Becker: Got it.

Dana Vilander: Cause you might not be 100% successful in pinching that artery, but you're gonna pack that wound as tight as you can.

Jon Becker: Because, again, we're just trying to retain every bit of blood we possibly can in the body. So going forward with an IFAC tourniquet, some form of gauze.

Dana Vilander: Right. Compression wrap.

Jon Becker: Compression wrap, which is, how are we gonna use a compression wrap, typically?

Dana Vilander: Like an ace wrap or coban or something like that? You're going to bring it round, tight. As tight as you possibly can.

Jon Becker: Again, creating compression. Compression on the wound site. Yeah, got it. So that's an individual first aid kit.

Dana Vilander: Right. I'm sorry we skipped over the chest seals. So when I started to create an occlusive dressing, you had petroleum gauze, and you would use tape to create that three sided occlusive dressing over a hole in the chest. What industry did was they created chest seals using a gel substance, hydrogel kind of a substance that it would stick. If you think about normal first aid tape that you have in the house or the white first aid tape that you have if you're sweaty or if you're a hairy man.

Jon Becker: Doesn't work.

Dana Vilander: It's not going to work. Well, the creation of, through industry of these chest seals, it will stick, and then they all have. Now. So you had a three sided occlusive dressing so that air could escape if it needed to. Now, they all have vents in these chest seals so that all you do is have to put the chest seal over the wound and it should vent on its own.

Jon Becker: And the intent is to maintain the vacuum integrity of the chest.

Dana Vilander: Right. We don't want air coming in. We don't want any more air even exiting an injured lung into the chest cavity that can't escape. But we don't want any air coming in from the outside also.

Jon Becker: Got it. Okay, so that's individual first aid kit.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: Let's move up to a team. What do you think the best methodology for a team to carry their gear? Everybody's got an IFAC, I'm assuming to start, and then each of the tactical medics then is going to carry a secondary backpack.

Dana Vilander: Right. Yeah. So when we were doing SWAT operations, warrant service or barricaded suspect or whatever, I had a small pack, but I had four additional tourniquets. I had more hemostatics, more gauze, more chest seals, and then some of the diagnostic stuff that you would need, like a pulse oximeter, things like that.

Jon Becker: So then when we're talking about a mass casualty event and these mass casualty bags, it's basically a series of throw bags. It's a series of little individually packed. What do you see is in those individual throw bags?

Dana Vilander: Tourniquet chest seal, if they can afford it. You don't see chess seals often in those, in those casualty kits. But I would say chest seal, hemostatic if you can afford it. Remember, hemostatic started about the dollar 50 range. So if you're a small, small agency, you know, you put 20 kits together, that's $1,000. What's in your budget?

Jon Becker: Just in hemostatic gauze.

Dana Vilander: Just in hemostatic.

Jon Becker: As opposed to like, z gauze or rolled gauze, which is…

Dana Vilander: Rolled gauze is a dollar and a half. Yeah. So you'll see rolled gauze, usually a space blanket. Try to keep them warm, which is part of the h in March. Chest seal be good. If not a chest seal, they'll have the petroleum gauze in it, also compression wrap.

Jon Becker: Okay. And so the methodology being, if you have a mass casualty. Now you can hand out these throw bags, which then allows one medic to direct bystanders, helpers, people working on themselves. The idea being to scale the medic.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that makes sense.

Dana Vilander: And a lot of them, you'll see like up to 20 of these throw kits in there.

Jon Becker: What is your recommendation? Like if an agency starting a program or starting a tactical paramedic. Tactical medic program, what's your recommendation as to where they go for training? What do you see as the best resources?

Dana Vilander: There's good training agencies or training companies around the United States. I think one of the best ones, if you looked at it, was strategic operations down in San Diego. They're nonstop teaching the military in TCCC procedures, both out of hospital and in hospital, what they have down there at their location. But they're also into the TECC program, so they're teaching a lot of police fire on the exact same techniques.

Jon Becker: What's the difference between TCCC and TECC?

Dana Vilander: That's a good question. So TCCC is military focused. The word combat, some people, not in the military or not in the SWAT world, thought that might be sound offensive. I think we all know that a gunfight is a gunfight. Combat is combat. But they removed it so that fire departments would be probably more amicable fire departments and others and the general public knowing that you have a TECC, tactical emergency casualty care as opposed to tactical combat.

Jon Becker: So before we wrap this up on TCCC stuff, is there anything else you think that teams should or individual operators should be thinking about or looking at?

Dana Vilander: I think one of the things is have realistic training. Following up on your training question, have realistic training and put your casualties, when you're doing this training in unique positions, and just remember the guidelines are, you know, direct fire, you're return fire, get to cover first, you know, address the gunfight, and then address the casualty when you can. If he can't be taken care of himself.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting! One of the things that you'll see in training is people go, that's unrealistic. That's an unrealistic scenario that a casualty would be stuck on a roof, or it's an unrealistic scenario that a casualty would be stuck behind a bookcase.

And if we've learned anything through our lecture series, and if we've learned anything just through the debriefs we've done through this show, you ask yourself, as the story evolves, could it get worse? Oh, it can't get worse. And then it gets worse, and then it gets worse again. And then it gets worse again.

And it's just, you know, you see these circumstances where it just gets perpetually worse. And the training seems, you know, training seems to fall into these patterns of like, oh, okay, well, Dana's gonna be our test guy. He's in the middle of the room, on the floor and the suspect is already dead.

And, you know, I just did an interview with Buddy Brown from York County, South Carolina. The suspect is under a deck. He shot three guys, he's killed one and he's given up. And he's 30 ft from you. And two of your guys are bleeding you to death. What do you do? And so it's like when you talk about real estate training and you ask Buddy, he said, we never trained for that. We never thought the guy would give up. Now the guy's throwing his gun out, he's hands up.

So now you're holding at him. But are you dealing with him? Are you dealing with your guys? How are you getting the guys out? You know, buddy himself is a big guy. They had a hard time carrying him. They kept dropping him, I think. What would you recommend in those training iterations? What are the things that people need to think about when they're designing a training scenario?

Dana Vilander: Well, first off, I would say every time you do team training, you put casualties into it. The more often you include casualties in your team training. You know, particularly for the part time teams that maybe get once a month or twice a month, every time you do entry training, you should be putting casualties in there because exactly what buddy was saying, you never train for that. If you never train for that scenario, how will you react?

And there's that old saying, you don't rise to the occasion. You revert to your lowest level of training or highest level of training, whichever that way that went. But if you have never even thought about this before, this concept that I could have a casualty with a suspect right here, what am I going to do? And that's what you need to put into your team training. You have to put that in.

The military is really good at doing that, invoking casualties. And through the courses that we have, we do that a lot. So the guys get used to that. Not get used to it from the standpoint of that, you know, if that's one of their friends, you know, they're going to be. They wouldn't be upset about it. But it's – No, it's an immediate action drill.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: That's a really good way to put it. It's an immediate action drill where you've. You have conditioned the team that when this happens, we do this. And, you know, as you said in all the debriefs that I've attended over the years, that's exactly what happens. Everybody defaults to the level of their training. And so I like that idea.

One of the things that you and I have talked about and is kind of a logical extension of where we hear is ropes work, and using ropes work specifically to evac people to move them to do whatever. Why don't we start just with kind of Dana's thumbnail sketch of history of rappelling in SWAT. It all goes back to the SWAT TV show and guys swinging through windows, but give me kind of your take on it. Yeah.

Dana Vilander: So ropes haven't been used a lot in tactical situations other than in the, let's just say, the suicidal jumper type of a situation. But go back in history, everybody's familiar with the princess gate, the iranian embassy, storming by the SAS, going through the windows. And I think that's what everybody's opinion is of rappelling and rope work. When I got to the team, we had to rappel in SWAT school.

And I think just about every SWAT school probably has a repelling segment, but I think it's more of just a hoo ya, more of a confidence drill. Yeah, something like that. And I think they're missing out on seeing the other applications. If your snipers are elevated, you know, how are they getting up there if they – If there's not a ladder, if there's not a stairwell, if they're. If they have to get down in a hurry.

So in addition to rappelling, though, for the. For the ropework side of SWAT, most teams don't. Don't do it. You know, like I said, they have the suicidal jumper considerations where negotiator be out there. And there's. There's very few teams that are actually doing that. I know San Diego is doing that. LAPD does that. ESD handles that at the special enforcement Bureau.

And I'm sure New York, NYPD and I'm sure agencies around the country are doing that. But it's an interesting thing. When you talk about doing a tactical rope access course with teams, and they're from small towns, they say, oh, well, we only have two and three story buildings, so I don't need to worry about that. And if I could just tell a quick story in a conversation with an LAPD officer, was they had a crazy guy on top of a restaurant. He's compliant, but they got to get him down. Fire department won't help him help them because he's a suspect.

Jon Becker: He's a crazy guy.

Dana Vilander: Yeah. So they have to get up there on their own. They get down there on their own. So they use a dumpster to climb up on top of the roof, handcuff the guy, he's compliant, and then they have to get him down, and they kind of drop him to the dumpster, and then he rolls and falls on the ground. Basically. They thought they did a great job until they watched the body camera footage of that.

So the question was, how could we do that? And there's simple, inexpensive tools in the rope world to do stuff like that, like webbing or short pieces of rope, but you have to learn those techniques, too. Going back to the training for the medical side, you have to understand what's potentially out there that you could do, and then you need to see how you can do it. So not what to do, but how you can do things using different pieces of equipment.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And I think it goes back to the team having as broad a skill set as they possibly can. Right. Like, it's. I think part of the challenge with a modern SWAT team is there's so many different domains of knowledge that are required.

And, you know, you see teams where they try to maintain that knowledge for everybody. You also see teams where they build cadres. And that seems to be kind of the emerging strategy is that Dana's the rope guy, John is the medic guy, and you can take the team to a deeper level. What's your opinion on that?

Dana Vilander: No, I agree with that because are you going to be the drone operator? Are you going to be the aerial drone operator? Are you going to be the ground drone operator? Are you the planner for the hit that you're going to do? Because you could just keep going and going and going. Right?

Are you the weapons instructor for the team and you have all these responsibilities, or if everybody does that, I agree. Having a cadre. Cause they can be specialists then. And for some of these skills, you definitely want specialists to keep everybody on the team safe. And then in the liability side of it, they're protecting the team and liability also.

Jon Becker: Yeah. You know, we're hearing. I'm hearing more and more from teams that they've kind of given up the idea of tactical rappelling, where they're going to do the princess gate, swing down to the window and all of that. And so you'll hear like, well, why do I need ropes? Why do I need repelling? Talk to me about some of the reasons and some of the applications that you see for ropes work in a modern tactical environment.

Dana Vilander: Sure. I mean, again, getting a sniper up into position, that's really common here in LA because they have the academy awards, they have all these things. It's real. Even at Sofi Stadium now with the Rams and the Chargers over there, ESD is up on the rafters all the time. You have protesters that go up there. So not necessarily on the SWAT operational side of it, but that's a specialty that somebody on the department has to have, and it's not going to be the fire you sar guys, particularly if these are suspects.

So the team needs to have that capability for those type of incidents. So if you go to the fifth and main hostage rescue with LAPD, you know, that developed so quickly because the suspect was acting erratically and violently. And then they did the dual explosive breach on that because it happened that fast. And what they would have done, talking to the team, the climbing team leader over there, if they had had the time, they would have sent guys down on ropes, whether it's to breach a window, whether it's to put a diversion outside, throw a drone in, whatever it is.

So there's definitely some uses for it. I think what teams aren't seeing is also that if, let's just say the suspect sets a fire below you, you're two or three stories up, and now you have a fire that goes below. That's to get started by the suspect below you, or they light off the natural gas pipe, and now you got natural gas filling the house and you're two or three stories up. Are you going to run down the stairs or do you want to just go out that window that's right there?

So there are escape techniques that are out there similar to what firemen use and train at on a regular basis. But I think SWAT teams should know that because you just never know what's going to happen below you as well.

Jon Becker: And also, you know, there's the whole. To tie it back into the TCCC conversation, there's also like, if one of your guys gets injured in an elevated position, you've got to get him down.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: Right. Or a suspect, you know, it's. I mean, you're probably a little less concerned with the suspect, but, you know, if. If somebody gets injured in an elevated position and you can't bring fire in, what do you do?

Dana Vilander: Right. Or just think about being on the fourth or fifth floor, one of your guys is down.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Dana Vilander: I mean, are you gonna. It's gonna take a few guys. Cause with equipment and everything else, you're gonna be fairly heavy. But how many, how long will it take you to get the guy down to the ground floor as opposed to breaking out a window, attaching a rope to him? Cause he's got some sort of a rigging belt or something. And then just dropping him to the ground? Not dropping him, but lowering ground, which could be done in about 25 to 30 seconds.

Jon Becker: Yeah, no, it makes a lot of sense. I think it's trying to articulate to teams why they need to maintain this other capability. With regard to gear for a team, what would you recommend a team carry with them?

Dana Vilander: I think everybody should have at least a rigging belt on. Not a. Not just a velcro belt or something. You need something like what Aardvark put out with the belt system that you guys have, where you can actually put a rigging style belt or a rated belt like from Misty Mountain or something like that, that can be integrated into a harness if you needed to, but you can rappel off of that.

And that is the first place with two carabiners. I think every operator on an entry should have 25 to 30 ft of one inch tubular webbing. Because you can escape yourself. You can use it to open doors. You can create a harness with it. There's a variety of uses to use with one inch tubular webbing. That's what everybody should have.

An agency that I work with quite often just did that after I did some training with them on what the possibilities with webbing are. And I'm not trying to sell my classes, I'm just saying those are the possibilities that are out there. But you should have a roping team guy you were talking about, special. You should have a specialist and he should have a rope that, depending on the size of the building, is that you can get down at least 100 ft, if not more.

And then he would have the ability to anchor the rope, send the rope out, and then have a carabiner or device that the agency, the team wants to use so that everybody can bail out again, this is more of the bailout mode for about three pounds weight. Really not that much money. You could have a kit that is fully capable to do whatever you want to do with it.

Jon Becker: That somebody just carries in a backpack. And that's where it sits.

Dana Vilander: Yeah.

Jon Becker: With a rope stuck on a vest.

Dana Vilander: Right.

Jon Becker: And even from a rope standpoint, it doesn't have to be, you know, 716 inch kern metal rope. It can be smaller.

Dana Vilander: Right. So technology obviously has come a long way even in the rope community. What the PJ's use is an eight millimeter rope by sterling. I know a North American rescue has a new eight millimeter rope. So 8 millimeters is down there in size where you would like to be because 100 ft weighs maybe about three pounds as well. And it's very compressible when you're carrying it.

Jon Becker: So Dana, obviously these domains require a lot of expertise. What's the best way for people to get a hold of you and to learn about the programs that you're running?

Dana Vilander: So we have a website, it's and we offer about 14 different courses. The majority of them that we have are California post approved. So I thought it was important to get the state's buy in for the SWAT community and for the law enforcement community in general to see that we have an approved program and guys will get the credits necessary for them when they take the classes.

Jon Becker: Are there any resources or websites you'd recommend? Do you have Dana's reading list or website list?

Dana Vilander: I really don't. I ponder that a lot. I do a lot of just the research myself. But on the rope side of it though, there's definitely, if you looked at on YouTube, not rescue craft. Well, there is rescue craft on YouTube, but also element rescue. Sean McKay, he does great videos, explains things very well. A lot of the techniques that we teach are the techniques that he's teaching and that's a good YouTube resource.

On the tactical medicine side, North American rescue has some really good content on their website and also on their instagram they have a NAR doctor. They have some really good content going out updating people on things that are happening regularly.

Jon Becker: Well, we'll link to all of that in the show notes and make it easier. We'll also link to your website.

So Dana, thanks so much for joining me today! You taught me a lot.

Dana Vilander: Thank you, Jon!

Episode 11 – Kris Allshouse: The Use of Drones in Law Enforcement

Jon Becker: My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

My guest today is Kris Allshouse. Kris is the executive director of LA County Regional Training center and a former SWAT operator for a large Southern California agency. Kris and his team at LA CRTC have emerged as some of the primary thought leaders in the use of drones, more specifically sUAS for law enforcement.

Kris, I appreciate you joining me today on The Debrief!

Kris Allshouse: Thanks for having me, Jon!

Jon Becker: Just for background, will you kind of give us a little bit of your career in law enforcement first?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, sure. I spent my career in law enforcement at the Long Beach Police Department, where I was on the SWAT team for 13 years. Work gangs, worked our training division. I finished in our advanced training unit before I retired and moved into the Los Angeles County Regional Training center.

Jon Becker: So how long have you been with LA CRTC and what's your job there?

Kris Allshouse: Started working there in 2015. I'm the executive director. We really, in earnest, didn't get started until probably the fall of 2015, but we've just really found a niche in drone training. Incident command. We're nonprofit, created to support public safety, initially law enforcement, but that has expanded to public safety, NATO allies. Any way that we could make people safe? That's part of our purview.

Jon Becker: So tell me, when did you guys first become interested in drones and specifically drones for law enforcement?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, I think right when we started in 2015, I started going to conferences because I didn't know anything about drones whatsoever or anything aeronautical. Ended up connecting with an old friend and we started training and we started training and started building this drone training program. And it was really new for some, for most. So anyway, pardon the expression, took off with the demand.

And then we just started pulling in instructors from all the really robust programs out there. So they brought all their knowledge, things done right, things done wrong, best practices to the table, each one from various parts all over the globe, really internationally.

Jon Becker: So we could probably spend hours talking about drones and many different public safety applications. Law enforcement, fire, I mean, everybody from the forestry service down is using it for this purpose. Let's focus in on law enforcement if we can. How have you seen the evolution of drones over the last few years for law enforcement?

Kris Allshouse: First, I think the right answer is the macro view, because I remember having a phone conversation with a northern California major city that said, we will never have a drone in our city several years ago. Now they have a very robust program.

What has happened is the paradigm has shifted where people have realized that these things benefit everybody in law enforcement. Everybody. If you are a black lives matter or a homeless advocate or, I don't like high taxes, it doesn't matter where you are on the spectrum. These tools help you. They benefit you. They benefit everybody, and they really decrease uses of force. They decrease violent confrontations. They really, really stretch the dollar as far as a force multiplier is getting things done. And it's just been an amazing thing.

So the biggest, probably shift that I've seen is this paradigm shift where drones are bad. And when people are starting to see even people who are anti law enforcement, for lack of a better description, they see what it does and then they go, okay, I'm okay with that. That's good. I like that. So that's been probably the biggest shift that I've seen.

Jon Becker: If you were gonna break down the categories. Cause I remember when we first started approaching drones, the idea was, oh, they'll replace a helicopter, and pretty soon you were seeing them used for crime scene investigation and tactical and fire. And if you're gonna break down the categories of usage, how would you split it now?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. And I think you and I talked about this a long time ago. A long time ago. There's that outside large. You know, it's going to be up high and kind of stagnant, maybe even tethered. And then there's something a little bit smaller that you could fly into the backyards and be overwatch, support for tactical teams and that kind of thing, or just area searches or whatever.

And then an interior drone, something specifically designed to fly in very confined spaces with a GPS denied environment. So those are probably some. And we could probably go even deeper. And there's overlap, of course, in all those categories.

Jon Becker: So that's vertically from a platform size. How would you split it horizontally? From a mission set standpoint?

Kris Allshouse: The mission sets are large and expanding. So there's the whole investigative side, first of all, that's really exploded. So there's these 3D mapping softwares that are out there and drones that best work with those softwares. And that is amazing for rapid clearing of crime scene, rapid clearing of accident scenes. As far as time goes, you close a freeway down in LA.

Jon Becker: Yeah, right.

Kris Allshouse: There's a financial number there. I don't know how they come to that, but it's expensive.

Jon Becker: Well, there's a financial number. There's an emotional number. There's a, you know, everybody hates sitting in traffic, so. Yeah. The faster you clear that scene, the happier everybody is.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. And so. And you and I have a little bit talked about this, that the tactical application with the 3D modeling right now, I could put a drone out back in the 1900s. You send a couple of officers out to go scout a target that you were working on, they come back and they're riding with Crayon.

Jon Becker: They come with a crayon sketch on the back of a cocktail napkin, and it's like, that's not even a house.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. How far away is that?

Jon Becker: I don't know about that far.

Kris Allshouse: So now you can go out there, and in two minutes, you can capture the scene, and then you can have it at the command post in a 3D model where you can measure things and zoom in on things in about ten more minutes, 10, 12 more minutes, and you can have that at the CP. That is a game changer for me. Tactically, I can't believe we're not just scratching the surface with data collected.

And that's where those mid size outdoor aircraft go, by the way. Those same ones can also do all these things that we have with barricades in cars or areas or Overwatch for teams as they make their approach, or search and rescue where someone's missing. How do we find them when we have these really high quality thermals?

Jon Becker: It's kind of investigative. Is a silo. Search and rescue applications is a silo.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. And then you have their tactical. Your tactical missions, and there's, of course, overlap, but ultimately, it's gonna be out of the trunk or out of the car.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Kris Allshouse: And they're just gonna pop right out. And it's already happening. Agencies like Antioch PD up north and Huntington beach, and a lot of them, Chula Vista, Torrance, they're deploying rapidly and resolving things safely and rapidly. So it's a huge win, win, win.

Jon Becker: How do you, as far as tactical use, how do you see, like, how do drones improve the safety of law enforcement? How do they improve the safety for the public? How do they improve safety for suspects?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, well, it's a great de-escalation tool. So if I fly, whether it's outside or inside, if I fly and make contact with somebody who's 500 yards away or inside versus, I come around the corner and I have to deal with that person in an armed confrontation or a potentially violent confrontation, even if it's somebody who's suffering a mental health problem.

Jon Becker: Yeah, mental health problems.

Kris Allshouse: How nice is that I have all the standoff time and ability to talk and to provide some services or intelligence to my own team where I can keep them safe, remove that aggressive confrontation until we can resolve it in a different way. That's just touching it. I mean, there's so much more going down this path where it's just keeping everybody really safe.

And now we go inside and I can. It's a flying camera, and it integrates into all the other tools that we've been using over all these years, k9 and positions of advantage, where you can see in and binoculars, for that matter. But all these different tools that we use. Back in the 1900s, we had like 30 foot poles with a mirror at the end to see it pop this camera to fly it to anywhere I want it to.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's interesting because, you know, you think about a tactical situation where you're first trying to shrink your problem, right? It gives you the ability to shrink your problem rapidly because you know exactly where the guy isn't, which lets you take space until you actually get to the problem.

So now your operators arrive and they're not exhausted from an extensive, you know, stealth contact search. Then you get there and now you have the ability to communicate, see the suspect in a way that he loses his tactical advantage very publicly.

I remember years ago I had a friend that worked, one of the ESU teams, and they had a guy barricaded in an apartment with a knife. And he said, if you come in, I'm set up. I'm going to kill you, whatever. They knocked down the door and pushed a ballistic shield against the door. It was an apartment in New York. And now they're looking at the guy. That changes the negotiation dramatically. There's no more pretending like you're in charge. You're behind the door. Do you think that it improves safety of the suspect as much as it improves safety of the team?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, probably even more. If we're well trained, we're pretty good at it. Not that we want them, but we're pretty good at armed confrontation, violent close quarter combat. We're trained. We don't want to do it, and we try to be there in a way to not let that happen. But if we're there and somebody points a gun and we're in a room, you don't have any options other than lethal force.

This gives you a whole lot of other options, including there's a psychological factor that comes with a robot that's flying and telling you you need to get out or you need to whatever, or just saying, what can we get you? Depending on the scenario, it's a double.

Jon Becker: Edged sword, and we'll probably touch on that later. As to the idea of something flying into your house and negotiating with you, both profoundly effective and creepy at the same time, for sure.

Kris Allshouse: But the alternative is there's another human there, and we all know that as there's an aggression, there has to be a response that's lawful, but that doesn't end well for anybody, and more often than not, it doesn't end well for the suspect. So this is. I think, overall, it is definitely more of a benefit to the public. And this is a big thing coming out with crowd management. So crowd management, you know, it's the new hot button thing, at least certainly it was last year.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Kris Allshouse: And you had a lot of people who were very strong advocates of saying, hey, we have the First Amendment right. We should be able to go do things, assemble. I'll just leave it at that. And I am one of those people.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I do.

Kris Allshouse: I really am a big proponent of that. The problem is you have organized trouble mixed in, and that's true probably for any event. So separating folks that are just trying to express their views on an issue, exercising their First Amendment right, versus those people who are just there, criminally minded, with total criminal intent and no intent to be involved in whatever's going on in the protest or the assembly, removing those, identifying who those are, this is a tool that allows you to do that, that protects people's right to continue to protest because we're removing the things that make it unlawful.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because if you think about the purpose of the First Amendment was specifically to protest the government. That's why it exists. So we want to have that ability. But the challenge with those crowds, as you say, is there are professional agitators. There are people that are there specifically to provoke a reaction. I remember years ago, went through a class, and the instructor said, the thing you've got to understand about a crowd is it's not homogeneous.

There are people that are there because it's interesting or it's novel. There are people that are there because they really believe passionately. There are people that are there to start a fight. And part of the challenge with crowd control and riot control has always been differentiating the good guy from the bad guy, the guy that's there exercising his constitutional rights, who we want, not only we want him to have that right, we want law enforcement to protect that right, versus the guy who's there to break windows and steal stuff and throw rocks at the police.

And I see what you mean by putting a drone up. You do have the ability to start to identify the agitators, identify the trouble.

Kris Allshouse: It preserves the assembly.

Jon Becker: That's a very good point. As teams are moving, we see this movement on the heels of the Breonna Taylor case to move away from dynamic entry for SWAT teams. And whether that's the right decision or the wrong decision is obviously subject to debate. How do you see drones and other robotic devices fitting into this new mindset of coordinate contain or contain and call out?

Kris Allshouse: Right. And, of course, that was happening for us at Long beach before I left, for sure. Probably before a lot of people, long before I left, is, you know, the tactics behind it. I use dynamic when I have speed, aggression, and surprise, and if I don't have those or I can't regain those, then I'm out. Right?

So now, if I don't need that, if there's no compelling reason to put us at risk or put suspects at risk, for that matter, this is a no brainer. So we have all these tools that have really emerged over the years, attachments to armor that allow you to port and open up houses so that you don't have to go in. We can try to resolve that.

Jon Becker: Yeah. We know you're barricaded in the bathroom. We're going to take the bathroom wall out. You're not barricaded anymore.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, I mean, like Sid used to say, it's the center of gravity of the suspect. If they're barricaded, then the walls are the center of gravity.

Jon Becker: Take the barricade away.

Kris Allshouse: Right. These are probably the most nimble of the newest tools, or of any of our tools that we've had. All I got to do is break a window if there's not something open, and I can fly this in and locate the suspect. Now, if they knock it out of the air or whatever. Okay. It's still intelligence. It's still way more than I had. I get to see what's going on inside.

So it's so easy and so rapidly deployed and so much data in such a short amount of time, it's kind of a no brainer to add to the tool chest for any tactical team.

Jon Becker: How do you think it fits into the use of things like K9s, chemical agents? Like, where in the toolbox does that go?

Kris Allshouse: So I would send something not alive before I would send something alive, and then I might send something not alive after I send something alive.

Jon Becker: Yeah. That's a very elegant way to put it.

Kris Allshouse: So I send the aircraft in or integrate it with the dog, which is happening a lot, training with the dog. So I fly, I find something. I perch, I hold. This is what I like about your Loki system is. And I'm a fan of three, by the way. I haven't told you.

Jon Becker: Yeah. One is none. Two is one. Three is the right number.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. I want three on that controller, and I'll leapfrog them all the way up there and hold those. And I put cameras all over the place, so I'm not dependent on any one or any two, for that matter. So in any case, you've used that live feed and then you integrate dogs and anything else. Chemical agency, if you get any movement or anything, all that put together in that tactical plan. I mean, it's unique and case by case, but those are some really great tools to have.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's interesting because the most dangerous thing is the thing you don't know about. It's the unknown. And it strikes me that whether the circumstances, a tactical situation or a foot pursuit or a fire or a search and rescue mission, this gives us the ability to solve the unsolvable, to find the hidden thing in a way that is not. Doesn't create risk. I think one of the things that is currently in the news is it seems like the regulatory environment is struggling to keep up with the evolution of technology. It seems like the technology has gotten considerably ahead of the regulatory environment. What do you see as a primary regulatory changes? That's our primary regulatory challenges?

Kris Allshouse: Well, you're hitting me right at the time of the military equipment designation in California for the drone, which is. It's unfortunate to see what most agencies are using you can buy at Costco.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Kris Allshouse: It's not some. I mean, are they highly specialized? I guess, yeah.

Jon Becker: It's not a weaponized predator drone that's dropping a hellfire missile. It's literally an advanced hobby drone.

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. You know, if you're getting it from the military surplus or something, I get it. I understand that there might be a designation there, but it's not. And this really. That's the same mantra I have. It's helping the ones that are in the most need of help besides law enforcement. Yeah. Is it good for us? Heck, yeah.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Kris Allshouse: It's amazing for us. But don't underestimate how powerful this is in helping. Like we just talked about preserve first amendment or address the homeless or. Or black lives matter. I tell this story all the time. I was at a conference in Torrance. Police department put up a video of them chasing a suspect yard to yard with the drone. And they had their manned helicopter above, and they were coordinated really nicely. Excellent job. Right?

So the whole conference, silent watching this and yard to yard. And the short version of the story is just like in any negotiation, you tell the suspect it's futile in some way. Right? We're here. We're not going away. Whatever. Something like that. Well, the drone does that for you. Even without a speaker, it does that for you. I'm here. I'm not going away. And this is how serious we are.

And it chases him about three yards, and you can see in this guy's face, like, and he gives up, he walks out, and everybody's happy. No cops are hurt, running to chase them. There's no use of force. There's no shooting. There's no dog bite. There's nothing. And you know how it is. I'm not going in the backyard with the potentially armed suspect without sending a dog or something. Right?

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Kris Allshouse: So none of that happened. This helps protect the people who have any potential confrontation with law enforcement. It's just a – it's a no brainer for me. And so regulatory, it's hard to see the military. Sad to see the military thing. The other side of it is this is a national priority in FEMA, and yet when the funding from the feds come down here, by the time it gets down to the state level, it's hit or miss. Whether it can reach these agencies, these small agencies that are struggling, they're literally going to Costco or they're doing worse. They're taking Officer Joe's drone and using that, which is, of course, a no no.

But it's, you know, part of that is this confusion that a lot of municipalities and counties are seeing about where we going.

Jon Becker: Well, there is this kind of idiotic contradiction that you see in the regulatory environment, which is that if I'm shooting a video of my kids snowboarding and I don't have a, you know, I'm not a part one of seven pilot, I don't have an FAA license, I can kind of do what I want to do because I'm not even aware of the rules and nobody's going to enforce them against me.

But if I'm shooting, you know, if I'm a photographer, taken out of law enforcement context, I'm a photographer taking a picture of a house for a real estate brochure. I'm an FAA pilot, and I'm paying attention to the rules. It strikes me that possibly the most dangerous people, as far as a public airspace environment, have no regulation, and possibly the safest ones have tons of regulation. What are your thoughts on that?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, well, I was talking to Marcus from CATO the other day, and he hit the nail on the head. He said, they're like four years behind us. They think that the privacy concerns and all these things are things that we haven't even thought about. They're already well ensconced in policy and TTPs, police agencies are on it. The policies are not. They're not mysterious anymore. They're out there. ACLU has involvement in them. There is. We are very aware of privacy, of meaningful policies that have a broad stakeholder appeal, which is where we teach everybody, start with the stakeholders, everybody in your community, everybody that's affected by this. Build that support, maintain that support. That's already happening.

The sad part is there's some legislative bodies that are not aware that we're on it. Law enforcement's on it. They are doing things the right way. And you're right, the commercial pilot's license or a certificate of authorization, these are things that we're already dialed in, though, and we're held accountable. Very much so.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's funny, because you look at the commercial drone market is hundreds of times bigger. When I say commercial, I mean the retail hundreds of times bigger than the professional market. And so it's like, just from a ratio of aircraft, it's hundreds or thousands to one. And yet here we are trying to regulate the environment.

Another thing that strikes me is kind of interesting, as you look at the rapid expansion ground based cameras, there are cameras everywhere. We have cameras in our refrigerators now, cameras in our TVs, cameras in our computers, and there is national policy. How are drones different than cell phone video, than body worn camera, than traffic camera? Anything else in your mind?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah. Well, they're more regulated. There is, and I get it. There is a real fear of big brother, which, it's funny because, like you said, there is no more privacy, but it's not because of the quadcopters that cops are flying. It's just not. Not even close. And so it is more restrictive, but this is also so much more recorded.

So the way we teach, the way public safety is doing it, is we log everything. We have training records, we have flight records, we have maintenance records. We have safety management systems, and now we have this software that integrates all of it.

So if I want to see what you flew and the path that you flew and the speed that you flew, it's right here. And how long that was and what your battery life was like and on and on and on. It's all right there now. And so there is no more. There's nothing hidden. It's all very, very transparent. So it's a no brainer from my perspective, no matter where you are on the spectrum, as far as privacy issues, as far as cops using drones, that kind of thing, because it's all verifiable and we're starting with stakeholders first and we're keeping them involved.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's an interesting question because I always think of the example of you walk by somebody's house, the back fence of somebody's house. You can't see into their house with a drone, you can. So there is that expectation of privacy question. Do I have an expectation of privacy in my backyard surrounded by fence? And I can make an argument that I do because nobody can see from the ground. But then again, anybody that flies over can see it. And so the drone kind of ends up between those two.

Kris Allshouse: It does. It does, Jon. So here's the thing. People ask this kind of stuff all the time, and the answer is, the constitution does not change. It hasn't changed just how we apply it some. And we don't have any really good case law yet. We just don't. We're going off helicopter case law.

Jon Becker: Well, generally speaking, any topic, there is no good case law, usually only bad case law.

Kris Allshouse: But there are some general things. Do you have a legal right to be there? Are you doing something right? If you discover something, was it discovered in good faith, or were you on a fishing mission where you had to manipulate and fly under something to see that kind of thing?

So good faith, legal right to be there. General concepts like that that are constitutional, constitutional under Fourth Amendment, and it doesn't change. So if you're looking at the concepts of being right, of unreasonable search and seizure, and you mentioned expectation of privacy, if you're looking at those concepts and you're understanding them and you're making wise, thoughtful decisions, you're going to be just fine.

Jon Becker: Do you think that the drone should require any different use of search warrants than any other investigative technique?

Kris Allshouse: The only time I would think that it would require a search warrant is where you're going someplace that you do not have a legal right to be and that the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and you're going to fish there, you're going to try to discover something that would be a case where you would need a warrant.

But if you're just flying the aircraft in the normal, routine function of your enforcement or something else even, and you come across something again in good faith, where there may or may not be any reasonable expectation of privacy if it's in an open backyard, probably not from above. Right? Especially if you're in Southern California, helicopters everywhere.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So in your mind, this is just another investigative device. The Fourth Amendment, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence covers all of this, and there isn't a need to make an exception. Do you think that that changes with exigent circumstances? Do you think that it's the exigent circumstances should just continue to be what they are?

Kris Allshouse: Well, so, you know, you can conduct the searches on those three things, consent, exigent circumstances, or warrant. So how you conduct something that requires a search warrant is irrelevant, whether that's whether I walk into a building, whether I fly into a building. It's just I'm conducting a search that required one of the three conditions to conduct that consent, exigency, or warrant.

I don't think this is a big one, though. It should not be written in how you plan to serve a search warrant. If I have a search warrant, I'm authorized to search. Whether I search by walking in or flying in doesn't have to be written into my affidavit.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's an interesting point. How do you think we best balance, obviously, as an attorney and as a con law guy, I love constitutional law. That was my area of interest. How do you think we balance our constitutional rights against privacy in this context?

Kris Allshouse:

Well, again, I don't think it changes. It should be balanced. And of course, we have to rely on the judicial branch to interpret that. Sure. But the same questions, regardless of how, have to be answered, and I don't think that changes in this case.

Jon Becker: There was recently a news story about a startup drone company that was proposing weaponizing drones at the border and using that as a means of securing the border. And it created quite a bit of outrage, and obviously people were spun up about that. Do you think that there are circumstances where it is legitimate to weaponize drones for law enforcement?

Kris Allshouse: I absolutely think so. Not in that case that you described.

Jon Becker: Yeah, nor I.

Kris Allshouse: But I do think, and here's the answer every time, is it going to save somebody's life or great bodily injury? And if I can find situations, which of course I can, whether it's taser or some less lethal option, if I can do something like that that prevents me from having to take another human's life or use deadly force on somebody. That's a win. As much as that doesn't sound like a win, that's a win. So I would never want to rule that out.

So limiting that saying I can't weaponize it, it's just saying, okay, well, then you forced me to put a human there.

Jon Becker: It has a weapon. It's interesting, I've had this discussion with friends where they say, well, you should never be able to remember. There was the incident in Dallas where Dallas SWAT used a robot to kill a guy with an explosive device.

And the reaction to that, had that happened in California, probably we would have eliminated anything robotic, including cars for police officers. But it was in Texas, and that's a different environment. But that raised the question of, like, is that okay? And I had friends who were like, that is never okay. That should never be allowed.

And I said, so if the guy stepped out and took a shot at police officers, they're gonna shoot him anyways, right? Like, how is that any different? And do you – I get the argument for non lethal. I think lethal is a more sticky environment, for sure.

Kris Allshouse: Well, but this is it, again, something for the courts to decide, because here is the question. Is the governmental interest so significant that we do not want that person to step outside? That's how compelling the governmental interest is in seizing him. If it is that compelling, then lethal force is authorized.

So you're weighing that against the individual liberties. And if you can make the case that our governmental interest is so compelling that that person should not be able to step outside or in view or whatever, then you've made your choice.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's usually another place that I think there's been a lot of attention is the use of UAS or other forms of robotics by terrorists as an attack device. And obviously, the idea of somebody using a UAS as a UAS born IED is terrifying in any context. How do you think we can best prevent that from happening?

Kris Allshouse: First of all, that's a horribly underreported event. It's happening a lot globally. Amazingly, we've dodged a lot of bullets here in the United States with this. But here's a couple things that I would just. Food for thought along this topic. In our incident command class, chaos. Working in the edge of chaos, we have the students come up with a terrorist attack. Every class comes up with a drone attack. And I make them have to do research and prove that this is doable. It's like, I'm gonna get a nuclear bomb and stick it.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Kris Allshouse: Okay. No, no. Tell me how you could do it. And they come up with really realistic terrorist attacks.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I don't think you have to be a math major to do that one.

Kris Allshouse: And so then you go back to the Connecticut kid who put a Glock on a phantom four. And I always go back to this Harrison Klebold in Columbine kids, not funded kids, they had secondary devices. If they all had explosive devices throughout, if they were an adult, terracell, or just an adult who's just not well, they could have really done a lot of damage. And then you add this capability, like, I can do a lot with the drone.

So this is why it's a national priority for FEMA, why the money is there, to try to do emerging technology and counter drone technology. There is a lot out there. The hard part is we're struggling to get it down to the state and municipal level, even down to the cities who are really dealing with some tough stuff, including just coming into your CP, flying over you.

Jon Becker: Yeah, flying over you, flying out to look at the positions of police officers, scouting things, you know, flying into airports like it's – Do you think there should be a national counter drone strategy?

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, and I think that is coming. I mean, I think with the traffic, air traffic management systems that will be coming online, every drone that's in the air will be known who it belongs to or where it is, what's it doing, what it's doing, what its whole flight pass. That's right here. That technology is not hidden. So I think that's absolutely gonna be the case where you can't launch a drone without. Without a regulatory body seeing what's going on.

Jon Becker: Do you think it's reasonable for state and local governments to be building counter drone strategies, or do you think that's something that has to happen at federal level?

Kris Allshouse: I think it best probably served at federal level, working with state, local agencies, where it's a total collaborative event.

Jon Becker: Kris, a recurring theme that pops up when the subject of drones comes up is this idea of a dystopian future. People cite the example of the Terminator and Skynet. Eventually we're going to build the right technology, that the planet's going to kill us, computers are going to kill us. We're all going to wipe ourselves off the planet. What are your thoughts on that?

Kris Allshouse: I have to admit, I'm one of those people that's a little bit afraid of it myself. I mean, Skynet's here. AI linked autonomous vehicles are here. So it does scare me for sure. And we were talking earlier, right? I want humans making decisions, especially ones that affect humans. Yeah, that's a – And I don't know what. I don't know. But, yeah, that scares me. And I'm selling it, or at least teaching it.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because I do have this, like, I have this internal conflict. Right? I find that I don't know why the subjects of drones bring this up more than robots did or autonomous cars. Maybe it's just the visual of something flying that human beings are key to a primitive level to react to. But I do see this tension of the ability to observe decreases the likelihood for lethal conflict, the ability for us to make decisions.

I agree with you completely. Human beings need to be making decisions, but human needs, we need to make decisions based on good information. And so there is this feeling of, like, the more information we present, assuming it's filtered and doesn't overwhelm us, is we're more likely to make a good decision. But how do you think we prevent that? In your mind, what's the best way to walk that balance?

Kris Allshouse: Well, I think as we move more and more down the technological path, that we never underestimate or undervalue the quality of really good decision making. Really good training. Training to make good decisions. So, in law enforcement, we're always fighting this. You know it as well as everybody. We're always fighting budget cuts and training cuts. And then they wonder why a 23 year old kid made a bad choice. He's a 23 year old kid.

Jon Becker: He's a 23 year old kid who's been through tactical training for 8 hours and is shot one time this year.

Kris Allshouse: And now that I'm old and retired, I think, boy, I finally know how to make good decisions. I finally know how to talk to people right in the field. Hopefully, I wasn't horrible, but I know that I know more now than I did then. I don't know what the balance is with training and all that, but not to get too far off the technology stuff, but that's all going to be integrated where you have benevolent people who are well trained, managing whatever technology we're using.

Jon Becker: Kris, I really want to thank you for taking the time to sit down with me on The Debrief today!

I think that these are really big questions, and I think that we're trying to balance constitutional rights against safety, and we're trying to balance technology against privacy.

And, you know, I am concerned about that as I know you are. And I am glad that there are guys like you that are doing the math and doing the heavy lifting and hopefully going to help us make the good decisions.

So thank you so much for joining me!

Kris Allshouse: Yeah, thanks for having me, Jon!

It's always fun talking with you. Thanks!

Episode 1 – Sid Heal Part 1: The History of LASD – SEB

Jon Becker: This episode of the Debrief is dedicated to the memory of Sid Heal. When we began this project, our primary goal was to capture the history and stories of the men who developed special tactics before we lost them to time. Weeks ago, we made the decision to launch the show with two episodes we recorded with Sid.

Sid has been my friend for more than three decades and was a key part of my early career and tactical education. Without Sid’s influence, I'm not sure AARDVARK would have ever developed into what it is, and I'm certain I would have been a very different man. As a result, it seemed only fitting for Sid’s episodes to lead the series.

Sadly, a few days ago, we lost Sid. As we were preparing for his memorial, I anguished over whether we should release these episodes and what the right thing to do was. That anguish ended when Sid’s family gracefully told me that I needed to release them, and that is exactly what he would have wanted me to do.

A special tactics community will remember Sid as a force of nature, as a teacher, as a marine combat veteran, as an author, and as the quintessential student of the tactical game. I will remember him as a great friend, a man of deep faith, a loving father to his kids and grandkids, and a dedicated husband to Linda for almost 52 years.

I'm very grateful for the time I was able to spend with Sid. His impact on the special tactics community was profound, and I know that he will be remembered by his teams, his friends, and his students for decades to come. I'm also grateful to have had this conversation with Sid just weeks before he passed and to be able to share that conversation with you.

My name is Jon Becker. For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

My guest today is Sid Heal. Sid is a legend in the special tactics community and a key figure in the history and evolution of special tactics in the United States. Sid is a retired CW-05 in the United States Marine Corps, serving numerous combat deployments, including the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and Operation United Shield in Somalia, just to name a few.

Sid is a retired commander of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and has led the Special Enforcement Bureau in a wide variety of other assignments. Sid is the author of several books and literally hundreds of articles. Sid is taught at the US Army War College and is the former president of the California association of Tactical Officers.

Sid, thanks for joining me today on The Debrief!

Sid Heal: Thanks for having me!

Jon Becker: So why don't we start with where your career started. Let's start at the beginning and kind of work our way forward to the present.

Sid Heal: Law enforcement career?

Jon Becker: Let's start with the Marine Corps.

Sid Heal: Marine Corps. I was 18 in those days. The draft was going. I was one, I was going to go at any time. Nobody would give you a good job. Nobody wanted to train you and have you leave. So we were basically societal cast offs. And so I joined the Marine Corps to keep from getting drafted.

Jon Becker: And then how long after you joined the Marine Corps did you deploy to Vietnam?

Sid Heal: I went in the Marine Corps in February, and I was in Vietnam by August, so. And that includes a 20 day leave, 10 days of mess duty.

Jon Becker: And then how long were you – how many times did you go to Vietnam and how long were you there?

Sid Heal: Two. Technically, I was only there on one deployment, but I got hit by friendly fire on April 5th, 1970. And so I spent the rest of April and most of May in Guam Naval hospital, and then they staged me back in Okinawa for about a week before I went back.

Jon Becker: And then you get back, you're done with the Marine, your Marine. Well, you're not done with the Marine Corps service. You come back from Vietnam. When do you go into the sheriff's department?

Sid Heal: Oh, not till 1975.

Jon Becker: That's right. Because there was an interim there, wasn't there?

Sid Heal: Oh, yeah. You could not have envisioned a scenario that would keep me in the Marine Corps one more day. But what happened was that I had, on the way to Vietnam, I had met a girl that I wanted to marry, and I knew that I wanted to go to college. And so the GI bill made that possible.

So when I came back, the two things that I knew that I wanted to do with my life was marry the girl that is still my wife 50 some years now and go to college. And so I got out of the Marine Corps, but when she had our oldest daughter, she couldn't work and we couldn't make it on the GI bill. And so I joined the Marine Corps to stay in school. They promised me that if I would come back in the reserves, that they would guarantee me my bachelor's.

Now, interestingly enough, I was a little bit more than skeptical, but they were absolutely truthful. I can't even tell you the number of things they did to help me stay in school. I'll just give you one that I thought was phenomenal. This particular unit that I joined was Anglicol, and you were required to be jump qualified within twelve months of your billet assignment. And so they sent me to jump school.

And when I would come back, I had to go to school and they would have a jump, or we'd have, and they literally would send us all over the world. I would just load my pack up with books and land. I was a corporal and the first sergeant say, hey, come here, and I'd go over there and he says, it's time for you to study. And they'd send me off to one side and I would sit underneath the tree and study. They were absolutely serious. I mean, that's just one of the things that they did. The reason I say jumping was significant for me was the fact that my pack was so heavy that to keep stick integrity, they would usually make me stick leader because I fell the fastest.

Jon Becker: I love that! So then, okay, so after that, you go to college. You didn't start at the La county sheriff's, right? You started…

Sid Heal: I started with the district attorney's office. It was kind of interesting in those days. I was a white male. I was not a high value recruit. And so I tested for every place I was accepted for Michigan State Police, which was my home of record, which is where I had joined. But I had gotten married, bought a house, had a baby, and I got asked to join the LA sheriff's department and the LA district attorney's office.

But the LA district attorney's office offered first. And I was in a position where I needed the bird in the hand. And so I did two years as an investigator. And be honest with you, I loved it. Investigation was, I don't even know how to describe it. The only thing I could compare it to was either SWAT or patrol. But you literally would beat the suspect at their own games.

So I learned informants and I learned interrogation and putting the pieces together. In fact, I started the sheriff's academy because I had to go to another academy when they hired me with a post certificate in investigation, a basic certificate. So I have two post basic certificates, one in investigation and one in general practice.

Jon Becker: So then two years later, you leave and go to the LA county sheriff's department?

Sid Heal: John van de camp became the DA and said that he did not need a police force. The Bureau of Investigation, they're all police officers. So I was low man on the totem pole, and I was going to be cast aside. And so they asked me if I would do a Y rate. I didn't even know what a Y rate was, but basically it's a demotion in lieu of layoff. But I had a baby. I couldn't go out and hope I could get a job that I want.

So I took the Y rate. It went right to the bottom of the totem pole, except for seniority. And they sent me through the sheriff's academy again. So I went through the Rio Hondo police Academy for the first time. So I went back to the sheriff's department. Interestingly enough, two years later, they called me to go back to the DA's office. Well, needless to say.

Jon Becker: That ship has sailed.

Sid Heal: That's right.

Jon Becker: It was gone. You had your chance at that one.

Sid Heal: Thanks for calling.

Jon Becker: So where was your first assignment? Like, walk me through your sheriff's career up until the point that you ended up.

Sid Heal: Oh, I started with jail. And it was interesting because there were a lot of opportunities in the jail, but I'm not an indoor person. I didn't realize how bad it affected me until I was actually inside. Day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year. I would do anything to be outside. Sometimes I literally have to check out just to go outside. I can see why people would be claustrophobic. I mean, it was that kind of a feeling. I've never been claustrophobic, but it was an anxiety.

So I knew that I was not going to do well there. And to be honest with you, had I not gotten out, I would have left. It was that bad. By the time I had three years in and I had already decided that I was willing to start over rather than stay inside anymore. So I got selected to go to Firestone station, which was actually number one on the list for two reasons.

One, I really, really liked the people there. I had done a ride along there in the academy, in the action. It was probably as close to TV as anything that I was likely to see. And the second reason was it was the number one fastest way out of the jail because there was a lot of people that didn't like that.

So I spent 80, see, last part of 79, 80, 81, and 82 at Firestone. Then I went to industry. My name was on by that time, intent to promote the sergeant. Then they made me a sergeant and sent me to Crescenta Valley. And then I only had 22 months in grade when they asked me to take a test for the special enforcement bureau.

I loved patrol and I was good at it. And they had asked me to go to SCB as a deputy, but I was having too much fun in patrol and I just really didn't want to start over again. But they asked me to go as a sergeant this time. And so I did. And I spent 84 to 89 there. And then they promoted me to lieutenant. I spent twelve years as a lieutenant.

And then I was actually quite shocked to be a sergeant, to be a captain. But I was ecstatic when they put me back in the special enforcement bureau. It was like putting briar rabbit back in the briar patch. I mean, I was a happy camper and I would have been content to stay there, but I got activated. I had been activated for every war that Marine Corps had at that time.

And this one, the latest one was Operation Iraqi Freedom. And they activated me in January, and I was gone pretty much the rest of that year. And so they put somebody else in charge while I was gone. When I came back, they promoted me. And five or six years I stayed as a commander. So that's pretty much it.

Jon Becker: So I'd love to kind of walk through because your career parallels the evolution of special tactics in the United States. And if you were to sit down and write the history of SWAT, you can't write the history of modern SWAT without mentioning Sid Heal. It's just one of those names that's going to be there. You certainly can't talk about flashbangs or tactical science or a variety of other topics. I will tell you that. You know, I've done a lot of these interviews. The one name that has been mentioned in every single one of them was yours.

Sid Heal: Oh!

Jon Becker: And that is, that is from an officer level to a chief of police level. As people talked about their careers, they talked about the evolution of their careers. And I went to Sid’s this class. I went to Sid’s that class. So what I'd love to do is wind back to when you first get to the bureau in 84, the 84 Olympics are happening. And kind of talk me through that initial evolution, because the bureau starts earlier. Do you remember when swots started at the bureau?

Sid Heal: Yeah. SWAT actually started in 1966. The concept.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Okay, so, Sid, I would love to start in 1984 when I, you know, you get to the bureau, the 84 Olympics have happened. You know, SCB and LAPD have now both spun up SWAT teams, but it's starting to evolve and you land there as a sergeant. So walk me through what happens when you first get there.

Sid Heal: It's actually even bigger than that, because there were a lot of societal changes that made SWAT, the concept of SWAT vital, not the least of which is fully automatic weapons and booby traps and rock houses. What had happened was that our system of government does not allow the military to intervene in what is believed to be a domestic policing matter.

So as a result of that, we had to rise to the level of our military counterparts, not the least of which, in those days was Delta Force and the Seals. So they provided a huge amount of training and we had all of our weapons upgraded. And largely the 1984 Olympics went on without much problem.

So as a result of that, we had all this training and equipment, and now we're faced with rock houses. So as a result, and I don't know who said it first, but somebody said, hey, if this will work for hostage rescue, this will work for arresting narco suspects, and sure enough, it does. And interestingly enough, within about two or three years, we were teaching a lot of the things that we had learned back to the military. So including my team had been activated and sent back to the east coast to train with Special Operations Training Group, which had just been stood up by the Reagan administration because of TWA-847.

So it was a time, the best way, it was explained to me, Washington, a colonel in special operations training group, full bird colonel, to tell you how high this was up in the Marine Corps chain of command. He said that they considered LAPD and LASD experts in urban warfare. And I was shocked. I said, sir, we're not at war. He says, you're attacking a fortified location. I said, yes, sir. And they're shooting at you? Yes, sir. And you're shooting at them? Yes, sir. Sounds just like war.

And so as a result of that, that started a relationship that went for years and years and years where we could literally pick up the phone and talk to people, in many cases in different parts of the world, and ask a question and get a straight answer.

The special operations communities, both in the military and law enforcement, did not play well together. It was like everybody had their best kept secrets. It did nobody any good, really. And so the National Tactical Officers association was formed in 1983 to start alleviating that. But you could have professional conversations that you could not get at a conference. You could not get in any kind of a public forum, but you could talk to people in Nebraska that were taking down underground concrete bunker complexes.

And I'm using these as actual examples. They flew us back to the east coast and then flew the dutch entry team in for the dutch Malaccan train assault. I went to Israel and debriefed in Tebbe and Malat. I went to Belfast and Haifa and Jerusalem and Princess Gate, in London, and the mall bombings in Sydney, Australia, and the Yonsei University riot in Seoul, Korea. And so many places I can't even think about because it was not going to be put to paper and they needed to vet the person they were going to talk to. And they would not exchange the information in any kind of a durable format.

We were free to take notes, but some cases we were told, like, we couldn't take pictures or we couldn't take some notes or just to leave this off. But we got straight answers. It really kick started a lot of our thinking.

Jon Becker: And just to put context on it, right. 1972 is the Munich massacre and 84 Olympics come. Everybody's afraid that that's going to happen in Laden. That's in context with Prince's gate. Baron, Switzerland, Mombachan, Kenya. There's a series of hijackings and building takings, and hostage seizure becomes a mechanism through which terrorists are negotiating to get media attention and push their message.

Sid Heal: Interesting thing that you should say that, too, because it resulted in a change of tactics with the terrorists. The terrorists at that time really relied on hostages. It gave them a huge amount of public exposure. It allowed them to negotiate because they had to be taken seriously. Otherwise we lost the hostages.

The tactics, techniques and procedures and some of the technology allowed us to recover the hostages, in many cases killing the suspects, the terrorists, and being very successful with the hostages. And when I say we now I'm talking about the counter terrorist community.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Sid Heal: The global counter terrorist evolving. Yeah. Both military and law enforcement. It was so successful that they had to switch to bombings because.

Jon Becker: Well, because you had entebbe. They all get killed. You have prince's gate.

Sid Heal: Yep.

Jon Becker: All the hostages, rescue suspects are killed.

Sid Heal: Mogadishu.

Jon Becker: Mogadishu Bern, Switzerland?

Sid Heal: Yep.

Jon Becker: You know, you had the one. Was it GSG 9? Did the airplane….

Sid Heal: Yeah, that was GSG 9. And the airplane was in Mogadishu.

Jon Becker: So, like, you have this series of, like, it works pretty well. It works really well in, you know, Munich, but that's kind of the apex of taking hostages and making a scene. From then on, the tactics start to adapt.

Sid Heal: Yeah. And evolve. The after action of Munich was an eye opener. They have a saying that success has many authors. Failure is anonymous, but there was no way that we could attribute some of the mistakes that were made at Munich to accident or incompetence.

There were some real command and control issues, some intelligence issues and a lot of tactical issues that everybody that was going to find themselves in such a situation started taking seriously. And because this informal collaboration had already started to evolve by the 1984 Olympics, and you're right, we were terrified. It wasn't just a feeling that they were going to attack. We were terrified. We knew they were going to attack.

We learned everything. I'll just give you one that was shocking to me. I was quite comfortable, having been so many years in the Marine Corps by that time, including my tour in Vietnam, in the rural environment. But there was as much to learn about the urban environment as there was the rural environment. And I was a duck out of water.

And so I really started paying attention to the people that had been doing this on a routine basis, not the least of which is the combat was extremely close range. The targets were fleeting and elusive. And as a result of that, we learned to shoot without getting a front sight picture by adapting it, literally with a piece of aluminum angle iron in those days with a flashlight that we would use fiber washers to adjust the flashlight so to the height of burst. And we had sighted our weapons in at 25ft.

A lot of people were shocked at that. But the advantage was is that if you could see the light and it was on your target, you could pull the trigger that quick. I can't tell you how many times that saved people's lives. And we went to state of the art submachine guns and the recoil, which at that point….

Jon Becker: [Crosstalk] – Started with MP5S.

Sid Heal: Started with MP5. Yeah.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Nine millimeter MP5S. And that's when the MP5 was just an MP5.

Sid Heal: Yeah, exactly.

Jon Becker: So, so then, you know, you and you and LAPD are running parallel in your development. I recently interviewed Mike Hillman.

Sid Heal: And there's another guy that I got to tell you, if they're not mentioning Mike Hillman, they're missing.

Jon Becker: They're missing. They're mentioning. It's not quite as much as they're mentioning you, but that guy is – [Crosstalk]

Sid Heal: He was one of my mentors, so let's put that in perspective.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Yeah. Mike. Mike. You know, Mike kind of walked me through, from the D Platoon side, the evolution of tactics and how they started to reach out to the European units. They started to reach out to the military units. You guys were doing the same things kind of together. Right?

Sid Heal: Together and apart. It's kind of interesting because we, first of all, we compared notes with each other on a routine basis. There was a lot of rivalry, but it was a friendly rivalry and nobody wanted to see anybody on the other side get hurt. And nobody wanted to feel the guilt that we would have inherited if somebody failed and got hurt because of something that we had withheld.

So it was open, but it was very informal and it was usually done on the phone or we train together in person. And LAPD ended up with teaching the west coast marines and the east coast seals, and the LASD ended up teaching the east coast marines and the west coast seals. We didn't really plan it that way. It's just the way it turned out.

But, yeah, and I couldn't even begin to tell you other countries that ended up getting involved. But if you ever go down to SCB and see the trophies and we display them with honor, is the number of world famous teams from France and Germany and the United Kingdom and Australia, and both in the military and law enforcement.

Jon Becker: So it's GIGN, it's GSG 9, it's, you know, 22 SAS. It's, you know, it's – At that time, it's literally a who's who in the tactical world exchanging tactics. Because, you know, one of the ways that Mike put it that I think was really articulate is he said, you know, we were concerned about them taking hostages on a bus like they did in Munich. And he says, we had to figure out how to assault a bus.

And I think the thing that's easy to forget is everything has a beginning. Special tactics in the United States, that beginning is the late sixties, early seventies. SED starts a little sooner. LAPD D Platoon is the first official SWAT team beginning full time in 71. But the real zenith here, the real acceleration takes place for the 84 Olympics.

Sid Heal: The original SWAT teams were in response to the Texas tower shooting. And so as a result of that, the concept was counter sniper, and the sniper had the primary function on the SWAT team. And everybody was pretty much in support for years. When we started doing entries, the snipers became in a supporting role and the entry teams took over the primary function.

So I got to tell you, what I've just described is a lot more methodical and neat than it really was. It was messy. For years, we refused to write down standing operating procedures because we didn't have any adherence to paper.

And as a result of that, we would change a technique. If we had a briefing in the morning, we were free to change that technique for an operation in the afternoon. It was that fast. So it was a state of constant review and continual adaptation.

Jon Becker: Where everybody worldwide is trying to figure out how to do hostage rescue, how to make it effective, how to apply it to multiple environments. And I think one of the things, this is just before I start my career, but there is this very collaborative sense. And I think that's right about the time John Coleman founds the NTOA and creates an official platform.

Sid Heal: Yeah, as a matter of fact, it was never national. It was always international. Right from the very beginning, it was obvious that we had to come to grips with this. We were in operations in those days where we were so certain of being shot that we would put a personal vest underneath our entry vests because we knew that the entry vests were not going to stop some of the things that were being shot at us. That gives you a perspective of pragmatism that no class or PowerPoint could ever achieve.

So just to give you an example, nobody really intended to specialize, but some were just the nature of the game. Seals would teach us how to tell if a boat was overloaded by looking at the water line. In some cases, they'd repaint the water line, and the seals would tell how to tell us, teach us how to tell when it's been repainted so it looks like it's actually higher than it is. And then we would teach them urban warfare because we could actually close down the city at night, and we would. A lot of operations that people had no knowledge of were because we were moving at night. Crossing a freeway at night is like crossing a big river, except you can get killed, and so.

Jon Becker: Except the river is full of alligators.

Sid Heal: Yeah, exactly. Yeah. I couldn't even begin to tell you. The marine corps with vertical operations, vertical assaults and helicopters and skid drops. One of the things we discovered was the fact that we could take down a skyscraper because there's no windows on the roof. And so we could actually, most places we couldn't land, but we could skid drop.

We also found out that when you skid drop, when you jump off the skids of a helicopter, you need to have some protocols, whether you call them standing operating procedures or not. Because if half the people jump off the helicopter on one side and the pilot corrects for the heavy side, you can tip the helicopter over. And pilots don't like that.

Jon Becker: Neither do the guys getting on the helicopter.

Sid Heal: Exactly. So I can't even tell you how many skid drops we did. And then I learned to repel. I mean, I repelled in the Marine Corps, but nothing like what we were doing, the Australian rappel, because we could go in from the top of a window without exposing us or the rope.

And then eventually we didn't like unhooking from the rappels, so we went to fast ropes and I got that from the Marine Corps. I don't know who invented it first, but I learned it first from the Marine Corps and then LAPD and LASD. And I don't even know how to tell you how many different things I would say in the five years of my first tour. There wasn't a day that I didn't come to work where I didn't learn something new. And I think that most of the people felt the same way.

An eagle was your biggest obstacle. It would be like bleeding in the water with these guys. If you had anything that you were sensitive about, a scar, a tattoo, your ear stuck out too far. I'm trying to think it was like sharks, they would go for you. But it was always with the understanding that we would be better, that we were no different than anybody else. But we were being exposed to knowledge that nobody else had really ever taken the effort to gather. It had probably always been there, but now we were actually discussing it at a professional level.

If I could take credit for anything, it was the fact that I was one of the few guys that started codifying it. I actually started taking notes, probably because I just wasn't the sharpest knife in the drawer and I did not want to forget this stuff. So I began taking notes in probably the spring of 85 is when I can first remember when I really, and that tickled my curiosity to study, if this is this, what else? And I wanted to know why it wasn't enough to tell me what to do. I wanted to know why it was important and how it's contributing.

So from there it just went on. I started writing lesson plans for years and then I got asked to write one article and so I wrote the article. I couldn't believe the interest that it got. It was the first time I had testified out of state and I was being called to Florida and Minnesota and Arizona, Oregon and Washington and places that I didn't know anything about the case, but I could explain it. And I need to emphasize that I was just one of the guys. I probably got more credit than I deserved because I had the name recognition from the articles and eventually the books.

Jon Becker: So mid 80s, you're at SCB, you start, you guys are students of the game, you're studying, you start writing lesson plans. At some point you get tasked to do flashbang research. Walk me through that.

Sid Heal: It was in 1980, early 1988, and we were getting sued for flashbangs. And one of the questions that were coming up was who trained you, what were their qualifications, and a variety of other things. So my lieutenant at the time, Russ Collins, called me in and he wants me to do a lesson plan on flashbangs.

So I went back, I gathered all the materials, and about a month later, I came back and said, russ, we're going to need to do original research. And Russ goes, why? I said, because the only information available is coming from the people that are selling them and they're only providing the information that makes their particular product look good. And they're really not addressing what we believe the key issues, when it should be used and when it shouldn't be used. But they would tell us everything they want to know about how it worked.

So as a result, he said, how long is this going to take? I said, at least six months. And to his credit, he said, okay. So that became my collateral assignment. And I interviewed doctors and acoustical experts and went to the crime lab and got the original study from the human Effects laboratory in Aberdeen, Maryland, and interviewed the military who had been studying grenade simulators and a variety of other things.

And so we wrote a fairly comprehensive lesson plan and published it December 1st, 1988. And we, according to our protocols, made it available to anybody with a need to know, which was other police departments. By January, it was the national model and we could no longer keep up with the requests which were coming in scores at a time. And I believe the lesson plan at that time was 30 or 40 pages. It was pretty comprehensive and it was at a user level. It didn't explain a lot of things, but it was expensive for the LA county, if you can believe that, to duplicate this lesser plan and send it to everybody that was asking. And yet we did not want to charge for it.

So we asked the National Tactical Officer association to make it available at cost, and they did. And to this day, as far as I know, it's still available.

Jon Becker: So, yeah, that was the original NTOA flashbang diversionary device user's manual.

Sid Heal: Yep.

Jon Becker :Yeah. Which quickly became the national standard and still forms the roots of almost every flashbang class worldwide.

Sid Heal: I think as an author, and I became an author later, I didn't really consider myself an author because I did the lesson plan, but the greatest feelings of success and self satisfaction come from having somebody that I respect as an intellectual thinker and teacher cite me either. I don't even know how to tell you what that feels like. It feels like, wow, it really was worth going the extra mile and being able to attribute that. I attribute all of the things that I learned to the original authors. But if I could take any credit was the fact that I just compiled it.

Jon Becker: Well, see, I think it's – So we met in 89. 88 or 89?

Sid Heal: I think you were 88.

Jon Becker: So say 88. I mean, I don't think it's possible retroactively for people to put in context how unusual that diversionary device user's manual was. It's unusual. Now, at the time, it was unheard of. Nobody took the time in law enforcement to go and understand blast physics and understand physiology and understand, like, people were using flashbangs, but they were using flashbangs because they had been exposed to grenade simulators and they kind of made them feel stupid. And they thought, well, this is going to work.

So really, like, you were the first one to actually look at it scientifically and say, this is why it works, right? I mean, I learned all of that from you because I knew you. Everybody else learned all of that from you. They all learned bleaching over Dobson. They all learned temporary threshold shift and hearing pressure wave sensory overload. Like those were terms you developed in that research, but nobody knew.

Sid Heal: I think you'll recall that I mentioned that it sounds a lot more methodical than it was in reality. It was quite messy. I'll just give you one. I had to laugh when you were saying that because I remember how messy. We had flashbangs that were basically adapted from grenade simulators, and the majority of that was basically just powder and paper. So you couldn't throw them through a window, you couldn't throw them through a screen, you couldn't get them through bushes.

So what we would do is we would get a cod weight, which weighed half a pound to a pound, and we'd put some duct tape around it and we'd throw it through the window. Well, that solved one problem, but we noticed some disparities. Somebody would say, holy mackerel, that was hot. No quality control or…

Jon Becker: Too many rolls of tape.

Sid Heal: Exactly. It was the amount of tape we were using. In some cases, we would just put enough to adhere to the weight and it would explode normally. But in other cases, they would put 100 miles an hour tape that we'd get from the pilots or duct tape that we could buy out of one of the hardware stores. And some people would put one band and some people would put five or six. And without knowing it, we were creating these miniature pipe bombs.

Well, when I got my class in blast wave physics, literally from Dr. Paul Cooper at Sandia Labs, I learned that we had no clue what we were doing. And it's only by the grace of God that we weren't getting hurt worse than we were or hurting somebody else.

Once we explained that, it also really lit the manufacturers and developers. And so they started building things that we could use as is, which is tremendous advantage from a civil liability standpoint. And to be honest with you, there's more money in doing that than there was in selling dope because they were making money hand over fist. The flashbang in those days costs about one dollar fifty cents to 1$, 80 cents to make and we were buying them for anywhere from $15 to $30 each. So it was a huge markup.

But the use of the flashbang was a game changer in our tactics because it created what I learned, a thing called an exploitation window, a period of time where the human brain is unable to process outside information because it's being overwhelmed by stimuli. And now we know it as the amygdala hijack, we're actually indexing a portion of the brain which is going to be perceived as life threatening, even though the flashbang, if used properly, is pretty harmless. But the fact that it's perceived overwhelms the brain's ability to do anything that we would consider thinking.

So we, in fact, I'll just give you one right now. Off the top of my head, I had three separate incidents where we took the guns out of the hands of the people or they threw them down when they knew we had them. That would have died had it not been for the flashbang. Well, needless to say, this created a situation where we tended to overuse them. If it works a little, it'll work a lot.

So we threw more than one flashbang and we didn't understand a lot of things. But once we started doing the research, we made a lot more knowledgeable decisions and intelligent decisions, wise decisions. So we found, actually, and I did a statistical analysis on that, is that we were using them less and we were using less of them, meaning, per the situation, it's one of the few non-lethal options that will support a dynamic entry. The effects of are virtually instantaneous, and I say instantaneous. Scientifically, there is no such thing. That's one of the things we found out.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but it's milliseconds.

Sid Heal: That's right, milliseconds. To give you an idea, there's about a two second window of vulnerability, but that's because it takes that long for the fuse to go off. It's a delay, but then we get anywhere from 2 to 8 seconds of what we call the exploitation window, where the individual is incapable of mounting an effective defense. I mean, they'll have startled reflexes and other things without getting into too much depth, but typically that was enough to save their lives and save our lives.

Jon Becker: So, yeah, 2 to 8 seconds is a long time.

Sid Heal: A long time. We could put the full entry when we were doing experiments with the Marine Corps. One of the things we would do is we would give the subject ear protection, which most of the suspects didn't have, and a camera, and having take pictures of the entry team when that flashbang went off, if they could take the pictures, all they got was pictures of muzzles.

In one case, we had Captain Jim French with a camera and we threw it in and he could not make his finger work enough to click the trip. I took the camera out of his hand, took his picture, and then put it back in his hand. That's how long 6 to 8 seconds is.

Jon Becker: I have a very clear memory. Shortly after we met, probably 89 or 90, we did a flashbang demo together, testing some stuff, and we gave a guy a squirt gun and put the squirt gun in his lap, threw the flashbang in and then simulated an entry coming in. And the last guy grabbed the squirt gun while the guy sat there trying to figure out what to do.

Sid Heal: In real life the first one that happened to me, the first one I can remember off the top of my head is we had a guy with an m two carbine. He had gun ports cut in his house. He swore that he'd never be taken alive. And when that flashbang went off, he reached out and could hit the m two that was leaning against his bed but could not put it enough together to grasp it. I literally picked it out.

Jon Becker: So the sheriff's department starts actively using flashbangs. You're writing. This is kind of the beginning of Sid Heal, warrior poet, for lack of a better term. The flashbang manual comes out. It begins to get people thinking about a deeper level of understanding. It's not just, oh, the manufacturer says it's this, it's let's go do our own research. When is the next significant event in your career that you think marks a milestone? Is it Somalia?

Sid Heal: Probably. That was huge. That put me at an international level for the first time by Somalia for me was in 1995 and, well, started in 1994. But as I mentioned, I was working with a special operations training group and I get a phone call. What do you know about nonlethal options? And I laughed. What do you care about non-lethal options?

And he said, I've been ordered to do research on this. And these guys were all just like, we were doing research. And they said, we don't know where to start, but we figured cops would know. I said, well, I'll just tell you what I think is that you're looking for a magic bullet that doesn't exist, that it's not a technology problem, it's a training problem, that we need to have a holistic view.

And one of the incidents that they cited, Washington, some refugees in Guantanamo Bay decided they would riot and take over a PX. Well, a marine's company was charged with guarding it, and they fixed bayonets, and apparently they weren't taken seriously, and they stabbed three people. And so I mentioned this incident. I said, if you're willing to stab them, skip the intermediate options, because I don't have anything that I can think of that would be as good as that. He said, well, we don't want to do that. We need to be able to accomplish our missions without having to kill the adversary.

And I said, well, I know a guy that I'll get him to talk to you. But I was a CW-05 by then, and I was not willing to drive to California. I mean, drive to Camp Pendleton. CW-05, for those who've never been in the military, I explain it as a huge amount of esteem accompanied with absolutely no authority. But my lips were moving, and typically a colonel or a general's voice would be coming out.

And so as a result of that, I enjoyed vicarious authority. And so when I said I wasn't coming, they took me seriously. And so they said, well, when can we meet? Let me know. I'm working all week. And they said, Thursday. I said, come on up. Well, on that particular day, it was raining and pouring down rain, one of the few days in southern California.

So we went into a room that kind of went as a skiff because everything they were saying was classified. And so they gave me a bunch of scenarios, and I explained where I thought some of the problems were, and I gave them some suggestions. That's all it was on how I thought we could have done it better. But the big thing is, they had no technological advantage. Their idea of a non-lethal weapon was shooting somebody in the foot.

So I called you to bring in whatever you wanted to demonstrate. Shotguns and bean bags. And I'm trying to think pepper balls didn't exist in those days. But, yeah, whatever we had, and I do remember it was so hard. What's that – [Crosstalk]

Jon Becker: Stinger grenades.

Sid Heal: Stinger grenades, yep. Flash bangs. Obviously, it was raining so hard, we had to blow the water out of the rear sight apertures to see. And they were surprised that we didn't go to arrange. We went out in the parking lot and fired it into a concrete wall. Whatever it was, it left him quite impressed. And so I got kind of volunteered as a consultant.

Jon Becker: This is in voluntold.

Sid Heal: What's that?

Jon Becker: Voluntold?

Sid Heal: Voluntold. Yeah. That really wasn't as bad as that, because there wasn't anything they could ask for that I wouldn't have given. They had been more than gracious with their information and time. But, yeah, it was understood that it wasn't given to me as if I had an option. And so I went down there several times, and they came up and we exchanged information. And I got a phone call in the spring of 1995, right out of a clear blue sky that said, sir, what is your – This is sergeant so and so. What is your Social Security number?

So I gave it to him and I said, just out of curiosity, why don't you get it out of my OQR officer's qualification record? And he goes, sir, I'm not from your unit. And I go, whoa. And so we hung up, and I turned to my partner, Danny Bean, and I said, Danny, I don't have good feelings about this.

Jon Becker: Get ready, buddy. You just became a partner of one.

Sid Heal: I got activated on a Thursday, got my shot record updated on a Friday, was sicker than a dog on Saturday from all the shots, and Sunday I was in Mombasa, Kenya, and it was like something out of a movie. It was a side of the Marine Corps that I'd only seen on the special operations side, but I literally had the pick of the Marine Corps of the best guys. They were all gunnery sergeants, Gunny agers and Gunny Dunn and…

Jon Becker: Gunny McGilton?

Sid Heal: What's that?

Jon Becker: Gunny McGilton?

Sid Heal: Gunny McGilton, Gunny Rodarty, and a second lieutenant in the Air Force who had six months and worked for Phillips lab. The guy was smarter than all of us put together. Our GPA, our YDEZ general classification jumped by double when he was present. I mean, he was that smart. In any event, he was in charge of lasers. And I literally had a blank check. And to this day, I have no idea what I could spend.

But I reported to a three star general around the chain of command, and there's a lot of people, even at a CW-05, between a CW-05 and a three star general including the MEW commander and the commander of the landing force and everybody else, well, including the ship's captain, to give you an example.

And so I not only had the best in the Marine Corps, I had a guy that could write checks in about ten different currencies at one time. I asked him, Bob, how much money can I spend on this? He says, that's classified. I says, yeah, but just give me some ideas. He says, well, you've already spent three quarters of a million dollars. I says, oh, can I spend a million dollars? And he looks at me and he gets excited, you think this is going to cost a million dollars?

And I thought for a second, I said, you know, Bob, I realized that one of my unfulfilled career goals in the Marine Corps is spend a million dollars in the Marine Corps money. And he laughs, and he goes, you can spend a million dollars. So I go, well, can I spend 2 million? He says, don't go there.

Jon Becker: There's the line.

Sid Heal: I'm not going to tell you what you can do. So I had sticky foam and oculus foam and lasers that are still classified and would do things that even Star Trek has yet to figure out, which is, well, I'll give you an example of how smart this guy was. One of the lasers we had was LX-5, laser experimental model number five. And it was at the, what we call, I later found out, the brass board stage.

Basically, they had built this amalgamation, for lack of a better term, this component out of off the shelf things. So they had gadgets and gizmos and whatchamacallits and thingama jobs that had to fit a certain way. And so it was necessary for all of my guys to learn how to do this. And so we were up. We were staying in a hotel at that time in Mombasa, Kenya, in plain clothes. And I was having everybody do the drills, take it apart, put it together, take it apart, put it together, hour after hour after hour.

Finally, about 02:00 in the morning, when we are literally brain dead, I looked at the lieutenant, and that was another thing that used to irritate my gunnies is that I called him by his first name in the Marine Corps decorum. That was a little out of their social constructs.

And so I go, Rob, I got good news and bad news. And he looks at me and goes, well, what's the good news? The good news is you're going to be the first United States Air Force officer to win a Marine Corps combat action ribbon since the Vietnam War. And his eyes get about this big.

And he goes, well, what's the bad news? Bad news is you're going ashore. There's no marine that's going to be able to fix that if it doesn't work. And we cannot have it not work. So we went ashore. We got in a huge firefight, which nobody remembers that wasn't there because it was so much emphasis on the non lethal part. But he did. He earned his combat action ribbon and it was awarded to him as his highest decoration. And he's proud of it to this day, even though he's retired.

So it was a wake up call. And when I got back, we came into March. Air Force Base, they flew us back, flew my team back. The rest of the team was on float and they were in the Mediterranean in that area. But I had a team and they flew us back. Well, being a CW-05, March Air Force base is about 25 miles from my house. So I called my wife and said, hey, meet me here. So she came there and I waved goodbye and never checked out.

So I just went home. I mean, I'm never going to be promoted again. And so I went home and sleep because there's like 11 or 12 hours difference with jet lag. And I get called up by a colonel in Washington, DC, said, gunnar, how long is it going to take for you to get back to Washington, DC? And I go, sir, I'm going back to work. He says, well, when are you going back to work? I said, Monday. And it's like Thursday night now. And he says, well, that's true. He says, but technically your orders don't expire till midnight Sunday.

So how long will it take you to get back to Washington, DC? I said, wow, sir, military transport. He goes, you come back any way that you can get here? So I flew commercial back, and what they wanted was a debriefing. And that was probably the tip of the tip that you just described in Somalia, I couldn't even begin to tell you how many different places and how many people I talked to at such high prestige in both academia, the military and politics, to the consulate level, including other countries.

So, yeah, everything else I did till that point really paled in comparison. If I had to pick just one, that would have been in 1995. And by 1997 was the first time I was speaking to an international audience. And they were paying me.

Jon Becker: Oh, yeah, no, that was – It exploded. Like, it kind of the same thing happened to the business, right? Like, that was the beginning of the Marine Corps non lethal program, which then we had the army non lethal program. And all of those programs kind of evolved out of that one trip to Somalia. And it was really kind of the genesis of us becoming a non lethally oriented business, especially because it was that Somalia mission. We didn't have time to put together lesson plans. We didn't have time to train anybody.

Sid Heal: And so it was messy.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Oh, yeah. I mean, I did a five day instructor course for your unit in one day with retroactive read ahead. Here's all the stuff you guys have, Sid. Godspeed! Good luck!

Sid Heal: A lot of the documentation we did after the fact.

Jon Becker: Oh, yeah.

Sid Heal: One of the things that was interesting, too, is that I mentioned the fact that CW-05s, which are pretty rare. I think at that time, I was the 13th one in the Marine Corps, including the reserves. I mean, there was only 13, period. And not everybody wore the bars because they became limited duty officers. But we had a huge amount of esteem and not a lot of authority. But I reported directly to General Zinney. I got credit for a lot of things that he actually deserved the credit for.

I asked him one time, I said, sir, do you ever feel dumber when I get near you? And he's not one that really chit chats, but I was a five, and I was as high as I was ever going to be, and I felt emboldened. And he looks at me and he goes, no, why? I said, well, sir, if there really is a scientific process called osmosis, I get smarter. I was just wondering if information and knowledge was a finite.

Jon Becker: Yeah, because I'm getting smarter. Are you getting dumber?

Sid Heal: Well, the great thing was, besides his intellect and his foresight, was he was pragmatic. He understood the concepts, but he also understood that the applications were what were going to make the concepts work. The rules of engagement, for instance, were unwieldy. And I was ordered to bypass the chain of command, not run anything through the chain of command, report to him directly.

And so I lived on the Ogden, but the flagship was the BellaWood. And so I would pick up the phone in the combat operations center up with, where all the navy guys were and say, I need a ride to the bell of wood at such and such a time tomorrow morning. And sure enough, there'd be a helicopter there. And then I'd go see General Zinni. First time I'd ever been in a flag officer's wardroom. And I remember in this one occasion, I started explaining the conflict, and he recognized it so fast. He held up his hand, which I took as sign language for shut up.

Jon Becker: Because it was sign language for shut up.

Sid Heal: Yep. And he turns to the chief of staff, which is the only reason I know his name, John Moffatt. He goes, John, he's right. He's right. We got to fix this. And he fixed it. That was just the kind of guy he was. I feel guilty accepting praise. That was really vicarious.

Jon Becker: I don't know. I mean, General Zinni certainly set the tone, but the evolution of the non lethal program accelerated rapidly because of your involvement. Whether it would have happened without you is a matter of debate. But the fact that when we met those guys at SCB, and that conversation started with, tell me what nonlethal is.

Sid Heal: Yeah.

Jon Becker: It ended with trained marines off the coast of Kenya, what, three or four weeks later. It was not a long time. And during that time, had to write rules of engagement and had to get all the stuff vetted, put it together. Like, had you not been there, you were catalytic to that process. You being there gave them a connection between the military world and the civilian world and tying them together.

Sid Heal: That was how General Zinni explained it to me, because I was actually feeling it even then, and I did not want to take undue credit, but he explained that I was bilingual. I could talk Adam boy Charlie David to law enforcement, or Alpha Bravo Charlie Delta to the military.

One of the things that it led to was in 1997, I got called into the under sheriff's office, and he started the conversation with, if you can do this for the Marine Corps, you can do this for us. And he had a bunch of notes on a legal pad and proceeded to rearrange my career path from what I had envisioned. And as he's going on, he's describing a project which eventually became known as the Technology Exploration Project. And none of what he described was anything that was really appealing to me at the time.

But I'm a lieutenant, and he is multiple pay grades above me. So I'm taking notes and I'm pretty quiet. And he says, I know you don't like this, and I don't particularly care, and goes right ahead with what, the next two years, which I thought was gonna be my career, and that was to manage this technology exploration project. And the focus was on finding technologies that had applications in law enforcement.

The idea was to leverage my contacts in the Marine Corps and my association with them, because I had a clearance. I was working on classified projects. I had literally been all over the world. I was gaining and had already gained by that time, a national reputation and in some cases, in international, in the sense that I was being interviewed by TV stations from Australia and Italy. I'm trying to think of some of the ones.

Jon Becker: We wrote an article. You and I wrote an article for Jane's international defense.

Sid Heal: As a matter of fact, that was an interesting one because it went to Jane's international defense review, and that was really a groundbreaker because I got invited to speak at the first international non lethal weapons conference and ended up speaking at four of the first seven as a keynote speaker.

Well, it's like Odenthal calls the self licking ice cream cone. The better it tastes, the more you lick it. The more you lick it, the bigger it gets. And that's exactly what happened. And I couldn't begin to tell you how many different places. But Haifa, Jerusalem, Israel, Belfast, Dublin, Mostar, Sarajevo, Seoul, Brazil, Argentina, I'll just skip the cities and go to the countries, because in some of the countries, I'd go to multiple cities because it was expensive to move me over. In any event, that led to teaching, and I started teaching at the us military war colleges.

Well, I did for 20 years and taught at every single one. My handler was a retired lieutenant colonel from the Marine Corps. Told me I had a hat trick. I was one of the few guest professors. I don't know what their associate professor, adjunct. I don't know what the title is, but that had been invited and spoken at every single one.

All four of the services, industrial college, the armed forces, the National War College, command and staff, general command and staff, which eventually became the basis for a book on the concepts. There was no textbook, and so I kept thinking somebody would write one. And we have had some good books on non-lethal, but they've always been focused on the technologies. And right from the beginning, the technology was the way of developing and utilizing the concept. In some cases, the concept existed without the technology.

Jon Becker: The technology was a manifestation of the doctrine. Right? Like, in the end, non-lethal is a mindset. It's teaching force as a rheostat rather than a switch. And the technology was just the vehicle through which you were administering that application.

Sid Heal: It's funny you should pick that out. That was one of the original metaphors that I used to explain the non lethal force concept to people that believed that the Marine Corps force spectrum ran from the M-16 to the F-16. That's a quote.

Jon Becker: Now I remember there was an article that you and I wrote a rebuttal to written by an army colonel, and it was like, I think it was. What price sticky foam? I think was the article arguing that the us military is the most lethal killing machine and never needs non-lethal. And then Afghanistan happens and Iraq happens, and they go, wait a minute.

Sid Heal: The Balkans were the big ones. When the Balkans went off, we got sent back in as peacekeepers. And one of the things that I used in Somalia, I explained, was the fact that it's going to be difficult to make a case for a humanitarian effort if the only tools we have available to us are to kill the people we're sent to protect. That has been quoted a number of times since then, but it also expressed the frustration that we experienced.

There were a lot of people out there that became adversaries that I never truly thought that they had thought it through, not the least of which the international community of the Red Cross, who believed that we were using them to enhance our ability to use lethal force. That's true to a point, but the lethal force was going to be used anyway, and the idea was to protect the innocent while still being able to use the lethal force. And there was a number of other ones.

Jon Becker: There was a mindset in the kind of late 80s, early 90s. I mean, I went through it. I remember did an interview on Daryl Gates radio show with the ACLU, and the whole argument was, this is going to be used disproportionately. It's going to be used racially, it's going to be used this way. So what you're saying is you would prefer they use a baton because that's the choice you're giving them.

Remember, you and I have both repeatedly used Maslow. The only tool you have is a hammer. You tend to view all your problems as nails. The corollary to Maslow is if the only tool you have is a hammer, all your problems are nails.

Sid Heal: Yep. What's really interesting, too, and I don't know why, but the baton is one of the oldest non lethal options available to us. It's been around since at least the 1820s, and for whatever reason, it doesn't have the controversy attached to it, the emotional baggage, as some of the safer devices, even though we'll admit that it's primitive and they cause injuries like the bean bag and the sting ball and the taser and the pepper ball. And I just have to wonderland what they think is going to happen.

One of the things that we're experiencing right now, today is the fact that judges and activists are advocating for injunctions against the use of nonlethal weapons or some types of non lethal weapons, without realizing that removing this particular device from the forced spectrum relegates us to using something that's far more harsher and primitive because the problem doesn't go away, because they don't like the way it was handled. And yet some of the biggest critics have come from the law enforcement community, but we can't get any traction.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting. I remember when I did the instructor training for Somalia. It was a room full of gunnery sergeants and arms folded. I'm the most lethal killing machine in the world. Tell me why I need this. And I remember saying to one of the gunnies, if right now you have rules of engagement, those rules of engagement require lethal provocation for you to use lethal force. Everything up until now, everything up until that occurs means you're taking rocks and bottles, and all you can do is wait till the problem escalates. It's like dropping a match on a piece of carpet and waiting till the house is on fire to try and step on the match.

Sid Heal: Exactly right. And that was one of the things that the international committee, the Red Cross, objected to, was the fact that we could target noncombatants to get them away from harm's way, which made the likelihood of killing the adversary, which were putting them in danger to begin with, easier. I'll admit the rationale.

Jon Becker: Yeah. But the inverse is also true. You're driving away the non combatants, so they're a lot less likely to be killed.

Sid Heal: What they ignore is the fact that in many cases, the technicals in Somalia were putting them in harm's way on purpose because it made us reluctant to use lethal force, and so it gave them an advantage, particularly when our technology was better than theirs so they could negate that technology.

So it's one of the things I got asked this in London one time, it's legally right and morally wrong. I understand where you're coming from, but the law needs to be caught up to the technology. We don't have to kill people that are not trying to do us harm.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but it's interesting because, and this is what you see happening today. I mean, you look in California with AB-481, there is so little understanding of the technology and the doctrine that there's a belief that nonlethal weapons are increasing the number of incidents of injury and fatality. And it isn't until you take them away and put law enforcement in a position like the military was, where it's like, here's your tools, hammer and screwdriver.

Hope you don't have to cut anything because you don't have a saw. I think that we're kind of at a point where the doctrine now is lagging behind the technology.

Sid Heal: Again, what's interesting is that if you really look at it from the balcony, we're using technologies that we were lauded for 20 years ago, even 10 or 15 years ago. What's happened is that we'll be the first to admit that we're using the cutting edge, the state of the art. There hasn't been a lot of improvements, and the improvements that have been made have usually been increasing the effectiveness of an existing device or technology rather than a new technology. So there are new technologies out there, but sadly, nobody wants to bell the cat.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And it's, I think, you know, as we've talked about, you know, there's always an arms race between technology and doctrine, right? Since the first guy picked up a stick and used it as a baton, there has been an evolution of technology and an evolution of doctrine. And, you know, you think about the lecture that Robert Bunker gave years ago at one meth, talking about the evolution of armor and the evolution of weapon, and there's this constantly taking place. We're in one of those periods where we have transitioned, and doctrine has become less important.

And I think that one of the things that you said early in this conversation that has stuck with me is that the why was what you were trying to figure out. We've reached another point where the how is past the why.

Sid Heal: Yes. And let me just add to that, that is a police problem. The training in police is unbelievably expensive, far more than most citizens understand. We pay the guy to go to school, we pay the person that's teaching them, and we pay the guy that's doing his job or her job while they're gone. It's horrendously expensive.

If you gave me a device that worked 100% of the time for free, I, as an administrator, would still have to factor in what it's going to cost to bring it up to training. And if it's got a steep learning curve, it may not be cost effective.

So when people are talking about defunding police, if they would just change the name to reform police, a lot of us would be on their side. The sad part about it is we've been complaining about this for years, but nobody has been paying attention.

Don't listen to the politicians when they're telling you they're spending millions of dollars on the development of non lethal options, for the simple reason is go look at how much of a percentage that really is compared to all the other things they're purchasing well.

Jon Becker: I've spent my entire adult life in non lethal weapons and the last significant technology was 15 years ago.

Sid Heal: Taser?

Jon Becker: Yep.

Sid Heal: Yep, you're right.

Jon Becker: It was exact.

Sid Heal: Interesting enough, the taser, the new taser is really an adaptation and an improvement on one that had existed before that.

Jon Becker: Yeah, but as you said, it was a game. It's not a brand new technology, it's an evolution of an existing technology.

Sid Heal: That was one of the things I learned by the travel. The travel really opened up my eyes because they would send me to places like Belfast and Dublin and Haifa and Jerusalem and Bostar, where I thought that they would be light years ahead of us in both the thinking and application. In reality, they were struggling with the same problems and the antiquated technology. You're right.

One of the things, when you mentioned the taser was the fact that a lot of the controversy surrounding it in the United States is cultural. It's not unpopular in the United Kingdom. But what's unpopular in the United Kingdom is impact munitions, which are not all that unpopular in the United States.

So it had no basis to do with science and safety and effectiveness. It was people's uneducated opinions, ignorant opinions in many cases. And in some cases I would argue and debate activists from the other side, including in public, and give them scenarios using their strategy as opposed to ours. And we would admit, for instance, that impact munitions are going to cause injury. So too, batons.

The difference is that I may be willing to shoot a man with a knife at 35 or 40 ft with an impact munition.

Jon Becker: Hitting him with a baton.

Sid Heal: I can't reach him with a baton unless I'm willing to accept the risk to my own life.

Jon Becker: And he's dead long before that.

Sid Heal: And that's exactly what's happening. And they have not thought some of these issues through.

Jon Becker: Well, it's interesting because, you know, again, it goes back to the why, right. It goes back to kind of this understanding of doctrine. And I think that that's kind of a good segue for us to talk about how you began to merge or fuse what you had learned in the Marine Corps from a doctrinal standpoint and what you had learned in law enforcement and push those together.

Sid Heal: Probably the best way to explain this is the fact that when I became an officer in the Marine Corps, I had had 10 years as an enlisted for 1978 until 1986, 8 years. I would conservatively estimate that the Marine Corps spent $100,000 on my education before I ever led troops in harm's way.

When I became a captain for the sheriff's department, which is an executive level. I got a handshake and a new badge. It was expected that I had already acquired this knowledge. Without a career path, without any command colleges, without any schools, the Marine Corps would give me material that I was expected to read when I would go to school. I took tests that I was expected to pass.

And if I didn't pass, I could expect not to be promoted again. And within the given time, I could expect to be reduced to harmlessness, is what we'd call it, put to pasture. That mindset drove me into studying for myself as a law enforcement officer, particularly when I became into some decision making authority.

Jon Becker: So that's the genesis of your book, Sound Doctrine, which I think we'll pick up on our next episode.

Episode 36 – Selection For Tactical Units – The Attributes with Rich Diviney

Jon Becker: My guest today is Rich Deviney. Rich is a retired Navy SEAL officer whose career spanned more than 20 years and included more than 13 overseas deployments, eleven of which were to Iraq and Afghanistan. As the officer in charge of training for an elite Navy SEAL command, Rich spearheaded the creation of a directorate that fused physical, mental and emotional disciplines.

Since his retirement, Rich has worked as a speaker, facilitator and consultant with the Chapman and company Leadership Institute and Simon Sinek, Inc. Speaking to and training more than 5000 business, athletic and military leaders. Rich's book, the 25 Hidden Drivers of Optimal Performance is a must read book for anyone involved in leadership or in the selection and hiring of personnel.

I'm excited to have Rich on the show today because I think this book gives us an analytical framework that can help us to understand not only our own innate strengths and weaknesses, but also help to utilize the strengths and weaknesses of those we lead to build a better team. I hope you enjoy my chat with Rich Deviney.

My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

Rich, thanks so much for being here, man! I appreciate it!

Rich Diviney:

Yeah, John, great to be here! And like I said, long time coming. It's been a while, but worth it.

Jon Becker: Yeah, totally, totally. So why don't we just to give context to kind of the book and the thought of the attributes. Why don't we start kind of the quick Rich Deviney bio?

Rich Diviney: Yeah, sure. You know, I grew up in Connecticut. I joined the navy. Well, I should say I went to Purdue University for my college was navy ROTC. And so I graduated and got commissioned in 1996, got picked up for Navy SEALs. So I went straight to SEAL training in 96 and then subsequently spent the next 21 years in the SEAL teams. Had a tour out in Hawaii, then most of my career I spent here on the east coast in Virginia beach.

And of course it got very kinetic after 2001, so I did a lot of deployments. The numbers start to elude me, but I think it was seven to Iraq and like four or five to Afghanistan and then a few others here and there smattered around, around the world. But as an officer, I was in charge of obviously, SEAL platoons, SEAL troops. I was commanding officer of a SEAL squadron, and I was also put in charge of selection and assessment for one of our very specialized SEAL commands.

And so all those experiences allowed me to really start digging into high performing teams. What they are, what makes them up. How do you pick for them and select and assess? I became fascinated with that when I got out of the Navy in 17. I kind of jumped into the leadership space with a couple friends of mine, one being Simon Sinek, who's a good friend. And we kind of started doing leadership stuff, but I was always kind of keyed in on this performance stuff.

And so as I kind of went down that road, I began to think about writing in terms of performance. And one of the first thoughts, ideas I had was, let me get everybody what I think the baseline is, and that's the attributes. And so released the book in 2021. Since then, I've built a business when my wife and I around helping businesses and organizations and individuals figure out their attributes and build very high performing teams.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting you and I talked about it offline, but it, you know, for years, I've taught culture centric leadership, and one of the things that I talk about is that people have innate skills, and I always describe them as skills. You know, they have. They have certain abilities, and those abilities, often, you know, a high level of one ability may offset them having a different ability.

And I always use the example of the sales guy and the accountant. The accountant is very precise and very deliberate, and if we put her in charge of sales, she would never leave her house. And if I asked the sales guy to do the accounting, we would go to prison. But I had never had an analytical framework that I'm like, okay, this is it.

And so when I read the book, it just instantly clicked, like, oh, my God, that totally explains it. And also gives enough detail that it kind of allows you to understand how you can apply it in your own life and how you can apply it in dealing with those you lead.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, well, I appreciate that. And one of the things I endeavored to do was figure out performance. And I think it all comes back to the early days, I mean, the early days of what I call healthy imposter syndrome. And it kind of started. I mean, there are probably instances of it prior to the Navy, but certainly when I finished SEAL training right in our class, I think our buds. Class buds, basic underwater demolition slash SEAL training. That's a six month course that Navy sailors and officers go to to become Navy SEALs. There's a 90% attrition rate at buds. Right?

But once you graduate, you are, you go to a SEAL team and you're on your way. Our class, I think, if I remember correctly, was somewhere on, started with 170 students. We graduated 38 students. And I remember even in that moment, looking around me and saying, how the am I still here? Because I looked around me and looked at the guys who were around me and said, these guys are seemingly so much better than I am. Why is that? And that, by the way, continued throughout my career.

And I call it a healthy imposter syndrome because it was not a feeling that debilitated me. It was a feeling that, okay, I'm here for a reason. Obviously, I made the muster. I did what I needed to do. I'm just going to step up my game right now because I feel like I need to. But ultimately, what are those things, what are those elements about me and about these individuals that allowed us to be here standing today on the beaches, graduating today?

And so I began to kind of think about this elemental human performance and what drives us at very elemental levels. And really, who are we at our most raw? Because that's like the saying goes, the real us. The real us shows up at our most raw. And I kind of like, okay, who's our most raw? I had the unique opportunity, obviously, I volunteered for it, to figure that out very shortly after I started buds training day one. They put you at your most raw, right?

And then you continue that way, and then you realize that about yourself, you realize about your teammates, and then you go to war, you go to combat, and you see it again. And so I think it's a real strength and advantage. And one of my goals was to take theSEALs off the pedestal and just talk about them and talk about this in a very human way.

And I think the attributes humanize everything because we all have them right now. Some of us can't be SEALs, but some SEA;s can't be accountants or entrepreneurs or whatever. We all have distinctive niches inside of which we excel.

But, yeah, so I always appreciate when I hear and when you say that the book was relatable, understandable, and immediately you could take that thing and apply it, because I didn't want to write another SEAL book. There are plenty of Navy SEAL books out there, and most of them are pretty good. Right? But I didn't want to write another Navy SEAL book, so I appreciate you saying that.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting! You actually intentionally avoid a lot of the kind of cliches of Navy SEAL books, talking about specific units, talking about kind of your career, which was one of the things that struck me is it's like, this is more self exploratory and trying to figure out how did this happen than it was. Look at me.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Yeah. I mean, there's a couple reasons. One is just from a. Just from a. A personal responsibility standpoint, I didn't want to ride the brand in any way and in some cases, maybe prostitute the brand. That's one reason I want to be respectful of that. And given some of the levels and ranks which I held, I have a responsibility, an official responsibility to do that. So that was one reason.

The other reason is because, again, I wanted to take the concepts and take it off the pedestal. As soon as you start wrapping too much specificity in some of these units and some of these situations, it immediately, it may puts you at a distance from the reader, and I want to make sure that we understand and the reader understands that this is human stuff. It's not just SEAL stuff, it's human stuff.

And then finally, just from an official capacity, if you do it responsibly, you get these books reviewed by the government before you release them based on the rank and position you held. And when I went through the government review, they were like, hey, there's absolutely zero wrong with this. So it was a win. They didn't have to black out anything so well.

Jon Becker: And I think, I mean, certainly our listenership can read between the lines as to what you did. Like, it's, you know, they will figure that out. Why don't we start with what an attribute is?

Rich Diviney: Yeah, that's a great place to start. So this idea is, what are those qualities that indicate that a human being has what it takes to do the thing, right, not knows how to do the thing, has what it takes to do the thing. So the example I'll give is, I was told this story about SEAL training years ago, and I think it happened before I ever went.

But the story goes that this kid shows up to SEAL training, and he goes in the instructor's office and says, I want to be a Navy SEAL. And the instructors say, sure, okay, but you have to do swim test first. And he's like, okay, fine. So they take him out of the pool. The swim test is an easy one, you know, 50 meters. So 25 meters to one end, 25 meters back to the other end.

And so the story goes that this kid gets ready to go, and he jumps in the pool, and as soon as he jumps to the pool, he sinks right to the bottom of the pool. And he starts walking across the bottom of the pool to one side, and he touches that side and he walks across the bottom of the pool back to the other side. He comes up and he's gasping for air, right, nearly drowning. And the instructor looks and says, what the h*** are you doing? And the kid, who's still trying to catch his breath, looks at the instructor and says, I'm sorry, instructor, I don't know how to swim.

And at that point, the instructor pauses and looks at the kid and says, that's okay. We can teach you how to swim. The question is, why does the instructor say that? The instructor says that because if this kid has the attributes, these qualities to show up to Navy SEAL training and he doesn't know how to swim, he has everything inside of him that we need to be a Navy SEAL. Teaching him the skill of swimming is going to be easy.

So in separating this, the distinctions are these skills are not inherent to our nature. In other words, none of us are born with the ability to throw a ball or ride a bike. We're taught to do those things. We train to do those things. Skills direct our behavior in known and specific environments. Here's how and when to throw a ball. Here's how and when to ride a bike.

And then finally, because skills are very easy to see, they're very easy to measure and assess and test. You can see how well anybody does any one of those things. You can put scores around them, you can put statistics around them. This is why we get seduced by skills when we're picking teams or hiring or even performance evaluating.

The problem with skills is they don't tell us how we're going to show up in stress, challenge and uncertainty. Because in an unknown environment, it's very difficult, if not impossible, to apply a known skill. This is when we lean on our attributes. Attributes are inherent to our nature.

In other words, all of us are born with levels of patience, adaptability, situational awareness. We can certainly develop these things over time, experience. But you can see levels of this stuff in very small children, right? Any of us who have kids or have experienced kids will agree with me when I say there are one and a half year olds who are patient and there are one and a half year olds who are impatient.

Okay, so there's a nature nurture element to attributes. Attributes don't direct behavior, they inform behavior. They tell us how we're going to show up to an environment. So my son's levels of perseverance and resilience informed the way he showed up when he was learning the skill of riding a bike, and he was falling off a dozen times doing so.

And then finally, because they're difficult to see, they're very difficult to assess, measure and test. How do you measure someone's levels of patience or adaptability? Right. But they show up the most viscerally. They show up the most visibly and viscerally during times of stress, challenge, and uncertainty.

And so when we're talking about teams and individuals that can operate in uncertainty, chaos, complexity, which, by the way, defines high performing teams and high performing individuals, that's the one distinguishing factor any team can do well when things are going well. The teams that can still perform when things don't go well or go sideways, those are high performing teams.

So if we're talking about that environment and we're missing out on attributes, we're not talking about attributes. We are missing a huge, probably the most important part of the performance picture.

Jon Becker: Well, it's interesting because you look at buds and certainly people wonder why, you know, why is getting cold and sandy a good thing for, you know, revealing how good a Navy SEAL is going to be and listening in your book, listening to kind of the origin story of the teams and buds and kind of the roots in UDT, it almost strikes me that they, you know, they were looking for, quote, unquote, tough guys, and in the process revealed attributes that made that a much more effective way to assess who could do the job than skills would 100% well.

Rich Diviney: And I would. I would say that toughness is simply the result of attributes.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Rich Diviney: And some attributes combined. And so. So, yes, Kaufman, in his early days, were looking for tough guys, but he was also looking for problem solvers. Not just about being tough. You can be tough and dumb. Right? But you need to be tough and still problem solve and adapt and move and flow and flex. And that's when you start to talk about a combination of attributes. Can you actually be tough? Can you tough it out?

The idea is most people in buds quit because of the cold. A lot of people think it's all physical. Right? And that's why they go. That guy's a physical study. He could probably do SEAL training. Well, that's not the case. There are division one athletes who go to Buds and quit the first day. It is all about taking you down to zero and then seeing what you have from there.

So toughness is one thing, but can you, while your cold, wet, and Sandy still perform? That's the case. Or do you wilt into something that's quite useless. That's what we're looking for. So it's not only about enduring the cold, wet and sand, it's about performing through cold, wet and sand.

And now you start to get into a combination of attributes that's pretty unique in terms of that profession. But every profession, every niche has its own unique set of attributes that's required. And that's why it's so important, because if we understand that individual unique list, now we're thinking about, and now we understand. Okay, now I know what I'm looking for in human beings.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Let's touch on one more definition then. I kind of want to dig into the attributes. Let's talk about the difference between peak performance and optimal performance.

Rich Diviney: Oh, yeah. So this is something that hit me as I was doing this work or began to do this work, and it hit me because I was, and this was probably around 2010 when I really began to dig into this. I had taken over assessment and selection and I began to dig in this. And one of the things that was predominant in the performance space was this idea of peak performance. And it was kind of a – And it still remains this kind of almost a fad type. I say fad. It's probably by definition not a fad because it's still around, right?

But certainly an obsession of people just wanting to be peak all the time. Peak here, peak there, peak everywhere. Chasing peak. That's the ultimate thing to peak perform. And people used to tell me, you, SEALs are the ultimate peak performers. And I said, actually, I disagree. We're not. And the reason is because peak, by definition, is an apex. And there's only one place you can go from an apex, and that's down. Right? Peak also has to always or often be planned for, scheduled and prepared for.

So in other words, the pro football player plans and schedules his entire week so that he can peak for 3 hours on Sunday. We don't get to do that. Navy SEALs don't get to do that. Regular human beings don't get to do that. So I said what we really are optimal. Optimal performance means that I'm going to do the very best I can in the moment. Whatever the best looks like in that moment. That means sometimes our best looks like peak and it's flow states and everything's clicking, everything's going great.

But sometimes our best is, I am literally head down, going step by step nugging it out, because that's all I have right now. It's dirty and it's gritty and it's ugly and it's hard. And that is still performing optimally. Optimal performance allows us to do a couple things.

First, it allows us to celebrate those times when we are not at peak, when we're actually gutting it out and it's dirty and it's gritty and it's ugly, hard. It feels like we're not making progress at all, but we are. That is still performing optimally. I can't tell you how many missions we went on overseas that we come back and we're like, man, that was ugly, right? But we still got the job done, okay?

And then it allows us to also do what I call responsible energy management. In other words, I don't have to be peak when I'm driving to the grocery store. I can be at some other energy level. You know, another thing that people think about SEALs is they'll see it on TV or movies, wherever. Before a mission, a group of SEALs will, like, huddle up and start who ya ing and high fiving like some athletic team getting ready to take the field. That never happens, okay? We never do that. We never did that.

In fact, a lot of times we'd be in our helicopters flying into combat and the guys would be sleeping, they'd be taking, they'd be napping. And there's reasons, because we don't know what's coming. We don't know how long we're gonna be out there. We don't know what is gonna be required energetically. We're not gonna waste an ounce of our energy doing things we shouldn't have or don't need to do.

And so optimal performance is kind of this umbrella underneath which peak lives, gutting it out lives, and even recovery lives. Right? And so all high performing teams understand this modulation, understand these differences. And so when I talk about performance and optimal performance, we're talking about performance in any environment, especially in environments of stress, challenge, uncertainty.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's interesting because as I read that I'm an Ironman distance triathlete, and you are an iron man. One day, that's it. Yeah, because you peak to Iron man, and prior to that, you don't have the fitness. And the day after, you certainly don't have the fitness.

Rich Diviney: Right.

Jon Becker: And so it's been like, oh, you're an Iron man. You could just do, you know, you can do. No, you're going to peak that level and that's it. And then you're going to have to recover from it. And there is a difference between what you can maintain in fitness on a regular basis, even if you are pushing to be as fit as you possibly can on a regular basis.

There's only, you're only going to get so much fitness before you break down, before you, you know, whatever. And it struck me that same way that really optimal performance is driving for what is the best I can be on a regular basis, maintainable, and at the drop of a hat have that level of performance versus, you know, I'm going to the Olympics and this is going to be the only day in my life I ever run this fast.

Rich Diviney: Right. Yeah, 100%. And I think, though. So the reason why optimal performance is a good umbrella underneath which to kind of bend everything is because the athlete performs optimally as well. But the athlete just has the environment or situation where they know exactly when they need to peak. It's defined, it's codified. Whereas we don't. Right? We don't know. We have to peak on demand, we have to recover on demand, and we have to be, we have to be managing ourselves so that when it's time to peak on demand, we can.

And what that means is, okay, I'm going to peak and then as soon as I'm done peaking, as soon as that's not required, let me see if I can get some recovery, because I don't know when I'm going to need to peak again or I'm going to have to go down this long road. Right?

The long mission, that's hours and hours, mountains climbing, mountains through Afghanistan, and it's going to be gut wrenching and we're going to have to gut it out the whole time. So even getting to the target, I'm just going to have to do my best. I'm going to have to manage myself so that when I'm on the target, I can do my best. So that when I'm coming off the target, I can do my best. And it's just a much more realistic way to modulate ourselves.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's fantastic! So why don't we – Let's dig into the attributes a little bit, just for kind of the listeners edification, maybe let's start with the five major categories and then we can dive into each of those.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, absolutely. So in the book I talk about 25. What's interesting, Jon, is that since doing the work, or since doing the book and doing work with organizations, we've beefed up that list of 42 attributes now in nine categories. Right?

Jon Becker: Wow!

Rich Diviney: That's another, that's a, that's a couple hours of deep dive, but let's, let's talk about these five, because I think these five still are great for the introduction to optimal performance. And so the five categories are grit, mental acuity, drive, leadership, and team ability. And those. Those are categories inside of which these 25 attributes kind of bin comfortably. They're not exclusive. Right?

So, in other words, just because an attribute is in the courage category doesn't mean it's not used in drive or used in leadership. Right? But they comfortably been those categories. And so grit is this idea. And again, people think of grit as a singular thing. A lot of times they describe grit as an attribute in of itself, but it's not. Grit is actually a combination of things kind of blended and catalyzed and stewed together that create. It's a result of what's kind of blended. And actually, Angela Duckworth wrote a great book years ago called Grit, and she.

Jon Becker: Fantastic!

Rich Diviney: Yeah. And she said the same thing. It's a combination of things. So the attributes required, and we'll get into these, I know, later, but the attributes that are required for grid are in that category are courage, perseverance, adaptability, and resiliency. Mental acuity are the attributes that describe how our brain processes the world around us. So just as we're walking through environments, what's our brain doing and how is it working?

So, situation awareness, compartmentalization, task switching, and learnability. Drive. If grit speaks to those shorter, terminal, you know, endeavors, drive speaks to the longer term. What are the attributes that. That create the driven person and be able to do something long term? Those are self efficacy, discipline, open mindedness, cunning, and, yes, narcissism. And we can get in that as well if you want. Leadership is the next category. What are the attributes that allow others to look at us and decide that we're leaders. Here's the thing about leadership.

Being a leader and being in charge are two separate things. One is a position, one is a behavior. And I always kind of joke, you don't get to self designate. In other words, you don't get to call yourself a leader. That's like calling yourself good looking or funny. Okay. Other people decide whether or not you are someone they want to follow based on the way you behave. If you call yourself a leader and you look back and there's no one following you, I got bad news for you. You're not a leader.

So those behaviors are what cause people to say, this is someone I want to follow. And many of us, if there's listeners who've been in the military or been in any. Any hierarchical bureaucracy of any sort, they may have had this experience. I know I did, where I've looked at a leader before, someone above me. I say, look at a leader. Looked at someone above me in a position hierarchically, and I say to myself, I wouldn't follow that person anywhere.

Meanwhile, there's someone over here to my right who has no hierarchical position whatsoever. I say, I would follow that person to h*** and back. Okay. And it's because of the way we behave. So these leadership attributes are basic, elemental things. They're empathy, selflessness, authenticity, decisiveness, and accountability. Those are the types of behaviors that we typically, as human beings, say, oh, okay. When I feel and see that, I tend to say, that's someone I would follow. Right?

And then team ability. Team ability is really how we effectively operate in teams. I don't. The word. I stole the word from naval special warfare. I think they made it up because I don't think it's a real word, but it's kind of how you operate as a teammate. Okay?

But just like leadership, you don't get to call yourself a good teammate. Other teammates, other people decide whether or not you're a good teammate based on the way you behave. And so those attributes are integrity, open mindedness. No. Integrity, humor, humility, and conscientiousness. Those are the attributes for team ability. We can dive into any one of those, but that's how those categories kind of been out.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it makes sense. And I think that when you dig into it, it's an overwhelming list. Initially, you look at you like, oh, my God. But when you start to look at them piece by piece and dig into them, you start to realize that, oh, yeah, that kind of makes sense. You have to have all of these different components. And so what I'd like to do is kind of go through, and obviously, audiences is a tactical operator audience.

So we'll kind of hit some of them a little harder, because I think they're probably a little more relevant. But why don't we start with grit again? Angela Duckworth's amazing book, which, if you haven't read everybody should read, kind of lays the foundation. But I kind of like the approach that you took of by splitting it up into attributes. It makes a little more sense, I think. So why don't we walk through the attributes that build grit?

Rich Diviney: Yeah, absolutely. And before I do, though, let me just say that for everybody's kind of essay, we all have all of the attributes, okay? The difference in each one of us are the levels to which we have each. Okay? So, for example, take. And we'll talk about adaptability, but adaptability, if ten is high and one is low, okay, I would consider myself about a level eight on adaptability, which means when the environment changes around me, outside of my control, it's fairly easy for me to go with the flow and roll with it. Someone else might be a level three on adaptability.

When the same thing happens to them, it's difficult for them to go with the flow and roll with it. Right? They're still adaptable because all human beings are. And so if we kind of line up these attributes on a wall, like dimmer switches, all of us would have different dimmer switch settings. And the way I like to describe this is, I like to think of us as humans, as automobiles, right?

We all have the same basic component parts. We all have a steering wheel, we all have a carburetor, we all have tires. The component parts are the same, but some of us are jeeps and some of us are Ferraris. And there's no judgment there because the jeep can do things the Ferrari can't do and the Ferrari can do things the jeep can't do. But it's those intricacies, those details that cause us to be different that allow us to say that I'm better in this genre than I am in that genre. That's how we have to look at these attributes.

So as we discuss them, I just want everybody to think, you're going to be high on some, you're going to be low on others. You're going to be medium on probably the most of them. But that those highs and lows, especially the ones you're high on, low on, really start to distinguish and dissect and articulate your performance in all aspects, but to include uncertainty, challenge, and stress. And so, yeah, so that's why I want to lay that kind of foundation.

Jon Becker: Well, it's funny because it's like your video game. You know, you think about playing video games, whether it's Mario Kart or Madden football or Call of Duty, you know, when you're picking a character, they're good at this. They're not good at this. They're strong, you know, strong like ox, like chicken, you know, there's this kind of variety of different attributes. And it is, you know, we are all. We all have them, but we are. And we all know people that, you know, if you. If you are married, you know that your wife has certain attributes that you don't.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And that you have attributes that she doesn't. And it is. It isn't a judgment thing, but from a leadership standpoint, it is. It is being able to pick people that are really good at the things that you need them to do and then trying to build an organization around. If Rich is really good at these five things, then let's try to have Rich do those five things and not do the four things that Rich isn't that good at, 100%.

Rich Diviney: And honestly, every group and team, every team, organization, group. And we do this work with teams and organization. They have a unique set list of attributes that are required for that team. So in other words, the attribute list that is required for a great Navy SEAL team looks different than the list for a great surgical team or teaching team, right?

So first is about understanding what that unique list looks like. Then when you build the team, there's going to be a couple of those attributes, and we're talking about maybe two or three, maybe four tops that every person on the team has to have. Right? And we know that, I mean, they just have to have these. They can't do the job. We could say that with tactical operators, whatever, SEALs, cops, I mean, there's just one, two, or three of these things that all of us have to have.

But then it's about matching and uniting the team. Like a zipper, we all have the basic three or four that we need, but now Rich is a little bit lower on patience and John is higher on patients. So let's zipper this. And so now we have both represent. We've taken care of the problem because we can fill in those gaps because not everybody's going to have the perfect set of attributes. And so that's how we have to kind of look at that. So I'm actually glad you brought that up because that's the way teams and high performing teams are infected, built well.

Jon Becker: And it's the same way that, you know, elite special operations units, you know, you cannot maintain the level of skills and knowledge. You know, there is so much in a modern environment that you can't maintain an extremely high level of knowledge at everything.

Rich Diviney: Right.

Jon Becker: So you do the same thing. You cadre out the team. So, you know, Rich is a really good sniper and John is a really good breacher. And, you know, we're going to take these skills and put them together to form this kind of milieu that allows us to solve whatever problems were faced with.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, and the same thing goes with attributes, and, in fact, more so with attributes to do the problem solving. Again, we problem solve with attributes. Once we have a solution, we use skills to execute. But most of the process of our experience when we're in an environment, especially the environments, we, the listeners, and certainly I experience is, let's figure. We have to figure it out. We have to figure out what's going on first, and then we apply the appropriate skill to that. Right?

So skills are absolutely necessary, but they're at their very back end. They're the very last thing we apply to any problem, because all that rest of this stuff is based upon, okay, what do you bring to this environment? So you can actually figure out the environment, solve a problem, and then apply a solution.

Jon Becker: But what's interesting about that is skills, because they're quantifiable and measurable, we're very inclined to want to do, to look at skills. And one of my favorite elite units, their selection process, they describe as specifically trying to avoid high functioning a*******.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Yeah.

Jon Becker: And focusing on skills is how we pick high functioning a*******.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Yeah. Well, and I would. I would. In concert with that, one of the things we always used to say is, is the hardest part about our job. You know, the Navy SEAL job, especially the Navy SeAL job, at the levels I was at, was the hardest part is deciding not to shoot. Right? Because anybody can pull the trigger, and anybody can spray and pray, right?

But the ability to understand an environment that's violent, that's kinetic, that's in your face, and is very, very rapid to understand, then process that environment a very rapid way, and then make a decision to pull the trigger or not to pull a trigger in less than a second is, in fact, attributes based. Pulling the trigger. Sure, that's a skill, right? But that comes after everything. The decision not to pull this trigger, that's all attributes based, which is especially.

Jon Becker: True in a law enforcement environment, right, where it is constantly evolving, chaotic. You know, your traffic stop might be for gang bangers with guns, or it might be an old lady who just got lost. And that actually, why don't we go directly to mental acuity then? Because while we're talking about that like that, that's obviously on point. So let's start with mental acuity.

Rich Diviney: That's a great place to start, because I do think our professions, those are the most important because, you know, grit has courage and all that stuff that matters, but it's really how our brain processes the world around us. And I think, well, let's get into it. So, situational awareness is the first one. That's basically our levels of vigilance about our environment.

So people who are high on situational awareness, like SEALs or cops or first responders, typically, we just notice more than your average person. I walk around New York City and I notice stuff. I notice hands. I notice dark alleys. I notice cars. My wife, who's walking next to me, she doesn't notice as much. And again, there's no judgment there. Her situational awareness is just lower than mine. But we are all, you know, we all have a level of vigilance in our world at least. But that's that situation awareness, the next one, which is extremely important, probably the most important one, certainly for Navy SEALs. I would imagine it's for cops and first responders as well.

But again, you can't make it through seal training if you don't have a preponderance of compartmentalization. Compartmentalization is the ability to, inside of an environment, kind of pick something to focus on, understand what the priority is, pick that thing, focus on that and block out everything else until that thing is complete. Right? That's compartmentalization.

So the example of that, like in seal training, is if you can't. So in SEAL training, the kind of the crucible of seal training which many folks may have heard about, is h*** week. Okay? H*** week is in first phase. It's the fifth week of training. First phase. H*** week starts on a Sunday afternoon, and it doesn't finish until the following Friday. And during that time, you only get about two or two and a half hours of sleep the entire week.

And the whole time you're running around the big heavy boats on your head. You're freezing, you're sandy, you're wet. That's where you get most quitters during h*** week. And the saying goes, if you think about Friday of h*** week on Monday, you will quit. Right? And h*** week is all h*** week is. It's just an act of constant compartmentalization. You're just picking things to focus on constantly. You're picking something, if I'm in the freezing surf zone, I'm just focusing on something, blocking out everything else and then moving on until. Until that's complete.

And so compartmentalization also applies because in a tactical environment, and we'll just, you know, let's just say, let's say if a SEALs are entering a room or a SWAT team is entering a room, that's literally what we're doing. We're coming into the room with a large. With a large view. Situation awareness. We're immediately assessing threat. We're picking something to focus on. We're focusing on. We're addressing it. And as soon as that's addressed, we're coming back out and we're picking something else, and we're addressing that and we're coming back out.

So really this, what the unconscious genius of this system, certainly at buzz was, is it's literally hyper developing this attribute that you're going to need in combat, and it's compartmentalization. So I think that's why compartmentalization is so important. Task switching is the next one, and task switching, again, you also need, because the people who are really high at task switching, they actually look like multitaskers. People actually sometimes make the assumption that they are. But we know multitasking is a myth, right? The conscious mind can't focus on more than one thing at a time.

And in fact, I've been debated on this. My neuroscientist friends have been debated on this. People say, well, rich, I can drive my car and listen to my podcast. And that's true, you can, but it doesn't count if you've relegated that other activity to your unconscious mind. The reason why you can drive your car and listen to your podcast is because you don't have to think about driving your car. But if you're driving your car, listening to your podcast, and someone swerves in front of you and you have to take evasive maneuvers to avoid that person, you will have to rewind the last 15 seconds of that podcast because your brain will have hopped.

And so high task switchers can go from the email to the conversation to this to that, and they can do it very rapidly. Whereas if you're lower on task switching, sometimes it's harder to pull out of one thing and focus on another and pull out of one thing. So in the first responder profession, the seal profession, the tactical officer profession, you need to be able to compartmentalize, but then you need to be able to pull out and task switch fairly, fairly rapidly. So there's a balance there that has to be addressed.

And then finally, learnability. I think learnability is an interesting one because learnability doesn't have much to do with our ability to learn. It has to do with the speed and efficiency with which we learn. So in other words, those people who are high on learnability, they're the people who you can show or tell how to do something once and they got it. Someone else is a little lower, might have to be told a couple times, they might make a couple mistakes, they'll get it, but it just takes a little longer.

So learnability is probably the one that you, it's very, it's very subjective to the environment, but you could probably be a little bit lower on that one than the other ones, even as a SEAL, even as a cop, because you can't be super low because you have to learn it somehow. You have to – But some of the stuff we learn, and I could throw CQC close quarter combat into this category, you don't, it doesn't have to be a super fast upload in your system there. You'll have some chances to kind of upload that. It can't be slow. Right?

So you have to be probably in the middle level or a little higher. But it does have to do with this speed and efficiency with tree learn. So those are the mental acuity attributes in total. And I think those are the ones that really speak quite accurately to things that certainly we did in the SEAL teams and certainly most of your audience, some of these folks do on a daily basis.

Jon Becker: Well, it's interesting because as you were describing this, I'm thinking of my friends who are coming back from overseas and how tuned up they are when they're coming back. And it is really mental acuity that is pushed. Their situational awareness is overloaded, by the way.

Rich Diviney: This, by the way, it's a good opportunity to say any of these attributes at their extremes is bad. Too much of anything, too little of everything is bad. Situational awareness is a great example of this because, yes, coming back from overseas, a lot of us experience what we call hyper vigilance and that actually can be very stressful on the system.

And I remember literally coming back from the war zone and I'd be, for example, walking in New York and I'd have to very deliberately say to myself, okay, I don't have to worry about the guy who's walking 5 ft behind me. I have to, I have to turn that off. I have to come off that a little bit. And so, hyper vigilance can actually be seeds to PTSD if you're not careful, because you just can't. It's hard to turn off. It has to be a very deliberate effort.

So folks coming back from overseas where everything is a threat, you have to be able to understand that and say, okay, I'm going to dial that down a little bit. Very deliberately, to the extent you can. I mean, I still can't, I still can't get over people who walk around the city with headphones. That just is beyond me. But again, everybody has, everybody's their own person.

Jon Becker: Yeah. The world, the world needs victims too. But, yeah, no, it's interesting because it is, you know, you think of any of any of these traits in and of themselves if tuned up too high, you know, if you're, if you are too hyper vigilant, you're never even be able to leave the house. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, if you compartmentalize too effectively, you're not going to be able to move from big to small or from complicated to simple or well.

Rich Diviney: And honestly, like, the world will burn down around you. So one of my good friends, he's a neuroscientist out there in California. His name is Andrew Huberman, has a great podcast called the Huberman Lab. And he and I have been friends for years. And so he was actually one of the reasons why I wrote the book because he and I were working on some stuff and he encouraged me to do it. But he's funny because he's a self admitted high compartmentalizer, low task switching.

And what that means in his life is he is so good at dialing into something and he'll just drop in and he can spend hours on one thing, like, and that's why he's so good at his podcast, his research and all this stuff. He'll spend hours, but everything around him will. His world can burn down around him and he won't. It would be hard for him to pull back out.

Now, you think about him as a scientist. That's actually a really, it's advantageous. Right? Because you need to be able to focus in. Right? But, you can start to see where this might have detrimental effects if you're placed in an environment where being able to pull out is necessary.

So that's why I think that, like, the most of the audience you have, and certainly, you know, seals or any type of that environment, you need to have a little bit of balance. You need to compartmentalize, but always maintain a situation awareness. So if I'm in something, if I'm focused on something and suddenly a new priority, it presents itself. I need you to task switch that new priority. And so there's a real balance there, I think, between these for some professions.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I mean, fortunately, Huberman is an extremely deep compartmentalizer because it's what makes his podcast fantastic, because nobody else would spend that much time digging into the stuff he digs into to the level he does.

Rich Diviney: That's right.

Jon Becker: It's interesting, though, because compartmentalization, like, you know, you always talk about front sight focus, people coming, front sight focused. That's basically, compartmentalization at the extreme right, locking down and losing situational awareness.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. And we used to, like, we used to train to go into rooms, like close quarter combat, and we used to train both eyes open. Right? So you have one eye that's looking down your sight, and the other eye is open, and you're just training your one eye to be focused on where it needs to be, but you have your other eye, so you maintain a level of periphery. Right? Because you don't want to get frontside focused.

And that was a deliberate tactic we used to train to so that we didn't get frontside focused. So we'd always maintain that. Plus, it's obviously faster. You don't want to be closing an eye to aim and then shoot, but it speaks to exactly that.

Jon Becker: Yeah, let's move on. Let's move on to grit, because grit is, I think it is the category of attributes that everybody associates with seals and with cops. And I think there is probably an overemphasis on grit as a group of attributes. Everybody thinks, oh, man, if you're gritty, then it's going to be, you know, like, we want the most gritty guy we can possibly get. And like you said, any extreme is too much.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: But let's walk through kind of how. What comprises grit?

Rich Diviney: Yeah. The attributes that comprise grit. So courage, perseverance, adaptability, and resiliency. So just kind of walking through that first courage, because it's really interesting. And, again, this is stuff Huberman and I worked on in depth when we first met, which was like, I don't know, six years ago, he was running his fear lab there in Stanford, and so he was studying the neurology behind fear, and I was applying. Okay, this is kind of what we do, how we process it in the field.

And one of the things, you know, one of the things we know about fear is that when we begin to have a fear response, fear begins to enter our system. Amygdala gets tickled, autonomic arousal goes up. Our brain presents us with two choices, and we all know these choices. One is flight or flee. Okay. People have thought about and people have said freeze before as a choice. But neurology, neuroscience is kind of determined that freeze is really kind of an oscillation between the two. You're kind of deciding, should you fight or should you free? Should you flee?

But the idea is whether you fight or whether you flee, that's a specific – Each has a specific switch in the brain that gets clicked. And so if you decide to fight. And this means step into your fear. It doesn't necessarily mean put your dukes up, right? But you're stepping into your fear or discomfort. That switch gets clicked, all right? And that is the courage switch, okay? And when you hit that courage switch, you actually get a dopamine reward for that effort, right? Which makes sense because nature has designed us to, in fact, step into our fear.

It's exactly why we as a species have gone from cave dwellers to space explorers, right? Because nature has designed our systems to step in and be rewarded when we step into our fear and discomfort. But all that to say courage is an attribute is the frequency with which you step into your fear and anxiety, right?

So what does that mean? It means that just because you're a Navy SEAL doesn't mean you're more courageous than the average person on the street, right? Because you could literally have a group of Navy SEALs in a gunfight with al Qaeda physiologically feeling less fear than the eight year old you just asked to step in front of the class and introduce themselves. Okay?

And so the idea is how frequently are you stepping into the fear that you could be a generally anxious person. Person. And if you're stepping into your discomfort and your fear, often you're accessing that card switch. Often your card is higher, your attribute is scored higher, because, again, you cannot have courage.

There's no access to that card switch unless there's fear presence. Or you could have someone who does seemingly very brave things. I don't know if you're familiar with Alex Honnold. He did the free solo. Amazing! I watched that movie and I get shivers. It's insane. That guy, when they did the move, they looked at his brain and his fear response is not like normal people. It takes a lot for his fear response to even kick in.

I would never say Alex is not courageous, but the courage switch is not getting accessed as quickly as some normal person. As me on that rock. My card switch would be accessed. As soon as I'm 10ft up, I'm going to be accessing my card switch on that. Again, cards as an attribute is with what frequency?

So I think that's important in terms of defining certainly our profession.

Jon Becker: I think courage is a very good example of where the extreme of an attribute is detrimental because somebody who is too courageous will get killed.

Rich Diviney: Yes. Yeah. And like in the book, I say, a commanding officer once told me, as a young junior officer, beware the fearless leader because that person is going to get you killed. Fear is a human response that's designed as a risk assessment tool for human beings. And so if we're not understanding our fear and accessing our fear, we're not risk assessing properly. Right? And so that you could get into the bulldog syndrome, you run in the burning building. So, yeah, too high is bad just as much as too low. Yeah.

Jon Becker: What about perseverance?

Rich Diviney: So, yeah, if courage is the ability to step into fear and discomfort, perseverance is the ability to continue doing it over and over again. It's literally this ability to just kind of keep going, head down. I'm going to just gut it out. Right? I will just move through, move through, move through. Obviously extremely effective and advantageous. However, we can see how too much of this, especially if you have very high perseverance and low resiliency, you will burn out. And people actually confuse, I should say they conflate resiliency and perseverance quite a bit. They think about resilience as, hey, if I get hit, I'm getting back up again. Right?

Perseverance is get hit seven times or, you know, fall down seven times, get up eight. That's perseverance. Resilience is when I get, when I, when I take a hit and I get knocked off my baseline, how quickly can I get back to that baseline? That's, that's resilience. And we'll talk about that in a second. But perseverance is quite simple. It's this ability to just kind of keep on moving through. Just churn through, churn through, churn through. Obviously, too high. Could lean to burnout. Too low. You're. You're not going to, you're not going to get anything done.

Jon Becker: So let's then we'll skip adaptability for a second and move on to resilience. Because I think, especially in a PTSD context, I think resilience is really important. So walk me through resilience. Give me examples.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. So just visually, if we could imagine our lives, imagine a line, and we draw a line for our lives, and the left side of that line is the day we were born. The right side is today, just a straight line on a page. And then we start to plot the highs and lows of our lives as our life as we've gone through it. And the highs can go above the line and the lows can go below the line.

And then we decide to draw a line connecting all those dots. All of us are going to have what looks like a sine wave because our lives are quite literally a series of ups and downs. So you can think of that line as based. And the idea of resiliency is when we hit a low, how rapidly and efficiently can we get back to baseline? When we hit a high, how rapidly and efficiently can we get back to baseline? Right? Because if you can't do it, if you can't do it at all, you're in trouble. Right?

But if you move too slowly, you're going to risk, like not getting back to baseline after a challenge. You're going to risk another challenge coming and you're going to get further and further down below that baseline because you get a, you go from zero to minus five. You're only resilient up to maybe minus four, minus three, and then you get hit again. Now you're down to minus seven and you go up to minus five. Now you're down to minus ten. Right?

Same thing with good things. Right? Because we have an experience of success or elation. If we can't get back to baseline, then suddenly we are in a position where maybe we get complacent, maybe we start resting our lore as we get lazier or arrogance. Right? So resilience is quite literally this ability to kind of get back to baseline. And how fast can we get back to baseline? Those who are high on resilience can, in fact, get back a lot faster.

Jon Becker: Well, one of the concepts that you talk about in the book and that I had read the book is anti fragility.

Rich Diviney: Yes.

Jon Becker: Right. It's this notion, I think we think of resilience when you hear the word you think of. Oh, yeah, that guy's really tough. He's very resilient. But when you put it in a context of getting back to baseline. Why don't you contrast that for me between what, you know, the difference between resilience and fragility or anti fragility.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. So anti fragility is. Well, okay, let's just kind of, I'll give you the opposite first. Right. If you are unable to get back to baseline, you kind of think about that sine wave, right? It's slowly going to go down. It's going to descend. Your baseline will slowly descend that you're falling into entropy. Okay. Because you're not recovering enough to get back to your baseline. So you slowly fall into entropy. Antifragility is when I go through something, when I recover, I actually recover to an extent where I'm stronger from it. In other words, my baseline increases.

So antifragility. And again, great book by Nassim Talib called Antifragile right. But it's this idea that when something bad happens, when I get hit with a challenge, I grow from it. Right? And that's really important. And there's very unique strategies. That's another set of stuff that Huber and I worked on together that, you know, that we'll probably release here soon.

But this idea that can we design ourselves and design our systems, that when we hit, when we hit a challenge or get something or have something stressful or challenging or uncertain or traumatic happen to us, can we conduct ourselves in a way that when we come back up, we're actually, our apex is higher than it was before. That's what we want to do, and that's anti fragility.

So that baseline is moving up and we're getting stronger. That's what our goal should be. Resilience is definitely good. If we have nothing else, let's be resilient. Let's get back to baseline. When and if we can, at any time, can we actually grow from it? That's actually, that's the best.

Jon Becker: Well, I think that's kind of the new developing doctrine around post traumatic growth.

Rich Diviney: Yes.

Jon Becker: Right. You experienced trauma and your resilience will take you back to baseline. But, you know, so if you are very resilient, you will, you will recover from the trauma. But the difference between, you know, recovering and post traumatic growth is you will use the trauma to inform development and growth and becoming stronger.

Rich Diviney: 100%. Yeah. And in the book, I talk about this, it's much like this physiological process called hormesis, which is this idea that, you know, that the system can get stronger. If you feed it small levels of toxins, it starts to inoculate. It's the crux or the basic premise of most vaccines. Right? You just a little, you know, throw a little in the system, your body will get used to fighting that.

But our bodies, right, our bodies are systems that actually conduct hormesis on quite often occasions. And we can do this mentally as well. Can we use injections of stress, challenge, uncertainty to, in fact, inoculate ourselves and get our stronger so that next time we get hit, we can actually take a lot more?

Jon Becker: Well, I mean, anybody that works out. Right? Is engaging in hormesis. Anybody that works out is engaging in post traumatic growth. You are, by definition, damaging your body. And it responds by not only going back to baseline. Like, you don't just recover. You know, if you lift a heavy object, you tear a bunch of muscle fibers, you're sore. You don't just get back to baseline. If you do it regularly, you get stronger.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, but what is the key to that process? The key to that process is recovery. Right? If you lift your arm, if you lift your biceps every day, you're not. Your biceps aren't going to get bigger unless maybe you're 18, because we know at 18, our bodies are so fast. But ultimately, recovery is the key. And so even in the process of antifragility, from a physical, mental, emotional standpoint, that recovery is the most important thing. And the recovery is going to look different for everybody, and it's going to depend on the trauma, because depending on the trauma, you may need a much longer time to recover fully.

And what I always say is, if you are in a position where you've gone through something and you're the finding recovery difficult. And so, by the way, the way, you know, you recovered that you're finished with that step is that when you think about or recall that instance, you can do so objectively. There's no more trigger, right? That means you've recovered properly.

But if you can't, if you're having trouble getting there by yourself, I always say get help. You know, get, as, you know, get help fast. Right? Do as much as you can. We can't always do this by ourselves. There are a lot of people, there's a lot of places you can get help to recover properly, especially if it's a more intense trauma.

But we can practice this stuff just with little trauma in our lives. The traffic jam, the bad day, the meeting that went not as planned and things like that. We could practice this resiliency, exercising this resiliency muscle so that we get good at it. And hopefully, when bigger things hit, we could be faster with the process.

Jon Becker: So. Okay, let's use that transition to adaptability.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Adaptability is actually a lot. Out of the three, it's probably the most simple and straightforward. I mean, this is literally the ability to adapt to an environment. When the environment changes out around us, outside of our control, how can we best adapt? Right. It's a very reactive attribute. Right? But this is in a book I talk about. This is the kind of be like the frog. The frog has, as a species, survived five extinction level events on this planet. Right?

And they've done so because, well, when they. When they need to live in the water, they live in the water. When they need to live on land, they live on land. Right. And they've just. They've. They've adapted to an environment.

So adaptability, again, the reason why it's part of the grit is because if you are unadaptable, part of the whole part, the whole process, or the whole purpose of being gritty is you are able to push through and power through some sort of environment, some sort of situation. So the outside environment is implied, and the outside environment is always going to throw things at you that you can't control, that you have to adapt to. So if you are low on adaptability, you may be gritty, but it's not going to be for that long.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Yeah. It's the old Bruce Lee saying, right? You'd be like water. Fill whatever container you go into and move to whatever shape. And it is, I think, especially thinking to a business context, like part of entrepreneurship, is high levels of adaptability. I think over the last 38 years of my career and the business I run every day is a different business.

The situation changes, the clients change, the technology changes, and the organizations that you think of, organizations that have been successful for long periods of time, Apple is one that comes to mind, and they're extremely adaptable. They're constantly evolving.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: So, yeah, it makes sense that it's. It's not. It's not okay to just be. You don't want too much, you know, strength, for lack of a better term, and not enough adaptability, because you will continue to beat your head against the same wall, and eventually. Yeah, you know, you're not going to survive it 100%.

Rich Diviney: And the other. The reverse is true as well. You don't want too little. Well, no, you don't want too little adaptability, which is what you described. You don't want too much adaptability, because then you're a limp noodle, and there's no. You're bending and flowing with the breeze at any soft blow. And that's not advantageous either. So in every environment, every niche, there's gonna be a level of adaptability that's required, and that's optimal, but it's not gonna be extreme in either way.

Jon Becker: Well, that kind of goes into the next category of stuff, which is drive.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So, with drives, you've got self efficacy, discipline, open mindedness, cunning, and narcissism. Walk me through that thought.

Rich Diviney: So, self efficacy is this ability to. It's kind of a combination of three things. The combination is confidence. I know I can do this. The initiative to get started, and then the optimism, the realistic optimism that as I go through, as I continue on, I'll figure it out. There's gonna be roadblocks and stuff but I'll just figure it out. So self efficacy combines those, those three things. If you don't have those three things in combination, you don't necessarily have the self efficacy full picture, because if you're just, for example, confidence.

Well, confidence on its own is not going to do much in terms of getting something done. It's the same thing with initiative. If you just have initiative, it's going to be a blind, frenetic energy. If you're just optimistic, well, we know you can plant a garden and just say, the weeds will not come. The weeds will not come. They will come. Right?

So it has to be something behind that. So that's self efficacy. Discipline is this ability to be steadfast and understand the wickets involved in a goal or an outcome or an objective, and be disciplined in those wickets to accomplish that objective.

Now, I bifurcate discipline in the book to two categories. You have inner discipline or outer discipline. So inner discipline, kind of like self discipline, outer discipline is kind of this overall discipline when it comes to long term goals. So the difference is this, the self discipline person is really good at those goals that the external world has no say in whether or not they accomplish. So that's like eating healthy and getting in shape and working out, right?

So I can make a decision, I'm going to eat healthy from this point on, and I can be in Vegas next week at the buffet. The buffet is not going to throw food at me. The external world has very little say. If no say on whether or not I eat healthy, that's self discipline. External discipline or outer discipline is this idea that you have a goal or objective that the external world has a say in whether or not you accomplish. That's becoming a SEAL. It's starting a podcast, it's writing a book, a top surgeon, right? The external world is going to have a say in whether or not you do that.

In other words, it's going to throw things at you that you must kind of adapt and roll with. And so the reason why I bifurcate that is because these polarities can live in extremes. I've known people who are very, very high on self discipline and they're very low on outer discipline. These are people who typically, the way this looks, is someone who, for example, everything about their life is structured, they eat the right thing, they're in super good shape. They have everything kind of mapped out, and everything's very there, spot on. They can't get an external goal or a long term goal accomplished to save their lives, right?

And there's a reason behind that. Because if those people who are really high self discipline, extreme, they love and need routine and structure. And you, and I know everybody knows when you set a goal that the external world has a say in the. You're going to be thrown out of structure real quick. Right? You need to your whole, you may not be able to work out one day. You may have to eat something that you didn't want to eat. Right? I mean, just kind of an example, right?

So very high self discipline, very low self discipline, it can exist, right? I'm on the opposite, actually. I have pretty high discipline and I have low self discipline. And so I'm really good at setting and achieving long term, kind of audacious goals. When I'm told how to do something or I try to tell myself I'm pretty bad, right? I mean, because I'm used to being outside of structure, I'm used to being on the right routine. I kind of b*** up against it quite often.

So in my life, to work on my self discipline, I've had to be more deliberate about injecting a little bit of routine into my life so I can actually be self disciplined in a better way. But all this to say, most people are fairly balanced in this, but there are cases where you may be higher on one side of that than the other and it's going to show up in your behavior. So that's an interesting aspect.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Yeah, that's very interesting!

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Open mindedness, I mean, that's just a passive openness to experience and ideas and things like that. The open minded person is passively open to new experience, new ideas, new new people, new things. Right? It's different from curiosity. Curiosity. And that's an attribute, that's another attribute I just don't talk about in this book. Curiosity is a proactive thing. I'm going to go seek out new stuff.

But being open minded, that's probably more important because there's just a passiveness that I'm going to be an open minded person. Typically, if you're, none of this is black and white, but typically the people who are very high, highly successful, driven people, they have a good amount of open mindedness, an amount that allows them to take in new ideas, new experiences, so they can actually accomplish their objective.

If you're really low on it, you're very close minded, it's going to be pretty difficult for you to achieve these long term objectives and stick with it. Conning, I love because conning is felt or seen as pejorative a lot of times, but it's not. Cunning is very neutral. The way we use cunning can be judged. We can use cunning for evil. We can use it for good. But cunning on its own is simply thinking outside the box. Can I problem solve in a different way? The cunning mind approaches a problem and immediately asks three questions.

The first question is, are there rules and boundaries? The second question is, are they real or are they perceived? And the third question is, if they're real, what happens if I break them? And then the cunning mind begins to look at ways around a problem. And so obviously, a huge attribute for seals and spec ops in general. Because we're always thinking outside the box. And again, but it can be used. Bernie Madoff is an example of bad cunning, like evil cunning. Whereas Oskar Schindler is an example of good cunning. And so you just have to understand that the way we use it can be judged. But the elemental attribute is neutral.

And then finally, narcissism, which people always have an issue with because for the same reasons that I did when I was putting the book together, I kept on coming back to narcissistic personality disorder, which, in fact, is a disorder. And, in fact, I got a copy of DSM-5, which is the psych bible of all the psych diseases. And it has a few pages on narcissistic personality disorder.

But the thing about that disorder is when you go through those, when you look at those pages, there's, like nine criteria that the physician will read through. And if the physician can answer yes to five or more, then the physician can then diagnose the patient as disordered. That is, they have the disorder.

But only about 6% of the population are disordered. They have the disorder. I looked at those nine things, and as I looked through them, I read them. And I'm happy to say I couldn't say yes to five or more. What? I wasn't innocent of everything I was reading. In other words, I would read some of the stuff I read. I was like, well, sometimes I feel like this. Sometimes I feel like that.

So then I kind of went back and asked myself, well, why did I become a Navy Seal in the first place? I was a 22 year old kid. It was in the nineties. There's no war going on. It was the mid nineties. And I was a patriot. Obviously, I wanted to serve my country. But one of the real reasons, kind of a big reason, was I wanted to see if I could be a badass. I wanted to see if I could do something. Very few people could do.

So I asked my other Navy SEAL buddies, why did they become a Navy SEAL? They said the same thing, right? Yeah, they're patriots. Yeah, all that stuff. But they wanted to see if they could do something very few people could do. So in realizing that, I went to the very elemental definition of narcissism. And the very elemental definition of narcissism is the desire to stand out, be adored, be recognized, be made, feel special. That's the definition.

And honestly, I will tell you with certainty, every single human being on this planet at some point in their lives, wants to stand out, be desired, be adored, be made, feel special because it feels good. It feels good because there's certain neurology that we get. We get neurobiologically rewarded when we're adored and paid attention to. We get dopamine, we get serotonin, we get oxytocin, right, but it feels good. But narcissism, first of all, we all have it.

Second of all, it's the impetus to some of our most audacious goals, right? Why else would you want to be the best surgeon, best author, best Navy SEAL, best cop, right? You know, it's. There's. There's narcissism hidden in there, or maybe even explicit.

But the idea is, we all have it. Where do we stand on it? What are our levels? It is dangerous. There can be a tipping point. And it's, you know, you want to. You want to avoid tipping over the edge, right? The way you do that is you surround yourself with people who tell you the truth, who ground you, who don't just tell you what you want to hear, who don't just bend the knee, right, who, you're not always the center of attention. Right?

Now the police community, most of the time, the SEAL community, a lot of the first responder community, we have built into those communities grounding mechanisms. We keep each other grounded all the time, right? And so we manage that as a group. A lot of times, if you marry the right person, your spouse does it for you. I know mine does, and I do for her. But this is how you metabolize your narcissism in a very healthy way, wherever it might stand.

Jon Becker: But you know, what's interesting is, so one of the things I talk about in the culture, cynical leadership class that I teach is one of the unique characteristics of elite units is this high level of candor. Yeah. Right? It's this, hey, Rich, you know, and initially, it's done in a very gentle way, like, hey, buddy, you pregnant? You know, look like there's maternity pants.

Rich Diviney: Right.

Jon Becker: Which is a nice way of saying, I care about you. I want you to be here, but you're getting out of shape.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, yeah.

Jon Becker: What is interesting, though, is that if that is the counterbalance to narcissism, as we are moving more into a world where we are not allowed to give feedback, where we don't want to trigger people or hurt their feelings. You know, one of the most frustrating things for me as a business owner is we fire people all the time and never have an ability to go, look, dude, the reason I'm firing you is, you know, you're an a****** and you treat people poorly. We have to say, well, you know, today's your last day. And so we're creating this culture where we're eliminating the feedback, the feedback loop that stops narcissism.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And as a result, we're ending up with a lot of narcissistic personality types that are, you know, I always say, you know, like the, you know, DevGuru runs a selection to certain. Select a certain kind of person, you know, politically right now in the country, we are selecting narcissistic a*******, and we are 100% successful.

Rich Diviney: Yeah.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And we're not, you know, this is where having that internal mechanism and that truth speaking and. And candid feedback enables us to temper your narcissism in a way that it is. It is constructive because it does make you want to be a SEAL, and it makes you want to do difficult missions, and you may, you know, makes you chase those things, but it also prevents you from then, you know, going on every TV show and spilling your guts about the stuff that happened when we temper it.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. And we're fortunate in the cop, first responder SEAL communities, because our humility is. Is induced not only through each other, but also environment. Right? I mean, we. I always kind of say, I mean, you can be the best swimmer in the world. Right? You can be surf. You can surf every day. If you turn your back on the ocean, it will kill you. Right?

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Rich Diviney: So we are environments that candor is absolutely necessary. Debriefs are absolutely necessary. We create a habit of. Of being very canderous and rapid with that feedback because we care, and we have to do it that fast. But I do agree. I mean, again, I think there are organizations still out there that are executing candor. I think. I've worked with businesses who do it quite well. I think from a societal level, this is our job as a family to provide each other with that love and candor that we get used to feedback.

It all hinges on this idea of trust. And if you can build a trusting environment, because you can't, if you don't have trust built between human beings, candor is just going to sound like you're being an a******. It's not going to. It's not going to. It's not going to come at you with the same weight and strength as it comes at you. When you know someone loves and trusts you and you trust that person. Right? Because we know all the people we can think of in our lives that we trust deeply. You know, that same list are the people who tell us what we need to hear when we want.

So I think businesses where businesses can do better is they can understand that. Let's build this environment of trust first. Let's work on trust first. Once we get this environment, trust, I'm going to seed in part of trust building is we're going to seed in the ability to be canderous and we're going to gauge it and talk about it in a way that we know this is because we want the team to get better. It's not to beat someone up or point the finger. It's like this is something that the team has to understand. And you start creating that environment, man.

Well, you know, you get people who, when they screw up, they're the first people to say they screwed up, right? They are. They are, absolutely. You get an environment where something happens, someone's to blame, and that person is the first person who steps forward says, hey, I screw this up. This is what I did. This is what happened. You don't even have to point the fingers anymore. That's the goal at a national level. I agree with you. I think, you know, people are, we're just in this, I think in this world where people want to feel like they are heard and more.

So it's a fear based system. Right now, everything about our media, regardless of what political side you're on, is focused on spreading fear about the other person. And fear is a physiological response. So we're going to angle towards those people who are telling us the opposite of what the, of what the folks who were afraid of are. So I don't know, how do we get there? We just need some more discourse, I guess.

Jon Becker: Yeah, well, I mean, I think it's, you know, it's a topic for a different discussion, but I'll kind of run it past like we are living right now in a time where others are exploiting our evolutionary biology, right? We are being fed foods that have, like, the perfect salty, sweet bliss point that we will eat until we gorge ourselves. We're being fed a diet of media that triggers those fear circuits and makes us watch. And social media is conditioning us to look for dopamine hits. And it's just a variety of industries have figured out how to exploit our evolutionary biology. The drive that makes us like sweet food, because you don't find it very often.

And when you do, you can get fat on it every day, three times a day. You just get fat. You don't survive, you just get fat. And I think that's true in a lot of the work environments. And one of the things that I like about the attributes is it does give you a context to look at some of those things and go, wow, we're really high on these, you know, not so positive levels of attributes. You touched on trust. Why don't we transition to team ability?

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Okay. But I will say team ability. Trust is not an attribute. It's not one of the team ability attributes. I know, it's the team ability attributes are aredemental, integrity, conscientiousness, humility, and humor. Trust is much bigger. Again, trust is this category inside of which something is the result of a lot of things.

So a lot of these attributes that we talk about, leadership and team ability attributes, when we behave these attributes, it elicits trust. The thing about trust is we can't. Trust is not just a feeling. A feeling is just a human emotion. Trust is a belief. It's a human emotion that's been rationalized or justified. What that tells us is something we already know, and that is you cannot make anybody trust you. All you can do is behave in a way that allows someone to choose to trust you. Right?

So the result, the whole trust environment is a result of these attributes. And so we think about it. So, for example, the team ability attributes, integrity, this is do the right thing. That's as simple as that. So we know when we see someone, and now here's the thing about do the right thing, it's subjective to the group, okay?

Jon Becker: For sure.

Rich Diviney: Do the right thing for a cub scout troop looks different than do the right thing for an ISIS troop. Okay? And so we have to understand what do the right thing looks like for our group. But when we do that, that elicits. That begins to build trust. Build team ability. Right? Conscientiousness is really simple. The ability to be reliable, work hard, and be diligent. Diligent, reliable, and hard work. That's conscientiousness. Humility. I think that's a no brainer. I mean, we know arrogance kills teams, and when we see arrogance, we don't trust it. We just don't. We see confidence. We trust confidence, but we don't trust arrogance.

And so humility. Humility and confidence walk a nice kind of parallel line a lot of times. And we know there can be very. The best folks are those who are confident and humble. Right. Arrogance and humility, they're opposites. You can't do it. So I would say that that humility is a no brainer because we just. We just don't think of people who are arrogant as teammates. We just don't. They just don't present themselves because of behavior.

And then finally, humor. Humor is really important because I've never experienced a high performing team that doesn't have it. Humor is powerful because it's neurobiologically rewarding us in ways that are unfathomably powerful. Powerful when we laugh, which is an involuntary response, we immediately get hit with dopamine. It's not a reward. It's a motivation chemical. Keep doing this. We get hit with endorphins, which masks our pain. That's like the human opiate. And then we get oxytocin. We're in this together like the bonding binding chemical for human beings.

And so when we laugh, especially with others, we immediately, our body is saying, this is good. Keep doing this. This doesn't feel that bad. We're in this together. That's why laughter is a hack into any miserable situation. It's why the highest performing teams will joke around in miserable situations. It's one of the things I miss the most about the teams, because we would joke in some of the most miserable situations, and someone crack a joke, we'd laugh, and suddenly you're a hack. It's a hack into feeling better, knowing we can do this.

The other hack it allows us to jump into is courage. When we step into our fear, we get dopamine. When we laugh, we get dopamine. So some of us have probably had this experience where we have been genuinely afraid or anxious. In a situation, someone says something that makes us genuinely laugh, and the fear goes away. It's because we've just given our body the same reward that we would have had we stepped into our fear in the first place. Right?

So, again, I've never experienced a high performing team that doesn't have humor as a huge part of it. Humor as an attribute is our ability to laugh. You don't have to be that person making the jokes, but as long as you have the ability to laugh, you're going to do fine.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's a sense of humor, right. It's not being funny. It's a sense of humorous and finding, you know, the ability to laugh in difficult situations, obviously, you know, brings a high amount of humor with it. And I think, especially in this industry, it is a coping mechanism, it's a bonding mechanism. It is, you know, it is critical to teams, and the teams that lose their sense of humor, lose their, their social construct, they lose their connection to.

Rich Diviney: One another, and they lose their resilience as well. I mean, you can't, I mean, it's, again, it's such a powerful, powerful tool. It almost transcends all of the categories because it helps in almost every one of them. Right?

Jon Becker: Because it, well, if you were going to try and like, hey, let's make, let's make rich, you know, more able to deal with difficult things or pain or whatever, you would give rich endorphins. You would give him dopamine, and if you wanted him to care about the people he was with, you would give him oxytocin. Right? It literally is. It's using your evolutionary biology for good.

Rich Diviney: Yes. Yeah. That's why it's so good. That's why it feels so good. That's why, and that's why one of the things about society, I mean, we have to keep laughing. To not laugh is death.

Jon Becker: Well, yeah, that's where it's really scary that we are like, as a society, that we're losing our sense of humor and we're like, oh, the comedian shouldn't say that. He shouldn't be allowed to make that joke. Like, no, no. And it's funny because growing up with tactical teams, I started over at 17, right. So I've been surrounded by SWAT cops and special operators my whole life. It brings a certain sense of humor, which is, I will call a little dark.

Rich Diviney: Oh, yeah. I always do.

Jon Becker: I can laugh at just about anything. And you hear people say, oh, too soon. And of course, the traditional response to that is never too soon. But in this case, literally never too soon because the ability to laugh about something terrible is how you get through 100%.

Rich Diviney: And we're not the only ones that do it. I talked to surgical teams, nursing nurse, nursing teams. I mean, people who are constantly dealing with trauma, their survival is dependent on their ability to find humor here and there. But we've also seen the medical benefits of people who. People who've had terminal illnesses or cancer who. Who go on a laughing regiment, and they. And they actually. They actually get better. I mean, because it is that. It is quite literally the best medicine.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Yeah. It's funny. Why don't we – So let's talk about the last category, which is leadership. And obviously, you know, the. The first three are kind of inwardly focused. Team mobility is kind of mildly outwardly focused. Leadership is very much outwardly focused.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. Yeah, it really is, because it's all about these behaviors that other people are looking at and experiencing. So, empathy. I mean, again, empathy, can I absorb. Can I get into the shoes of another? Right? And we don't, you know, someone who has just an inability to do that we tend not to look at as real strong leaders. Right? I mean, that idea that I can. I can really get into the shoes of people who are in my span of care and do what I need to do what I can do for them from that position is really, really good.

So, as leader, as people in charge, if we want to be leaders, if we find ourselves low on empathy, it's something we need to work on, because it's really that important. Selflessness, again, this is the ability to do something for another, but it adds this risk or loss to oneself. So, for example, if I'm walking down the street and I see a homeless person, I give that person $10. That's actually generous. I'm doing more than is expected, but it's no skin off my back.

But if that homeless person turns around and gives that $10 to another homeless person, now, that's selfless, because that's giving something. Doing something for another that is. Is at some sort of risk or loss to oneself. Right? This is why selflessness, not generosity, is a leadership attribute. We don't look for generous leaders. We look for selfless leaders.

Now, selflessness doesn't mean putting one's life at risk all the time. It could mean giving someone. Time is literally the currency of leadership. We all have the same amount, and when we give it to another person, we can't get it back. So when you give it to another person, that person really feels like you are doing something for them. You're giving something to them.

So, as leaders, we want to be able to give that to others and be selfless. Right? That's how important that is. Authenticity. That has to do with our ability to be consistent in our behavior. Okay. It doesn't have to do with. I'm always open kimono about everything and all that stuff and wear everything on my sleeve emotionally. No, it's, am I consistent in my behavior? Am I authentic in my behavior so that people expect and know what to expect from me? You could be a generally grumpy person, but if you're consistent that way, people begin to, they may not like it, but they can expect it. Right?

So that's authenticity. Decisiveness. Again, we have to think about decisiveness in terms of the speed with which we make decisions. Decisive. Making decisions is a skill. You can teach someone how to do better and make better decisions. Decisiveness adds that speed and efficiency factor that has to be considered. We don't necessarily look at people as leaders if they are people who waffle and can't decide and kind of wish wash. Right? We just don't. Right?

And so we, as people in positions of leadership or people in charge that want to be leaders, have to just understand that decisiveness is necessary. We have to be able to gather data and at a certain point say, okay, I don't have 100%, maybe I have 80, but I'm going to make a decision that has to be buttressed by the last one, which is accountability, which is once you make that decision, you begin to move out. Are you owning that decision? The consequences and the good stuff it. Right? That's ownership. That's, I'm going to. I'm taking accountability for my decisions and the results thereof. Right?

And again, people who are in positions of being in charge, and they're constantly pointing the finger at other people, we just don't tend to look at those people as leaders. Real leaders. I mean, I know there's some examples of people out there who always point fingers. Right? But real, true leaders, like people we'd follow to helen back, okay, because pointing fingers means you are cease. You're ceding control. Right? You're basically giving the steering wheel up to someone else, and you're not taking control, you're not taking responsibility and accountability. That's a serious charge for anybody who wants to be a leader.

Jon Becker: Well, and the attributes, the leadership attributes are things that are really more based on the way the follower reacts to the leader. Right. Like it's, it's. I want, you know, you look at empathy like I. If you're my leader, I want you to care about me and be able to put yourself in my position so that you'll make good decisions periodically. I want you to be selfless. I want you to give up what you want for me. If you're not authentic. I can't trust you. If you won't be accountable and own when you make a mistake, then I can't trust you to not throw me under the bus.

And, you know, as a leader, I come to you for decision. Right? That is what leaders do, is they make decisions between two difficult alternatives. I always say, like, you know, there are two kinds of things that come into my, you know, into my business. Cookies and turds. Nobody needs help eating the cookies, right? They just eat the cookies. Right? So what ends up on my desk are turds. It's, of these two difficult decisions do you want to make?

And the farther up you move in an organization, the more Solomon's choice that becomes, the harder it is to choose between. Wow, these are really terrible alternatives. I'm going to have to make a decision. And as a follower, as somebody who is relying on a leader, if they won't make a decision, then they doom you to whatever happens.

Rich Diviney: Yes, they do. And, oh, by the way, it has to be buttressed by accountability. You can go and make decisions all day long if you as a leader are nothing accountable and don't, and are not openly accountable for that. In other words, someone can come into my office and say, hey, can you help me with this decision? I say, yeah, go that way. They go that way. It screws up or it's the wrong thing, and then we blame that person. Right? That is not leadership. Right?

We have to say, oh, that's on me. I got, you know, so I would say, as leaders, you can always delegate responsibility. You can never delegate accountability. Right? Because we, and in fact, as leaders, we're supposed to delegate responsibility, but we always are accountable. If I told one of my guys when I was a commanding officer, hey, you have this. This is yours, and they went off and they screwed it up. Say, okay, you screwed it up. Let's see what you did wrong. That's on me. Right? It's on. I'm not, I'm not dropping the accountability bucket on you. Right? They will take accountability because you're modeling it. Right?

But ultimately, you know, I'm taking accountability as well. And that's the, that's the, that's the secret. But I've had leaders, I've had people in charge who delegate both. And that's wrong. It's just not leadership.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's, you know, you see leaders who will delegate. You know, they'll delegate the negative. You know, it's, I always say, like, negative things that occur are your responsibility. Positive things that occur are a result of your team's good work.

Rich Diviney: Yeah. And that's a good model. Yeah. Whether it's true or not, I mean, you know, ostensibly, you could say in some cases that things go right. It's like, okay, yeah, that was a good stuff on my part, but that's not said by a leader. That's, you know, that's all under the water, and it doesn't need to be expressed.

Jon Becker: Yeah, we won. I lost. I'd like to touch one more thing to just kind of wrap up our time together. It's just an interesting concept that you talked about in the book, which is dynamic subordination.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, yeah. Well, this is so this is a concept that actually describes how high performing teams, in fact, task organize. And the idea is that high performing teams, if you were to look at a task organization chart, it does not look like a pyramid where the leader sits on top and dictates. It does not look like a flat line where everybody's kind of doing the same thing and no one outranks anybody. And we're all in this, and it's all groovy. And it doesn't even look like the upside down pyramid. The servant leadership model, where the leader is sitting on the bottom of that pyramid. What it really looks like is an amorphous blob. And dynamic subordination implies that a team understands that challenges and issues can come from any angle at any moment.

And when one does, the person who's closest to that problem, the most capable, immediately steps up and takes lead, and everybody follows and supports. Right? And then the environment shifts again and someone else steps up. And I also call it alpha hopping. That alpha position just hops to where it needs to go. And so it takes hierarchy out of the equation. Your position on a team has nothing to do with your hierarchical position, has to do with what you contribute to that team.

And so I always say, I was on hundreds of combat missions. I was in charge of every single one. It didn't mean I was always being supported. In fact, most of the time, it was the opposite. I was supporting other people. Assaulters, breachers, snipers, whatever. Sometimes the environment would shift and they'd be supporting me.

But ultimately, we are a team that moves like an amoeba or a flock of birds, where the person steps up, we all support. This is how we play the long game. This is how we optimally form. Because when someone is up in front doing, you know, leading, other people are supporting. Guess what? The people in the very back could be doing. They might be able to recover. Right?

There's kind of like the flock of geese flying in the v formation. That, that, that lead geese, that lead goose is taking all the wind resistance. Right? But that lead goose doesn't stay up there for too long. That lead goose, after a while, a few minutes switch, swaps out with someone else or another goose, right? And they keep on swapping out. So this is the idea about dynamic subordination. It's the way you play the long game and it's the way all high performing teams operate.

Jon Becker: Yeah. That's fantastic. Yeah. I think like a bicycle peloton, right? You're on the front pedaling like h*** for 30 seconds, 60 seconds, then you're peeling off and recovering so you can make it back up. Yeah. So, Rich, kind of tradition on the debrief five, we like to end with five rapid fire questions. Short answer, you know, kind of gut instincts, actually. Before we get there, though, what's, what's the best way for people to engage with you? Where can they find, you know, Rich's, you know, latest work and content?

Rich Diviney: Yeah, the best, the best, easiest is the. so it's all one word theater. But we have there, we have all of our stuff, all of our consulting information, all of our, you have the book there. We have some assessment tools there that you can take to see where you stand on those attributes and media and things like that. All my social handles are on there as well. You can find them. So is kind of the one.

Jon Becker: Stop shop, and we'll link that in the show notes. All right, let's go on to the rapid fires. What's your most important habit?

Rich Diviney: Asking better questions. The brain, the mind will focus on whatever you ask it. We're question answering machines, so if you feed it the wrong questions, why am I so bad at this? Why am I so p***** off? You will get answers. It's unavoidable. But if you feed it the right ones, why am I grateful? What can I do better? You'll get those answers, too. So I've done that since I was in high school.

Jon Becker: What's your favorite, current favorite online resource? Website or podcast?

Rich Diviney: Okay, well, I'm supposed to say Huberman, because he's a good friend, but I do like, it is great, I think podcasts. I love Sam Harris. I've always loved his podcast for quite a while. Resource. I read, I try to read as much as I can. I'm actually part of a, this might sound funny to some. I'm part of a Navy SEAL book club. It's a bunch of us SEALs, both past and present.

So we got Vietnam guys all the way to active duty and we pick a book and every month or month and a half we read it and we get on a zoom. We just had one last night and we just discuss it and then we pick another book. And so I've gotten reading back into my repertoire, which I really like.

Jon Becker: I'm going to avoid the obvious joke that it's a coloring book and that you guys eat the crown.

Rich Diviney: Yeah, well, that happens.

Jon Becker: What's the most important characteristic of an effective leader?

Rich Diviney: Listening. Yeah, just shut up.

Jon Becker: What's something you've changed your mind about in the last few years?

Rich Diviney: Well, I've been married to my wife for 23 years, and one of the things she's shown me and made and allowed me to believe is in the beauty of people and empathy. Right? And my wife, she finds beauty in everybody. And I think that's such a unique, great quality. And so I think changed my mind about the importance and the power of true empathy.

Jon Becker: Final question. What's the most profound memory of your career?

Rich Diviney: Boy, there are so many. But I would say if I were to kind of pull a bunch together and make one, it's this idea that when you have the right group of people operating towards a common objective and goal and you can laugh and you can gel, that's kind of. That's heaven right there. I mean, that's the best you can be. That's a high performing team. Even when you're in really miserable circumstances, you are in bliss in terms of the people you go through.

So I think the idea that I could, in many cases, be walking in the middle of al Qaeda central in Afghanistan or Iraq in a beehive, and I had no concerns because I knew the people around me. We had it locked, the usual risk assessment tools going on, but nothing that said we couldn't handle it. And I think those times were very profound in terms of, man, this is just a great group of people and I love them and I trust them and I'm just, I'm where I need to be.

Jon Becker: That's fantastic! Rich, first, thanks for your service to the country! Thanks for the work you're doing now. I think it's really fascinating. I think it's a good. You did a fantastic job of transitioning a life of service to the country into lessons learned that I think a lot of people can apply. And thank you so much for being here. Today with me.

Rich Diviney: Well, thanks, Jon! It's been a pleasure! And thanks for asking! And I'm so glad we finally got it done.

Jon Becker: Absolutely. Thanks, buddy!

Episode 7 – Mike Hillman Part 2 of 2: The History of SWAT

Jon Becker: My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

This is the second part of a two part series with Mike Hellman. Mike is a legend in the tactical community with a list of career accomplishments that would take a podcast of their own. But as a brief bio, Mike was one of the original founders of LAPD SWAT. A deputy chief at LAPD, the assistant sheriff in Orange County, California, and an assistant chief of police for the Los Angeles Port Police.

He was one of the founders of the National Tactical Officers association and is nationally recognized as an expert on leadership, crisis management, critical incident management, special operations, and a wide variety of other subjects.

In the first episode, we talked about the history and the origins of SWAT and Mike's career at LAPD. In this second installment, we'll explore Mike's career after LAPD, his views on leadership, critical incident management, tactical decision making, and the role of SWAT in the modern environment.

Mike, I appreciate you sitting down with me again to have this conversation!

Mike Hillman: Jon, thank you very much for at least inviting me and certainly what you're doing here with The Debrief program. I think it's just outstanding.

Jon Becker: Thank you so much! So, first time we talked about history today, what I'd love to do is get into kind of Mike's view, you know, Hillman's view on leadership. Why don't we start with character of a leader, personal conduct. Give me your view on what the essence of an effective leader is from a character standpoint.

Mike Hillman: Well, you know, leaders, some people would say leaders are born. I think leaders are developed, and it depends upon the character, the competence of an individual, and the willingness to really develop themselves. And from the day that I became a Los Angeles police officer, I learned a great deal about leadership because I worked with some really quality individuals.

I worked with some that were what I would call laissez faire type. And I was able to extract the good and the pieces that I really didn't want to apply. And the focus that I've always tried to deal with from a leader's perspective is, what does it look like through the lens of the police officer? And if I'm the leader I expect high performance and I expect individuals to be accountable, and I expect people to be able to look around corners and think ahead.

And so that the components of leadership, which I've always subscribed to have been at the essence of what I would call humility. Whenever I've gone to a class and I listen to somebody identify themselves as an expert, I immediately want to get up and walk away because as I said in the first episode that you talked about, there are no experts in this business. We're students of the problem.

And in 50 years of law enforcement, what I've learned is how much I don't know, and I pay attention and watch other people. But along the way, there's been a lot of lessons learned. The complexities of decision making, the impact of it, the political nuances of it, the right and wrong, the risk versus benefit, all of that comes into play in any of the decisions.

Jon Becker: It's interesting because the way you're speaking about it, it sounds like introspection is a big part of at least your personal philosophy. And as long as I've known you, that is certainly, if you were to ask me, hey, what is the characteristic that sticks out most about Mike Hillman? I do see you as somebody who spends a lot of time looking at their own behavior, looking at their own responsibilities and then trying to develop that. Do you think that's essential to develop, or do you think that happens naturally?

Mike Hillman: It doesn't happen naturally. You have to work at it, because there is a time where leading from the front and having the experience in certain cases to where you have individuals that are of less experience than you to watch them, have to go through the same things that you've learned the hard way. There's always a time where you want to say, you know what? Stop what you're doing. Let me intervene here and put you on the right course.

But if the situation is not a life endangering situation or going to result in some horrendous risk management issue, those people need to learn as well. And so that I can try to help maneuver them rather than say, stop what you're doing, I might say, did you ever think about this? I'm always worked in the leadership area as a suggestion. Have you thought about this? I've never had to.

You know, when I work your way up through any particular organization, you're positioned at various levels of responsibility. Just because you pinned sergeant Stripes on or put Lieutenant bars on or captain commanders or deputy chief or chief doesn't make you a leader. You have to earn the respect of individuals that you're dealing with, you have to be able to walk the talk.

I've never worked a day in my life because I've always, never forgotten where I came from. And it's important that leaders don't forget where they came from. As I mentioned at the beginning, you've got to look at things through the prism of the officers or deputy's eyes, and you have to hold them accountable. You have to expect that they're going to make, you know, good decisions. You have to trust in your workforce, and you have to hire and be able to select into an organization competent and highly skilled individuals.

And today in law enforcement, we talked earlier about some of the SWAT selection process. We have some of the best operators that I'll put up against any of the military or any other agency within the world.

Jon Becker: But it's interesting because you seem to have inherent a guiding principle. One of the things that I talk about in our culture centric leadership program, one of the things I talk about with my own people is the idea that there has to be a guiding principle to the organization.

In our case, it's protecting tactical operators. When somebody's new, they start with us. My first interaction with them, I tell them, do the right thing for the end user, everything else will follow. It seems that for you there is this inner compass of doing the right thing for the individual officer. It's kind of at the core of what you believe.

Mike Hillman: Well, it is. And to kind of address what you're bringing out here right now, leaders need to be visible. They need to be very competent and have demonstrated their competence. They need to be individuals that can react in a very decisive and reasonable manner during a crisis situation. And they need to be able to handle complex types of decisions. They need to be able to make decisions that sometimes their competitive nature of things, because of the complexity of an incident and because of the time component, they have conflicting priorities.

But that decision maker has to be able to provide a solid state decision making and guidance to subordinate elements who are in a crisis situation, are looking to that person to put them on the right path.

Jon Becker: What do you think the root of that decisiveness is?

Mike Hillman: I think that's a good question because it's based upon experience. It's based upon your thought processes and how individuals will make decisions. I think that when I look back on some of the supervisors that I've worked around, which have been just top quality individuals, but there have been some that the lesser experienced individuals may not have the depth and the hard drive to be able to bring out some of the necessary elements to make good, solid decisions, because whatever decision you make, there's a consequence for it or several consequences, and it may take you down the road in a rabbit hole that you don't want to be in.

So that the decisions that are made, you have to really think ahead. And I talk about that, I use that term a lot when I say to supervisors, you have to think ahead. What's this going to look like tomorrow? What's it going to look like politically? And some people would say, well, you know, we don't make crisis decisions based upon politics.

Well, that's not true. We do. We make decisions all the time based upon politics. And then the other issue is you have to start considering risk management. And some people will say, well, we don't make decisions on hostage rescue based upon if we're going to be sued. I get that. No question about it. But you can't be cavalier about it because we're based upon the objectively reasonable, this standard, and also totality of circumstances, Graham versus Connor.

So all of those pieces have to be brought into play. And we can't just go out here and have somebody come up to you and make a recommendation to you as a leader that would say, you know, hey, boss, what I want to try is this thermonuclear grenade and see whether or not it's going to bring the hostages out.

Jon Becker: Yeah, probably not.

Mike Hillman: Because if you don't have the experience to say, what are you talking about and why are we doing this, that's a bad decision.

Jon Becker: Mike, as I listened to you described that, the one thing that is missing in that whole thing is the leader's view of themselves, like their role, their career. I always say the difference between a manager and a leader is a leader does what's right. A manager does what's right for his career. I noticed that as you're talking about that, it's a very selfless approach. It's trying to get to the right resolution, it's trying to manage risk, but there's no thought paid to the effect on the leader himself.

Mike Hillman: Well, as I said, I've never worked a day in my life, which means that I've really enjoyed what I've done. There's been sad moments, obviously, but there has been a very positive interaction that I've had with personnel that I've worked with, and I've never tried to become an individual that was self consumed with their own abilities.

You know, I always looked at my strengths as being able to bring people together, and I looked at my strengths as being able to listen and to engage people that were a lot smarter than I was, to be able to offer advice and direction and to listen to them, and then to be able to implement it and then to reward them.

Jon Becker: Because in the end, one of my favorite things is that an effective leader gets the right answer. He's not necessarily the guy that has the right answer.

Mike Hillman: That's correct.

Jon Becker: And it seems that that's kind of also your view.

Mike Hillman: It is. It's very much, you know, the leader is there to be able to gather all of the information and to be able to accomplish the mission. And you never want to waste a good crisis. If you've got a good crisis, then let's capitalize on that. And many leaders that I've seen always become consumed by, oh, my gosh, I'm going to finish my career in a negative sense by if I make a bad mistake in this crisis.

Well, if you think in terms of that, you're going to lose. But if you think in terms of my job is to focus on the mission, develop the people that come in, listen to what the people have to say, and if people can give me good advice, and then I can basically make the decision on which path we're going to go on, then there's going to be a risk to it. But you can't be in fear of it.

If you're going to be successful, you've got to make that decision. In a crisis situation, people will always gravitate to the strong leaders that they see making decisions. I can think of many times where I've been in situations where there's been a lot of, quote unquote leaders, and that not much was happening. And I was blessed with the fact that I had good people that I was able to bring in and make the decision, to be able to proceed and accomplish the mission through them.

And the workforce that I had suddenly started developing, taking people away from other leaders, and they wanted to join this group because we saw that we were making progress in the success. But good leaders never fall in love with their own decisions. They always want to listen.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's an interesting point. You have to make decisions. Part of being a leader is being decisive. You have to make decisions. It's very easy as a leader to spend too much time, especially in your line of work. You don't necessarily have a lot of time to make decisions. But that means two things. One, you're going to make an imperfect decision, and two, if you stay wedded to it, you're probably going to end up in the wrong place.

Mike Hillman: You're going to end up down in a rabbit hole. You have in the decision making process, the Boyd cycle, but in the decision making process, you have to allow room for flexibility. Some people would say, well, wait a minute, he just said, do this now we're changing course.

Well, you may have to change course, and people need to understand that. And as a leader, if you're going to be the leader, you better declare yourself as a leader. I'm not suggesting that you declare yourself as the most significant individual in the world, but you are basically saying, all right, ladies and gentlemen, this is the direction we're going to go in, or declaring themselves as an incident commander, extremely important.

I can think of numerous incidents that I've been involved in where there are complex incidents that involve a lot of moving parts, or in a crisis situation where you have a lot of people coming in and trying to make decisions and influencing the workforce that are at a higher level, that it becomes very convoluted and takes away from being able to accomplish a, the mission to any degree of success.

Jon Becker: It's interesting you said something that I think is really key. You can't fall in love with your own decisions. Implicit in that is you have to be willing to change your mind. And I think that that is something that we have lost in leadership. Right?

Especially when you look at political leadership and politicized environments. We've gotten to a point where like, no, I made the right decision from the beginning, and they will ride that truck all the way back to the dump, even when they're wrong, rather than saying, I made a mistake. We need to go this way.

Mike Hillman: Well, yes and no. If you are in an extremist situation, which is life endangering, and you sit on a course of action and you have nanoseconds to accomplish it, that speed, surprise and diversion sometimes will be able to be your best friend. And it's better to be lucky in some cases than good with a real, real solid decision that you're going to be able to be decisive and say, we're going in this direction.

But the majority of decision making that is made by leaders involve time. They're not in a critical type of an environment. They're not in an in extremist type of an environment. And those are the kind of decisions that sometimes leading from the front may not always be the best. There may be servant leadership. You know, you look at today's leaders and today's workforce, you're dealing with millennials that are much more, much more versed in social media and the meanings of how to be able to transmit information than I ever was. And I will listen to those individuals. And sometimes you have individuals that are much more competent in some particular area than you could ever be.

Now, your role in that scenario is to guide those individuals. And at some juncture where there needs to be a why on the road that there has to be a decision made. That's where you come into play. But you have to be able to listen to what your workforce says. And the workforce may not always be right, but the good majority of the time they may be. And like General Powell said, you know, the 40% to 70% decision making, if you got 40% of the information, you're probably headed in the right direction, rather than waiting for 70% to make the wrong decision.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because it is this balance of decisiveness and certainty in your decision, but yet openness to others and their information and a willingness to question your own decisions retrospectively. And I think it's a very hard line to walk. What characteristics in a leader do you think are important in order to get there?

Mike Hillman: Well, certainly character is the number one piece because you have to be able to have the character that gains the respect of the workforce. You have to have experience, the experience that you can't just walk into a particular environment and accumulate experience.

Because people look at you, and when they look at you as a leader, they look at you to see, does that person walk the talk. You have to be able to have respect for others and treat people with respect. You have to be an individual that is going to hold people accountable for their actions. You've got to be able to reward good work. You have to be able to discipline those that may not necessarily want to engage in good work. You've got to be able to motivate individuals. You've got to be able to mentor individuals.

So that what I always looked at is that I wanted to make my workforce better than I could ever be when I exited. And that all of those skill sets of being able to listen, to be accountable, to be humble, and to be humble to the point to where you don't walk around saying, hey, look at me. You just do it like the Nike commercial.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because the root of all of that is humility, right? It is acceptance of the fact that you're not perfect. You're not going to necessarily make the decision, in my view, is as a leader, I am the least important person in the room. I'm the one with tasked with making a decision, but I am the least important person in the room because I know the least about almost every discipline. I'm a generalist as a leader.

Mike Hillman: Right, you are. And, you know, leaders are individuals that can bring about change. And change is very, very difficult to implement, especially in cultures, organizational cultures, unit cultures. It's interesting to look at some of the leaders that I've worked for that have come into an organization and made change and how they've done it.

And anytime that you're in an organization and you have to experience change, it's not pleasant because you may be pretty well set in your ways and you may have a pretty much paradigm that you are focused on. And then all of a sudden, somebody comes in and upsets the Apple card.

But the good news is that change is good. You know, I used to be in the organization. Well, in the organizations that I've been in, when you would promote from a police officer, a deputy, to a sergeant, that they would relocate you in some other position within the department so that it took you out of where you were at, exposed you to another environment and other personnel. And I always thought, you know, when I was a police officer in Metro and I got promoted to sergeant, I had to go to a patrol division.

Well, why can't I stay there? It was probably the best thing that ever happened to me, because you learn other dynamics, and if you take somebody out of a specialized assignment, there's some good things in there, there that when they go to another assignment, they influence the rest of the department in things that they may not have been experienced in before. So it's a positive thing. But change is very difficult to implement as a leader.

Jon Becker: Well, and throughout your career, you have, I mean, you have acquired a reputation as a fixer, as a guy who could take on very difficult problems, very complicated problems, you know, challenging organizational cultures and make those resets. What is at the essence of that? When you come into a situation that is maybe not correct and are tasked with resetting a culture? Give me your process there. What's the first thing you do? How do you think through that?

Mike Hillman: Well, since I left the Los Angeles Police Department, I've worked at two other agencies. And the first thing that I did when I went into each of those agencies was, number one, to be able to make sure that everyone knew that I was a guest there. And I said that I'm a guest here and that I don't necessarily want to change any of the culture. I want to learn the culture, and I want you to share your culture with me so that I can learn it. But I'm going to need your help along the way. And I respect the culture that you have here.

Now in that process, as we go through the change element, that culture may not be the direction that needs to go for the community. And so that sometimes you're faced with decisions that are contrary to the culture where you came in and introduced yourself and said, here, I'm not going to change this culture.

So now you're faced with either I discredit yourself or you're in a position to where you can help make change. And so what I found to be very successful is that I found very competent individuals that I was able to work with, and I became visible within that workforce, and I did a lot of listening, and I would work very closely with, some cases, the various labor organizations within the organization to determine just exactly what their needs were.

And so as we went forward, I made sure that we had good communications up and down. And that as I started to think about things that we may want to move in a different direction that would impact culture, I would always make sure that other people were brought in to the decision making process to see the direction I was going at. Now, sometimes not everybody would subscribe to it, but that's what leaders have to do. They can't be everybody's friend. They have to be able to accomplish the mission and change the course of things.

You know, when it comes to personal appearance, I'm big into that for leaders, because the community hires us to be representatives of the community, but also to be very professional. And when you look at some organizations that may not have a uniform appearance, that is what I would call to the standard of impeccable, then a leader may have to influence that by bringing in other individuals and convincing them that it's not appropriate to walk around here with a Sam Brown belt that looks like you drug it to work instead of wore it, you know, and the standards of things like that, you walk, you. You are what you appear to be to other people.

And, you know, in a lot of ways, when somebody calls the police or law enforcement, they expect individuals that are going to be very professional in both in appearance and in manner. And so that if we have situations that involve disciplinary issues because people are mistreated, that's not a cultural issue, that's a disciplinary issue.

Some people would attach it to a culture, but it's a disciplinary issue. When you have members of an organization that are supposed to be in law enforcement and public service that come in and treat people with disrespect, then that's where the leader has to either go through some training or some disciplinary process.

Jon Becker: So, Mike, that kind of takes us to leading in this. Curry, like the modern environment, how do you maintain high standards in this environment?

Mike Hillman: Well, you've got to look at what is the modern environment? You know, when I started in law enforcement, the modern environment was the Los Angeles Police Department just came out of a corruption erratic and that the standards of appearance were actually very, very high. And Los Angeles Police Department was always known for very high standards in the uniform appearance end of it.

And as things start to evolve, a lot of this has to do with culture of an organization, but it also has to do with the leaders who are at the top. And in leading the modern day law enforcement professional. They've gone through the academy, individuals have. They've learned a great deal about cultural sensitivity, the nuances of the law of use of force.

And today, much different than one, certainly I came on. The requirements of the law in terms of use of force are much more stringent. We have a social media network now where information moves at light speed. We have such a distrust of law enforcement by the community as a result of things that have happened over since actually Ferguson and even before to where that there is a sense of distrust for law enforcement working in the community.

So that leaders in the community have to be able to collaborate, number one, with the community and be able to showcase their law enforcement agency as being sensitive to all of the nuances that we have today, all of the unhoused population or the homeless, all of the mental health issues that we have to deal with, all of the use of force issues, all of the body worn camera and in cardinal video that recounts every action of police officers, that now has become very public.

So how do we deal with that type of an environment? Well, you get what you select. And so that being very careful as leaders, when we as a police chief or someone that is in charge of hiring, you want to bring in individuals that are willing to follow the rules, bring in solid individuals that are of character and that you can trust on and off duty.

The biggest problem that law enforcement faces today, I think, is some of the off duty conduct of some of our law enforcement officers. And I think that begins with the leaderships in leadership and what we demand of our workforce. When I was on LAPD, I was known for being very hard on officers that got involved in DUI situations and were involved in off duty, traffic collisions and things of that nature, because that affects us all.

Everything that is done in another agency in this modern day environment, everything that's done by a police officer in another agency impacts us. George Floyd, how does that impact other law enforcement agencies? We've had a huge impact. It's changed all of how law enforcement does their business today. You know, and all of the actions that have been taken by individual law enforcement officers.

Individual law enforcement officers need to understand that from, whether they're from LAPD or from some other agency, that what I may do on LAPD could impact somebody from Washington, DC, or Ferguson or Minneapolis or any of those other agencies. And so the leader has to inculcate within the organization an understanding that we work for the community. And it's not all about me, it's not all about our pay. It's about what we can do for the community.

Now, you take all of that and you lay over the top of it because of the lack of trust and the defunding movement that has taken place. And the ideology of some of our prosecutors in coming in and going after law enforcement for use of force situations has put a chilling effect on law enforcement going out here and doing their job on a day to day basis.

So as an individual leader, it's important that we go out and we work with our individual police officers. Be visible, show them that we care. When you get into a police chief position, it's very easy to become isolated from the workforce because you become more politically oriented. You become involved in dealing with the county board of supervisors, you become involved in dealing with the police commission, you become involved in dealing with citizen action groups and all of that.

But when you forget the workforce and you don't go to briefings and to roll calls and communicate with your police officers and actively listen, you're not going to accomplish anything. A good leader, a good leader is highly visible. And not, like I said at the beginning, don't ever forget where you came from and look at the situation through the eyes of the police officer. But you also have to be able to balance that with what the community needs are.

And so this modern day leader has got to take all of these factors and motivate our police officers to go out here and not only answer radio calls, but respect the people that we deal with. And when I hear situations to where police officers really don't spend the time that they should of communicating with the public when they go to a radio call or some type of thing like that, I want to make sure that we focus on that because that's what we have to do. That's our job. Because when somebody calls the police, it's because they need the police for some reason, either in an emergency or some type of a cat is up a tree.

Well, just because a cat is up a tree doesn't mean that we just slough off the radio call. And I'm using this as just an example, but the idea is that we need to spend the time as police officers being able to help individuals. You know, I looked at a lot of the actions of what took place during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests in a lot of the different cities.

And when you look at some of the accusations against our police officers for being discourteous and so forth, you know, when you take in the assaults on police officers right now, which I don't have the statistics, but in my time, when you'd make a traffic stop on an individual, you could expect that the individual was probably going to not only be scared, but would probably be in a position to. Wherever. You would have to explain to them, it's going to be all right.

Today, when a police officer goes up here and makes a stop, they're subject to that individual getting out of the car and going right to guns and shooting them. The assaults on police officers right now are horrendous.

So you've taken a modern day leader that's dealing with the threats against police officers, the community engagement that is anti police, the political engagement that doesn't trust police officers, and we wire them up with body cameras and we put them in a police car where they can't even carry on a conversation with themselves and be able to really communicate amongst themselves in a cogent way. Personally, because I'm retired, I think what we've done is gone overboard.

And I think that we need to come back and to really start to take a look at our workforce and to be able to support these men and women that are out here putting their lives on the line every day, it's very, very frustrating. But the modern day leader, the modern day leader has got to take all of that into consideration. Be visible, be a good leader, expect high performance, don't tolerate any nonsense, off duty, hold individuals accountable, and be out there in the community and balance that with the workforce. That's a modern day leader.

Jon Becker: It's interesting because you raised the point. The government regulates. The government governs by consent, right? We empower the government to regulate our behavior and to take our rights away when it is legitimately done under the scope of the constitution. And so there's always this tension between constitutionality and safety, between permission being granted by the community and government overreach.

And, like, you know, you look at the modern environment where so much is recorded, so much is public, you know, there's no hiding anything anymore. It's, I think, very challenging for a law enforcement leader to balance all of those plates at the same time and try to maintain the, I mean, there is a constant tension between law enforcement and the Fourth Amendment. We can be very effective at preventing crime. We can be very effective at honoring people's rights. But there is this tension that always has to be walked between protecting us and respecting our rights.

Mike Hillman: But that's a good thing.

Jon Becker: Yes, absolutely.

Mike Hillman: That's a good thing. Because when you say tension, I would like to describe it as there is a collaborative nature in a balance. And I'm trying to look for the right word ability to be able to synthesize both the Fourth Amendment and the actions of what the police officer has to do to keep society safe and the ability of the leader or the person at the top or the people all the way up through the chain of command, you need to go back over that constantly with our workforce, because what happens is when you take a police officer that's faced with negativism every day in the community, how do you take that and be able to shift him or her back to the mindset of, you know, I'm out here to serve the community, and, you know, not every conflict with the Fourth Amendment, if we have a use of this is something that is a leader.

I learned very early on that every, let's take a use of force situation, for example, the use of the baton and the use of the baton on an individual. It's alleged that the officer used an excessive amount of force with the baton. He used a pool cue jab, he used a power stroke, and that the individual was stopped for grand theft auto.

Well, what did the individual do that precipitated the actions of the officer? Well, that's the actions that the officer has to be able to articulate and that the officer has to be able to articulate that the reasonableness and the totality of the circumstances dictated the fact that this individual was attempting to either get away or to assault the officer, which caused him to have to use the baton.

Now, somebody in evaluation of that meaning within the department says, you know what? That's out of policy, and we're going to take that out of policy, and we're going to discipline that officer. Well, that's correct. If that's the case that they come up with. But not every situation that a police officer is involved in that involves a negative use of force is a disciplinary issue. It may be a training issue.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Mike Hillman: And if we can train the officer not to do something like that, again, that is the way to bring about change. And I mentioned that change is very difficult, but the modern day leader has to balance how we discipline our workforce, if we have to, so that we can bring about change because we want, you know, to use your description, which I think is good, is this friction between the Fourth Amendment and the officers actions. There has to be a level playing field in there.

And that's why we call the objectively reasonable standard and the totality of the circumstances that the officer has to make that decision on. And whether you use. When you use force. Nobody likes how use of force looks, period. Yeah, it just…

Jon Becker: Nobody wins.

Mike Hillman: No, it just doesn't look right, and it looks bad. But sometimes that's the only way that you can use force to overcome resistance, prevent escape, and affect arrest, you know, depending upon what the subject does. So the upside of the body worn cameras is it's able to show what the officer had, was faced with he or she in trying to deal with an individual that was in conflict with the Fourth Amendment. And hopefully it turns out to the point where, see, I told you that the officers did what they were supposed to do.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because body-worn cameras, initially, everybody thought, oh, this is going to be terrible for law enforcement. It's actually been very good for law enforcement, I think, in a lot of ways, because it has shown the public that the actions they're taking are legitimate. And in the end, like, if you look at the founder's intent in the constitution, they were distrustful of the government. They restricted the power of government. Right. And they wanted that intentional responsibility to justify the actions. And I think that that's kind of created an environment where you can demonstrate legitimacy.

Mike Hillman: It has. And just a few minutes ago, when I was talking about that, the body worn cameras, you know, the gotcha type of attitude of some departments with body worn cameras, to me, is wrong, because there is. What comes out of a body worn camera is training issues, and certainly the behavior of the officers and behavior of the public and what the facts and circumstances were that the officer was faced with.

Now, it's not something where you take a body worn camera imagery and you just go out and look at the imagery and decided, oh, my God, the officer used the f word. Well, that was probably discourteous, but, you know, in the grander scheme of things.

Jon Becker: It may have prevented a shooting.

Mike Hillman: But that also might be a training issue.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Mike Hillman: And not necessarily discipline.

Jon Becker: Yeah, you have to balance the actions against the intent. And I think we've kind of lost a little bit of that. We are implying and assuming negative intent so often in law enforcement now. And when the public are holding.

Mike Hillman: That's a media created issue.

Jon Becker: Yes, 100%.

Mike Hillman: That's a media created issue. And people in the public need to understand that. And that continues on the whole concept of what we have in this modern day environment with the social media right now is to sow dissension everywhere we can and distrust of the law enforcement community.

Certainly what happened in Minneapolis, I certainly don't condone, nobody else condones. And what happened there created a tremendous negative effect on law enforcement that's going to take us years to grow out of. But this whole media concept of the negative piece that you just pointed out is what is so destructible.

Jon Becker: I think part of the problem, too, is across the board, our evolutionary biology has been hijacked. Human beings are evolutionarily predisposed towards validating negative information and seeking negative information.

You think about if I said, hey, your neighbor's kid is going to Harvard, you go, hey, that's great. Your neighbor's kids got COVID. The dopamine system in your brain's like, pay attention to that. That's dangerous, right? That tree has good oranges is nowhere near as effective as that tree is poisonous. And we have allowed ourselves to be victimized by that in the food industry, in the media, we want to be fed negative information, and we tend to ignore positive information. And so what we've ended up with is an environment where everybody is just screaming about everything that's bad, and it creates this perception that the world is coming to an end.

Mike Hillman: Well, that's true, but this social media piece that we have right now, if you look at any of the DHS and FBI bulletins that are coming out right now, and you look at the disinformation that's been spread about COVID.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Mike Hillman: And you look at the disinformation that's being spread about rumors involving law enforcement and the fact that you can get on a blog and absolutely castigate someone and use Facebook and Instagram to destroy someone. And in our modern day world, you know, my grandkids, they look at that. They look at that every day. And when you see that type of negativism that comes out of that and I get asked questions by my grandkids all day long, hey, papa, what about this particular aspect? And I say, don't believe it. It's not true. It's disinformation.

And, you know, I don't want to get into the politics of it, but in this last administration, we saw a lot of that flourish and the actions of social media. Being able to bring together large numbers of people in flash type of mobs is huge. And how does law enforcement deal with that? And law enforcement gets criticized for going into the social media world and monitoring that because it becomes an invasion of the First Amendment and their privacy.

And now we have a situation where if we can't, you know, position law enforcement in a fashion to be able to deal with preventing, you know, large numbers of people coming to a particular area to do destructive things, like in Santa Monica during 2020. How do we deal with that? In monitoring that, we get criticized.

Law enforcement get criticized for that, when in reality we should be looking at it and saying, you know what? We're leading at the front end of this, and we're trying to prevent something bad from happening in the community. And I don't mean to take just Santa Monica here, but this is an example of that particular group that came to Santa Monica in May of 2020 that ended up down in the promenade, that ravaged that whole entire area. That was an organized effort by social media. Individuals didn't know each other necessarily.

But when you look at the facts of that, there is a whole series of stolen vehicles that took place in northern California that were brought down here. And essentially, individuals that were attuned to committing this type of criminality, of smash and grab types of things, went to those stolen vehicles, ended up in Santa Monica.

Well, how do I know that? Because of social media. Because of social media. But by the same token, how do we get into the front end of that to prevent that from happening? And, I mean, that's happening all over. You look at what happened in Coleyville in Texas that was live streamed on Facebook for the first 40 minutes of an individual taking hostages.

And in the situation in Powwow with the individual, I think his name, I forgot his name now, but the synagogue that was basically taken over by a 19 year old that shot several people inside there, he was attempting to livestream that. Look at what happened in Christchurch, New Zealand, where they live streamed all of the execution of those people in the mosque. That's social media. That impacts the ability of us in law enforcement to deal with that every day.

Jon Becker: Well, and it's interesting because it's created this kind of movement and flare or this kind of fixation with militarization of law enforcement.

Mike Hillman: Well, that's a whole other issue.

Jon Becker: I'm kind of interested what your thoughts are on that.

Mike Hillman: Well, you know, first of all, this militarization of Swat was brought about post Ferguson. And when you look at some of the things that were brought out by a particular author that authored the book on militarization, I don't necessarily disagree with some of the things that he said in terms of, you know, police are used for warrant service operations on inappropriate types of operations where they should have done more due diligence, or they have used military equipment to the point to try to intimidate or harass individuals.

Well, you know, since obviously Iraq, I mean, you know, during the, with the 1033 program that we have right now, I mean, all the military surplus from the MRAPs to all of the other armored vehicles that we have has been a good thing for law enforcement. But it's the application of it in this modern day environment.

The leaders need to know when to apply a hammer, when to apply a screwdriver, and they need to know that not necessarily everything is going to include showcasing an armored vehicle with an individual in the top, with an AR 15 or an M four, that there may come a time where it might be something to where law enforcement would be pretty much in the shadows, but yet have some in presence to be able to communicate with individuals, to try to soften some of that.

Now, you look at probably what happened back in the 2017 era to where I'm looking at Phoenix. I'm thinking of Phoenix right now to where Phoenix PD had to deal with the president and several other cabinet members that came to the Phoenix Convention center. That obviously created a situation where there was a large number of people and they were very factionalized. They were factionalized. They were the Pro Trump, and that they were the anti Trump. And then you had the antifa that was in the middle of it trying to manipulate the rest of that crowd.

So how does law enforcement balance that Fourth Amendment with the use of force and to be able to deal with trying to deal with crowd control issues when the majority of the crowd are peaceful, but yet they're incited by a group of smaller individuals? And people would say, well, law enforcement should go in and remove those individuals. Well, wait a minute.

If they have a First Amendment right, just like everybody else. And so it's not quite that easy. And then you go into that group and just try to remove those disturbers, if you would, and all of a sudden now you have a situation where the rest of the crowd now becomes against the police because you've tried to remove these individuals, and now you have a much larger problem. So those are kind of decisive issues that a modern day leader has to deal with because everybody's watching. Everybody is watching internationally.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And there is this constant tension, like looking at a crowd control scenario there. You have a tension between the First Amendment and safety. Right? And the Fourth Amendment is certainly in play there. But there's this tension between First Amendment, the ability to, you know, to protest government, which is constitutionally protected, and specific groups that are targeting those kinds of events as an opportunity to, you know, to loot, to break things, to destroy stuff.

Mike Hillman: But that's not a First Amendment issue, right?

Jon Becker: Well, but it's – You're balancing the First Amendment against public order.

Mike Hillman: Okay. The First Amendment applies to individuals being able to voice their opinions, to be, if they want to speak out against the government, they can't. And they have the freedom of the press and they have freedom of speech. But when you have individuals that would like to hijack that First Amendment and become protesters that now go out here and start to not only protest but become looters, they move into the category of riotous.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Mike Hillman: And so when you move into the category of riotous, those are individuals that are beyond that First Amendment. But in that group that turns out to be the First Amendment peaceful group, you have some of the anti government individuals, if you would, or leftist groups that like to be able to come in and sow discord, they start to now interact with them. And you have police that go in to try to remove them or at some point try to remove them on the perimeter. Now, you've taken that entire crowd and basically it was peaceful and turned them into almost a riotous crowd.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's interesting because there does seem to be a growing discussion around the tactics of law enforcement and the result that occurs, whether it's dynamic entry for search warrants or its intervention in crowds, there seems to be this difficult balance between acting early and decisively or being the catalytic event that starts the problem.

Mike Hillman: Yeah, that's true. And you look at certainly what's taken place in Oregon and Seattle here in the last year and a half to two years to where that Oregon was completely taken over by a bunch of left wing individuals. And that we have now a group of individuals that have become riotous, raped, pillaged, and plundered and burned, and that you have the federal government that's come in and tried to be able to defend the federal property while law enforcement has tried to be able to deal with all of those issues, and they've had to use force, and they've had to use kinetic energy projectiles and chemical agent.

And now, all of a sudden, there's injuries that have happened. Well, yes, that's true. There are injuries because nobody likes what the consequences of use of force are. And so now that, because there's been injuries that we now have the media and social media creating an atmosphere in this modern day environment, then we need to get rid of them.

We need to put a moratorium on them, and that we demand from the leaders of an organization to put a moratorium on the use of kinetic energy projectiles in any type of protest. You cannot use chemical agent. You cannot use kinetic energy projectiles.

Well, look what happened. And certainly in Oregon, because now, over the last six months, they had, because of the moratorium. Oregon, Portland in particular, was faced with a situation where in downtown Portland, that a group of individuals came in and ravaged the community and resulted in a lot of property damage. Of course, the community now says, where were the cops?

Jon Becker: Yeah, we as a species, we are very prone to wanting black and white rules, and none of these situations are subject to black and white. So really, the complaint, if you look at the modern environment for law enforcement, oh, there's too much militarization, there's too much kinetic energy, there's too much chemical agents, there's too much all these things, because it's easy to identify the technology and say, oh, the technology is bad, when really what they're complaining about is the application of the technology.

Mike Hillman: That's what I was trying to explain. Instead of, instead of where they used a hammer and they should have used a screwdriver, it may not call for being able to front an MRAP. It may not call for having a SWAT individual with helmeted up and essentially kitted up along with an M4. It may not call for that.

Jon Becker: But I think one of the challenges, especially in the modern tactical environment, with the. There is no national standard. I mean, NTOA has a standard. Not everybody follows it, but there is no national standard as to what constitutes a SWAT team or a SWAT mission. And I think that that creates this gray zone. Just as somebody who deals with thousands of teams.

You know, one of my friends has the expression, my daughter has a driver's license. I have a driver's license. Mario Andretti has a driver's license. We don't all drive the same. I think one of the challenges in the modern environment is the term SWAT has taken on such a broad connotation that now the mission set is not clarified.

Mike Hillman: Well, that's going to be agency specific. And I think back to when we first defined what SWAT missions were, because we had to educate the workforce in LAPD as to what the SWAT missions. And essentially we said that if an individual has committed a criminal act, is suspect thereof, is possibly armed, secreted in a position of advantage, affording cover and concealment, and refuses to submit to arrest.

Those were the criteria that we used on LAPD to say that would call for a SWAT type of component. Now, forget about the negotiations piece, but that was early stages. So in some agencies now, SWAT is a much smaller component. FEMA's tried to type it like they would in a fire truck or fire, yeah, into a fire cabin with four types. And when you don't have SWAT agencies that work together all the time in smaller entities, even some of the regional teams, it's doomed to failure because you have to be able to define clearly what the capabilities of them are.

In some cases, the FBI local field offices, they can use sound and flash diversionary devices, but they can't use chemical agent, and they can't use aviation assets to support them. HRT can. So that limits some of the capabilities of them. Well, some other smaller agencies may not even have any type of capability for that.

When I look at some smaller agencies that have maybe a ten person SWAT team that have a small municipal airport and they're out trying to train at a large international airport on tubular assaults for aircraft, why are we doing that? That's not within their mission set. And what are we going to use them for in terms of warrant service? We have low risk, medium risk, and high risk warrant types of services.

And if you can avoid having to do any of the high risk type of warrant, I to where you can contain and call out or to set up a surveillance and to be able to wait for the individual to come out, then lock it down and go in and secure the location, take the suspect into custody, that avoids confrontation.

And when you look at the statistics of LAPD, in terms of their use of deadly force, what is it less than 1% or 1% of the time, of the number of incidents that they've had over the years that have resulted in any type of use of force, that's the type of thing that we want to engage in. That's the responsibility of the modern day leader is to oversee those types of decisions.

What are we training in and why are we training in that particular area? What's the mission set that we need for this particular agency? So a small agency that has maybe 60 police officers and maybe 10 or 12 SWAT operators, do we need to have a coordinated target selection? Do we need to have a hostage rescue capability?

Probably not. Probably not if we're dealing with a residential environment, but if we have to do a contain and call out or a breach and delay and a warrant service to be able to surround and call out, that's probably what the capabilities of them are, to provide special weapons and tactics to support whatever the mission is.

Jon Becker: So, Mike, it sounds like a lot of time, it's not technology. It's nothing. The concept of special weapons that creates the issues. It's mission set definition. It's what kind of mission should we deploy technologies or tactics on? And that mission creep and mission confusion, kind of creating these events that then create bad law. If you were the chief of a smaller agency, how do you avoid that?

Mike Hillman: Well, let's go back to your statement, and I totally agree with what you're saying here. There is a, the hierarchy of, that goes to the leader of this small agency that has to be able to define a need for that particular discipline. Okay, so if an agency had a series of domestic disputes that have ended up in barricaded suspects and that they don't have the resources of being able to have maybe the county sheriffs or some other allied agency to come in and help them, then they may have to develop a mission set that would go to dealing with a barricaded subject type of situation.

And so then you get into, if there is a need, then what do we need to do to fill that need? And what are the limits of training to meet that need? Do we need to get into tubular assaults? Do we need to get into aviation operations? Do we need to get into bomb squad operations? Probably not. But sometimes the issue that comes up is that leaders will forget there is a specific need versus a nice to have.

And you'll have some people that will try to influence the leaders to say, hey, boss, it would be nice if we could have a SWAT team and that we can be able to stand on our own and do what we need to do as a SWAT unit, when in reality the leader needs to say, I don't think so. And as much as you would like that, number one, I don't see the need, and I don't see that we need to train to that particular level.

So I get into the situation where the leader needs to be able to define the need and then to define the mission and put together the policy statement that says, this is what you will do to be able to resolve this issue. This is the amount of training time that I'm going to give you to build the skill sets necessary to do that. And then, wait a minute. Then the leader needs to be able to influence the community as to, this is the capability that exists and why.

Jon Becker: So it's interesting because all of that takes place on the front end of that problem and not on the back end of that problem. And, you know, one of the things that we talk about in my job is requirements. It's very easy to find technology and apply technology and go looking for a place to run that technology. You saw that initially when Taser first came out, it was like, oh, my God, it's the new tool. Everybody's got to have it. We're going to use it. And all of a sudden, you started seeing bad law being made because they were using it in applications.

You know, people in swimming pools and on roofs and other applications where you're like that. That probably wasn't the best plan. And what you see in the military, actually, in the way they think programmatically, is they define a requirement. So out of the gate they say, we need to be able to do X, Y, and Z.

Mike Hillman: Well, that's what I was referring to with the need that needs to be done by the leader. They need to define what the need is, or as you said, the requirement.

Jon Becker: And then I guess from a leadership standpoint, you also have to then be willing to defend the scope of the requirement and not allow it to creep, which in the case of tactical situations can lead to some unpleasant results, like having to pull your team off and call another team, having to, you know, having to bring somebody else in to complete a mission. You know, those kinds of things.

Mike Hillman: Well, when you defend the requirement or the need and you identify that there's an anomaly, that these guys have gone beyond that, then you need to put a stop to it. That's why leaders, you know, this whole military 1033 program with the military acquisition of equipment really got out of hand because leaders were not paying attention to the screeners from these various agencies. They were getting various equipment from the military.

I mean, it's fine to be able to get a couple of Ranger Polaris types of off road vehicles to be able to use for parades and things of that nature, but do we need to have M14s do we need to have M203s? Why? Because in the modern day environment, we don't need that type of capability that comes from the military.

Well, I mean, I'm being general in my statements here because, you know, a lot of the sophisticated weaponry that we have now do not include the M is a great weapon, but that's not what I'm referring to. But some of the equipment that is getting traction within the demilitarization of SWAT includes the mraps. Well, the thing that people forget about the mraps, that it's a high profile vehicle and it's an armored vehicle.

But what happens in California if we have an earthquake that becomes one of the most valuable assets that we can come up with, especially when you have collapsed buildings to be able to protect the officers that are going in and providing rescues. So it has that type of application and that needs to be put out by the leader. It doesn't need to be put out necessarily by the media that says, okay, here's another example of an over militarization of a local law enforcement agency because that leader needs to define that requirement or that need for that particular piece of equipment.

And one of the things that we got to tell our young SWAT officers about is that technology is not an end all and be all. It's certainly, you got to have communications, you got to have optics, you got to have all of this. But by the same token, you got to be able to operate off the trunk of your crown Victoria or your Ford Explorer when everything quits.

And all of a sudden all you have is a good old ingenuity of the tactician and the ability to be able to maneuver and to be able to get to where the suspect is. Technology is not an end all and be all. It's a great enhancement and it's a force multiplier, but it's not everything.

Jon Becker: That's fantastic! I think I'd like to go through a couple of quick, rapid fire questions with you, just kind of one sentence thinking, you know, off the cuff. What do you think your most important habit is?

Mike Hillman: Consistency.

Jon Becker: Give me a little more on that. What do you mean?

Mike Hillman: Leadership. Consistency in leadership. Be fair, impartial, and do the right thing at all times.

Jon Becker: What do you think the difference between a leader and a manager is?

Mike Hillman: A leader is somebody that's out front working with their individuals and earns the respect of the workforce. The manager is a positional piece.

Jon Becker: What's the best book you've read on leadership?

Mike Hillman: I haven't read a book on leadership.

Jon Becker: What is the most profound memory of your career.

Mike Hillman: Attending 76 funerals at police officers that made a mistake or their lives were taken without due cause.

Jon Becker: What keeps you awake at night?

Mike Hillman: Knowing when I was on the Los Angeles Police Department that I had 7000 police officers that had guns.

Jon Becker: And that you were responsible for it. I think that's a fantastic place to stop. Mike, I so appreciate you doing this with me. I learned so much.

And again, thank you so much!

Mike Hillman: Oh, thanks, Jon, very much! Thanks for everything you're doing! I appreciate it!

Episode 19 – Critical Incident Review – Fatal OIS SWAT Vehicle Takedown in San Bernardino

Jon Becker: This episode of the debrief will have a slightly different format. Today, we will be conducting a critical incident review of an actual event. We will discuss the timeline of the events as well as the aftermath, recovery, and lessons learned.

Our goal in this discussion is not to criticize or second guess any actions taken by those who responded to the event. Their actions are beyond reproach, their bravery is without question, and their sacrifices are real and need to be honored.

It is our hope that by discussing this event, we will learn from it and help to improve operator safety in the future. With regards to form, we will be using the officers actual names because they are heroes and they need to be remembered as such. For obvious reasons, we will not be using the suspects name.

My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

On August 18th, 2021, the San Bernardino, California Police Department SWAT team was assigned to locate and arrest a suspect who had ambushed and attempted to murder a San Bernardino county sheriff's deputy the day before.

When the team located the suspect and attempted a vehicle takedown, he immediately ambushed them with a ten millimeter handgun, striking Officer Jordan Robison eight times as he was exiting the van, and Officer Chris Shipley once, Officer Robinson was hit in both forearms, his shoulder, his femur, his stomach below the armor, and took a grazing wound to his ribs. He was also hit twice in the abdomen, which were stopped by his armor.

Officer Shipley, despite being shot in the leg, was able to return fire along with a teammate, fatally wounding the suspect, Officer Shipley, without regard for his own injuries, then rendered life saving medical aid to Officer Robison. SWAT Medic Spencer Brombaugh, who was also on scene, provided lifesaving aid to officer Robison and kept him alive throughout the subsequent transport to the emergency room.

My guests today are Jordan Robison, Chris Shipley, and Spencer Brahmbaugh. Jordan, why don't we start with the lead up to this event? Like, what got you guys involved in this case?

Jordan Robison: Well, the initial intel that I was told when I was upstairs in person home training was that a deputy had been ambushed and we had heard all kinds of things from he had been shot in the head and was, you know, clinging to life to know he's fine, he's coherent and he's talking. But the common factor that we learned was that a deputy had been ambushed in the actual city.

And then as details started to unfold about the nature of the ambush, it kind of started to raise some red flags as far as who we were dealing with just due to the violence of it.

Jon Becker: So why don't you walk me through the ambush? What happened?

Jordan Robison: Yeah, so a deputy, on August 17th, the day prior to our shooting, a deputy attempted to pull a traffic stop for vehicle code violations on a white BMW. I think it was for, like, window tint or something minor. The vehicle then led him on a short pursuit, went around a blind corner. And what I mean by a blind corner is there was like an eight foot block wall, cylinder block wall. The vehicle went around that corner, parked. The driver exited the vehicle with a rifle.

And so by the time the deputy rounded that corner, it was a met with immediate and accurate gunfire. I think 39 rounds total were actually fired. The suspect then advanced while firing on the deputy, went around to the rear portion of the car with the intentions of executing the deputy, saw the deputy was down, then fled the scene back in his vehicle. So that's what we were dealing with.

Jon Becker: As AK-47, I remember correctly.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, yeah, it was an AK.

Jon Becker: So 30, some odd rounds of rifle fire. I have no idea how the deputy survived that.

Jordan Robison: No. It severed one of the fuel lines inside of the cardinal, inside of the deputy's vehicle, causing the vehicle to ignite. So by the time officers got there, the deputy's vehicle was completely just a fireball.

Jon Becker: So what kind of injuries did the deputy sustain?

Jordan Robison: He sustained bullet fragments to his face and his arm. I'm not sure if it was a bullet fragment or an actual round that he sustained to his arm, but he did sustain a lot of bullet fragments to his face, which required a lot of delicate surgeries, especially around his eyes, just to make sure you can make a full recovery.

Jon Becker: So this was a county deputy, correct? Right? San Bernardino PD is in the San Bernardino is in San Bernardino county. So you have a PD and then a county that surrounds it?

Jordan Robison: Yes, but there's pockets within our city itself that are policed by the county due to how the districting unfolds. So he was on patrol in the actual city itself, but it was a county pocket.

Jon Becker: Got it. And obviously, with that kind of relationship, the two agencies are close and work together regularly.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, yeah, definitely. We always when you're on patrol, you'll work hand in hand with deputies at times, especially when it comes to jurisdictional issues. And then, as far as our SWAT team, we were really close with the SBSO SWAT team as well.

Jon Becker: Okay, so that happens the day before. And then when do you guys get put onto the case?

Jordan Robison: I wasn't out there at the scene. I know Chris was working special investigations at the time, so he probably might know more than so.

Jon Becker: Chris, when did you first personally get involved in this thing?

Chris Shipley: It was the day that the deputy got ambushed. I was notified again. I was working within that specialized team. We happened to be in Los Angeles county at that time. They asked me to come back to the station, so I shot all the way back to San Bernardino. During this time, there was some jurisdictional issues of who was really going to take it.

Was it going to be the county or was it going to be the city? Just based upon where the incident did occur during that time, it was things to note too, was just to kind of put little things in perspective. The type of person that we're dealing with as well is following the initial ambush of the deputy, the team that I'm currently on, the county SWAT team, was out on surveillance on the vehicle itself within apartment complex.

Again, this county that we work for and the city that we work for is one of the most violent cities in the nation. And the apartment complex where it was located was notorious for just being influenced by a lot of gang members, too. The vehicle that was involved, a separate party that wasn't related to the initial incident, comes out. They apprehend him, and he has an additional fire on him as a firearm on him as well.

So again, they were going back and forth of who was going to take over the case. Ultimately, the decision was, we're not going to do anything tonight. We're going to pick it up tomorrow. So I leave, go to my normal duties the following day. Sometime during, like, mid afternoon, I get notified by one of our team leaders, basically saying like, hey, they've located Ollacong. It's our case.

We need to start heading towards Hemet where he was located. Hemet for where? The weekend. We work for San Bernardino City within, just within Riverside county, the next neighboring county next to us, like a 30 minutes basic drive time to our city's jurisdiction. I started heading out there, out there after getting permission from one of my sergeants who was an ex SWAT guy too, as well. During this time, as I'm getting there, they say, okay, never mind, dude, he's en route back to San Bernardino. We think he's going to come back to San Bernardino.

So we'll meet back at the station. I get to the station where I meet with our tag medic, Spencer Bumbaugh, and we start kind of discussing what we're going to be dealing with. From there, we basically get tasked with some sort of vehicle takedown to try to apprehend him at his residence itself, again, in one of the notorious areas.

Our whole sire city is notorious, so it's kind of hasn't really put much into perspective, but it's a. It's based on the far outskirts of our city. It's which geographically, it's the furthest point within our municipality to the nearest trauma centers. With that being said to. It's the location of itself is a notorious gang area where there's only a few couple ways to get in and out, and it's all heavily gang influenced. That was a big red flag, too, which I should have. I should have paid more attention to these little kind of. These little triggers that kind of could accumulate to kind of compound to the type of individual that we're really dealing with.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So, I mean, just. Just to clarify, this guy shot a deputy, or, you know, tried to execute a deputy and then he went to work.

Chris Shipley: Yeah. So in that way, he tried to try to execute the deputy was just. I mean, again, this is a hyper vigilant, the most dedicated attacker. These are like, besides some radicalized group of organization. Like, you don't ask. Like, that's one thing I will respect this guy for is the amount of. Is how vigilant he was to be able to make those type of decisions and to execute those accurately. I saw the vehicle after two of the deputy that was involved. And I mean, you know, I'm talking accurate gunfire all through the headrest. To this day, I don't know how he survived with especially the amount of injuries that he did have.

Jon Becker: That's a miracle. I mean, to have 39 AK-47 rounds shot at you from close range and not die is just. That's the first miracle of this case.

Chris Shipley: Yeah, I'm talking the vehicle look like swiss cheese, and I'm talking right through the driver's side of the vehicle itself.

Jon Becker: Okay, so he's coming back to San Bernardino. You guys pulled the team together.

Chris Shipley: Yes. So we have a small element team in the van itself with some different contingencies and marked vehicles. The idea was to try to apprehend it before he got into his residence, located in what we classify as, like, the rainbow reedy area, which is the 21st street. Like, just gangster. It's like a hood to try to apprehend him there.

Again, to put some things in perspective, too, which is some things. Red flags, which I should have been more cognizant of, is, like, we've had officers involved, shooters in that place where they try to lynch. Like, it's – you have every single person that comes out, and, I mean, it's violent. Like you're on a skirmish line, just trying to watch every single corner because there's armed, essentially, gang members everywhere.

Again, red flag. That should have been a place. I probably wouldn't want to try to apprehend the suspect, too, just because of how easy it is for him to get to different locations as well, just because they're more townhome style residences that are just lined in a specific direction, a pattern.

From there, he doesn't end up coming to the location itself and starts doing. He goes to an alternate residence again, within the sitting county of San Bernardino. He stays there for a short duration. Again, we have our airship that's above him. That's a fixed wing that's keeping. That's monitoring surveillance on him as well. He gets out of the vehicle that he was transported from work, and then another individual arrives. What he was later identified as is like a. Like a hood uncle. It's just some sort of like another, I guess, I don't even know, a mentor. Yes. That he gets picked up by him, and then they start going to all these different locations.

So they go to, like, four different locations within a small proximity. Yeah. These big red flags based with all the counter surveillance, too, that I should have been more wary of and I should have been more vocal about to. But again, I went on the realm of just trying to. Trying to find the explanation, because it is. That's not out of the North for San Bernardino, too. This is what they – A lot of them do, especially these. These notorious gangsters. They just. They're so spot on with this, too. That's just their normal day to day is where they do counterfeit, because they usually wanted some wanted vigilant.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I mean, the guy knows he shot a deputy the day before. He knows people are looking for him. He runs a counter surveillance program to protect himself.

Chris Shipley: Yes. And he was unreal, unbeknownst to us. And what we should have just anticipated that he was. He already made every single officer, and he already knew officers were on him. He picked out the vehicles that were involved, that were doing the surveillance.

And again, this is what we're talking about. Like, a truly dedicated someone that's, like, is the most elite. Like, you have the most elite operator. And they function at that different. That type of capacity. That's the other side of it. They function at that type of capacity.

Jon Becker: So he's a tier one dirtbag.

Chris Shipley: You can see. You can say that. So he does all this counter surveillance through, again, through, like, a small, immediate area where he finally reaches to a specific street where he. They make, like, a turn into again, like, at a high rate of speed. This is stuff that's not going to relate to us as well, because it would change again, I wouldn't change a lot of things. It's just been more red flags to notice. Is kind of the type of driving, too, because we can't see it. We're just getting stuff that's getting broadcast over our channel. They park along a curbside.

Again, this should have been, like, a huge red flag for me is, why are they doing that? Why are they parking along this curbside? What I think it was they parked there. He wasn't. He was trying to set us up. He wasn't hedged. He was anticipating just to kill all of us and then probably flee over the next wall line. That's what I imagined he was probably going to do.

So as we basically get the green light, like, this is where we're going to do the takedown. You couldn't ask for a better backdrop, though, as well. It's kind of one of the silver linings with it is, as we make that final turn to is we had a specific plan in place. Once we contacted the vehicle again, a lot of this stuff wasn't getting relayed to as far as what the airship above us was seeing, too, is because he had his hand on the gun already. He was looking back, just waiting for us.

So as we come to contact the vehicle, doing like a. Like a vehicle containment technique. He's already exited out the vehicle, and he starts firing. And I'm talking accurate gunfire, too, basically upper thoracic of where we're all positioned.

Jon Becker: So let me just reset for a second. So he's. He and his hood uncle are pulled over on the side of the road. The airship spots him, identifies that. You guys decide that that's where you're going to take him down. You're in a van. Van pulls up and hits the passenger. The driver's side door. So he's in the passenger seat of the car.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: And the van. The van hits the driver's side door, and you guys begin to exit the van.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: Okay. And he exits the car immediately. I mean, you can see in the surveillance video, you watch him pull the gun out as you're pulling up. So, I mean, he's decided this is going to be his last stand, apparently, yes. And as he exits the car, he begins firing at the van door as you guys are going to exit.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: Okay. So, Jordan, you're the first one out the door.

Jordan Robison: Yeah.

Jon Becker: So, walk me through it. You. You open the van door. You guys hit it, hit the car, open the van door, and whatever.

Jordan Robison: So, before that, as we approach, we hit the – Hit the car for the, I think they call it bumping. The purpose of it is to throw the occupants inside whatever vehicle that you're bumping off, because it's supposed to be a surprise technique where, yeah, they're sitting there, and then all of a sudden, their car gets hit. And then once they're figuring that out, we're getting in position.

So it kind of gives you an advantage. But like Chris pointed out, the problem was we had no advantage because we had no element of surprise. He was watching us the whole time in the rearview mirror with his hand on the gun. So by the time we execute the bumping technique, his hand. His left hand is already on the door, and he already has a gun in his other hand.

So he exits the car as we're doing the bump technique. And another problem with this van that we're using is the door doesn't work right. It's had malfunctions for years and years and years. We've known about it.

So the problem is, I have to hold the door partially open. I can't close it, because if you close it, that door is notorious for not wanting to open again, and you can't have that during that situation. You can't have it all the way open, because he'll see us coming, and he'll see guys all the way down the road, will expose ourselves way too early, earlier than we want it to.

So I'm holding the door partially open as we approach this, looking back, I don't know how I'm supposed to hold a hundred pound van door. When you slam it closed or when you slam against an object, all that hundred pounds goes flying forward. And I was a strong guy, and I couldn't hold it closed. So as we execute the bumping technique that Van dor slams shut, I fall directly onto my face. I think Ernie fell next to me. I think you maintained your balance, Chris.

So I fall instantly. Instinctively, I didn't even tell myself to do this. Just instinctively, I spring up, open up the door, and at that point, I'm looking down the barrel of his gun. I jump out of the van. I remember looking down at the ground to make sure I didn't eat s***. As I jump out, making sure my feet were on the ground.

Now I remember looking up and sighting my rifle. And I, at that time, I just remember being hit multiple times as I'm doing this. I remember feeling the heat, feeling the impacts, feeling. I think I felt my arm break. I didn't feel the second one until I landed on the ground, but I felt one of my arms break. And I take an instinctive step to my right to get out of the way.

I didn't even consciously remember trying to sight him on my gun. I just remember taking a step to my right and then getting hit in my femur. And then I, that's when I fell. And I kind of landed on my front side and then kind of rolled to my back. And I remember at one point trying to push myself off the ground.

And that's when I realized both my arms were broken. I already knew my leg was broken. That's when I realized it been hitting my stomach. I could feel my shoulder burning. I knew, I'd been hitting my shoulder. That's when I kind of realized the extent at which I'd been wounded. And I knew at that point, and I was kind of relying on everybody else around me.

Jon Becker: So, so you, you actually get out of the van, Chris, you're still in the van, right?

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: So you're Jordan's first out the door. You're second out the door.

Chris Shipley: Yes. After we basically made the contact with the vehicle, he's already exiting too. And again, you see this perfectly in, in the video surveillance two is, is he starts firing immediately before, essentially, the doors open because of the issues that were, that arose. I remember, as the doors get open, you just, you see the gun just, you're looking straight down the barrel again within a close proximity to, again, just straight CQB, close quarter paddle. And then he's just firing. And then as, as jordans get out of the way, I get struck.

And I remember, I remember that feeling, too. It was just like I immediately got so mad. So he's again, he's shooting. That was one thing that was like, again, you have like, these different. A lot of the different during, like, these big instances. For me, it's always like something that's really, really heightened. For me this time it was the – There was the auditory, like the sound of. It was like, it sounded like explosions.

So as he's firing, again, it was a ten mil, too. So as he's firing, I get shot. Jordan's essentially is running around. These are just fundamentals, and this is one thing that we will. That I want to just reach to the viewer, too, is a lot of these components and these things that are, that are practiced isn't just applicable to one type of scenario or operation. These are concepts and principles.

When it's in its basic form, is what shifts. It shifts the reactionary gap into our favor. We're always going to be behind the curve, too. We're always going to have what they always, they always quantify as, like that second and a half perception reaction time to. Even when you, like, people say there's deadly rights, there's a perception reaction time, then you have to adjust for that.

When it comes down to that old dogfighting theory, is the UDA theory, like the observe, orient, decide, and act. That's where they get that second half, too, is we're always going to be behind the curve, no matter what. We have to perceive the threat and then we have to react accordingly to it.

Jon Becker: But in this case, he's firing at you before you even open the door.

Chris Shipley: Yes. And then this is one thing that Jordan did, was these are, these are the fundamental components of CQB is essentially using your momentum and your tempo to run in a specific direction that shifts the angle, too. So now he – Instead of it just being a one on one gunfight, what it was from one threshold to the suspect itself, his, Jordan allowed it to be a two on one gunfight, three on one gunfight by creating that angle and distance. And those are just fundamentals. These are rotating to the most basic foundation of a lot of these different types of tactics.

So Jordan runs, I don't know what point. I think it was like, right when the door get open. That's where I got shot. I see him and he's running and like, he's the suspect running laterally or moving laterally, too. I engaged the suspect and I remember watching him just fall. It was like a light switch.

Yeah. Once I saw the suspect fall, my first, I just had to get to Jordan, I heard Jordan screaming. And another thing that, again, was, like, my first, again, my, for some reason, my hearing was just, like, elevated. This didn't sense itself was I could hear him. And I was like, I gotta get to Jordan. I have to get to Jordan.

So I merely ran to Jordan. And I was trying to just try to triage him as quickly as I could. And the first thing that popped into me was arm was bleeding really, really, really bad. And initially, like, I was looking at, like, the bigger limbs to itself. I was looking at his chest, and we were wearing all black, too, but his arm, we're wearing, luckily, at this time, it was just wearing short sleeve polo shirts. So his arm was bleeding so bad. I was like, all right, I got a treehouse. His arm, like, it was gushing blood.

So I took out my tourniquet, I started applying it to his right arm. And then during that time, like, a bunch of different people started showing up. These people from these different types of task force and units, too, that were involved in the whole investigation, they started getting on scene along with some of our other operators, too, as well.

And then at that point, I remember thinking to myself was like, I knew I got shot. I mean, it's for those that say, like, they didn't know they got hit. I don't know how that works. Like, you must be at a different, elevated response. But I was like, I haven't died yet. And at that time, I thought it was extremely delayed, too. I was like, I haven't bled out yet, so I must be all right.

So once all the people started getting, I saw Spencer get there, too. And that was after Spencer got done there, I was like, my job's done. Spencer's gonna handle it. I remember thinking that, too. It's like, I can't. He's got it.

So then I kind of pulled myself away, and I started asking other officers if they have any tourniquets just because I can turn myself again. I remember thinking I was like, I haven't died yet, so I must be fine after that. You can see, and this is the thing, too, is we preach a lot of these things to different officers.

And everybody always says, oh, yeah, I – When you get confronted with the truly dedicated combatant, it's like, oh, you just eliminate the threat, and then you move on to triage and do all these different types of things. It's a lot easier. But what does that truly look like? And in that moment, you got to really understand what those moments truly look like.

Jon Becker: I mean, to put it in scale because you've described it obviously slowly, but this entire event, from the suspect's foot hitting the ground to the suspect is shot in the field and down. You're down. You know, you're putting a tourniquet on Jordan. That entire event is 22 seconds, and the shooting part of it is about 4 seconds.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: So, like, you know, you talk about engaging a dedicated combatant, 30 rounds under 4 seconds. Like, it is difficult to describe how violent this encounter was and how quickly as you guys engaged, how quickly you came under fire, and how quickly the entire event was over. And yet, as you're describing it, it obviously plays out in your brain more slowly.

And each of you guys have told me that you have this kind of slowed perception, which is one of the things you talk about in traumatic events, is, you know, a compression of versus a slowing of time. But just to give the listener perspective, the shooting took 3 seconds and had 30 some odd rounds swapped between the two of you. Jordan has hit eight times. You're hit once. It's hard to explain how quick and violent the whole thing was until you see the video.

Chris Shipley: Yeah. And that's one thing to remember, too, is how much the body can truly endure, too, is people just say, like, oh, yeah, you can just. You can fire, and that just eliminates a threat. But it's not. It's not true like that. Especially hunters that hunt, too, they understand it basically, like in human anatomy and physiology, what, biologically, how much your body can endure under that type of stress. It's. I mean, it's amazing.

Jon Becker: I mean, Jordan's a perfect testament to that. You know, he was shot eight times and is sitting here with us having a conversation. So we are truly ridiculously durable.

Chris Shipley: Yeah. Oh, absolutely. And I put that lot to his physical capability, too, as well as, I mean, he was at the peak. His abs had abs at that time.

Jordan Robison: Left in there.

Jon Becker: It's amazing that the bullets were even able to penetrate the muscle.

Chris Shipley: Well, that. Yeah, that thing, too. And then they. Obviously, the surgical scar goes right down the center of his abs. It makes him even bigger. So it's the strategy. Yeah, it was a win-win for him.

Jordan Robison: I do got to say that when I was hitting the stomach, the bullet went in through one side and failed to exit throughout the other side of my abs because the muscle actually.

Jon Becker: So we're just thinking the muscles actually caught the bullet.

Jordan Robison: My muscles stopped a ten mil.

Jon Becker: Got it. Fantastic!

Chris Shipley: I think that was more the cumberband on the type of armor that you use.

Jon Becker: Okay, so then let's pick back up. So, Jordan, you exit. Chris exits. Your teammate continues to engage the suspect until he's down. You fire at him once or twice, and then your teammate is continuing to engage him as you're turning to care for Jordan. The suspect is down at this point.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: One of your teammates closes on him to ensure that he's ineffective and neutralized. Walk me through again, putting the tourniquet. When you first come up on Jordan, what do you see?

Chris Shipley: The screaming again, that was the big thing for me. And then just the amount of blood that was already coming out of his arm, too, was like, oh, I was like. It was arterial. That was the first thing I thought. And again, I don't have the capabilities like someone like Spencer and stuff like that. But you start to. A lot of the training and stuff like that that he's preached to us when it becomes.

And this is one thing that resonated with me, too, is what he discusses is a lot of this stuff becomes like, he worked on Jordan. Like, it was just like another individual, another victim on the street for him, another mope, someone that was just insignificant to him without the. And that just shows you the type of caliber of one of his capabilities and then two, just the, we'll say, like, a lot of the hard skills that's probably ingrained with him over three decades, I don't know, maybe four decades now he's getting old.

But again, yeah, that's been able to just transform who as a person, too. And, I mean, obviously, I'm. I'm swayed a little way, but I think so highly of them both just personally in their everyday life. And you see that in their families, too, as well. And you can see the type of characters and attributes that have just been kind of. Kind of developed in their kids is and then their physical capabilities, too.

And then, I mean, like, Spencer's one of the best shooters when he was on our team, and one of the most athletic people I've ever seen, too, is just. He's just naturally capable. Jordan, not so much, though.

Jon Becker: So you guys had an organized Tac med program prior to this, right? Like, it's not just that you were training individual team members. You actually had an embedded tech medic with you.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: Which is Spencer. So talk me through. Talk me through that. What did that, you know, what. What capability did that bring to the team?

Chris Shipley: Oh, I mean, it was. I believe it to my core is that saved Jordan's life.

Jon Becker: Okay, so, Chris, you put the tourniquet on Jordan, start to control the bleeding, and Spencer runs up.

Chris Shipley: Yes.

Jon Becker: So let's pick up with you, Spence, like, you at that point. Start me with, like, where you were when the shooting goes down, and then walk me through what happens.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: So, while part of the team was in the van, they were getting closer to the subject, and while he was running counter, the sergeant at the time had called off the two marked units that were supposed to trail the van in. And I was in an unmarked dodge Durango that had been converted into, like, an ambulance.

And so I was only one man in there. I didn't have a partner with me at that moment, so I decided to hang back with the marked units. And we were probably two or three blocks away, maybe a quarter mile away from these guys. When we heard the airship put out that they were making contact with the subject, shots were fired. And that was something that Chris and I had talked right when we saw each other at the station.

You know, Chris said, you know what's going to happen today? This guy is going to shoot it out with us. And I said, absolutely. Anyone that saw that video from the sheriff's deputy, like, we knew what was coming. And so the airship put it out fully expected there to be shots fired. What I wasn't ready for, and we were on it. It was the two marked units, and I were code three up the street, 100 miles an hour, and moving towards these guys. And then they said, you have officers down.

And I knew which guys were in that van. You know, these two guys, specifically our families, hang out together, and we hang out together, and it was just like, holy s***, here we go. And I arrived on scene. I parked my vehicle and grabbed my bag. My bag is specific to just ALS equipment and things that these guys don't carry, so it's more advanced than a basic IFAC. And I get there to find Chris putting a tourniquet on Jordan's leg after he had put one on his arm.

And I think I said to Chris, I go, what's wrong with you? Because I'm shot. So you should take care of that. He said, okay. And he kind of leaves, and I get in there, and everyone. What we had trained these guys to do is, hey, start finding wounds, start getting clothes off, start getting his equipment off, because that's all stuff that just takes time, and we want to make sure that we know what we're working with before we load them up into my car. And so that's what these guys were doing. They were finding wounds. They were putting tourniquets on. He had two tourniquets on his, one on each arm, one on his left leg.

And then I started kind of doing a head to toe hands on assessment, like, touching everything. I remember right after I talked to Chris, I look at Jordan, and Jordan screaming, I can't breathe. I thought, oh, s***. Like, this is getting worse as we're moving along. And it was just an officer who was pulling on Jordan's helmet as hard as they could to get it off of his head.

Jordan Robison: I do remember that somebody tried to yank my head off.

Jon Becker: So it's not bad enough he's been shot eight times. Someone's gonna choke him out with his own helmet.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: And so, to my relief, he was breathing fine. He was just getting choked. And so we hit that buckle, and the helmet came off and then started cutting everything off. We could cut his body armor off, cut his belt off, and then guys started working up the pant legs. And the wound that stood out to me was the one in his abdomen. And there was a – On his left, lower side of his abdomen, he had a – The abdominal wall was sticking out a little bit, so we could see, like, his intestines coming out, protruding from his abdomen.

And to me, that was a big red flag. Like, this meant we were either going to stay on scene for a little while longer while I put an abdominal tourniquet on him, or we were going to load him up and go. So, like Chris had said, it seemed like we were there forever. Like, I was working. My hands were going fast. I, like, we were doing all the things we needed to do, but I just couldn't get out of there fast enough with Jordan, you know, we just could not get him off of that street fast enough.

Guys were repositioning my vehicle, bringing up the backboard that we have, and I'm trying to palpate his abdomen and make sure we didn't have anything that was. That was bleeding, anything major, like his aorta, that was bleeding out in his stomach, because that would have called for putting that tourniquet on his abdomen, which is something that comes with its own set of risks. Putting that on means that he really only, like, we have to get to the hospital in 20 minutes with that on, or we cause other problems for him and his long term survivability.

So he didn't have any signs of any swelling in his abdomen, anything like that. And it all felt really good. Like, there wasn't blood floating around there. But we had also, had also only been on scene 20 seconds after it happened, and there just maybe wasn't enough time.

So it was one of those things. We got him on the backboard, and the guys picked him up, and we started moving towards the car. And the driver, another SWAT officer, was in the car. He was heads up, and he hopped in my vehicle, which is something we had trained like, hey, here's the keys. Here's where they are. Here's how you guys get into it. You know, and put in gear and just the hangups on a vehicle, they don't normally drive right where the lights are and everything.

And so we get Jordan loaded up, and we start driving down to the hospital, and I get in the back, and after moving them, we always train like, hey, check your tourniquets, check your treatments. And the great thing was, Jordan was talking the whole time. Didn't matter what he was talking about. He was just talking.

Jordan Robison: So screaming, yelling.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, I was happy to hear it. If he was talking, that was just one less thing that I had to worry about in that moment. And so I start with his right arm, which was furthest away from me. I'm on his left side.

Jon Becker: You're in the back of the Durango?

Spencer Brahmbaugh: I'm in the back of the Durango next to him. Yeah. So his head is behind the driver, and his feet are at the tailgate of the Durango.

Jon Becker: Got it.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: And then I'm sitting next to him in that rear passenger seat. So, yeah, we're in the back, and I start going over everything again. And his shoulder. He has a wound in his shoulder, like a through and through, too high for a tourniquet. And it's bleeding, but it's not something that. It's not bleeding terribly bad. Not something. I'm going to pack right now. I'm going to continue checking everything else. His right arm was bleeding significantly after we had moved him.

So I tightened up that tourniquet, got that controlled left arm, tightened it up some more, and then his left leg was also bleeding after moving him. So I ended up putting a second tourniquet on that leg. Got that tightened down, and I go, hey, man, where do you hurt? Which is kind of a silly question to ask a guy that's been shot eight times, but he goes, it hurts between my legs.

And I go, s***, like anywhere else. And he said, no, that's what hurts the most. And so got all his clothes off at that point and checked everything to make sure there's no other blood that we are missing, any other wounds that need to be packed. And it was an intimate moment, I think, for us.

Jordan Robison: But at least she looked me in the eyes, you know.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: It was a lot to manage, you know, but after that, and we're driving. So let me back up. Prior to this, as we're moving locations with this suspect, like, I'm reworking which hospital we're going to go to because we have a couple trauma centers. We have two trauma centers within 2 miles of each other, so which one's going to be easier for us to get to it, you know, two or three in the afternoon with traffic.

So I'm trying to keep that up on my iPad that I've mounted in my vehicle. And, it's like a 30 minutes drive for us with traffic about a 12 miles, 30 minutes is what it says. And so I have that in my mind, and I know we're moving fast because the guy driving is, I hate. He's calling out turns and bumps and dips and we're hitting them hard. And every time Jordan's like, in more and more pain.

So we're a couple minutes into this ride, I get on my radio and I call our dispatch, the fire department dispatch, and I asked them to give the trauma center a heads up. Like, hey, I need you to let them know we're in route with an officer that's been shot multiple times. ETA is about ten minutes.

And that's something that they're typically able to handle for us. If I don't have time to call the hospital direct, which is a much lengthier report, I can just call or dispatch and they'll make that happen, make that notification to the trauma center. So our dispatch center was unable to make that notification because the trauma center had just moved to a new wing of the hospital, so they didn't have the updated phone number.

So as we're driving, I remember Freddie, I'm getting ready to start an IV in Jordan's neck because I couldn't start one. Either of his arms…

Jon Becker: Tourniquets on, everything else, practically.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, yeah, everything had tourniquets on. And, so I'm going for an iv in his neck, short of putting an IO, an IV into his bone, into his sternum. And so he had a really good vein in his neck at that. At that point I go, this is what we're going to do. And tell the driver, I go, hey, I'm going to start an iv. And he goes, we're going to hit a dip. I said, okay. And so we hit this dip, and we really hit that dip. That was a dip that was airborne a little bit.

And I remember my hand went up and stuck the needle, the catheter, right into the headrest of the passenger seat. I'm just like, this could not f****** get any worse. Which it wasn't a big deal. It was just one of those, like, those little moments that sort of crushes you and you're like, God, it was going so good.

So there's another catheter right next to where I'm working. I had all my stuff set up, and so I open it and we end up getting a line in his neck. And something that presents with trauma patients is how profuse and how sweaty they are. And that was Jordan, you know, just. He was Ashen, he was pale, he was profusely sweating. And so nothing was really sticking to him. So I had to hold this IV in place. I had started an IV drip of a medication to help with clotting. And so that was hanging in my car. And that's a medication we have to give over a certain period of time. And so it's called TXA.

So we put the TXA in the bag, and the bag is now flowing into Jordan's neck, which is something that is, if he does have a significant bleed in his abdomen, this is something that's going to help his body maintain the clots that it's making.

I think we asked Freddie to turn the heater on. Freddie was driving, and because we're just trying to keep them warm, get the TXA on. And then, I think shortly after that, we ended up making it to the ER in about nine minutes.

Jordan Robison: Well, the wrong ER entrance, but, yeah, yeah.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: The wrong ER entrance. So, yeah.

Jon Becker: I think there's actually a story associated with the wrong ER entrance that is kind of a funny one, if I remember correctly.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. So we pull up to the old ER entrance, and this had been. They had moved the ER within days. And it's something that we should have known, something I should have known that that is 100% on me. Like, that update should have been pushed out to these guys. And Freddy goes, we're here.

And I look up, I go, we're at the wrong ER. And he goes, where's the right ERDE? And there's a security guard. You know, my car's got lights on it. We're with a convoy of multiple other police cars and some security guards in the parking lot. You guys are at the wrong place. And Freddie rolls down the window, and I roll down my window, and we pretty much kidnap this guy. We say, get in the car right now. Like, just get in the car. And he didn't know what to do.

And so I'm opening my door to go and get him, and Freddy's calling him over, and he ends up getting in the car. He's sitting on my rifle, on my helmet, on another medbag I have, and he's a bigger, bigger guy, and he's trying to fit into this car.

Jordan Robison: He struggled.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: So we're all yelling at him.

Jon Becker: His day's gonna get worse.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: It gets worse in a moment. So we. He's directing us, directing Freddie, and I'm talking to Jordan. I'm trying to keep this iv in his neck. Nothing. The tape's not sticking. And I'm like, Jordan, just keep talking to me, dude. Like, we're getting through this. We're almost there. Like, you know, hang on. And we make, I'm looking up now. I'm paying attention to where we're going. Like, this guy's giving us the right directions, and so tells us, turn left.

And they says, turn left again, and it's right there. I mean, we were 300 yards off, but just a long drive on the road, and, you know, took a little while with traffic and stuff. And Freddie just goes in the wrong lanes of traffic, goes opposing, and, like, in the bicycle lane, and I just hear screaming. And I look down, like, Jordan, it's okay, dude. We're here. And it's the security guard. Screaming. Says, security guard screaming.

Jon Becker: Screaming the scream of a man who's been kidnapped and is now driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic with people he doesn't know.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Arms, people.

Jon Becker: One of them is bleeding profusely in the back.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: With a random rifle poking him in the back that he's sitting on. Yeah. So we end up getting to the ER, park the vehicle, and Chris had gotten there just before us, right? Yeah, yeah. So they knew Chris was there. And then they bring a gurney out to my car. And so we open up the back, and I are pulling Jordan out, and it's another moment where we're just dropping guns out of the car. Like, Jordan's gun belt and handgun or whole belt comes off of him into the parking lot. And letting these guys know, hey, he needs blood. Like, you need to get the blood bank and get them. Get them going, because Jordan's going to need it.

And pretty much once we get into the hospital, the paramedic gives like, a trauma handoff to the physicians and the nurses that are in charge, lets them know any history, medical history of the patient, any allergies, any medications, and most importantly, like, where is he hit, and what have I done to fix that? So it's a pretty quick thing.

But, yeah, I just remember as soon as we got in there and they got to work on Jordan, and it was a relief to me from doing that for so long when we were five, six minutes and him being in the trauma bay, and they didn't just take him straight to surgery.

And so, you know, that if they're. This hospital isn't taking him to the. Or performing surgical interventions, you know, they're in the trauma bay, then, like, we're doing pretty good, you know, on the fact that he didn't lose consciousness and that these officers that were on scene were putting tourniquets on and finding bleeders right away like this. That was the stuff that really made a difference, was everyone kind of doing their part to make sure he's okay. And through all the trainings and all the things that we've done, guys like Chris just.

Yeah, he knew he was hit, but we knew Jordan was down. It was different. So when Chris is hit, like he. He said, like, it was different. I knew I was hurt, but I knew Jordan was down, needed help more than I did. And that's something that he said to me, and that is super impressive, but it's guys like that that stepped up and. And really helped make the difference in this. This was a truly a team event, you know, when it comes down to just everything after the shooting, all the medical care, like, every guy that put hands on Jordan had a part in it. You know, the guy that instead of.

And I don't even know who it was, instead of just hanging out and trying to put a tourniquet on, like, he knew to go to my car and get the backboard, you know, the guy that went to my car to move it into position so that we can get out of there a little quicker, like, stuff like that. Those spots that they trained to be in the. That they didn't hesitate to get themselves into to make sure that he had the best outcome possible.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I think two things struck me in watching the video. The first is how calm and professional the team was initially. And when you arrive, the team and you. It is very clinical. It's calm. I mean, everybody around the scene is running around freaking out, but the team itself, and you are calm, deliberate.

Everything is done in a specific order. Like, it just, it looked rehearsed, it looked practiced. It was not a team surprised that somebody went down and having no idea what to do. It was a team realizing, okay, this is what we trained for. Everybody do this. And even the communication among the guys, when you look at the body worn, is calm. I mean, obviously it's urgent, but it's calm.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. It's a different level with this group of guys. Like I was saying, everyone knows their job and they know everyone else's job. So if there's a gap to be filled, we have guys that are filling it. If there's work to be done, they're finding it. And it was the same with him being down as it is, you know, us making an entry on a warrant.

So just that day, it was, I, like Chris and I had said he was the first guy I saw, and we knew, like, we knew this was not going to be something that was just going to. This wasn't going to be a guy that was just going to put his hands up, be like, hey, you got me.

Jon Becker: No. Yeah, you watch the video. It's very clear, he intended to die that day and was going to take everybody he could with him.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. And so that was when I was leaving the fire station. I took a few extra minutes and got everything ready. Like anything extra in my car that didn't need to be there wasn't in there, you know, and everything was set up where it needed to be.

Jon Becker: I think there's a thousand, like, one of the reasons that I wanted to sit down with you guys is there are a thousand little lessons learned here that, you know, by all accounts, this day could have had a very, very different ending.

And so one of the things I want to do is I want to go through kind of from a team standpoint, from a medical standpoint, what are our lessons learned here? What are the things that other teams need to know? Because had you guys not been as well prepared, we would not be sitting here with Jordan. I think that's a very safe thing to say, considering the nature of his injuries and the number of his injuries.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, I don't necessarily think there was anything that I did that was spectacular that another paramedic couldn't have done.

Chris Shipley: No, I truly disagree at that point.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Well, one of the things I love.

Jon Becker: About all three of you, none of you have taken responsibility for anything. You know, Chris being a perfect example, he will not mention this, so I will that he was given the CATO award for valor for taking a gunshot wound to the leg and using his own tourniquet on Jordan, which was a bold move, betting that somebody else would have a tourniquet.

But, like it is, anybody that watches the video in this sees a number of heroic acts. I mean, Chris being the first one that really stands out at you as a guy that shot through the leg, taking a tourniquet to put it on his teammate, and reacting that quickly. And I think that it's very easy in these kind of situations to overlook the individual acts of heroism. And a lot of those things happened before the event.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, this was all stuff that, you know, just these. This team saying that, yeah, we want to take a guy who. His first job wasn't being a cop, it was being a paramedic and a firefighter, and we're going to send him through the police academy and send him through SWAT school and put him on entries, and he's going to be embedded in this team. Having a paramedic that close to the team is. It's that timeline.

It's how much blood has he lost? How fast do we get the TXA on? How fast do we get him, you know, out of that, away from that point of injury to the trauma center? Like, yeah, and any other paramedic could have done paramedic things that day, but the fact that they had the trust in me to be that close and with the team, you know, and I told Jordan, like, one of my regrets with this whole thing was when they said, hey, just unmarked vehicles only.

Like, yeah, maybe I should have stayed. Maybe I should have pulled up to one of those marked cars and be like, hey, why don't you get in with me? Let's go. Because now at least this guy has to make a decision. You know, it's either the white van or this gray car. And I got a shooter in my seat next to me, you know, or I'm in the seat, whoever's shooting. But we have another gun on them. You know, that could have been. Maybe Jordan was only shot twice. Maybe he wasn't shot at all. There's all those what ifs, right?

Jon Becker: Having watched the video, unless you guys shot the guy before he got out of the car, I don't think there's much you could have done, because by the time anybody could have engaged him, he was almost out of rounds.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, or you jump out of your car and you get shot, and then we're all scrambling, trying to figure out how to save the medic.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Which would not have gone as well.

Chris Shipley: But I think that's one of the things that we train for, is we don't train for everybody, usually. I mean, people define success. I mean, it's ambiguous in itself, but they always base their. Their type of tactics on the best case scenario, not the worst. And he's a truly dedicated cabinet. And just to piggyback off what Spencer was saying is, he says any paramedic had done this. No, I disagree. I've seen a lot of different types of paramedics, and they do get exposed to a lot of different type of caliber of traumas within our city.

But what he did in those moments and how calm he was, because I remember this thinking this to myself, too, was. I remember looking at him and being, oh, thank God he's here. I remember just thinking that to myself, being like, if it wasn't for him, I wouldn't have felt that calm within it.

Jon Becker: But, see, that goes back to training. That goes back to knowing the capabilities of your teammates and preparing for worst case scenario. Right? It's like you said, it's very easy to train for best case scenario. Really? You are preparing for worst case scenario.

Chris Shipley: Yes, but that's just the higher level of learning that, like, you have someone. I'm just using these guys specifically, like Spencer, where he's a high level learning. Like, yeah, he runs the paramedic tab and everything like that, but he's not a paramedic. He's leaps and bounds, what you classify as, like, a typical paramedic just because of his capabilities and within those types of moments itself, too, especially when you have some sort of. You have a lot of emotional connection to, again, the person that you're triaging.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's one of the most amazing things about this whole thing is that the three of you were close friends prior, and so it is, you know, your brother's down.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, I remember one of the things you told me afterwards, one of the things you felt guilty about, Spence, you said, like, I felt guilty that I treated you like I would treat anyone else. And, you know, it. It wasn't just you. It was the whole team around me. Everybody was just calm, just putting on tourniquets. It literally felt like a training exercise. I mean, I'm screaming and my legs exploded. But like everybody else, their faces. We've all seen them in training. We've all played the officer down before, you know, and their faces were identical to that day. Just like, we have trained this a thousand times.

And I know you said you felt guilty about it, but that's just your training kicking in, and I'm glad you didn't get emotional and all that. You did exactly what you needed to do to do that day. And even Jon, you said it was clinical. That's exactly what it was just clinical that day when it came to the Tac med stuff. So I thought that was interesting.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, that's one of the things that, my wife and I talked a lot about was she's like, how was Jordan in the pack? And I'm like, I don't know. Yeah. She goes, what do you mean you don't know? I go, I don't know. He wasn't great, but that wasn't my focus, was having a conversation with you back there while we were doing this. Like, it was. It was bigger than that. But I think in that moment, looking back on it, I'm like, oh, yeah, it could have been a little bit.

Jordan Robison: Like, no, no, I wouldn't have changed it.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah.

Jordan Robison: Another thing, too that we didn't talk about that I want to bring up is that selflessness that Shipley showed at the beginning, right? Where he takes his tourniquet off and comes to me and starts using that. Well, that just didn't stop there. He got to the hospital first. Cause he was in a marked unit and the driver got him there first. And all the ER staff. Because I talked to him afterwards, the only thing they had heard. Cause there was like a lot of telephone going on was that there was one officer down and they didn't know how bad it was. And that's all they knew. They didn't know ETA's, they didn't know anything.

So when Shipley shows up, all the hospital staff comes rushing out to go to Shipley. And they're like, hey, let's go. Let's get you on the gurney. And Shipley's like, no, that's like, just wait. Like somebody else is coming. Like, get off me. And you told the initial hospital staff, like, hey, just wait. Like, my partner's right around the corner or something like that, right?

Chris Shipley: Get Jordan.

Jordan Robison: Yeah. So that's just another example of just that selflessness of just like, hey, no, I'm okay, but my partner's coming. He needs you. I'll wait for the nurses that you don't need, you know, so.

Jon Becker: Which is just a further continuation of Chris's remarkable calm under fire that you see in watching the video. He is the only person I've ever known that's been shot and was telling the other people to calm down while they were working on him and concerned about his rifle.

Jordan Robison: He did a hair flick, too.

Jon Becker: Yeah, yeah, there's a little brief hair fix, and, yeah, I think that. Okay, so one of the things I would love to talk about with you guys is kind of lessons learned from this, you know, whether it's individual or team or, you know, tac med. Spencer, why don't we start with the tactical medical program? What do you think you guys did right?

Spencer Brahmbaugh: I think some of the stuff that we did good that made us successful in that day was definitely the ownership that the guys on the team took to when it came to the medical part of it. Everyone was willing to carry their equipment and keep it on them, make sure it was, you know, up to date and in good condition. And they were pretty religious about that.

And every time we had a training at least once a month, or every training day would be twice a month, we would throw something in there and they would say, hey, we want to do an officer down in this scenario or in. This wasn't something that took away from, you know, the main topics we were training on. It was just a – Here's a reminder, like, be ready for this. And we would randomly put those in there, and the guys would perform. It was never one of those things where they're like, oh, we're doing this again.

I think the guys on this team understand how violent that city is and that we have that potential when we're going out there. And the ownership they took in, it really made a difference and understanding their role and every role there is to be filled in that incident. And then so guys were just, like I said earlier, just looking for work, you know, wherever it was, you know, whatever needed to be done, they were making it happen.

And then just the training that we would put in as a team, specifically on the medical training days, which was a, you know, a ten hour day of all medical stuff, you know, the sergeants or the team leaders, letting us have that training. And then my partner, who was, you know, medic, he'd left the team before this, but he was the first medic into the inland regional center.

So Ryan Starling was the guy that really started this team down the right path. And then we got together about five years ago on the team and started working, you know, just to make it even better and make it a more solid program for these guys and for us and so I think that's kind of started a long time prior to this day.

Jon Becker: So, yeah, I think that success, you know, for lack of a better term, on game day is not success on game day. It's success in every training prior to game day.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, it was everything that every guy on that team had done, you know, the ones that were currently there and the ones that left, like, all those guys putting in this effort, you know, specifically on the medical stuff, made a big difference in the outcome for Jordan.

Chris Shipley: But I'm sorry to rim you guys. I know he won't talk good about him or highly of himself or something like that. So that's where I'm going to chime in a little bit, too, is you define like the game day, and that's a lot of the stuff that I think people forget is on your worst day, that's the best you're going to do.

A lot of you have, like, a lot of these different types of people that I look up to, too, and they discuss kind of these, these hard skills that you have set. You're already competent within your capabilities that you can resort to him because that on a cold day, on a cold start, that's the best you're going to do. And for him, that's what kind of goes back to is, I don't know if it's nature nurture. I think it has a lot to do with just the nature of who he is individually. But over the last, I don't want to say his age too loud.

Jon Becker: Century?

Spencer Brahmbaugh: I'm only 38.

Chris Shipley: He said it. But over like that, I mean, nature. So over the last almost four decades, he's gonna be 40 years. Last four decades is he's be able to refine those skill sets that he has. And again, I believe it's a lot with the nature of who he is, who he was born as. I mean, he had the foundation, but now he has a skill set that he's just, he's enhanced. And it becomes like a lot of the times we discuss, like, these, these subconscious behaviors that he's just so competent in little things where he doesn't have to, he doesn't have to think about it.

Just like when you ask somebody just to drive from point A to point B is they'll get to that place and like, oh, shoot, I don't even remember driving there, but they're doing all this. They're, they're driving. They're driving rightfully. They're using their signals. They're stopping at the right points. They just don't recognize it because it's become so Nate in their behavior that they've done it repeatedly over and over and over again. That becomes subconscious to them. They don't have to resort to, and that's where, like, within that medical capabilities and stuff that I would have to try to, try to effectively think that he'd just so naturally do because he's, he's honed those skills, those skill sets.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I mean, it goes back to fundamentals. Right? It's, you know, one of my favorite sayings is you won't rise to the occasion. You'll fall to the level of your training.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yes.

Jon Becker: And, you know, so much of training is fundamental. And it's, I think it is very easy for teams to get sucked into the exotic training paradigm where it's like, let's go, do, you know, let's go, you know, shoot out of helicopters, hanging from ropes or whatever, when really the basic fundamentals is where most, you know, all the debriefs I've ever attended, all the debriefs I've done, most of the time when a team falls apart at a fundamental level.

Chris Shipley: Oh, absolutely. And then you'll, so it's like, you ask him, you'll sit there and be like, hey, like, to me, he's a master of his craft, but he's still, he's still a student. And that's where you recognize is he's just constantly learning. He's constantly getting better, and he's adapting. He's trying to make, like rich. Devonny always discusses, like, if you can make yourself 1% better in every single aspect, then you're just, you're going to significantly compound your success rate.

And then you have him just like he, he won't discuss like he, he went through after we were just, we're talking about the whole incident self is he's, he started revising his entire, well, he keeps it organized in itself, just naturally, but he was going through revising his, his vehicle over and over and over again just for the ever changing components of what we're confronted with, anticipating the worst case scenario.

And again, that's a higher level of thinking, but that's based upon all his four decades of experience. About four decades of experience. But again, yeah, he's just, he's constantly looking to try to better something in every single aspect of his capacity, I guess.

Jon Becker: Well, and I think that it, you know, you mentioned something interesting there, which is that he's training for worst case scenario. Right? I think another pitfall is, is you go into training, every time you hit a resilient, you know, you hit a problem, something fails, stop. And one of the teams that I interviewed that survived a pretty hellacious shooting, not quite this bad, but pretty hellacious shooting. They said that part of their culture was that they train through, like, if they're playing sims, they train through injury. You don't get shot and stop. You get shot and keep shooting.

And he said, you know, initially, that was kind of a controversial thing, but when one of our guys got shot in an operation, he didn't even hesitate, he kept pushing. And I think that if you. If you train for best case scenario, when worst case scenario shows up, you're not prepared.

Chris Shipley: No.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. And that's one of the ways that we train this team trained was you just push through it. And one of the things we were able to get them to buy off on is, all right, you get to push through it, but when this shooting is done, we need to figure out who shot and go from there. So every time that engagement happened, we were having guys putting tourniquets on, evacuing them out of the house, and working away to get me from one room to that room or the other medics or however it was.

But I think ultimately, the thing that made the medical side super successful from my end was my goal was to shed my tasks. Like, I have all these tasks that I need to do to make sure that this guy isn't bleeding anymore. And if I can give those two officers and this stuff we were doing through training, if I can say, hey, you guys are doing tourniquets, you guys are cutting clothes off. You guys are looking for chest wounds and putting chest seals on. Like, those are all things that I would like to have done before I get there.

So even though I would make entry with this team, we would tell them, the first 60 seconds is on you guys. So after that, threats down and the shooting is over, like, it's on you guys to figure it out for a minute until I get from wherever I'm at to that room with you. And so taking those tasks off of my plate just makes it so there's. There's less stuff I have to worry about. And we can focus more on the advanced life support side of it instead of the tourniquets and just the chest seals, so.

And one more thing from the fire department side that I think, in a roundabout way, made a big difference was the fire department funds this program for the San Bernardino Police Department. And it's not a cheap program to have, but ultimately this has gone through a lot of different guys from the admin side on the fire department. And it just takes one guy to say no. We've been able to pitch it and each guy on our side has just said yes.

You know, they see the need and they're willing to stick through it and, and to eat the cost. And that day, you know, it showed up. Like, this is the reason, Jordan's the reason that we have a program like this. So we get guys like that home, you know, and Chris too. I heard he got shot.

Jordan Robison: That's the rumor.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: He denies it.

Jon Becker: I think you raise a really valid point, which is that ultimately it's a multi agency thing. Right? And the way that you have done this with a cooperation between the fire department and police department, not only brings better advanced life support, but also embeds firefighter paramedic who is tactically trained with the team in a way that police department probably wouldn't fund.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. And we're finding that it's more and more acceptable for police departments to buy into it because of the liability side of things. You know, they're willing to say, yeah, this takes some liability away from when we have a use of force to have a paramedic there. But ultimately it's, it's a hard stretch to say we're going to take a guy as a fireman and put them on a SWAT team for a lot of places.

But I, from seeing both sides of it, I think it's easier for a guy to recognize when he's in trouble, when you need to use force than it is for a guy to be able to look at someone and say, this person's a critical patient. Like, this person is going to die if I don't intervene or if we don't get something done or moving on this patient, that takes some time for paramedics to recognize that stuff throughout their career. I think it's, sometimes it's much more clear cut to recognize when you're in imminent danger as a police officer.

So from being a fireman for, you know, paramedic for 15 years and then coming over to the police department side, it seems, I don't want to say easier, it's definitely not easier, but it's less of a stretch to train a guy to go to the police academy and go to SWAT school than it is to send a guy to paramedic school and be like, these are all things you need to look out for and how all your patients present, because we're not just dealing with trauma.

We're checking out all these people that we serve warrants on their houses and they're having chest pain after they're having shortness of breath. We have an older guy on the team that might be having a medical problem or an allergic reaction. So it's really the spectrum of what we're doing is much more than just trauma.

Jon Becker: Well, one of the things that we talked about offline that I think that seems appropriate here is that frugality can be a fault. It becomes very easy for administrations to look at situations and say, oh, bearcats are really expensive, drones are really expensive, paramedics are really expensive, and start to save, you know, save pennies, you know, is it penny smart, dollar dumb? I think it becomes very easy for administrations to cut complicated programs and cut technology and everything else.

And, you know, I don't know what the paramedic program cost the fire department and the police department combined for all the years that you've done it. I'm pretty sure Jordan thinks it was worth the money.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, I do.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah, I think we all think it's worth the money. It's just what guys need to realize is that we can, we can spend all the money on this stuff, but if we're not willing to give guys the equipment they need or the training they need, and we're spending money on the wrong things, then we're not doing justice to the guys that are actually serving the warrants or going through the door.

The team spending money or needing a second bear cat or wanting better equipment isn't a bad thing. It means your guys are looking forward into the future and they're seeing how these trends are going and really what they want to do with how they operate and how they work. And we should spend more money to make sure these guys come home safe. I don't know how you put a number on that. It's hard to quantify.

Chris Shipley: The thing you also do forget is we have an obligation to the public too, as well. I'm more on the training side of having the tools and the new top end types of instruments, stuff like that. The training is what's important. A lot of those hard skills is we have obligation to the public, too, because how prevalent a lot of these big, say, mass casualty incidents are occurring now. You have these copycat cultures, and then even worse, you have these radicalized terrorist organizations that are just infiltrated are our, we'll say our country, too.

And a lot of people know is like San Bernardino is a hub for terrorist organizations on the west coast. San Bernardino County, Riverside county, ground zero. Most people don't understand that. We've had, I mean, we've had the IRC, which was a big event in the last seven years now and then a couple school shootings.

And that's just becoming more and more prevalent. And because you have skill sets that you, you've, you've trained and you've looked forward to the most updated type of training and to learn from your past experiences and other people's past experiences, because you have, like, I mean, Columbine was a big one where it just, I mean, that revised the whole priority of life scale and then you have voldy that just completely violated and look at the casualties that were inflicted.

And I mean, those kids, like, they have done nothing in this world to deserve that. And we also have that within our city too, is we have everything from higher level of education to kindergarten to these big commercial buildings and stuff like that. It's just bound to happen again. But by having these skill sets, we can't mitigate the inheritance that are just in the nature of our industry and our profession.

But that'll just, that'll safe what that allow us is to be unequivocally more successful. We're during one of these incidents that makes the public more safe. If by having Spencer teach us, you can compound that knowledge to his level and it's never going to be his level, but just to compound the knowledge that he has, we can transfer that.

So it's like you have another big incidence that occurs is if I could start rendering Aidan faster, I can recognize this stuff faster and I can save more lives faster. I can delay that onset enough just so that he can get there, people in his profession can get there. How many more lives can be saved?

Jon Becker: I think it's easy, though. You know, complacency is a threat, right? Complacency for many police departments is the threat because these things don't happen very often. Right? You know, you've executed hundreds or even thousands of warrants and none of them gone this way. So you start to confuse. Good luck with good tactics. Jordan, from your perspective, like, I know we've talked about the complacency played a role here. Talk to me a little bit about that.

Jordan Robison: Sure. Well, I think before this incident, we had seen this trend where admin was trying to get us to do more with less understaffed, overworked is how I describe our agency and what we had to deal with. And there's some advantages to that, to where you get creative. You learn a lot of solutions that a lot of other agencies and cops don't have to think about.

The problem and the downfall with that is it kind of puts you in this mindset to where, because you get away with it a few times, then you get away with it a lot, and then you get away with that for a few years, that when you come across something like this, and we've all talked about it, we knew in the pit of our stomach that this guy wasn't like other crooks that we're dealing with. This guy's different.

However, we still have that. Oh, well, I don't want to activate the whole team yet. You know, that's a lot of overtime. Maybe we should do. Let's do the same thing we've been doing, where we're going to do a little more with a little less, even though we know that this guy is different. We've all said it, we talked about it with each other. I think that mindset kind of bled into this incident as well. And I think you have to look at things from an individual. Like, you have to take each incident on its individual merits and individually.

I know Chris talked about a lot. This incident threw up red flag after red flag after red flag, to the point where the whole team, looking back in hindsight's easy to judge. It's easy to judge things on hindsight, but looking back with all these red flags, the whole team should have been activated and said, hey, you're going to sit around the station for 24 hours just to have you on standby.

I think I know personally, my mindset was, hey, I don't care how fast he is, I don't care what he's done. I'm faster, I've trained more, I'm better. And you should have that mindset when you go into it. But you can't neglect the reality of the tactics that you have on the ground, because, as we just saw, it doesn't matter how fast or big or strong you are, a bullet's faster and a bullet's stronger.

So I think that really bled into some of the tactical decisions that were made that day. Do more with less. And that was one of the days we were, we were caught and we were punished for it.

Jon Becker: So do you think that, like, the fact that you had been successful with small team tactics with, you know, taking a van versus taking a bearcat or something else that those things had created almost like a danger inoculation for you guys. Like, it just, even though it seemed dangerous, like we've always done it this way. It worked.

Jordan Robison: Yeah. And I think that's also part and parcel with the city that we work in. We deal with high level criminals on such a regular basis that, you know, you kind of become numb to it. We see just horrific shootings and horrific incidents of violence on a regular basis that you do become desensitized to it. And it's very easy to just say, yeah, no, this guy was pretty violent yesterday with the deputy. We know what's going to happen, but, you know, we've always done this. It's going to work.

Instead of taking a second saying, hey, this guy has thrown up more red flags than I've seen our other crooks regularly do and take that on its individual merits, it's very easy to just fall into, well, this is, this is what we're going to do because this is how we always do it. Instead of taking a moment to critically think, is this the best tactic for this guy on this day? And I definitely think looking back, that's where I fell short. And I know I've talked to a lot of guys and they feel like that's where they fell short that day, too.

Jon Becker: So, Jordan, I think you guys made a lot of good decisions prior to this. Right. In training, we've talked already about attention to detail, attention to things. Talk about personal preparation for me a little bit because ultimately I think your fitness and obviously the teams skills play into this. But, you know, we've talked offline about the need to be attentive to the details of your personal job. Give me kind of your thoughts on that.

Jordan Robison: Sure. I know Chris touched, touched on it earlier, too. We have a duty to the public. We have a duty to each other. Like I have a duty to Chris when I'm on the team. I have a duty to Spence when we're on the team, to be the very best we can be out there. I know that sounds cheesy, but it's true. You have a responsibility to be the best version of yourself.

And especially when you're on a tight knit team doing high risk operations like a SWAT team, you have to be in the best physical shape possible. If Spence goes down and I have to get him over a fence, if I'm too weak to get a limp body over a fence, I'm no good and I shouldn't be on that team. So that was something I took really, really serious.

Physical fitness was huge for me, especially for the recovery, which we. We talked about later, but for the day in day aspects of the team, physical fitness is everything. So I ran multiple miles every day. I lifted six times a week. I was in probably the best shape I had ever been in in my life at that point.

But I feel like that's how you have to be on a SWAT team. That's part of your preparation. That's work you do before you get to the station. That's work you put in every day just to be a part of that team. Things that you need to take care of when you get there, especially for newer guys listening, and I wish I would have learned this earlier, is get your gear scored away. You should know everything that's on your. On your gear. You should know how your vest is set up. You should know the specs on every single thing on your vest, to your gun, to how you load your mags. Every single detail of every single thing that you set up will make a difference. I know Spence preached it early on, and he was really heavy on having a tourniquet that's located in the triangle.

So, for example, let's say your right arm gets hit. You need to be able to access your tourniquet with your left arm. Your left arm gets hit. Same thing with your right arm. Your leg gets hit. You need to have a tourniquet for your leg. Multiple limbs get hit, get hit like it did with me. You need to have multiple tourniquets. I carried a tourniquet high, a tourniquet low, and I think I had a tourniquet, my medden medbag. And I think I carried one more. I carried one more tourniquet on my belt. And it came into play that day. I had three tourniquets applied on me, and then we needed a fourth for Officer Shipley.

So if there's any patrol. Patrol, guys or girls listening. And you're not carrying tourniquet out on patrol, you're insane. Like. And you should be carrying multiple. And I know there's realities. You patrol about much. You can fit, but you. You need to have your gear prepped for this scenario, not for. Hey, if things go right, you need to have your gear prepped for when things go wrong.

Jon Becker: Yeah. One of the things that we see in a lot of teams that I've dealt with over the years is they strip gear off because it's heavy and it's inconvenient, it gets in the way. And, you know, you kind of watch them go through gear phases where they are totally prepared, and then they're like, I'm not going to carry my tourniquet this time. And you see guys starting to strip more and more gear off to get back down to the lightest thing they can. And again, I think it goes back to that training for the worst case scenario, not for the best case.

Jordan Robison: Yeah, and I think, too, I've not going to name names, but I've been at trainings where I pick up somebody's vest and it flies off the ground. And I'm like, where the h*** are your plates? And they're like, oh, no, they're in a different vest or my back hurt today. I don't want to train with my plates in. That's insane. That's absolutely mind blowingly insane.

Train how you're going to be out there in the field, because if you can't stand on a ten hour, ten hour training with your, with your plates in, because it's too heavy, then you're not going to be able to stand out there on a 15 hours call out with your plates in. You're going to be fatigued and you could forget to put them back in.

And as we saw from this incident, my plate and my vest directly is the reason I'm here. You know, all tactics and everything aside, plate stopped around direct center to probably my aorta. And then the Cumberbun stopped an additional round going into my thoracic cavity. So I think your gear is just.

Chris Shipley: Everything but the piggyback off that too, is. I don't think people really delve into the question, like the why. Like, he discussed about picking people up being the physical capability of, like, you'll have people say like, oh, yeah, I'll just pick up and I'll just dump me. Drag carry them.

Well, how's that truly gonna look when you have a completely incapacitated person where you have, it's completely immobile, he's. Now you do some sort of sweat, blood, all these different type of factors too. Like, how's that truly gonna look? And they don't think about stuff like that. They're like, oh, I'm tough. I'm a big guy. I'll just pick him up and carry him.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Something a little different about the team and kind of the culture we had was everyone is always competing. Like, we were going to SWAT competitions, to shooting competitions. If Chris Drew, and it was 1.1, someone was trying to beat him. Like, the whole team was out there trying to beat his draw time. We would have duels with sims on our lunch breaks. Like, it was that kind of competition that I think just forced everyone to get better across the team. And that was a great, like, culture for us to have.

Jon Becker: Well, I mean, you raise a point, which is this culture. Right? Like, culture is what underlies the behavior of an organization. And having the right culture is where excellence comes from. It's not an individual act, it's a cultural act. It's not acceptable to fall below the line. And so as a result, everybody's striving and like you said, just trying to get better, trying to get faster. And I think in the end, with this incident, Jordan's alive because of that.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Absolutely. Yeah, yeah.

Jordan Robison: No, I agree. It's that same culture. I remember we did an aardvark competition a while ago and.

Chris Shipley: Sorry, what kind of competition?

Jordan Robison: It was AARDVARK sponsored art. And I was, I was new on the team and at this time I hadn't been shooting as much as I could have been working a ton of overtime on patrol, doing FTO stuff, kind of not focusing on the team. I'm brand new and this is. And I'll just kind of throw myself under the bus here. And I went to this team and Spencer was on a team with a couple people, and I was on a different team with a couple people. And Spencer's team finished first and our team, we finished like 10th or 11th or something like that.

And I performed to everybody else's standards in the competition, mid table, you know, average. But to our team, I was by far the slowest and the worst when it came to shooting on our team. And that feeling of just shame. And that's when it first kind of hit me of, hey, this isn't acceptable. Like, hey, you need to go to the range, you need to step your game up and you need, you need to, you need to step up because you've just embarrassed yourself in front of your entire team.

And that was kind of that first. And I was brand new on the team, I think, a few months, but that was that first intro, that first taste of, hey, this is a different culture now. Like, you're going from patrol to a close knit team who competes with each other to be the best. And that's when that mindset started to take over.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Preston.

Jon Becker: So, Jordan, last topic, you said earlier that there are things that you would have changed, obviously, retrospectively, like anything else. Right? It's easy Monday morning to look back at an event and go, oh, well, that didn't go well. And I think that a big point of the debrief is to talk about those things. Where do you think this went wrong? Like, what? What do you pin down as your primary? If I had to do it again, I would do it differently.

Jordan Robison: Well, it's – So with this, and I'm sure people on the outside looking in can identify, like, 100 things that probably went wrong. I think one of the big ones, when I look back, one of the big flaws in the plan, because I think that plan could have worked. But I think the problem. One of the main problems was we gave him too easy of an equation to solve. We gave him one van. Four guys versus you. That was too easy of a problem for him. And he solved it pretty well. He hit two out of four.

When you look back, there was genuine confusion when it came to turn on the street, because the marked units weren't sure if they should turn on, because we knew if this guy saw a marked unit, it was game on. We knew if he saw a marked unit, he was going to get out of his car, shoot or run. So marked was off the table, so they weren't sure if they should turn in with us. UC units also weren't sure if they were turning in with us. There was genuine confusion.

So when we went to turn onto the street, we went in with one van versus him. And ultimately, I think that just gave him, like I said, too easy of an equation. And, yes, we won because of everything else we've talked about, but when we got lucky and two, he was able to solve it. So.

Jon Becker: So to do over again, multiple vehicles, probably?

Jordan Robison: Yeah, give him that. I think Spence talked about it, too. Make him make a choice. You know, by the time he sees 1, 2, 3, 4 cars popping up, officers popping out, he has to make that decision. And that decision takes time. And by that .1 of us will have a gun. One. And it's all looking back, it's all hindsight. Anything could have happened had we done that, too. Somebody could have been shot in the face and we could have been going to a funeral instead. But I think, looking back, we should have given him a more difficult problem that he had, they. That he had to confront.

Jon Becker: That makes sense. Would you? I mean, obviously, hindsight being 2020, should you have taken armor?

Jordan Robison: Yes. It's hard to, because one of the considerations, and it's not an easy choice. It's not because he sees armor that car has not been rendered immobile. We don't know who the driver is. We haven't identified him. We don't know his criminal history. We don't know if he's armed. We don't know if he's going to run.

So one of the main concerns if we pulled onto that street with a piece of armor is he recognizes that and now we're involved in a vehicle pursuit with a guy we know is going to engage officers. And that was one of the things we wanted to avoid. So there's a million different ways you could do it. Just ultimately, I think we should have done a little more. But armor is a good option. I just don't know if it's the right one. Ultimately, I don't know.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I think it's, it's obviously, it's challenging, right, because it's, you know, you can do 100 vehicle takedowns and 99 of them go fine, and this happens. And if this never happens, then you don't know whether it was good luck or good tactics.

Jordan Robison: Exactly.

Jon Becker: You know, I mean, when, when you've had a bad event, you can look back and go, well, you know, that didn't work. What else could we do? Is there anything else that you think that a team that's listening, an individual operator that's listening, you would want them to know or want them to at least think about?

Jordan Robison: There's so many lessons. One of the main ones, I would say, is that separate your leadership in terms of roles and responsibilities. I think we had too many people trying to do too many things, and I think some of that was lost in the tactics, tactical decisions that were made that day. I think that if you have one leader who's dedicated to you are the takedown. You are the takedown team leader. This is your element. That's all I want you to focus on. This is you. I think it kind of simplifies things. Instead of one guy trying to make too many decisions, I think that is one of the areas where we ran into problems.

So I would say for any, especially team leaders listening, try and simplify your problems. Put guys in charge of their individual elements and then kind of trust them to do that. Cause I think we had just had too few people trying to make too many decisions, and I don't think it worked.

Jon Becker: I recently interviewed Kevin Cyr, who's the team leader for the RCMP ERT in British Columbia. And one of the things that Kevin said is, and it's kind of a controversial statement for some people, is the chief shouldn't be the one making the decisions. A person making the decision should be the person that has the best situational awareness and knows the most about the situation.

Jordan Robison: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And it stuck with me because it is easy to push responsibility up too far in an organization and as a result, kind of cripple the tactical decision making. And it sounds like that's kind of one of your concerns here, is it? It got, there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians or too many chefs and not enough cooks or whatever.

Jordan Robison: Yeah. I think it's also easy to conflate time on with experience. So there's a lot of people who had a lot of time on who were making decisions versus a lot of people who had a lot of experience in this. And there were a lot of people who offered alternate points of view. And I'm not trying to throw anybody under the bus, genuinely, I'm not. It's just, I think when you're a team leader making decisions, it's up to you to put the best person in the role, not because of. Not because of the rank or because of any other factors. It should be the best person who has the most experience with that specific job that you're asking him to do. I feel like that is something we could have improved on, I think.

Chris Shipley: Yeah. Just, again, going back to just questioning, questioning the why and then questioning what a real life, what a real life situation is truly going to look like, what that, to its underlying core, what that is really in a real world situation, what that's going to look like. And we got to live it. But we, this is this type of scenario that we always replay and we reiterate over and over again, like you say, you do this stuff, but they experience it. It's completely different.

And once you add all those different external factors and everything else that's going on, I mean, it just, it muddies the water extremely fast. And that's what I just hope people get is like to really, really question the why. Everything that someone tells you is you question, you try to find a reasoning to disprove or discredit what they're saying, but that just allows you to understand it more thoroughly so that you can apply it in every single type of situation. Because if you can understand how it works, then you can apply it. And I think that's just the one thing, that one message that I hope that I would like other people to get to hopefully take from this.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: I think for me, going to a new team now, it's changed how I look at things like how I look at these problems, like, my slideshow is a little bit different when we're doing this and making sure that on my end, we're doing a good job of getting our guys covered medically and being prepared, and we have more medics and physicians positions on this team. And you first get on the team and you're just happy to be there, right? Especially as a fireman, you're just thrilled. Like, this is so cool.

But, it takes an incident like this to realize, yeah, it's for keeps. Like, we're playing this for real, and sims are great and training's great, and everyone goes home. But if guys aren't asking that question of, hey, why are we doing this? Why is it this tactic? And if those leaders are given the answer, because we've always done it and we've always been successful, like, that should be a red flag. Like, have you always been successful because you're really good or because that just happened that one time we did it, it worked out.

So, I don't know. It has definitely changed my outlook on, on the team and how I view some of these incidents that we're showing up to. You just, I'm a little more vigilant when I'm looking at them. Another thing for us, something I think we did while Jordan was in the hospital that was really beneficial to our, the group of guys that were there was for the next three or four days, we just all got together and we just hung out, and it was always at someone's house and someone else's house, and all the wives got together, like, they were devastated as well, you know, and we must have talked through it, what, a hundred different times?

Chris Shipley: Yeah.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Yeah. And it was rough. There were some days where it was just like, you had the ugliness of it, the anger. Every, every emotion you could think of, everyone went through. And I think those four or five days that we did that really helped most everyone that was involved in this kind of move forward and then start focusing on getting Jordan home and making sure that hes going to be good after that. But it took a toll. Chris and Jordan, our family's all vacation together, hung out together. They were there at my house seeing my oldest off to the navy.

And, yeah, this was definitely something different that no one in my family, you know, my kid was in boot camp and called home and he's like, hey, someone said this happened, like, is everyone okay? Or he was just out of boot camp and, like, it was a big deal. It kind of affected everyone we know, and so just being together and working it out after the fact helped.

So, yeah. Make sure if this happens to your guys and your organization, that you really do your best as an administrator or as a supervisor to look after everyone. Because one of the guys who's driving my car was devastated. Like, he was absolutely a wreck after this because he had to listen to everything I wasn't paying attention to in the back.

Chris Shipley: Sorry.

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Right. But realistically, I've had 16 years of kind of ignoring this stuff. Not to be rude, but there's just other stuff going on. That was his first time, and it was his buddy. So we need to take that into account, make sure our guys are. Yeah. Everyone on that team, even guys that were off, were mentally okay after the fact.

Jon Becker: I think that's a fantastic place for us to stop. Guys, thank you so much for doing this! I appreciate you!

Chris Shipley: Thank you, Jon!

Jordan Robison: Thank you, Jon!

Spencer Brahmbaugh: Thank you for having us!

Episode 6 – Mike Hillman Part 1 of 2: The History of SWAT

Jon Becker: My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

This is the first in a two part series with Mike Hillman. Mike is a legend in the tactical community with a list of career accomplishments that would take a podcast of their own. But as a brief bio, Mike was one of the original founders of LAPD SWAT, a deputy chief at LAPD, the assistant sheriff in Orange County, California, and an assistant chief of police for the Los Angeles Port Police.

He was one of the founders of the National Tactical Officers association and is a nationally recognized expert on leadership, crisis management, critical incident management, special operations, and a wide variety of other subjects.

For this first episode, we're going to look back at the history and origins of SWAT, talk about how it has evolved over time, the founding of the National Tactical Officers association, and look at the current challenges being faced by SWAT teams.

For the second episode, we will explore Mike's views on leadership, critical incident management, tactical decision making, and the role of SWAT in the modern tactical environment.

Mike, thank you so much for joining me today. I appreciate you being here!

Mike Hillman: Jon, thank you very much! And if I can go back, there are no experts in this business of SWAT where all students have the problem. Any day that we stop and we start rewarding ourselves because we've got all the answers, we're headed for disaster.

Jon Becker: It's a fair point. Why don't we, to start, let's go back to the beginning of your career and kind of walk through. You know, it's. Your career started at a critical time in the evolution of SWAT, and you were present for a lot of the events that gave rise to this. So I would love to just kind of walk through the history and parallel that to your career, if you wouldn't mind. So where does it start?

Mike Hillman: Well, you know, the sixties were a very tumultuous time, as they are now. Of course, I mean, history repeats itself. But in 1963, after I got out of high school, I went into the army and got out of the army, and I went into the Los Angeles Police Department in 1966 on my birthday. And it was something that I had wanted to do for some time. I was very impressed with the Los Angeles Police Department. In 1966, we just finished up with the first 1965 watch riots. And because I grew up in Los Angeles, I had a chance to see how the Los Angeles Police Department performed, and I was very impressed with it.

I had a very strong interest in tactics coming out of the army. I was very interested in what LAPD had to offer. And when I got out of the academy, I found myself, like every other recruit, doing the various things that a young police officer would do to be able to help learn their career. And when Rampart opened, we opened Rampart and I went to patrol and then ultimately went to traffic enforcement division. And that was probably right about the 1969 timeframe, when I had a chance to really get exposed to what the Black Panther party was involved in.

And again, there were ambushes of police officers that were taking place. Unfortunately, not much has changed since then. But at the time, it was something that was a very high priority for all of us in law enforcement. And then along came the opportunity to be able to go to what was described then as a full time special weapons and tactics team. It wasn't a platoon then, but there were other fore plank holders and forefathers that were involved in the part time team.

And in 1970, when I was ultimately selected into Metro, we started with a full time special weapons and tactics platoon that ultimately started off with a little less than 60 people. And I was fortunate enough to be a team leader at that particular time.

Jon Becker: So you were a p three at that point?

Mike Hillman: I was a p three plus one plus one, which was an enhanced position of the patrol officer position, and it was in a leadership role.

Jon Becker: And you came in literally as the platoon became a full time element was when you arrived, you were selected into that first group.

Mike Hillman: I came in as a p three, which, when I came into Metro, then ultimately the platoon had started under Bob Smithson, and I was promoted to a three plus one, which put me in charge of. At that time, we called them, you know, an element which was a five person element, and two elements constituted a squad of twelve people with a supervisor.

Jon Becker: Got it. So that's 1971?

Mike Hillman: Yes, it is.

Jon Becker: And then 72 kind of begins the modern terrorism age with the Munich massacre and the beginning of evolution of hostage taking as a methodology of business for terrorists.

Mike Hillman: Yes, internationally. I mean, the Munich Olympics were obviously a benchmark, and there was a lot of lessons learned out of that. We had transportation of hostages, we had buses involved. We had multiple locations that were involved. And now we call them complex, coordinated type of attacks. But at that particular time, that was something that was relatively new.

And I described the seventies, at least in my career, as kind of in dealing with SWAT as pretty much the benchmark of some of the things that we started to do in terms of SWAT. We relied very heavily on the United States Marine Corps to be able to have us be able to come familiar with sophisticated firearms training. And sophisticated firearms training was basically pistol craft and the use of rifles as well as movement building entry was something that was left to us. The marines were not too much into that at that particular time.

But what we saw is, in the seventies, in the early seventies, we had, in Los Angeles, we had a, gosh, Mike Edwards, who was a police officer, was kidnapped and killed. He worked 77th Division. We had, at the time, just after the SLA shooting in May of 74, we ended up experiencing a helicopter crash that killed one of our commanders because we were learning how to be able to shoot out of the helicopter.

And that was a piece of tactical technology that we were looking at, because we were dealing with the aftermath of the Hanafi muslim incident, which took place in Washington, DC, which represented a high rise type of capability. You got to remember that going back to August of 1966, we had the Charles Whitman incident that took place in Texas Tower, Texas Tower in Austin. And so we were concerned about how we were going to deal with that type of situation.

So, I mean, there was a lot of things that had taken place. Marcus Foster, who was a school board superintendent up in Oakland, had been kidnapped and killed by the SLA. And one of the key factors in that whole period of time is because we'd finished up with the Black Panther party in 69, and we started to see ambushes of police officers were becoming much more prevalent. The SLA had planned an ambush situation up in Concord. There had been shootings up there where they were taking vans and basically putting automatic weapons in the back of a van and basically baiting in law enforcement to try to kill them. There was a lot of this type of activity.

So what we were doing in SWAT at the time was trying to develop tactics amongst ourselves that would bring us up to a state where we could be able to counter those types of things. We spent a lot of time training, and this goes to the issue of the reputation of SWAT.

A lot of time training recruits when they came into the department, when they would go through their last portion of their training at universal studios. And one of the pieces that really helped us in SWAT was to be able to build a rapport with the department, SWAT was new.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Mike Hillman: SWAT was new in even, you know, you can go back to 66, 67, and, you know, it was relatively an anomaly at that time.

Jon Becker: It's revolutionary. I mean, it's the one of a kind at that point.

Mike Hillman: Well, it was. And in 70, and during the 70 period of time, we had to spend time internally in developing our own department into understanding what SWAT was in terms of a life saving organization. So the 70s were really a benchmark. We were starting to learn a lot about what we needed to do and where we needed to go.

Jon Becker: Was most of the mission set initially kind of counter ambush, you know, counter, for lack of a better term, insurgency. More focused on that kind of Black Panther weather underground. Like, how do we counter ambush? And that was the initial mission set. When did that begin to change? Was it Munich or was it after that that you began to kind of broaden the – spoke the scope?

Mike Hillman: Munich certainly changed the paradigm a little bit. But to your point, at that time, counterinsurgency wasn't a term that we use. Counter ambush was what we were dealing with. And we were still dealing with the aftermath of the Black Panther party. And one of the issues that we had to deal with is that we had information and intelligence that the Black Panthers were using storm drains to be able to navigate in the underground within the city so that they could be able to move unobserved and to be able to deposit their weapons and that type of thing in that facility.

So we spent a lot of time in the storm phase, believe it or not, which today's hazmat environment would obviously not bode well, sure. But then when we got to the Munich Olympics, then we started to look at the different dynamics of what the terrorists had used.

So that seventies period was obviously we were dealing with the anti Vietnam issues, we were dealing with counter ambush, we were dealing with protests. But for the most part, SwAT was focused on counter ambush and also starting to deal with moving into the counterterrorism field. And that wasn't until the eighties.

Jon Becker: Interesting. So during this period, if my memory serves me correctly from previous conversations, this is kind of when the CNT concept begins to develop for LAPD also, right?

Mike Hillman: Well, it was very interesting, the dog day afternoon that came out with NYPD, it was 1976, excuse me, that there was an opportunity to go back and take a look at what New York Police Department had been doing in terms of what was a completely new concept, hostage negotiations.

And the concept of hostage negotiations in New York police Department was that two individuals, Doctor Harvey Schlossberg, and Frank Bowles, who both had – Both were NYPD personnel, but they had behavioral science degrees, and they were psychologists that started to look at being able to use communications to be able to help people that were in crisis, not only hostages, but also to effect the safe release of a hostage and or surrender of a suspect. We had the Stockholm incident that started to develop, and so that the Stockholm syndrome was part of that.

So we, in LA, were still looking at the methodologies that we're using for what we would call a contain and call out type of environment to deal with SWAT. And one of the issues that became very apparent is that we use time. Talk and tear gas were the three primary issues that we. But at that time, that was what we had to deal with. And we thought, well, you know what I'm. There could be something here that we ought to take a look at. And so that LAPD did not want to become insular. We wanted to reach out.

And so I was fortunate to get a chance to go back to New York, and I took a look at essentially what Harvey and Frank were doing. And I thought, this is an incredible opportunity. But here's the difference. NYPD had the. The ability to be able to draw from detectives and to create a negotiation component out of detectives while their emergency services division would be the tactical operators.

And so that they would respond to an incident that involved a hostage situation, to where they would take their negotiators and put them in the first place, and then bring in the tactical component, and then that there would be, what we would call now an incident commander, or now, at that time, was probably a tactical commander would probably start to listen to what the negotiators would say in terms of what their progress would be.

And the issue that I saw when I was back there is that negotiators would always want to say, just give me a little more time. Where at some particular point, windows of opportunity to be able to rescue a hostage are not always there. And so that negotiators can go past windows of opportunity and miss an opportunity to be able to engage in the number one priority, that's life saving, get those hostages out.

So what the issue was is that they would then get into an intervention mode. Intervention would be the last piece that they would use. And there was always a disconnect. There was competition between negotiators and between tacticians.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Mike Hillman: And so when we had a chance to come back, and at that time, Lieutenant Pat McKinley was the platoon commander, I explained to him that I said, you know, we might want to consider taking this negotiation concept and apply it to all barricaded suspects situations where we can communicate with individuals, time, talk, and to be able to get them to hopefully convince them to release the hostage or to come out.

But we do not want to have a situation where we have to draw from other resources within the organization, because we have the talent pool here within SWAT and D-Platoon to be able to train our operators, as we would call them now, in a position where we can train them as primary and secondary negotiators. But that's not all of it.

We need to bring in a psychologist. And we had a huge behavioral science department within LAPD, and we ended up taking psychologists. And we explained to them, this is what we want to be able to do, is train our personnel in communications to deal with individuals under stress, psychologically deranged individuals, terrorists, you name it, the traditional type of criminals, and to be able to give them communication skills, to be able to overcome that type of action and to be able to coordinate negotiations and tactics. So the idea was that verbal and physical tactics needed to be together.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Fusing the two as opposed to having them as separate disciplines.

Mike Hillman: Precisely. And so we brought them into D-Platoon. Now, since then, I mean, things have evolved. Mike Albanese has done a tremendous job in being able to carry on where some of us left off. But the issues. We had bilingual individuals. Now we have investigators within, or detectives within D-Platoon now that build that component. But the negotiation piece was a huge shift in that 70 period.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that was at the time, not only a swat as a concept, revolutionary, but this whole, you know, like, you go back to Munich and kind of negotiation, and it wasn't. It kind of wasn't a thing. Right. Like, it's. Whoever ended up with the microphone was the guy that was having to negotiate. And it wasn't a discipline the way it was as you guys developed it.

Mike Hillman: Absolutely. You're right on the money. And it just sparked a comment that it was a huge shift to paradigm. It was not well received initially within LAPD because it was like, well, wait a minute, we're digressing from what our operations are. And I became very adamant about it, and so did Pat McKinley. I said, we're special weapons and tactics, verbal tactics and physical tactics. And the priority is to save the lives of the hostages and to avoid confrontation when we can.

Jon Becker: It's interesting! That's a very advanced concept for that place in time. Like now, that's de rigueur, that negotiation occurs, and the two kind of fuse, and you're looking for windows. But at that time, that was a very different view of criminal behavior and the need for intervention. And so I can see where there's probably some. Like, what do you mean, you're gonna negotiate? Like, why are you gonna talk to the guy?

Mike Hillman: Well, and that there was a lot of controversy over that. There became the east coast and the west coast concept. And I always said that verbal and physical tactics need to go together. And I said, we will use verbal tactics to help reduce the potential threat to the hostages, gain the release of the hostages, and also the surrender of the suspect. But there may come a time where we have to use negotiations to manipulate subjects into a position where they can be neutralized to save the lives of the hostages. And we've done that.

Jon Becker: It is like there is that crossover between the two. And there is a point where there are some people you will not negotiate out the kind of the modern islamist terrorist. You're not going to negotiate them out. They're there to die. And so at that point, that communication becomes a means through which you can effectively rescue the hostages, even if that requires an intervention. It facilitates intervention.

Mike Hillman: Well, there's so many tactics that can come out of the negotiation process, and it starts off with the intelligence. And, I mean, you look at the most recent incident that took place in Colleyville, Texas, to where the jewish synagogue was taken over, and yet they had a landlines phone where the suspect in this particular case was positioned and was communicating and basically had a camera in a position to where they could see him.

And so that there was a tremendous amount of intelligence that came out of that. In a negotiation process, if you can use negotiations which has been done to be able to gather that intelligence so that tactically plans can be made to be able to intervene, that's the best case scenario.

And not to move into the eighties, but when we got into the eighties, that's where we started to develop the tactical operations center concept, to where we started taking the negotiators and starting to bring in intel, using the snipers, the Sierra positions, to be able to gather intel for the operators to be able to handle an in extremist type of emergency assault if necessary.

Jon Becker: So it's interesting because even early on, you guys were looking this as a fused concept with an overarching mission not to tactically intervene. Right? I think that's one of the most interesting aspects of what you just said, is it was not just, let's tactically intervene. The objective is to rescue the hostages. And there may be ten paths to doing that. Intervention may be one of them.

Mike Hillman: The objective were to have the suspect release the hostages. And when you talk about the delivery of food, when you talk about the delivery of vehicles, what we started to see here is going back to Munich and going back to one of the incidents that I can recall, specifically the time motel to where we had to plan on. How would you deliver a vehicle if the individual demanded a vehicle for escape?

Well, the decision is we're not going to allow a suspect to go mobile, but we may have to manipulate them from a stronghold into a position of where they come outside so that if we have to intervene, we can. But we need to be able to disable a vehicle and we need to be able to handle vehicle assaults.

And I'm kind of moving ahead out of the seventies, but when we get into the eighties, the technology that started to develop on how we were going to deal with immobilizing a bus was very interesting. But before we got to that, then we started to develop tactics on vehicle assault processes. And that was huge. Coming out of this late seventies and going into the eighties.

Jon Becker: It's interesting because I guess the next, if you look at the history of SWAT, there are certain signposts on that road. Munich obviously, SLA being one, Munich being in the period that follows Munich, the hostage taking period. And then we kind of get to the 84 Summer Games right in LA. And that is a significant moment. Talk to me about the buildup to the Olympics and the effect that that had on you guys.

Mike Hillman: It was about 1979. It was just before the ad period, and the Iranian embassy had been taken over in Tehran, the American embassy. And there was a lot of interest in that particular incident as to how the United States was going to deal with that. And I remember getting a phone call because of some of the relationships that I had with some of the US army special operations groups, which at that time were not considered that, but they were considered something less than special operations.

And we were introduced to several people that came out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Colonel Charlie Beckwith and blue Light. And because of the relationship that LAPD had with the sheriff's department and the fact that we wanted to be able to start thinking about combining our resources of the special enforcement Bureau and LAPD because we got along very well to be able to create a much larger tactical component, we got invited back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and kind of a – You show me your stuff, I'll show you my stuff.

The first relationship started to develop about that time. And it was just a short period of time that we spent with them.

Jon Becker: And just for context, Colonel Beckwith is regarded as the founder for special forces detachment, or Delta?

Mike Hillman: Right. And at the time, the SEAL team six, or Dev group, as it's known now, was starting to spool up as well. So then along came desert one, which was in the eighties, right, in that period of time. And the debacle that occurred in the desert one.

Jon Becker: Which is the failed attempt to rescue the Iranians?

Mike Hillman: Hostages, where it killed a couple of Americans and ultimately ended up leaving a helicopter and a c 130 over in the middle of the Iranian desert. And it was a terrible situation. And it was really kind of an upcoming for, at that time, Delta Force. So it was after that time, probably in 81, where I spent quite a bit of my time. I was a lieutenant. I might have been still a sergeant. I can't remember exactly what it was, either a sergeant or lieutenant, but Daryl Gates had said, whatever we need to do to keep America free and to work with those particular individuals, we're going to do.

So I found myself down at Fort Bragg Adore, spending quite a bit of time with Delta force, who were in the process of recuperating from the debacle that occurred in the desert. And there was a lot of – At that time, a lot of tactics and technology that started to come out of that period. Now, you got to remember that we had the incident that occurred at Princess Gate that involved the SAS.

Jon Becker: 22 SAS.

Mike Hillman: There was the incident that occurred with the Palestine Liberation organization out in the middle of the desert that took over the airliners. There was the guy.

Jon Becker: There was Tebbe. There was there in Switzerland.

Mike Hillman: Not only in Tebbe, but there was GSG-9. A lot of these special operations groups had started to develop about that particular time, and they were sharing tactics and technology with Delta Athenae that time. And so we ended up an LAPD being able to spend quite a bit of time in picking their brains. And to be honest with you, I came back with a mound of information to where I said, okay, now we've got negotiations, we've got tactics. Let's bring it together with a tactical operations center. And it was like, well, what's that going to include?

Well, that means that we take Sierra positions, or at that time, we call them snipers and use them to gather intel and to verify or refute information that was coming in from negotiations so that we had the connection between the two. The negotiators say he's on the phone now. The snipers might be able to see that snipers might be able to see where the hostages are. We could start developing that type of relationship, coordinating it within the tactical operations center.

And I could see at the time it was going to require additional personnel, additional supervisors, because we had negotiation, crisis negotiation team supervisors that were trained. And we had SWAT supervisors that were trained. They were cross trained in each other's responsibilities. So that on a particular call up, you'd have a SWAT supervisor that was in charge of dealing with overall tactics. You would have the crisis negotiation.

Another SWAT supervisor that might have crisis negotiation team training. That would take their primary secondary negotiator, the psychologist and the journalist, and start being able to develop an exchange of information along with a sniper coordinator. So you had all kinds of components that were coming together. And the sophistication of what we were doing in the eighties became, at that time, cutting edge. We started to learn things that we'd seen in the army. Known at that time was hostage rescue. And we called it crisis entry.

And, you know, the involvement of crisis entry was something that, as we started to shift in paradigm. And we got more experience up into the more modern area, it's changed since then, now with limited penetration. But at the time, it was cutting edge type of actions.

And then we started thinking about going back to the Munich timeframe. What about taking Sierra positions and having simultaneous snipers shoot at the same subject at the same time? Oh, that was new. That was called coordinated target selection. And then based upon what we learned after the SLA shooting in the eighties, we needed to establish an exterior perimeter around a particular target site. That would prevent suspects from escaping and would prevent them from moving about.

So we created what we would, at that time, we call the support line tactics concept, which came out of Ron McCarthy's head, which ultimately involved a sniper position that was in Overwatch. And then we had contact teams. And if we had movement in a particular area while an incident was going on, we would move the contact team to be able to interdict it. So all that was coming out of that eighties timeframe.

Now, some of the things that we were dealing with in the eighties timeframe was the development of sound and flash diversionary devices, which we really started to see develop commercially. It became something. I could give you a side note about one of the experiences that I had while I was down at Fort Bragg on that particular issue.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I would love to hear that!

Mike Hillman: During the eighties, there was a – I'm going to start off with probably 1981 to about 1984, because these were the times. This was the period of time where we were leading up to the Olympics. And this was what I call a watershed moment for LAPD at the time, as well as LA county sheriffs, because we had to start developing much more in terms of our skillset to be able to deal with the potential of what we were looking back on with the Munich Olympic debacle that took place, where they had transportation of hostages and the buses, aviation and the snipers had missed, and all kinds of other dynamics and lessons learned out of there to prepare for what was going to happen, potentially, with 1984.

So I found myself down at Fort Bragg, and I found myself working with just absolutely the most incredibly brilliant individuals and tacticians that anyone could ever have. I mean, it just was just so impressive. But it was interesting going back to the GSG-9 hostage rescue incident. An organization or commercial manufacturer known as Shrmali out of the UK had developed a sound and flash diversionary device that they had used to stun, and they were called stun grenades in. They were used to stun the suspects and the terrorists at that time, so that the rescuing force get on the airplane money out, cutting it short.

So now I find myself at Fort Bragg, and the army is going to develop and build their own diversionary type devices. So I was invited into a room by one of the army engineers, Eodtex, and he said, okay, so now we're going to show you how to build flash bangs. I said, oh, this is going to be good, because I can take that back to LAPD. So we started off taking in the table. There was a variety of different tools. There was an M-116, a one hand grenade simulator, which had a pull striker on it, friction fuse made out of cardboard.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Mike Hillman: And then there was a M 201, a 1 second half bouchon type of fuse that was sitting there. And there was a hot glue gun, and there was a small, little three eight inch drill bit. And so I'm….

Jon Becker: Looking Joe Ross.

Mike Hillman: So I'm just looking at these items, and there's five or six other individuals who are sitting there. There's a guy from SAS that's sitting there, and I'm here, and two or three other army guys. He says. Now, very carefully, you want to tap this upside down to get the cardboard and the powder, which is aluminum powder, down in the bottom. It's very sensitive. It's flash powder, which as soon as he said flash powder, I immediately went, this is dangerous.

Jon Becker: Oh, yeah.

Mike Hillman: And the next thing he says, you're going to take this three eight inch drill and you're going to very carefully, keyword carefully.

Jon Becker: Don't make a spark, don't cause any static.

Mike Hillman: Push and drill a small hole in the cardboard to which I find myself doing, and everybody else is doing, but everybody's kind of looking at everybody else like, is this really happening? So finally, we do that. Next, you take the 201 a one fuse, you put it inside the cardboard and take the hot glue gun and hot glue around it. And hence you have a flashbang.

Jon Becker: So in one of two ways, you either get a flash bang or you get a flash and a bang.

Mike Hillman: So I had all my fingers.

Jon Becker: You got the flashbang.

Mike Hillman: And when we came back, I ended up talking to Arlie McCree, rest his soul, who at that time was our bomb tech. And he said, you did what? And I said, this is what we did. But eventually we had them build us flashbangs that were made just exactly like that. And that was the precursor to the commercially made ones. Now, there was all kinds of problems with it because they would frag and I. The Bouchon would cause injury things of this.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that would launch. The Bouchon used secondary projectile.

Mike Hillman: That particular piece of it was something that we took and prepared for for the 84 Summer Olympics. So the next thing that we came up with was, how are we going to disable a bus if a bus is demanded, a la Muniche. So the FBI hostage rescue team had started to develop in 1981, and they basically went through the same maturations and processes that we did in terms of learning and bringing in various expertise.

And one of the individuals that I found very insightful was an HRT operator that was a bomb tech by the name of Jamie Atherton. And so Jamie Atherton from FBI came out here and worked with Arlie McCree and Ron Ball in developing a technique on dealing with buses. And so we ordered up for the period of the Olympics, well in advance of it, three Crown coach school buses.

Now, Crown coach was an old style school bus. Diesel back window came up, drum brakes, etcetera. So that the technique that we came up with is that we were going to disable the vehicle if we had to, and still create where we could use speed, surprise and diversion to be able to get on a bus, some type of charge that would prevent the vehicle from moving and essentially stop it.

So we took, not we, but the bomb techs, took about 400 grains of dead cord, put it around the inside of the drum brakes, and basically serrated the castle nuts for the front hubs so that you could take that and tie it into the back with a window and put det cord around the back window to be able to create a shooting port in the back window and then command detonate that with a remote device. And I had the privilege of watching that and watching the front wheels come off of a crown crown, literally, the…

Jon Becker: Wheels coming off the bus.

Mike Hillman: A crown coach type of bus is very impressive because that bus immediately will stop. Now, Mike Albanese, who was a sergeant at the time, did a tremendous job of being able to take the side of that bus and replace all of the safety glass with tempered glass so that you could hit the glass and it would clear out. So that now what we were practicing was a bus assault.

So the bus assault, if we could get individuals that would come out in the open, if we were not able to take, you know, a coordinated target selection piece of it, they would get onto a bus or get on one of these buses, we could essentially be able to stop that bus or prevent it from leaving by blowing the front wheels off.

And then it would be approached from the back with essentially a salt force complex or component, and a assault force that would come up on the side with ladders that were cut down so that they would have shooting ports and at the same time have a rescue component in the front of the bus.

Well, that's what we did, you know, prior to 84. Well, then, because we had basic access to the United States military, to HRT, to a lot of other resources, DARPA, who was the Defense, Defense Advance Research Agency, came out with a concept that they called surrogate travel. And at that time, I had transferred as a lieutenant to anti terrorist division to develop the intelligence component to support SWAT within the tactical operation center. And so I had access to this surrogate travel piece.

Well, in 1983, there was probably close to 500 Department of Defense personnel that came out and took thousands of photographs of UCLA, USC and all of the venues. And they would take photographs of the building from the ground, from afar to each door, to the locking mechanism, to the windows.

So that today, when you go on a virtual tour of a house, you go on that virtual tour of that house, where it all consists and run without any particular interruption at all. Well, this surrogate travel piece came in a pretty substantial size containers. There were two or three different tv sets where you would have one monitor that would show you the overview of the location. You'd be tied into a joystick along with another piece over here that would have about the size of a 33 and a third record, which I just dated myself, that would be on a large cd or a dvd.

Jon Becker: It's like the old record. Yeah, they were like video disc.

Mike Hillman: Well, it was a large video desk.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Mike Hillman: But it was about the size of a 33 to third record. And you would take that and you would be able to manipulate that and you could basically look at a door, you could look at the hinges, you would look at how the door opens, you would see it open, you could walk inside. It would be essentially, what we have today is the modern day version. Well, that was state of the art then.

Jon Becker: That's Google Maps virtual home tour.

Mike Hillman: Correct.

Jon Becker: In 1981, before it's probably anybody is even thinking.

Mike Hillman: I mean, it started to develop in 81 and became a reality in 83. Cause we were using it.

Jon Becker: But it's just, it's crazy to think, like you said several things there that you kind of just passed over as part of the story. But like, you're talking about the birth of flashbangs in law enforcement.

Mike Hillman: Oh, yeah, right.

Jon Becker: Arlie McCree being, if not the foremost law enforcement bomb expert in the country. Certainly one of them. The foundations of the Langford versus Gates suit, which is the seminal decision on the use of flashbangs.

Mike Hillman: Well, we didn't even discuss that one.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I mean, and then pre scouting locations, pre practicing tactics. I mean, this is so much of what is today regarded as modern. And like, this is just what we do. You guys were doing literally for the first time.

Mike Hillman: Well, at that time, this was all cutting edge.

Jon Becker: Oh yeah.

Mike Hillman: And you know, going back to the Hanafi Muslim incident that took place in Washington DC, where we had two high rise buildings that were taken over at the top levels by the Hanafi Muslim at two different locations. We were trying to figure out how we were going to be able to essentially put assault components on each one of the buildings to be able to rescue hostages because they were separated. And so that they were separated across an alley.

And so there was training that we basically engaged in where we put ladders across an alley that was probably close to 5600 ft off the ground where we had operators that would have to carry explosive charges across to another building. And we were at that time looking at, you know, we had a. It wasn't even a one. It was a smaller helicopter that we were looking at to where we started to engage in fast roping and using that technique to be able to insert personnel or extract them off the top of a building.

We went back to the Vietnam area and used spy rigs to start trading our people. If we had to put them on a building and we had to get them off, we could put them in spy rigs and pull them off the building. So all of that was state of the art. And some of the technology that we started to garner from the military is 45 caliber suppressed weapons to where you could use that to take out streetlights or engage in being able to have a sniper that wouldn't compromise an entry because you couldn't hear it to be able to take out some sort of a terrorist that would be a sentry guarding a compound.

Jon Becker: So the beginning of suppressed weapons in law enforcement.

Mike Hillman: And so all of this was, you know, at the time, this was all state of the art.

Jon Becker: What I think is really interesting here is that like all of these things, suppressed weapons, aerial insertion, climbing cadres and extractions

Mike Hillman: And aerial extractions.

Jon Becker: Aerial extractions, things that are today regarded as de rigueur, you had to solve for the 84 summer games between you and the sheriff's department. You had to have a solution for every nightmare you guys could come up with. And in the process, literally triggered things that happened in the industries. Flashbangs, as an industry, developed largely because of those initial forays they did.

Mike Hillman: And it was quite a process with the development of flash bangs. I mean, Sid Heale did a tremendous job of writing the doctrine on how to be able to deal with flash and sound diversionary. But in that eighties timeframe, John Coleman, who retired from the sheriff's department and was in SCB, the special enforcement bureau, he basically started the National Tactical Officers association, and that was about an 82.

And his vision at the time was to bring tactical operators from all over the United States together to share experiences, because no one particular entity had all the answers. And it's very interesting in this business, in law enforcement, you can become very insular, and you need to be looking outward and being able to be much more collaborative and either collaborate or you die. Either one. You know, it's, you have to be able to see what other people are doing, and maybe you take the best from what they have and what didn't work so well and be able to combine it.

So the eighties were really a watershed moment, and it wasn't, you know, after probably the 84 Olympics, when I started to promote up through the ranks, that I finally came back to develop our special operations bureau to where I was able to really have now influence over our aviation component, our special weapons and tactics component, and be able to help merge them together.

So today we have a very close working relationship with our aviation and SWAT components and our K9s. I mean, you look at K9s, the process in the eighties, we started to move K9s into D-Platoon. It wasn't until later on that they became less than an anomaly to where canines were used to assist in searches, the use of breaching, explosive breaching. We had an opportunity to go to work in an off duty capacity to help train the special response teams for the Department of Energy.

Those are the groups that provide the security for the various nuclear sites. And tremendous technology came out of that. We were able to come up with the first two armored vehicles, V 100s, that were provided to Lapden in the eighties. We had the rock houses that we were dealing with, and we were using extraordinary means to be able to get into the rock houses. Extraordinary means that we were using either bar poles or we were taking and penetrating the location with a V 100 that had a long pole on it that ultimately was used to be able to take apart a house.

Jon Becker: That's, I think, another one of those moments that kind of inflected the entire industry. Right? Because prior to that, everybody was using the old bread trucks and the SWAT TV show where they had the bread truck. And the V 100, as far as I know, is one of, if not the earliest deployment of armor by a special tactics team. It's certainly one of the earliest deployments. Tell me a little bit about the environment of the war on drugs and this fortification, the idea behind fortifying houses so you could get rid of the evidence and kind of the tactics that evolved from there.

Mike Hillman: Well, let me go back, Jon, for just a second and touch on a couple of things. You know, everything we've talked about now has not come about without the risk of failure.

Jon Becker: Sure.

Mike Hillman: And the risk of failure means that there are some things that we learned the hard way. You mentioned the Langford V. Gates when we first started with use of flashbangs. Well, unfortunately, there was a flash bang that was used that ultimately caused the demise of a female on a high risk wart server, Dolores Langford. And so the evolution of all of this, going back to it, was a week after the Sibbense Liberation army incident at 54th in Compton, where we were pushing, shooting out of a helicopter because of what happened with Texas Tower and so forth.

And we ultimately ended up killing a commander out of it because we were operating without the expertise of what we were starting to develop on our own that later came about from the United States military. And so that some of this demilitarization nonsense that's come out has been something where I totally disagree with it, because the technology, the tactics, and the ability for us to save lives of individuals is a result of our relationship with the United States military.

Jon Becker: 100%. And what's interesting is throughout my career, since I started Aardvark in 1987, and so I've kind of been a witness to a lot of this evolution and fortunately have known a lot of you guys for a long time, there's this notion that all of a sudden the military said, oh, hey, here's tactics. And that has not been the case. It has been this give and take between the military and law enforcement.

Like, I can remember when we first became involved with DoD was for United Shield in Somalia. And the way I got involved was the sheriff's department pulled me in to meet with the Marine Corps. The conversation started with, what is non lethal? How do we do riot control?

And so you had the exact opposite. You had the US military going into these environments, whether it was Somalia or later into Afghanistan, where they had a multi threat environment, it was not what DoD was built for. And they had to figure out tactics. And frequently the way they figured out tactics was they embedded with law enforcement and said, show us how this happens.

Mike Hillman: You're absolutely right. You just spurred another thought. This is when Jeff Rogers and I were working together, my lieutenant and I was a sergeant working for him that, you know, originally we started off with. We went to the United States Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton to have them help us with, you know, education and what we call now ieds and things of this nature and, you know, pistol craft and rifle and shooting skills.

And later on, the special operations training group out of the United States Marine Corps came to LAPD and said, hey, we're going to go into an in extremist environment and have to start doing house to house type of searches, show us how to do entries. And so we started off with entries and we started off working with them. But going back to this eighties time frame, one of the, I mentioned that, you know, it was not without some errors that took place along the way.

One of the things that came out of the eighties is that we worked very closely in developing this crisis entry or hostage rescue tactics where we'd flood a location with personnel using speed, surprise and diversion that unfortunately took off and became the norm for a while.

So that when we started getting into this rock house business that you mentioned to where we started seeing, you know, the destruction of evidence, narcotics and things of this nature, that using speed, surprise and diversion in a crisis entry was something that was being used not only by us but by a lot of different agencies because it became the norm after the dynamic.

Jon Becker: Dynamic entry was how you just, that was just how you did it.

Mike Hillman: At that time, we still called it crisis entry, but it became dynamic entry. And as a result of that, a lot of people got hurt. And we started to re examine the fact that, wait a minute, why are we having to do this and putting ourselves at risk when we're going after narcotics, when there's other ways of doing it to be less confrontational? So I think that probably Lee McMillan probably had a chance to describe the limited penetration concept that started to redevelop some of that crisis entry. And now we have the container call out, and we have the breach and delay and limited penetration skills that we started to develop now.

But in the eighties, this was something where we really started to pick up on that, the use of Tems, tactical emergency medicine. The NTOA was starting to bring all of these skill sets together. We were doing a lot of aviation insertion extraction work with light observation style helicopters and so forth, and it became quite a, quite an industry.

Jon Becker: So talk to me a little bit about the early NTOA. John Coleman founds it. And then, you know, from my recollection, you know, shortly after there, I think of NTOA. I think of John Coleman, you and Ron McCarthy, as kind of the, at least from here, as kind of the prime movers who was there initially and who kind of built, you know, built it up to what it was.

Mike Hillman: John Coleman and Janice Coleman, husband and wife, built that whole organization. Ron and I and Jeff Rogers and you, because you were involved in bringing a lot of the technology together, were very instrumental in being able to help the NTOA get off the ground. And we started that particular process. You know, my role was to provide the training and the curriculum for the yearly five days and to be able to get the venue.

And, I mean, we had to rely on a variety of different venues. We used San Diego. We used Albuquerque, New Mexico. We used, I'm trying to think where else that we used. But primarily in the early days, those were the two entities that were willing to support us. And it was interesting because in the early days, I go back to San Diego. If it were not for decision makers at the highest level supporting the NTOA, I do not know where we would be today.

Jon Becker: I agree.

Mike Hillman: Yeah, because, and I left out Florida. We went to Hollywood, Florida, on one occasion, but in San Diego, San Diego sheriff's department provided us all the aircraft and the facilities and provided all their personnel. In Albuquerque, a private vendor provided us with an aircraft. Doe provided us with a venue. In Hollywood, Florida. They did the same thing. And a lot of these agencies had administrators and decision makers and chiefs and sheriffs who were putting their careers at risk.

And San Bernardino county sheriff, they gave us a helicopter and a pilot to be able to support the training. Nowhere else in the law enforcement community could any of this take place without the support of all of that. And John Coleman made all of that happen.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's interesting because I remember very early in my career, NTOA became the catalyst through which everybody grew. Like, I can remember, if you advertised in NTOA's magazine, you got the page your ad was on, you never got the magazine. And I don't know whether I was the first civilian member of NTOA, but I definitely was early.

And I can remember every issue reading cover to cover, and it was debriefs and it was tactics, and it was the channel through which the community shared information. And you could watch the entire community elevate through the magazine, through the conference, through LAPD, LA sheriffs going out and doing training. And that was, for me, that was the point where it kind of caught fire nationwide.

Mike Hillman: It did. And the whole focus of what we were trying to bring together was this collaboration, number one. But the true skill set of a good tactician is not fighting the last war, fighting the last incident. But looking forward now, you have to look at some of the successes and lessons learned from what happened before and building what I would call a tactical considerations file to where you, as an experienced operator, can go back to, in my case, I can go back to the sixties, and I can pull up everything from the FBI Florida incident to the, to the GSG-9 operation to any of the major incidents, princess Gate, any of the incidents that we happen in LA, I could pull up pieces from it.

And if I see similarities, I'm able to say, okay, now this is what is an anomaly. This is what's a similarity. This is what worked well. This is what didn't. And I mean, those kind of – That kind of experience level is what John Coleman was trying to inculcate into the community by having debriefs so that, you know, you might not agree with everything that was done, but by the same token, you didn't have to agree with it. This is what happened.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's interesting because, you know, like, debriefs have always been a thing in the military, to look back at an event and evaluate tactics, evaluate what happened, and try to learn as many lessons as you could. What I think changed with the NTUA was the concept that you weren't only looking at your own debriefs, you were looking at everybody else's.

And I don't know when John saw it, and he may have seen it from the beginning, but this idea that, you know, a tactical command or a tactical operator is using paradigms to make decisions.

Mike Hillman: Correct.

Jon Becker: And those paradigms, you don't have to live through that event to be able to utilize that paradigm. That's like basic. Somewhere in the past, millions of years ago, some guy found a rattlesnake and tried to pick it up and got bit. And everybody since then has said, yeah, don't pick up a rattlesnake. But that's correct.

Mike Hillman: That's a good analogy.

Jon Becker: But not everybody had to go get bit. And I think that one of the things that the NTOA did, especially early on, was it was like, hey, Mike found a rattlesnake. Mike picked it up, it bit him. Don't pick up rattlesnakes. And that was the thing that I really loved early on is the depth of debriefs.

And honestly, that was the genesis for our tactical lecture series was, as a kid in growing up through the industry, going to debrief after debrief after debrief with our teams and realizing as you walked away, like, oh, I know, not to pick up rattlesnakes. And then you have all those paradigms. You have that Rolodex that. Now you look at it and you're like, it's not a rattlesnake, but it's snake shaped.

Mike Hillman: Well, you know, and that's really a good point. And it goes to the issue of what makes a good SWAT operator. And thinking back when I was brought into SWAT, it was, do you have an interest? Yes, I do. Can you run, do pull ups and push ups? Yeah, I can. Can you shoot? Yeah, I can do that, too. Can you think I can do that now, today, as a result of the eighties, Jeff Rogers had taken the selection process from Delta, from Seals, and from HRT. We sent officers back to the hostage rescue team to participate in their selection standards.

And today we have got the best operators that any agency could ever have. And the state of preparedness of these individuals where they don't pick up rattlesnakes and they learn very quickly and they're looking ahead, they're forward leaning, they look around corners.

When I say look around corners, I'm talking about thinking ahead and coming up with new dynamics and tactics. The state of the people that we have today is phenomenal. It's because of the selection process. You get what you select. And I'm sure that some others that you may interview will talk about the selection process for D-Platoon within LAPD. And it's very, very stringent, and it's been highly contested as a result of it.

But today, it's produced the best individuals you could ever have. When I was a deputy chief there, and I had those individuals under my command, I never worried about anything or any decision that they were going to make.

Jon Becker: But a lot of that evolved from all this work that was done early on. I think that's a good place for us to stop our first conversation and lay a foundation for a second conversation. Mike, I really appreciate you taking the time to sit down with me.

Mike Hillman: Well, thank you, Jon, for at least you putting forth the effort to be able to share some of the experiences! We really appreciate it!

Jon Becker: My pleasure!

Episode 29 – Lessons Learned As a SEAL Officer and As The Assistant Secretary of Defense – Michael Lumpkin

Jon Becker: My guest today is Michael Lumpkin. Michael has worn many hats in his extremely distinguished career, including Navy SEAL captain, Assistant Secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflicts, acting Under Secretary of defense for policy, Deputy chief of staff for the Department of Veteran affairs, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and a special envoy at this Department of state.

Michael's military career included numerous deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, serving as the officer in charge of training the West Coast SEAL teams team, commanding officer service as the deputy Joint Special Operations Task Force commander for the Arabian Peninsula, and service at the US SOCOM Office of Legislative affairs.

His civilian government career has included the implementation of the 2010 Omnibus Caregivers act for VA overseeing the Osama bin Laden operation, reorganizing the DOD, POW, MIA effort, leading the DOD's response to Ebola in West Africa, negotiating and executing the recovery of Sergeant Bo Bergdahl, and direct appointment by the President of the United States to stand up the US Department of State Global Engagement center to counter ISIS marketing efforts.

Michael is currently the chief of staff at US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a commissioner on the Afghan War commission. I really enjoyed this chat because Michael has a uniquely broad level of knowledge at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of national power, including on both the military and civilian sides. This has given him a very unique perspective on leadership selection and standards. I hope you enjoy my chat with Michael Lumpkin.

My name is Jon Becker.

For the past four decades, I've dedicated my life to protecting tactical operators. During this time, I've worked with many of the world's top law enforcement and military units. As a result, I've had the privilege of working with the amazing leaders who take teams into the world's most dangerous situations.

The goal of this podcast is to share their stories in hopes of making us all better leaders, better thinkers, and better people.

Welcome to The Debrief!

Michael, thanks for being here today!

Michael Lumpkin: Thank you!

Jon Becker: So why don't we start? Let's go back to the beginning. Talk about the origin story. Let's start with the Navy experience. When did you first join the Navy?

Michael Lumpkin: I joined the Navy in 1986, right out of college. So graduated from University of California, San Diego and win the Navy.

Jon Becker: And where did you start? In the Navy?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So I started off as a surface warfare officer. So initially you joined the Navy as an officer, you go to officer candidate school. And then I came out to San Diego for learning how to drive a ship. And of course, at the time, in the eighties, the Navy's motto was join the Navy, see the world. So I grew up in San Diego, so I literally joined the navy and saw the other side of San Diego county.

Jon Becker: That's the world.

Michael Lumpkin: That's the world. That was my world in the navy to start out with. Yeah.

Jon Becker: So how long, how long did you do that before you decided to transition to the teams?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So back in that era, they were only taking about 16, 17 officers a year into the SEAL team. So it was very tough to get there. And the large majority of them came from the naval academy. So because I went through a conventional school and not a service academy, I was very, very competitive in their very few slots.

So I spent a year as a surface warfare officer and then ultimately transitioned over to sealed training once I qualified as a surface warfare officer.

Jon Becker: And so, okay, so you start, you obviously go to buds. What buds class were you in?

Michael Lumpkin: I was in 162.

Jon Becker: And where did you go? Was there anything about your buds experience that we should talk about? Anything?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, I mean, buds is an interesting place, and a lot of people think it's kind of the end state of being a SEAL. It's really, it's a screening process. It's screening more than it is. Training is to screen candidates to see if they have the aptitude to actually be an ABCL.

So I started out with 106, I think was the number in class, 162. By the time of that, 106. By the time we graduated, I think there was 18 of the original class members that started. So it's pretty high attrition rate. And I think it's just you have to be both mentally and physically equipped and have, frankly, good DNA and stay healthy to make it through training.

But I saw guys who were world class triathletes not make it through. And I saw kids from square states in the middle of the country who really never spent any time in the ocean that weigh 105 pounds. Make it through no problem. So, I mean, probably the first and foremost thing I learned was, you know, don't judge a book by cover, that people are capable of many things and you got to get to know the person before you know what they're really capable of.

Jon Becker: That's kind of a recurring theme I've heard from people that have gone through either, you know, whether it's, you know, ranger selection, green beret selection, you know, delta selection, buds, any of those units is, you know, you look at the class the first day and you're like, oh, no, that guy's. That guy's going to make it and that guy's not. And sometimes the guy that you're like, oh, that guy's going to make it just falls apart.

Michael Lumpkin: He does. And sometimes it's health, sometimes it's, you know, stamina. Sometimes it's just mental drive or, I mean, it could be issues at home. You know, it could be, you know, many reasons, but don't look at somebody and judge what you think they can and can't do.

Jon Becker: So where did you go when you get – When you get out? Do you qualify? Where do you go?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So once you finish the basic buds training at that time, I went to army jump school down at Fort Benning and then went to SEAL team four, which focus was on Central and South America at the time. And that's where the real training started. So we did a – It was a training block that was basically SEAL qualification training was the first real training to be a SEAL and not so much screening, but you actually learned small unit tactics at a SEAL team. And then I deployed to Latin America and spent about four or five years in and out of Central and South America.

Jon Becker: And that's when. What year is it?

Michael Lumpkin: So essentially, you think you're doing 89 to probably 94.

Jon Becker: So this is the Tom Clancy era of South America. Clear and present danger, narco wars kind of timeframe.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. I mean, it truly was the wild, wild west. And frankly, from a Navy SEAL perspective at the time, it was kind of the only show operationally that was going on on scale. I mean, there was things going on, of course, in the Pacific and the Middle east, but not like it was in Latin America. It was the height of the drug wars, and US drug policy was quite a bit different than what it is today.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's literally Tom Clancy's clear and present danger. Right? You have US soft forces deploying against the cartels in South America.

Michael Lumpkin: Yes. So I spent time assigned to DEA unit in Colombia, spent time in Peru, El Salvador, Panama, of course, and just throughout Latin America. And it was a great experience. I learned how to operate as a SEAL unit, but also the benefits of working in an interagency kind of organization and construct to get the end states because there are limits to military power and what the military can do and sometimes, especially in dealing with situations in Colombia and such, the benefits of that law enforcement and what they bring to the table and how to work together was a key thing. That I learned during that period.

Jon Becker: Where do you go? So you're there, four or five years. Where do you go from there?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So then I kind of bounced around through different SEAL teams and then went to graduate school and maybe decided that I needed more education. Truly where I understood that there's a difference between education and training. The navy, they kind of lump them together frequently, but they are fundamentally different. I had, Admiral Olson once said something to the effect of, if you have a 16 year old daughter, do you want her to get sex education or sex training? So that kind of highlights, in your mind, there's a difference between the two. And I heard him say that once, and it was like, okay, that one landed to me.

Jon Becker: Yeah, yeah. I have a 17 year old daughter. That one landed hard. Making side notes here for a minute, but I need some time to recover. So define for me what you see the difference. You know, how you saw the difference between the two.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, I see. Education is the theory of the case. It's the understanding the bigger picture where, you know, in the military world, it's where I – Policy and operations meet and why decisions are made that affect what happens on the battlefield. It's largely strategic and operational in nature. I see training, especially as a special operator, is what's happening, and how are you and your team going to react to the events that are happening around you, and how are you going to plan for contingencies? It starts at the basics of mastering the basics, predicting what could go wrong and take steps to mitigate it, and how to prepare for what's going to come next. And that requires some forethought and preparation of what the battlefield for tomorrow is going to look like, not just today.

Jon Becker: What's interesting about that is that the way you just described it is the way that I've always envisioned the two. Training is the how. Education is the why. And I think that one of the problems that we have kind of today in military and special tactics, law enforcement, special tactics, is there's a great deal of emphasis on the how. We spend a lot of time training. We're going to train operators how to do things. We're not spending time teaching them the why. And so many of the kind of modern debacles that we see happening is because with the why comes the why not.

Michael Lumpkin: Yes.

Jon Becker: And it just, it seems to me that a lot of the time we're spending, you know, let's teach them how to do things, but never teach them, you know, to go back to your initial analogy, you know, I don't want her to know how to do things. I want her to know why not to.

Michael Lumpkin: Well, yeah, fair enough. And a good operator understands both. Yes, they spend the time to get the education, whether it's through a formal institution or it's spending the time to kind of look, listen, and feel of what's out there and the lessons learned of others to make sure and see and see how they Fitzhen, fit into their life. And are they doing the right thing for success to have the outcomes they're looking for? Because it's easy to get complacent and to.

And once you do get complacent, you set a new standard, and it happens over time. It happens over and over and over again, and pretty soon you're somewhere where you don't want to be in your training. So it always starts with mastering the basics and then building out from there.

Jon Becker: One of the things you told me quite a few years ago that has stuck with me is that your standards are not what you say they are. They're what you tolerate.

Michael Lumpkin: That's exactly right.

Jon Becker: And that has stuck with me for years, because it is true. It's like you said, when you're teaching the how and you're not teaching the why, the why gets lost. And it's very easy for the how to shrink. So your skill set, the breadth of your skillset shrinks because you no longer understand why you need the breadth of the skill set.

Michael Lumpkin: Absolutely. So there was at one point during the height of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that some of the SEAL teams were basically not even doing diving anymore. They weren't prepared for a contingency should it arrived.

And that's one of the basic pieces of being a SEAL, is combat swimmer operations. And you have to make sure that you do. You know, it's hard. It's difficult to put ten pounds of stuff into a five pound bag, but you gotta spend the time to do it, and you have to do it and train and prepare for the worst possible circumstance. Now prepare for the worst and hope for the best. It's not the other way around.

Jon Becker: Well, and I think that that's very easy to get lost. You know, I recently interviewed Jonathan Mattingly, who was the sergeant that led the Breonna Taylor raid. And one of the things we talked about is that that warrant was going to be an easy warrant. He said, just give me the easy one, we'll take the easy one. And he had done 2000 warrants at that point, and number 2001 or whatever was not the easy one. And so I think if you are not preparing for worst case scenario when it does arrive, you are wholly unprepared for it.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So you need to assume every time the worst is going to happen and approach it that way. I can remember when I was in charge of training all the west coast SEAL teams, and we had a desert training area out in nylon, and there was times when. No, at noon in the summer, doing immediate action drills of practicing enemy contact with full body armor and kit.

Jon Becker: It's not fun, and it doesn't make you popular with your troops.

Michael Lumpkin: It does not. It does not make you popular, but you do what you have to do, because at the end of the day, it's about bringing everybody home, going back to the warrant. It's about bringing everybody back from that warrant, you know, and making sure that everybody's safe and sound, and then it's executed flawlessly. That's what you should be striving for every time, because the enemy, whether you're. You're a SEAL going into combat or you're somebody serving war, the enemy gets a vote. They get. They get a vote on what happens.

So this is one of those times where control, ultimate control, is an illusion, and you have to, you know, plan on others in trying to influence the situation, frequently in a negative way.

Jon Becker: Yeah, yeah, that makes sense. So, okay, so you do five years South America, float around team to team. They send you to Naval Postgraduate school in Monterey, California, which is obviously when you grew up in San Diego. Going to Monterey is a completely different world.

Michael Lumpkin: That's it.

Jon Becker: Yeah. The beaches on a cliff as opposed to on the sand.

Michael Lumpkin: Right, exactly. The surfing's not as good there, but still. Yeah, yeah. And then. So from. From there, I went and. And did time as the pet SEAL and the third fleet staff. So every fleet needs a pet SEAL. So I was the one there helping train the battle groups and to the SEALs that were at that time riding the amphibious ready groups and the carrier battlegroups, bounced to. Took over a schoolhouse in Mississippi, where I was training foreign nationals how to do maritime riverine operations. Then that puts us about to the year 2000. And I was tapped to run the training for all the west coast SEAL teams when the SEAL community was reorganizing.

Jon Becker: At that point, you were lieutenant commander?

Michael Lumpkin: I was lieutenant commander, yeah, at that point. And then from there, well, 911 happened. I can remember being at the training command at the time. You know, it was 530 something in the morning, and, you know, TV was on and watching. Watching everything unfold and saying, you know, the world's gonna change. And it did.

Jon Becker: So how long had you been at buds at that point?

Michael Lumpkin: So I was training the west coast SEAL team for probably, I'm guessing, nine months time. Eight months.

Jon Becker: So you've got. You have buds and all of the other additional training stuff on Bubba.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So actually, buds itself, the schoolhouse was a separate entity, but I had all of the operational teams.

Jon Becker: Okay, got it.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, got it.

Jon Becker: So 911 happens, and so then.

Michael Lumpkin: It’s just immediately get everybody ready and try to get them out the door. So we did everything from try to bring desert patrol vehicles out of mothballs, you know, to get them because we didn't have ground mobility, because that's not the war we were training for Afghanistan. We were. And this is not just an indictment on naval special warfare, and I don't think it's a fair indictment. It's more of the military and the Department of Defense as a whole is that we weren't prepared for that type of conflict. We didn't have the mobility, so we were cannibalizing vehicles. We were doing what we could to try to get the forces over there as fast as possible.

And then we – Large deployments there until 2003, when Iraq happened, and then kind of the focus was then split between Iraq and Afghanistan. At that point, I'd become the group one operations officer, which is group one is overseas, all the west coast SEAL teams. So I was the operations officer until I took command of one of the SEAL units down in Coronado.

Jon Becker: Okay. And so then you end up taking command, like, getting a command. Which team did you get?

Michael Lumpkin: Special boat team twelve. So I was in charge of all of the mobility for the west coast SEAL teams.

Jon Becker: Got it. Where do you go from there?

Michael Lumpkin: Well, I went to be in the office of Legislative affairs for US Special Operations command. So I was the SEAL that over. So, you know, basically represented us SOCOM on Capitol Hill, on the House and the Senate with authorizers, appropriators to make sure that they got the resources that were needed.

Jon Becker: So you were the one that was shaking Congress down for money?

Michael Lumpkin: It was, yeah, yeah. I got pretty good at it. I got pretty good at it. So over that period of time, from 2001 until 2000, probably seven ish, the sealed community went from and not the SEALs. The special operation community went from about 33,000 people to an excess of 50,000. So you saw meteoric growth of the organization, and that wouldn't happen without Congress and, you know, appropriating monies and resources to make sure that could happen.

Jon Becker: So go back to the training. I mean, while you're, while you're running training, commanding training, there's also, that's like rapid growth of SOCOM. Right? That's where they want to start to dramatically increase the number of teams and increase the number of units. And how did that affect you?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, very challenging, especially if we want to maintain the standards. When you grow something quickly, there's a real risk of dilution and capability. So frequently you're sacrificing capability with numbers. And so it's one of those things we had to monitor a lot. And I would say that there was significant change.

I'm not saying there was a dilution in capability, but the culture changed to keep the standards evolved. It's what happens with massive rapid growth. You see the same thing in industry as you do in the military.

When product lines, you can't scale them and they scale them too fast. Frequently you outrun your supply chain. A myriad of different things can happen that affects overall quality. This is one of those things that us SOCOM and the SEAL teams in particular have had to wrestle with, of maintaining the culture that they had of operational excellence and making sure that they could have the force strength as far as numbers that they needed to be successful.

Jon Becker: How much were they trying to grow the teams at that point? Give me the order of magnitude.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, just off the top of my head. So they created two new SEAL teams in that period of time. These are two, one on the east coast, one on the west coast. That unto itself, we had three west coast SEAL teams and we went to four. So if you're looking at just a basic simple math, that's 25% more SEALs in a matter of where it takes years to make a SEAL, you do that rapidly, there are consequences.

Jon Becker: So how did you, because, I mean, obviously if you're tasked with training to some degree, you end up being the guardian of the standard. Right? Like how do you, how do you manage that tension?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, it's a great question. And I think the first step is that, you know, clearly there was a large team of people that were trainers. And if you're not willing to make the sacrifice of put your very best people as your trainers, your very best, and it hurts, it hurts to take them out of the operational lineup, but you have to be willing to do that to keep the standards and if you're not, be prepared to pay the consequences.

Jon Becker: That in and of itself is an interesting point because so often in both law enforcement and military, the guy that ends up going to training is the guy that's nothing appointee into the spear. Right? Like, you don't take the best and the brightest. You take the guys that, you know, aren't the best and the brightest. Cause you want the best and the brightest on the front lines.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, but the whole key is you want to make many best and bright people. Right? And you have to do that through a process. You have to have a kind of a codified process on how you do that. And you have to have the right people who have the training, who understand the difference between training and understand the education piece, and who can fuse the two together to, you know, impart capability and wisdom to those people that they're training. It's tough. It's, you know, and the navy has a culture, and it was largely started by Hyman Rickover when he started the submarine forces, that people do what's inspected, not expected.

So the key is, as a leader, you have to make sure that you are, you are the keeper of the standards. You have to do inspections. Gear inspections is one thing, but there's also the inspect. The tactics, make sure they make sense, that they will bring everybody home, that it will accomplish the mission. And it's a tireless and never ending job, but you have to do it or you will be unsatisfied with the outcomes. And especially in life and death situations, people will die.

Jon Becker: It's a really valid point. I recently read a book that's very critical of DEvGRU, specifically the teams called code over country. I think there's probably any book. He has a perspective, and it isn't necessarily a pro-dev group perspective, but one of the points that he makes in the book is that the issues that they've had were failures of leadership, not failures that he talks a lot about the unit culture and how it was very enlisted driven culture.

And the point he ends up making, albeit maybe unintentionally, is what you're saying, that as an officer, you are responsible for the standard and for enforcing the standards and not allowing the operational aspects of the unit to erode those standards. How do you do that, though, from your perspective? What have you seen work?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, for me is you have to have an alignment of three different things. You have to have accountability, responsibility, and authority. You have to make sure that those things happen at the right level. For example, as a team commanding officer is, I had a training officer. He had to know what his authority to make decisions, when it needed to come to me, when he could make the decisions. He knew what he was responsible for, and he knew that he was going to be held accountable. When those three things happen, you get success almost every time.

Jon Becker: But if any one of them is falling down.

Michael Lumpkin: You're setting yourself for a problem. And in an organization, especially a bureaucratic organization looking department of Defense or in a federal government, or probably even in a large police department or federal agency, frequently that doesn't happen. And it's not by design. It's just over time and power and distribution and things. But it's key to make sure that they are aligned again. It's about outcomes.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So the focus of the organization has to be the product.

Michael Lumpkin: That's correct. And when the organization, there's a misstep or things don't go right, everyone should feel it. It shouldn't be. Just even though. If my training officer, for example, didn't do something correctly or he something that screwed up, everybody needs to know not to lambast him, because it affects everybody. It affects the organizational brand. I talk about the SEAL brand. It's one of the strongest brands on the planet. Without a brand manager, nobody manages their brand. It's just over time, it's just becoming something unto itself, I think.

Especially when there's so many different pockets of operational capability and as many people as there are, you try to channel it and hurt it with ethos and a creed and all the things that they've created. But at the end of the day, it's about people, once that's been done, is holding people accountable based on what they're along the lines with their responsibility, and make sure they have the authority to make the decisions.

Jon Becker: Yeah. It's one of the things I talk about when I teach culture centric leadership is the idea that, you know, I actually stole the line from you. People do what's inspected, not expected. But if you don't get on the scale every morning, you're probably getting fat.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: Right. If you are not, you know, I always say the culture of your organization is like a reputation. Everybody has one, and if you're not paying attention to it, it's probably not a good one.

Michael Lumpkin: Well, and the other piece of that that's important to factor in is that people, I think it's human nature. They train to their strengths, not to their weaknesses.

Jon Becker: For sure.

Michael Lumpkin: In a sense, I can go to the gym and see the, you know, the guys hovering around the bench press. I've got, you know, we'll call them chicken legs and massive chests, you know, because that's all they do, is bench press. So great. If that's the look, they're going for.

But, you know, people train to their strengths, and you truly have to be objective. You can't be have somebody who will be objective before you for you. So that person who's objective for you will tell you what your weaknesses are. So you know what to train to. And that's, frankly, you know, in business, that's a little easier because the numbers show.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: You can go in and pull the numbers and see where your revenue is coming from, where your expenses are going, and you can kind of figure it out and discern it operationally. You have to make sure you're looking at a tomorrow's potential battle potential, and you have to. Worst case versus most likely. And you have to create a training regimen that trains the people's weaknesses, not to their strengths.

Jon Becker: I think it's very difficult to do, though. You know, I think it's. I think it's very easy to, to do. And, I mean, I see it all the times with teams that I work with. Like, they'll run the same problems over and over again, and if they hit a difficult point in training, they'll just avoid it because it's difficult and it's awkward and nobody wants to have bad conversations. And, you know, it's, I think. I think that you lose skill, you lose operational capability, whether it's in business or tactical, in drops.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And you don't realize until you needed those capabilities that they're gone.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And I do think part of this is having a organizational culture that embraces honesty and the fact that you tell me my baby's ugly and I'll decide if it's gonna get plastic surgery or not.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: You know, I think that's kind of key. And so the key to any after action is the honesty of the hot wash. And whether it's a senior or a junior, everybody should be able to say what went right, what went wrong, without any, you know, blowback for doing it, because that's the way you learn. And part of that is, you know, is everybody has to be able to laugh at themselves, you know, to a certain extent, because we all make mistakes, because, you know what? As long as you have humans involved, you will. Mistakes are going to be made.

Jon Becker: But I think. I think it is very difficult in the modern world to create a culture of brutal honesty. Right? We have kind of begun to not want to know that our a** looks fat in those pants. And it's become very easy to socially rude to say that. And it's a hostile workplace environment, and we are kind of. I remember when my son was in the fifth grade, 6th grade, the coach got up and gave it talk to the parents about how they were going to teach the kids sports and they were going to do sports and for them doing all these things.

But he kept using the word non threatening, you know, we're going to play, you know, teach him to juggle. It's good fry hand coordination in a non threatening way. And I walked up to him and he's, he's basically saying, like, if your kid is a dork, you know, we're going to support him and let him know he's a dork.

And, I walked up to him afterwards and I said, hey, coach, you know, Jon Becker, Jonathan's my son, and said, do me a favor and if he sucks at something, let him know he sucks at it. Don't tell him he's magic because I deal with too many people that come in looking for a job that nobody has ever bothered to tell them, hey, you suck at this and if you want to get better at it, this is how you do it. But I think culturally we're given a lot of f****** 7th place trophies right now.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And I think this is where the leadership comes in and has to, if it was easy, it'd be done already. I mean, as far as creating a culture that can accept that kind of honesty, but at the end of the day it's about saving lives and getting, you know, being successful in the mission at hand. And you have to be able to, to be really honest in order to educate and to train people to make sure that they're ready for what's going to come next.

Jon Becker: How did you, as they're trying to expand the teams, I imagine there is a point that you guys hit the diminishing returns point for lack of a better term.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. No, absolutely. Especially when we didn't increase the size of the training staff. Your numbers are increasing, your throughput. Each person being trained received less time and you're still trying to get the same outcome. It's really difficult and you have to sit back and rethink about how you think about solving the problems.

So you have to start thinking about the better mousetrap, how to do this on scale. How does this change? Do we need to tweak this? Do we need to tweak that? Are there things we can do to find economies so we can try to increase the time of training and to make sure people have the time to get the iteration that they needed to do? The repetition of training in order to create muscle memory.

Jon Becker: So, I mean, as you're doing that, when you hit the point of no return, how are you managing above you? Because I'm imagining there's probably some downward pressure.

Michael Lumpkin: Of course there is that, again, you have to. There's times when you have to salute and say, aye, aye, sir, and get it done, but there's other times when you owe it to your seniors to tell them, here's the challenge, and this is what I'm doing to mitigate it. So just don't dump the problem on their lap, but also offer that this is what I'm doing to mitigate the problem. Do you have any suggestions that might help? So, I mean, help me help you. Well, that's kind of it, right? Because, I mean, at the end of the day, everybody works for somebody.

Jon Becker: Yes.

Michael Lumpkin: Whether you're in business, you're working for your customers, or you're the president of the United States working for the American people. Everybody works for somebody.

Jon Becker: But I think that one of the challenges in working for people is you have to be willing to speak truth to power, and I think that that is very challenging in a high alpha environment like the one you worked in.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, it is. And it doesn't always end well. It doesn't. So, you know, you got to be able to take the licks and, you know, frankly, it's. And not make things personal. When it is personal, you have to not wear it on your. Your shoulder all the time that you got dressed down or that the boss didn't see it the way you see it, but you owe it to the boss to tell them, this is the challenge you're facing, because at the end of the day, you're not by yourself.

This is, frankly, why they call them the sealed teams. You have a team of people and a culture that's focused on teams working together to solve complex problems. So embrace it.

Jon Becker: Makes a lot of sense. So what else did you like at the time that you're doing the training? What else was there that, like, what were the lasting lessons for you there?

Michael Lumpkin: You know, there's several. I think I kind of touched on it earlier, is you need to remain objective to your weaknesses, and you really, because we all have them, and you have to just identify what they. What they are and just be cognizant of it, or you're going to be the guy at the bench press, you know, standing around.

So, again, you don't want to do that. You know, I always said that, you know, kind of tactical lessons learned are kind of written in blood, you know, that spilled on target. That's where we learn the tactical lessons. Operational lessons are learned in the newspaper and strategic lessons are written in the history books.

And I say that because there's lessons all the time that. But you got to be observant enough to discern them and to recognize them for what they are and be willing to apply them just because something happened. I mean, you've had some great folks on your podcast who tell some events that happen and just an amazing perspective on things.

There's something there for all of us to learn. When you hear them and figure out how does this apply to you and your team? Frankly, whether it's a sealed team or it's a law enforcement team, I think it's so important. Frequently lessons learned are put in a book, put on a shelf and never looked at again.

Jon Becker: Which is why we're doomed to repeat history.

Michael Lumpkin: Over and over. And over again and again. I say this regularly. We haven't won a war since World War two and things aren't getting better. So we need to rethink about how we're thinking about the problem.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Our plan may not be working here. We're spending almost a trillion dollars a year. Yeah, it's a very valid point. So when you leave training, you end up at being the congressional liaison for SOCOM. What do you learn there? Like, what is the big lesson of shaking Congress down for money?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And authority. So it's not just the money, but it's also to get the rules changed in acquisition to make sure we can get the stuff we want in a streamlined fashion. It's about all kinds of different variables where the law and policy come together. I think what I learned is from that perch was where tactics, what's happening in the field as an operator and policy legislation mix and what it looks like and how each one feeds each other.

I also learned that it's how much more valuable it is to, at least for me, it was to go from being an operator to kind of a policy legislative view instead of the other way around. Having that experience of being a, being in the trenches for a while gave me an amazing perspective on how sausage is made and how I can influence the recipe.

Jon Becker: That's a really good way to put that. Yeah. I think it's so much now in business, in law enforcement and military, we see people coming out of school and going into the tops of organizations like apprenticeship is not a thing anymore. Right?

You come in as a trained genius and it has always struck me when I'm dealing with somebody who's 23 with a backpack and a Stanford education who's now at the head of an organization that they make really simple mistakes because they never had that low level experience that taught them all of those paradigms for decision making that you don't get.

I mean, again, that crossover between education and training, you can understand the why all day long. If you don't understand the how, the application of the why gets a little dicey.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And it's also the understanding and anticipating what the second and third order, 4th, 5th order consequences for every decision are. And they're real. And frequently policies and decisions are made where the second and third order consequence was way worse than the original thing they were trying to fix.

Jon Becker: Mean like us trying to fix terrorism in Iraq by removing Saddam Hussein.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, like that one.

Jon Becker: Just as a theoretical, that would be a good thing, destabilizing a country together just to get even.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And do away with the Baath party, the glue that held the society together. Oh, that one.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that one.

Michael Lumpkin: Okay.

Jon Becker: Yeah. But see, again, it's like you look at the recent exfiltration from Afghanistan and we have policymakers that are making decisions without consulting people on the ground with the real operational experience. And that seems to be kind of a recurring theme in both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. Is this like, oh, we're going to do this policy wise and then, oh, what do you mean that happened? And it's like, it just feels like there's kind of a disconnect vertically in a lot of our organizations where we are.

And you see, even with law enforcement in the way that we're placing, you look at the city councils are like, oh, we're going to cut the law enforcement budget. We're going to cut the number of cops. What do you mean, crime went up. What did you think was going to happen?

Michael Lumpkin: Right, exactly.

Jon Becker: But they didn't. How do we, from your perspective, because you've been, you know, we haven't quite finished going through your career yet, but you've been on both sides of this. Right? Like you've been on the policy side and you've been on the tactical side. How do we improve that? What, what is your perspective on that?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, it's a great question and I wish I had. There was a really simple answer for it, but there isn't a, I think it, and it really depends on the way that we'd look in the Department of Defense is probably going to look different than it does at LA Sheriff's office. But I think what it really starts, where it starts is people talking together and recognizing that they don't know it.

All the policy folks need to understand whether it's a city council, they got to sit down and recognize what they don't know. And this part of this is, I do think there's opportunity for, whether it's a city council or it's a senior policymaker, actually being educated and trained, and I don't mean at, you know, at GW University.

I'm talking about by, say, military people or by city council, by the, by the police department is to actually conduct training and walk them through different scenarios tactically, so they can understand the consequences of things. And it's work. It's not easy, but I think that's where it's going to have to start if it's going to happen on scale.

Jon Becker: That's funny. I was in law school when Rodney King happened, and I was working at police litigation. I was Rodney King happened just before I lost. All the litigation is happening. And while I'm at police litigation, we're working on the Rodney King case. And we had a conversation in a class one night, and the professor was basically kind of ripping on LAPD and saying how, you know, this is ridiculous. They shouldn't happen this. And it was very clear that she had a fundamental misunderstanding of defensive tactics. And so I finally just said, like, professor, how do you think police officers are trained?

She goes, well, they're all black belts. They're all black belts in martial arts, so they should just be able to do this without having to use sticks. And she kind of looked over and saw the absolute look of horror on my face. I think she's like, well, I don't understand. Why do you have that look on your face? I said, because almost none of them are. And they get almost no defensive tactics training. Like, you don't even understand what's going on, do you? And it was the first time that I really realized the public perception and the fact set that they are making decisions from and raising opinions from can be completely wrong.

And if there isn't this moment where you go, hold on, that's not what happens, that you do end up with some really stupid policies and really stupid decisions. California right now is in the process of trying to ban bite dogs completely. They're trying to ban bite canines because there have been a couple of bad bites in a couple of city council members. And what they don't understand is the consequence of that is more people are going to get shot.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. They will. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, that's an approach. I would say not a good one, but it's an approach. Right.

Jon Becker: I mean, it's definitely safer for law enforcement. You know, if we just shoot them, then that's a simpler problem. But it's not going to solve the societal aim that we're trying to solve now.

Michael Lumpkin: And generally, if there are, I think we've reached the point in society there aren't a lot of really simple answers to complex problems.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: So you have to be willing to do your homework and figure out and work your way through the complexity of the solution to the complex problem.

Jon Becker: I also wonder at times if part of the reason that there aren't a lot of simple solutions is because we are spending too much time on the how, not enough time on the why. Like I use example with my kids, the first time your kid takes something that doesn't belong to them, you have two lessons there.

One is, you know, Billy, don't take that piece of candy. The other is, don't take things that aren't yours. Billy, don't take that piece of candy is the how. Right? You don't take things that aren't yours is the why. If he understands the why, you're not going to then end up saying, and don't take that toy and don't take that other thing.

And don't, you know, you just, you don't take things that aren't yours. And I feel like we've kind of gone away with leaders. We've gone away from really fundamental leadership training and we're more focused on management. We're more focused on what time do your people come in and what time do they leave and not focusing enough on what are they supposed to be doing.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, absolutely. Because leadership and management aren't the same.

Jon Becker: Oh.

Michael Lumpkin: And many people lump them together.

Jon Becker: I always say systems are managed, people are led.

Michael Lumpkin: That's exactly.

Jon Becker: You can manage quality.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: You can manage air conditioning systems, you can manage it. Systems, because they are self governing in a different way. Human beings have to be led.

Michael Lumpkin: They do. And I do think that where the operators can help their leaders, and I'm going to say policymakers, because they kind of have to sometimes put your, put your head in their space to see how they see the world. I think that's really important. And I don't know that that happens enough, whether it's in the military or in law enforcement.

I mean, because at the end of the day, policy needs a forcing function, doesn't change on itself. You will use your dog bite you said it was a result of some nasty dog bites. Something happened, and so it was a forcing function for that policy to change. Sometimes it requires death or suffering to move it in the wrong direction or even to move it in the right direction.

But I think people hunting people say, well, why don't our leaders do this? Because something bad enough hasn't happened to force the policy to change. And that's just. It's an unfortunate reality, but it is. I mean, in the world where everybody's dying from task and information toxicity, the only things that get detention are the most important things that are sitting on somebody's desk. And again, that's usually the forcing function that drives, you know, to change.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I think it's very easy for the urgent, in that case, to crowd out the important, too.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: You know, it's like the thing that's on fire becomes the thing that you're paying attention to. You're paying attention to. The teams are constantly on the ground in Iraq, engaged in desert warfare and local urban warfare, diving.

Michael Lumpkin: Right, exactly.

Jon Becker: So why take them out and make them dive?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And again, so it's that balance of worst case versus most likely. Right?

Jon Becker: That's a good way to put it.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So the other things I think that are important is that people have to recognize and really understand and objectively understand what their organizational culture is, because culture will trump strategy. Lead it for lunch every day. You can have the best strategy in the world, but you don't have the culture. Organization, culture, whether it's the ability to be candid with each other, is to train to weaknesses, not strengths. It's not to truth, to power, or, frankly, senior leaders inspecting work that's being done, expecting the tactics and looking at it, then the best strategy isn't going to make any difference. It's not going to work.

Jon Becker: I remember when I first started, AARDVARK inspection was a culture, was a heavy culture in law enforcement, and it was a regular thing that has changed over the course of my career, to the point that I was recently with a team that were doing force on force stuff, sims stuff, and was horrified because everybody cleared their own guns. There was no secondary inspection.

And I remember the team leader saying, you guys are all grown men. Make sure you have an empty gun. And it just struck me as like, secondary inspection exists for a reason.

Michael Lumpkin: It does.

Jon Becker: And it isn't because I don't think you don't care. It's because sometimes you make a mistake.

Michael Lumpkin: That human thing again.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, humans make mistakes. It just takes a second to be thinking of something else and miss a step.

Jon Becker: Yeah. And the thing that you and I have talked about in the past is you're taking people where they are, and sometimes they are at the height of their powers and the peak of their game, and they are sharp and completely focused on their job, and sometimes they're in the middle of a divorce and drinking too much, and their dog just got run over by a car, and you've got 25% of their capability manifest. And so that's where an inspection catches it.

Michael Lumpkin: It does. Because we all have stuff going on in our own personal lives, and some days that it, frankly, it affects us more than others.

Jon Becker: A pilot, and we were talking about checklists, and I'm like, you know, why do you guys use checklists? Like, you're. If you've been flying a long time, like, why do you need a checklist? And he said, you need a checklist because if you make a mistake, people die. And he goes, I said, well, they're like, just, you know, you know, the checklist don't just kind of go through the checklist. He goes, I read the checklist every time, and I read it out loud. And my copilot verifies what I said. And I said, that's very inefficient.

And he said, yes, and so is killing 300 people on an airplane. And he said, your culture has to be focused on preventing any type of mistake, and the only way that happens is to be inefficient to create intentional obstructions because the path of least resistance is downhill and off a cliff.

Michael Lumpkin: Right. So one of the things I used to do is I used to look at what can go poorly, and then I would take the kind of, when my mind, okay, we're at investigation and work backwards. What could I have done to have mitigated, whether it's combat swimmer training operation, is how do I prevent a boat from coming from out of nowhere and running over one of my dive teams? How do you make sure if somebody's jumping out of a plane, that their parachute opens? What can I do to prevent a malfunction?

So, in the training phase, you go through all of that stuff, and you build it in, and it just bleeds over, and it becomes second nature when a real world operation is in progress, because you just have to, and you got to spend the time to do it. I mean, even on my own personal boat, I have checklists. I have checklists when I leave at the end of the day because I don't want my boat sinking to make sure I don't forget the one step that keeps it afloat that night.

Jon Becker: It's funny, I was working on a military contract years ago, and we had a subcontractor that was making explosive device force, and we had a DCMA inspector that had come out and do safety inspections on the subcontractor. And he called me before the meeting and said, hey, I know this is your subcontractor. I have some very strong concerns. I've been to this facility, and I'm very troubled by these things. And he's like, I wonder if you can meet me and we can have a conversation? And so I said, sure. And I flew into, it was a place you had to drive to.

So I flew and met him and rode in with him. And I said, these guys have done this a really long time. They're really good at this, blah, blah. I don't understand where at this point I'm still, this is my subcontractor. I'm going to defend them. And so were having this conversation as were driving as a four hour drive. And so we have a long time to talk. Nice guy. I think he's overly cautious and kind of annoying.

And I'm like, I don't understand your concerns, blah, blah. He kind of expressed some his concern. He goes, do me a favor. He says, my bag is behind my seat. He goes, there's a notebook in the bag. We pull it out. And I said, sure. And I pull it out, and he goes, just look through it. Just flip through the pictures that are in that notebook. And the pictures are literally smoking hole after smoking hole.

These are all ammunition factories that have blown up and explosive factories that have blown up. There were 35 people killed in that accident. There were 20 people who killed in that accident. I said, okay. I said, well, why are you having me do this? And he goes, those people were all much better at their jobs than your subcontractor is.

So we're going to do a really thorough inspiration after that. And it changed my culture about safety, though, because just the words, those people were all much better at their jobs than your subcontractors. And there's this moment of like, oh, yeah, no, that's, and these were, you know, some of those were like big defense contractors who, you know, do this, like, really do this for a living.

Michael Lumpkin: Right.

Jon Becker: And it changed my attitude towards inspection in a way that it's never gone back. And, and I think, I think you make a really valid point.

Michael Lumpkin: But I think professionals understand why you need inspection. I think it is one of those discerning differences between a real professional and somebody who does the job.

Jon Becker: Preston, that's a really good point. Okay, so let's go back in time. So now you're getting towards the end of your military career, right? You're congressional liaison to SOCOM. What makes you decide it's time to retiree?

Michael Lumpkin: There was a series of different things. I think one of the things I've always had the ability to do is to be kind of objective about where I am and what I want to do and what I, frankly, I don't want to do. So I was selected for promotion to captain, and I saw that there was some stuff going on in my neighborhood as far as congressional seats and the way things were going.

And we had a new folks that were coming into the, you know, that were running for the presidency. And at that time was 2008. And it just made sense that I didn't want to spend the rest of my career making PowerPoint slides in a cubicle in the Pentagon.

So it just seemed like kind of, it was time for me to go and do something else, because I think there's many ways to serve, and it's not always in uniform, or there's just many ways to serve the American people. So I chose a different path.

Jon Becker: So you declined promotion and retire.

Michael Lumpkin: I did.

Jon Becker: But they weren't done with you yet?

Michael Lumpkin: No, they weren't. So essentially what happens is that I go into the private sector for a while and that I get asked to come back to government. So I ended up going to be the deputy chief of staff at the Department of Veterans affairs, which started a pathway over to. I was traded like a ball card from Rick Shinseki to Bob Gates over to the Department of Defense. And I went there and served as the principal deputy assistant secretary for special operations at the time was the senior civilian overseeing the entire special operations community. And then I kind of bounced around through the administration.

By the time it was done, I did a stint as the undersecretary of the policy, which at the time was the number three position at the Pentagon, did a stint as a senate confirmed assistant secretary for special operations and low intensity conflict. And in the last year of the administration, I was asked to go over and do the counter ISIS messaging to stem recruiting for ISIS internationally to join their cause.

The assignments themselves were kind of interesting. I mean, they were great. I mean, I got exposed to all kinds of amazing things, but I also got to do some, I'll call them special projects or work different things that I would have never, ever had exposure to. And I think it was that mindset of what I brought from the special operations community, that made me kind of uniquely suited to take on some of these tasks and to have my seniors recognize that I could and would be successful at these tasks.

At VA, it was implementing the 2010 Omnibus Caregivers act. This was a Congress decided that the number of service members that were sick, injured or ill from service, many of them had caregivers, family members that they should get stipends and get healthcare. And so I worked that program to get that fully implemented at VA, worked with some really talented folks at VA to make that happen.

Over at DOD, in addition to doing my counterterrorism special operations oversight, I also was asked to reorganize the POW MIA effort in the Department of Defense. This is bringing home our missing in action and looking for, continue to look for pows from prior conflicts all the way back to World War 2.

I was tasked with negotiating and executing the recovery of Sergeant Bo Bergdahl from Taliban custody. He'd been in custody for five years, almost five years by the time that I was given the mission. And we got him home in a matter of months by being able to channel the resources and then the other project of size and magnitude that I was able to lead was running the Dods task force to eradicate Ebola from West Africa.

Jon Becker: I remember that. Well, let's go back first to when you get to ASD SO/LIC with what at the time, I think I called the most fortuitous timing in history. I think you started on a Monday and Osama bin Laden was killed like the following Friday or something.

Michael Lumpkin: I think I started on the 22 April and you're talking 1 May, so it was literally a week. Yeah.

Jon Becker: I remember calling you and saying, you are either the most ruthlessly efficient person on planet Earth or the luckiest guy I know.

Michael Lumpkin: I wish it was the former, but let's be honest, it was the latter.

Jon Becker: Here's your new business card. Here's your parking spot. By the way, we know where bin Laden is. Are you cool if we go get him? What was that? I mean, what was that like walking into that? Cause that's obviously, you have to realize at the time that is going to be probably the most historic event you'll ever participate in.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. You know, it's interesting as, I mean, it just made me respect the team that did all the heavy lifting on that. And it truly was an effort between the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, as well as a myriad of state department, a myriad of other government agencies who worked together, people that were focused, so singularly focused on a single task.

Jon Becker: Just grinding for years.

Michael Lumpkin: Grinding for years, and obstacle after obstacle put in front of them and them either going over the obstacle or going around it. But it was key. They didn't let anything stop.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I think one of the things that I, I think is very, you know, I don't know, it's one of the things you have to admire with the US government, and it's true of other governments, the Israelis, certainly. But like, there is a point where you've pushed the button with us and there's going to be somebody who it is their entire life to just solve you as a problem. And bin lad was such an example of that where it took so long and they had to be so patient to do it, that it's, you know, it's really impressive.

Michael Lumpkin: Again, just phenomenal. People who committed, just committed to the mission.

Jon Becker: Yeah. At the time you have to realize that's significant.

Michael Lumpkin: Oh, absolutely. Actually coming into the DOD at that level, at that time, it basically showed me what is possible. So sometimes we forget what is possible. And when you see it so quickly upon arrival, it kind of focuses you on, I think even in this talk here, I've used the term outcomes a lot of, to me it's about the outcomes. And so if you truly understand the outcome and you're really, truly committed it and you have the passion, you'll do whatever it takes to make it happen.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: And I use that to kind of approach those other things that I talked about that I was able to work on and projects that all were successful about putting a team together, creating the right culture, focus on the outcomes channel and manage the resources and just get it done well.

Jon Becker: And while your ASD SO/LIC extortion happens. Right?

Michael Lumpkin: It did, yeah. So we had that unfortunate shoot down of extortion 17, the helicopter carrying members of the army air crew as well as the Navy SEALs and support folks. Yeah. So it was a, that was terrific.

Jon Becker: How did, from your, from your advantage, how did that play out? Like, walk me through that.

Michael Lumpkin: Well, I mean, first there was the notification that it happened and the one with, the one thing I've learned over the years, information that you get is the first bit of information is never accurate. So I'd heard a helicopter was shot down. I was going, okay, I might have some casualties, which is a bad day unto itself, but when I heard that it was the worst possible scenario, it just was like a throat punch, especially when you, I mean, there was guys that I went to buds with that were on that Hilo. Really yeah. So, I mean, so there was the, you know, the professional thing, but there was also the personal.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: Of knowing them and knowing them well. And then it was just the. Having patience. I had to have a certain amount of operational patience because it takes time for the information to get through the food chain to get up to me so I know what's going on, so I can report to my seniors, so I can do my oversight mission that I'm supposed to do and not just pick up the phone and call down and start.

Jon Becker: I need it now because I'm dropping things on people.

Michael Lumpkin: Well, that actually slows the process. And sometimes you don't want to be that person. And so that was a really tough thing for me to do, is just operational patience as the senior leader who wasn't there when it happened, wasn't in country when it happened, and then after that, it turned into kind of picking up the pieces.

And I think it's the first time that I ever really saw firsthand the impact of, I'll call it disinformation or mistruths on the Internet or the conspiracy theories about what happened, why it happened. Because when you have a special operation Hilo with a premier special operation team, you know, shot down, somebody clearly screwed up. I mean, so that was the narrative, right? That was out there floating around, because again, people forget the enemy gets a vote, too.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: So the immediate thing was is that I heard everything from. We made a trade with the Taliban and for getting bin Laden back, we sacrificed these great Americans. I heard just all kinds of nonsense. And frankly, the Department of Defense spent a lot of effort trying to dispel those that disinformation that was going on with family and just across the board. But I was really – This sounds trite, and I don't mean it to, but I was so disappointed in, frankly, the lack of faith that some people in this country had that somebody would actually do that.

Jon Becker: Yeah, that's a reprehensible idea.

Michael Lumpkin: And I was in some dark days for a while after that. I mean, first of all, there was the event that happened again that was so horrific. But then it was all that aftermath, and for months there was. And I can understand why families were distraught, losing loved ones, some of them on their 7th, 8th deployment or more, and to turn around and have this happen. Yeah. So those were some dark days for me.

Jon Becker: What did you learn from it?

Michael Lumpkin: I think I actually learned several things. First of all, I think it not so much I learned, but it highlighted sometimes as a leader, you have to have operational patience. You truly have to sit on your hands and let things play out just to find out the truth and make the system work. I think that's thing one. Thing two, I learned the information component of every operation is not an afterthought. It has to be baked in. In the military, they call it information operations.

But also, I would say, whether it's a police department or any agency, you have to make sure you understand how you're going to react if something doesn't go right. And what are you going to do if it does go right? What is going to be response to the media? This should be prior to the operation, not afterwards. Had we, had the Department of Defense been better prepared from a public affairs stance and an information operations, I think we wouldn't have had. The event was going to happen. It happened, but it would also be we wouldn't have had the significance of the conspiracy theories and everything else that went with it.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I think it's interesting. We see a lot of failure of that, especially in law enforcement right now. There are so many cases where something happens to and the conspiracy theorists take off, or just the media. We've kind of developed a media that hijacks our environmental or evolutionary biology, and we like to be fed bad news, and they're great at feeding us bad news. And so they take that initial inaccurate information and they run with it.

And Breonna Taylor's a perfect example of that, where when you understand what actually happened in the case, I mean, you had the future vice president of the United States go on tv and say that they were at the wrong house, that they served a warrant on the wrong house and killed a poor, innocent woman who was in the house.

And then you realize, no, actually, she was a target of the investigation. It was her house. They were supposed to be there. But here's the vice president, United States, LeBron James, Beyonce, you know, Alicia Keys, all with giant loud microphones, and the news media saying that they hit the wrong house. And that becomes the narrative for a long time.

And what we didn't see was the Louisville police Department coming out and saying, no, no, no, hold on. Here's a search warrant. Here's what happened. Here's the information. I think sometimes it's easy to kind of hunker down and think, oh, the storm's going to pass. And I don't know that it always is going to. And sometimes you have to be ready to respond aggressively with the media well.

Michael Lumpkin: And if you don't control the narrative, somebody else will.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: Or at least you're leaving it open for them to control the narrative. And once you surrender it, it is so hard to get back. It is so hard. And this kind of led me, you know, ultimately over to the State department to do the counter ISIS messaging where, you know, for there, you know, my takeaway is that how people.

How vulnerable people are to what's on the Internet and how they listen to things that frequently, the more outlandish, the more they lap it up. I think it goes back to that human nature thing you were talking about to try to believe the unbelievable or the thing that's the negative of why somebody else is working against their best interest.

Jon Becker: So let's talk about that. The State Department job, because it was you. You stood it up, right? It was kind of. You were tasked with standing that thing up.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. I mean, something existed previously, but it was deemed not by me but by others, to be ineffective. So they. They created this new entity called the Global Engagement Center, which was designed to engage globally, you know, those people that were potential recruits for ISIS and other extremist organizations.

Jon Becker: And by engage, you mean counter messaging. On the one hand, you could say marketing. On the other hand, you could say propaganda.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, you can. It depends on your perspective, right? Yeah.

Jon Becker: Terrorist freedom fighters.

Michael Lumpkin: Exactly. So, I mean, and the way government largely does things, you know, they do things on scale. They think about, you know, let's do some information operations, let's drop flyers from an airplane or let's put something on tv or. So you end up with this big message trying to hit a bunch of people in a generic kind of way, hoping it lands on those one or two or three people that are potential recruits. Historically, that's the way it's happened, you know, with social media, what it is today.

Like, I can buy audiences, which means I can go and figure out who all 18 to 35 year old military age males in Morocco subscribe to AK-47 blogs and have looked at x number of videos of Abu, you know, Abakar. So Baghdadi. I mean, you can buy that audience. And you know what I'm. I can influence what they see on their social media feeds. I can buy ads and send them to them. I can literally micro target what people look at on their computer, what they see. And I tell you what, if you have Alexa at home or something else, let's make it just that much easier. Right?

Jon Becker: So now that if you have Alexa at home, turn her off.

Michael Lumpkin: So, I mean, if people understood how much they give away about who they are as a person based on their Internet searches and their Facebook or any other thing and how vulnerable they make themselves. Not just to, you know, I mean, to foreign adversaries, but also to just to bad people. If people they understood. I think they do a heck of a lot less of the social media.

Jon Becker: Yeah, no, it's funny because I remember when you first went there, we had a conversation about it and it's. You don't like as a business, you do that all the time. That is Google stock and trade. Google says, here's a free search engine, because now I know everything you search. So then when somebody wants to sell you something, I know exactly how to target you.

And there's a limited amount of privacy. That kind of makes it impossible for me to find Michael Lumpkin through Google as a business, but it doesn't make it impossible for me to find somebody in this age group who belongs to a SEAL group, who also belongs to a policy wonk reading group. And, oh, wow, look at that there we found Michael. I do think it is terrifying. The further I dug into it, the more terrifying it was. It's hard to believe that the US government wasn't doing that. Yeah, effectively.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. That they weren't buying. I call it buying audiences because those are services you buy. Right. So. But, yeah. That they weren't doing that in this kind of – For us. So we ended up changing that. We built something that I think really did have a significant impact on recruiting efforts for ISIS. I mean, ISIS isn't dead yet and they're still out recruiting. I mean, and they've got a – And the global engagement center, the State Department, all the agencies need to continue to adapt to the new social media trends and stay ahead of them.

Jon Becker: Yeah, I mean, it's funny because it has become information warfare.

Michael Lumpkin: Without a doubt. It truly is.

Jon Becker: And it's almost like the kinetic warfare now is trailing the information and the effective use of the information leads to the kinetic.

Michael Lumpkin: Well, I mean, frankly, kinetic is. The problem with kinetic is that if we drop a bomb on somewhere, we're going to rebuild it, likely as a nation, information. I can get people to change their behavior to, if I don't want them to go into a building instead of destroying it, I can probably do an information campaign to tell somebody there's a bomb in there and they don't want to go in the building.

I mean, there's all things, kinds of things you can do with the message to influence behavior both positively and negatively, if you understand the audience and you understand the tools that are. That are in front of you.

Jon Becker: Well, and our world adversaries are all using it negatively against us.

Michael Lumpkin: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. So, I mean, if you go to, you know, Vladimir Putin, he basically ran the information operations program when he was, you know, in uniform. The point is, this is like, in his DNA.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: And for us, it's, historically, it's been an afterthought. I think we're doing much better than we used to. But when I got to the start, the State Department, they were only spending $5 million on counter messaging.

Jon Becker: $5 million?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And frankly, that's salaries. That's for people. Wasn't a lot of money.

Jon Becker: So. Yeah, so, I mean, they're spending less on Google AdWords than probably a small betting company or shoe company is.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely. You know, the budget's higher now. We work to raise the budget, but I mean, and frequently people, if they don't understand information warfare or information operations, is usually the first thing to get cut when you're looking to save money.

Jon Becker: Kind of like training, kinda kind of like, I mean, it's interesting because you see it in law enforcement all the time. You know, what gets cut are proactive programs. You know, what gets cut is kind of the community oriented policing. And the departments, especially when they get the kind of funding cuts that Portland and Seattle and San Francisco have, is the department becomes reactive. Neighborhood crime task forces go away, proactive organized crime task forces go away. And what ends up happening is the law enforcement is less able to prevent crime from occurring and as a result, has a bigger responsibility to react to it.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And again, this is, I don't, here's what I want to believe, and maybe I'm naive. I don't think, you know, your city leaders want that to be the outcome. I just don't think they understand the second and third order consequences. So I do think that this goes back to my comment earlier about having to educate them what the impacts are going to be of those decisions, because at the end of the day, they get to make the decision. Right. Just like at the end of the day, the Congress and the United States get to make decisions. But I think it's important for whether you're wearing a uniform or you're a policymaker and you have a view on it to make sure that they know what the consequences of those decisions are going to be. So at least they're sober when they're making the decisions.

Jon Becker: So, Michael, I'd like to go back and just pick up a couple of things that we touched on, but I want to just probe a little deeper at the point that you are ASD SO/LIC. I guess we should probably explain what that is because we're assuming it and the entire audience understands it. So let's start there. Tell me what ASD selects.

Michael Lumpkin: ASD SO/LIC is the assistant secretary of defense, hence the ASD for special operations low intensity conflict. It basically oversees us special operations command in policy as well as special missionaries like counterterrorism, counternarcotics, all the cats and dogs that don't fall anywhere cleanly. Stability operations, I called it always kind of the kitchen junk drawer of policy stuff within the Pentagon.

Jon Becker: And just so people understand the relationship between. I don't think the average American understands the relationship between the civilian side of our government and the DOD side of our government. Maybe give us a little civics lesson.

Michael Lumpkin: I mean, so our country's kind of founded on civilian oversight of the military. And so us special operations command doesn't work for a service. I mean, it's kind of its own combatant command that's kind of sitting out there and it has members of each of the services. Operationally, it kind of reports up to the secretary of defense.

But from an administrative point of view today, not originally envisioned this way, but today US special operations command is under the administrative oversight of ASD SO/LIC. So administratively. So we're talking about budgeting, man train and equipment as well as policy oversight of our special operations capability in this country.

Jon Becker: So it's all of our military reports into civilian leadership?

Michael Lumpkin: It does, yeah. And kind of is what's so unique to our democracy. I mean, our founding fathers were, I mean, their foresight is just amazing, but it keeps, you know, it's part of the, you know, checks and balances system. So we don't have a military that kind of runs amok.

Jon Becker: Yeah. I always tell people you don't understand till you read the constitution and read the federalist papers that they were not trying to build an efficient government. They were trying to prevent an efficient government. They were trying to balance powers and they were trying to prevent the evils that they saw, that they fled in the form of England in centralized control, broad governmental power and strong military being directly related to the king and all of these things.

To me, that was the greatest foresight of those guys is they saw way beyond their own capabilities to do something like this and create this civilian oversight to prevent DOD from staging a coup. Like, let's just call it what it is.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, absolutely. And it works. I mean, is it bumpy? Are there challenges? Are there issues? Sure. And some of them are structural, and some of them sometimes are just personality based on folks who happen to be in the seat at the time. I had the good fortune to work when I was ASD SO/LIC with some great special operations command commanders, guys the likes of Bill McRaven and Tony Thomas. And so I was very blessed with the relationship that I was able to have as I walked the line between being an advocate for our special operations community and providing oversight.

And it's a line, and you have to keep focused on making sure that they're doing the right thing. But when it made sense to advocate from a budget perspective to the Congress or within the department to get into the bureaucratic battles that are necessary to effectively resource our special operations capability in this country. Yeah, it's a line that has to be walked.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Historically, though, has that position been filled by a straight up civilian?

Michael Lumpkin: I mean, yes, it's always because it's a political appointee, the Senate confirmed.

Jon Becker: So it's not, I mean, from, not from. Not from an appointment position, but from an experienced standpoint, who has historically been in that role? Is it former military or is it.

Michael Lumpkin: We've had it where it hasn't been former military, but historically, I would say more times than not, it's somebody who came from the special operations community, I mean, myself. And then there was also Mike Sheehan, who had the job, who was a special forces guy. We had Mike Vickers, who was a special forces guy. So we had a litany of guys of both political parties, depending on which administration was in office, what party that came from the community.

Jon Becker: But it is a political appointee. So obviously it is subject to the administration, but it's kind of historically, aren't you more politically agnostic than potentially other parts of the government are?

Michael Lumpkin: It's a great question, and the answer is, it really depends. I say that because there's kind of, I'll call it three kinds of folks who work in, maybe four, actually, that work in, like, Department of Defense, for example. You have the uniform military, you have GS government service and GS civilians. You have contractors, and then you have political appointees, and each one has a completely different role and mission. A political appointee. They existed. They're nominated by the president to the Senate.

The Senate either confirms or does not confirm after a series of hearings of that person for the job. The reason political appointees exist is to drive the president's agenda. And so it is generally somebody who's affiliated with one political party or not, or somebody becomes affiliated with a political party through the process.

Jon Becker: Got it.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: And I guess that's one of the things that we've seen in the last decade probably is kind of the destruction and politicization of a lot of the GS positions. One of the things that I've told people the last couple administrations, what's bothered me is kind of the undermining of the bureaucracy because to some degree, the bureaucracy is the continuity. It is the stability.

Michael Lumpkin: It is very much so. So when I was, I mentioned earlier my last job in the administration was over the Department of State. Well, I got fired on January 20th, 2017 when the day that President Obama left office. The standard business rules in DC are, except for a handful of folks that are carried over from one party administration to the next party, is that business rules are you resigned and there's an expectation you're going to resign and the next president gets to appoint his, who he wants to drive. He or she wants to drive their agenda. Yeah.

Jon Becker: Because they want somebody who is aligned with them to accomplish what they want to get done.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. Because the Department of Defense is a large bureaucratic organization. Right. I mean, it's just massive $860 billion and just behemoth thing, bureaucracy. I mean, I applaud what it is, but you have to recognize what it is and what it isn't. It standard tries to standardize routine tasks. That's what a bureaucracy does. It fights change every step of the way, and that's the culture of what it is, and you have to know that.

So if you want to walk in there and say, I'm going to do wholesale change to this organization, okay, you're delusional. You're not going in. It doesn't matter if you're the secretary of defense or you're just a GS 13 rolling in as a political party. It doesn't matter. You're not going to do wholesale change to the organization. They will fight you every step of the way.

Jon Becker: Yeah. So it's all governmental change is incremental.

Michael Lumpkin: It is. And it's generally done by consensus as well. So if it's a large national policy, it's done by, what does state think, what does Dod think, what is, you know, USAID think? And it's done by consensus. It's incremental. So it's baby step. So you really have to map out what you want to accomplish and the roadmap on how you're going to do IT.

Jon Becker: Which I guess the upside to the system resisting change is it prevents tyranny.

Michael Lumpkin: It does.

Jon Becker: It prevents somebody coming in and losing their mind and trying to undermine all the institutions. But it's almost like a. A big boat. Right. Like it. It doesn't turn quickly, but it also doesn't turn quickly.

Michael Lumpkin: Right, right. Yeah. And saying is, you know, it takes four, 4 miles from an aircraft carrier to turn.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: So you got to know where you want to go before you start, you know, messing with the helm at least.

Jon Becker: 4 miles in advance.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah.

Jon Becker: So let's go back and just pick up a couple of things. One of things you mentioned was the rescue of Bo Bergdahl.

Michael Lumpkin: Yes.

Jon Becker: So how does that first pop on your radar and kind of walk me through that event?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So I had been recently confirmed as the assistant secretary of defense, and at the same time, my boss announced he was leaving the department, so there was going to be a gap. So I was elevated to not only my day job as ASD SO/LIC, but I was also sitting in the desk of undersecretary of defense for policy.

So, which I mentioned earlier is, I think at the time, was the number three position at the Pentagon, and so I was put in charge of overseeing all of policy within the department. So I kind of dual hatted at the time. And I think it was in December of 2013, a video was released of Sergeant Bergdahl that showed him in a. He wasn't in a good state. He'd been in captivity for somewhere in the neighborhood of almost five years at that point. And so there was real concern. The decision was made to go, we need to up the ante in our effort to get him home sooner, just based on his physical state.

So I was tasked by then secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to kind of oversee, from the department's perspective, I understand there's going to be many players, but from the department's perspective, on how to get him home. So there was a quick mission analysis on how to do it. We knew it was going to, discussions had happened on how to do it previously, so we dusted them off. We looked at new alternatives, and it came down to, like, listen, this is going to have to be a prisoner exchange. This is the way it's going to have to go.

And so then it just got into the negotiating via a third party because we weren't going to talk and negotiate directly with the Taliban. So negotiating with an intermediary nation in order to get him home. And we finally settled. To be clear, there's a lot of people who were called mixed views on whether we should spend any effort getting him home. I was always of the opinion that, listen, we have a uniform code of military justice, a legal system. If he is guilty of some illegal infraction, let the system work when he gets home.

Jon Becker: Yeah. Because just to set the stage, he was – He walked away from his post and was kidnapped.

Michael Lumpkin: That's correct. So he was kidnapped by the Taliban after abandoning his posture. After abandoning. So he left his base and was apprehended and held. So then in my mind, it was just like, you do what you have to do to get somebody home. No one's left behind. That's kind of the mantra of the military, and I believe it to my core.

So this is one of those things after mission analysis, you put the team together and you start figuring it out how it's going to work. I had a great deputy, and we worked it. And in order to ultimately ended up exchanging five folks out of detainees out of Guantanamo Bay for Sergeant Bergdahl to get him home, frankly, I would have emptied the entire place, entire Gitmo, to get him home if that's what it took. Because in my mind, one american soldier, it's worth that. And let's just keep in mind also, to date, we still haven't charged anybody Guantanamo Bay.

Jon Becker: Yeah.

Michael Lumpkin: So. And that's probably a different story for a different time. But the reality is, you know, that nothing. There was no cases pending as far as somebody about to be prosecuted for something. So they were just kind of sitting there languishing in my mind. I also looked at it as that this is why we have hellfire missiles and the US inventory. If they return to the battlefield, well, deal with that.

Jon Becker: We have other ways to solve that problem. We do.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, we do. So it was a great effort on teamwork at the interagency level between the State Department, US Southern Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the folks in Afghanistan. It was just a phenomenal team effort. Everybody came together, but it was a strategic objective with operational staging, with real tactical outcomes that fed every step of the way. So in my mind, it's exactly how military operations should go.

Jon Becker: Interesting! What about Ebola? I know you know, at one point, you got tasked with when Ebola was outbreaking in Africa with the US response to that. Talk to me about that.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, it was kind of interesting. You know, I was passed by Secretary Hagel again, because, let's face it, no good deed goes unpunished. So I got another one. This is to help eradicate the Ebola epidemic, an outbreak in West Africa, in particular Liberia. And this started off with a phone call from the CDC director, this is where I really learned about how to kind of focus the mission and work at the interagency was that he called me and he says, hey, yeah, I understand you're the guy at the Department of Defense. What can you do to support us? And it's like, I don't know. I can send tanks.

Jon Becker: What do you want me to bomb?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, yeah. What kind of aircraft carrier? What do you want? And he goes, well, what can you do? And it's like, well, we don't really work that way. What's the mission you want us to do? And it really helped educate the interagency as well as the department on doing real mission analysis and focusing the department on what it can do.

We ended up landing at the place where we did those things that were uniquely military. We could do the logistics. We could fly all the support equipment in and out of the country. We could build the Ebola treatment units because we've got CB's, we've got red horse, we got people that can build.

Jon Becker: Yeah, for sure.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. And it was so we had, it was doing training. We know how to train on scale. So we were training healthcare workers because we had healthcare workers coming from all over the world that were migrating to help solve selflessly to solve this problem. And then ultimately it was providing command and control. This is where the 101st airborne, after, after a while, came in and basically ran the operation from bringing their military acumen in to effectively move the logistics, get the people where they need to do to ultimately stem Ebola in Liberia.

Jon Becker: Interesting! So, okay, so when you're done there, you again retire from service again. You go into public. Well, you go into private sector.

Michael Lumpkin: I do.

Jon Becker: And are doing some kind of policy stuff. And when then you end up at a software company. Right? You end up doing some computer stuff, like, how do you think everything from your prior life helped you when you got into the private sector?

Michael Lumpkin: It's interesting. So, yeah, I was the president of an it company, and I'll tell you what, I really, on day one, really couldn't spell it. You know, I couldn't, I didn't know about, you know, it wasn't, was it modernization? So it's data migration, data syndication. It was about getting disparate things, you know, sources of information, kind of collusion together, ultimately resulting in, you know, usable data that leaders could use to manage in the healthcare sector, you know, but the principles are about the same in leadership. They are. It's about getting a workforce, getting them committed and focused.

It's about creating processes. It's about focusing on outcomes, whether it's just a happy customer or it's to do something with data to get some unique. Something unique that you never had or saw before. Because the one thing I have learned over the years is you can't solve a problem you can't see.

So you have to be able to see the problem. And data, 90% of the time, can help with that. So it was about taking all that great stuff that the taxpayers paid lots of money to teach me and kind of put it to work.

Jon Becker: Interesting! So you were recently tasked to be on the Afghan War commission?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. So I think it was the. I can't remember what year the National Defense Authorization act created the Afghanistan War Commission. Essentially, it's to unpack 20 years of war and come up with the lessons learned of what did we do well? What did we not do so well? So they – There's 16 members of the commission nominated by different members on the Hill. House, Senate, different committees. I happen to be the Senate Armed Services Committee, Jack Reed's nominee for the commission. It's 16 people who are just wicked smart. Some of them have been on the ground, some of them are policy folks. And we're coming together to do a kind of a holistic view of us efforts in Afghanistan.

One thing that's most impressive about this organization is it's not a whitewash and nor is it a, you know, I gotcha kind of thing. It's about coming up with lessons and viewpoints of how we can learn from what happened to help and aid decision making in the future. So I align it more along the 911 commission than anything else.

Jon Becker: Interesting! Yeah, I think that. And obviously, coming from where you come from, that's a culture that you've embraced most of your life of kind of hot washing things and really looking at them, and how do we not do this? The stuff that we did right. How do we continue to do that? And the stuff we screwed up, which I think in Afghanistan, there's probably going to be quite a few. Few lessons learned. How do we not do this again?

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah, I think we need to go back and take a look at every step of the way, everything from the equipping of our force to how we made the decisions. Decisions that were made are interesting, but how did we make them?

Jon Becker: Yeah. Yeah. I think that time has not been overwhelmingly kind to our effort in Afghanistan, not only in how long it lasted, but the fallout from it and how we burned through special operations personnel and how we burned through our DOD personnel, I think, is something we probably need to take a look.

Michael Lumpkin: I agree. So I'm just excited and proud to be, first of all, nominated for the effort, but also to be a participant.

Jon Becker: That's fantastic! You're a perfect guy for the job. Why don't we finish with kind of some rapid fire questions?

Michael Lumpkin: Okay. Let them rip.

Jon Becker: Let's see. What do you think your most important habit is?

Michael Lumpkin: Every night when I shower, I think about my day, of what I would have done differently and done better. Sometimes it's a 30 minutes shower, but I'm pretty hypercritical of myself. But I kind of take my entire day and reevaluate it and just kind of grade myself. I think that helped shape my the next day.

Jon Becker: What was the most profound moment or memory of your career?

Michael Lumpkin: I can remember when I was a junior officer, I was the assistant officer in charge of a SEAL platoon, and we had a training accident that had profound impact on two members of the team. And it was what affected me was seeing the team coming together to treat life threatening wounds and seeing training really pay off.

Jon Becker: Interesting! Which probably then, I mean, at that point, you're a junior officer, so everything you do from then on is inflected by that moment.

Michael Lumpkin: And at the end of the day, it was about the basics.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it always is.

Michael Lumpkin: Yeah. Generally.

Jon Becker: That's the expression. In the end, it's all about driving and putting and everything else is kind of noise. What do you think the most important characteristic of an effective leader is?

Michael Lumpkin: Humility.

Jon Becker: Why?

Michael Lumpkin: Because some, I would say ineffective leaders put their ego too close to their position. They think they are that position. They are not. They just happen to be the incumbent and they are the keeper of the standards.

Jon Becker: I can't touch that any better than you just said it. What keeps you awake at night?

Michael Lumpkin: I am concerned. It's hard to come up with just the one thing. What's happening in the information environment right now and the way how vulnerable the average American is making themselves and subsequently making our country. I have real concerns with what the future holds.

Jon Becker: What do you think we can do to assuage that?

Michael Lumpkin: I don't have an answer. I think one of the best things that's ever happened to our society is the Internet. I think one of the worst things that's ever happened to our society is the Internet. It's, again, it's truly a double edged sword. Yeah, I just. If I had an answer, you know, frankly, I wouldn't be up at night.

Jon Becker: Yeah, it's well said. Well said, Michael, thank you so much for doing this. I appreciate your time! This has been fantastic!

Michael Lumpkin: It's been a pleasure! Thank you, Jon!